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ABSTRACT 
 
 The construction industry is often criticised for being wasteful compared to other 
industries, confrontational, and for lacking capacity for learning and improvement. Numerous 
industry reports have been commissioned by the United Kingdom (UK) Government and 
industry organisations, over the past eighty years, with the aim of highlighting concerns and 
calling for industry reform. In 2013, the UK Government challenged construction to achieve 
50% faster delivery and a 33% reduction of clients' capital costs by 2025. In 2016, the 
Government Construction Strategy 2016-20 was produced with an ambition of achieving 
efficiency savings of £1.7 billion over the course of the current Parliament. It is however 
suggested that prevailing business models are unlikely to meet these targets. 
 Eliminating (process and physical) waste from construction design and delivery is a 
necessary step towards achieving the aforementioned targets. However, waste-reduction 
understood simply as the improvement of current processes rather than fundamental system 
redesign is insufficient. Obtaining a wider understanding and conceptualisation of waste in 
construction is crucial, in order to prepare the industry for the radical change demanded of it. 
This research was, thus, undertaken to explore the institutional, procurement and commercial 
environments surrounding the design and delivery of construction projects, and reveal the 
consequential wastes. A reflexive grounded-theory methodology was adopted to explore the 
institutional factors influencing construction procurement, and to facilitate an in-depth 
understanding of the impact of prevailing construction procurement arrangements on project 
performance and outcomes. Data were primarily collected through in-depth and iterative 
interviews with 24 senior professionals within the UK construction industry, including a 
review of supporting documentations provided by the interviewees. 
 Consequently, a conceptual model of ‘institutional waste in construction’ was 
developed by the author of this study, which was then evaluated by various UK industry 
experts to assess its quality and rigour. This model is a novel contribution to knowledge 
providing innovative perspectives to the generation and persistence of waste in construction 
projects. The model also provides novel explanations as to why wasteful procurement 
practices prevail in the construction industry. It is concluded by stressing that any industry-
wide initiatives for improvement (e.g. BIM and Partnering) will stall or at least fail, to 
achieve its full potential, unless the prevailing institutional factors, identified within this 
study, are addressed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Research background  
It is widely accepted that there is considerable waste in the end-to-end design, 
construction and facility management process (Egan, 1998; Koskela, 2000; Keys et al., 
2000; Mossman, 2009; Sandberg and Bildsten, 2011; Viana et al., 2012; Dassault 
Systems, 2014; Formoso et al., 2015; Bølviken and Koskela, 2016). Over the past 
eighty years, the UK Government and many organisations have commissioned several 
reports, with the aim of reviewing the performance of the construction industry and 
suggesting means of improvement (see for example, Bossom, 1934; Simon, 1944; 
Banwell, 1964; Latham, 1994; UK Government, 2012; Farmer, 2016; Infrastructure and 
Projects Authority, 2016). Of these, the Egan report, ‘Rethinking Construction’, was 
produced in 1998 to address concerns raised by clients engaging services of 
construction companies; and was followed by the ‘Never Waste A Good Crisis’ report 
published by Construction Excellence in 2009 to review the subsequent progress. The 
former report sent a clear message to the construction industry by stressing that: 
“Recent studies in the USA, Scandinavia and this country suggest that up to 
30% of construction is rework, labor is used at only 40-60% of potential 
efficiency, accidents can account for 3-6% of total project costs, and at least 
10% of materials are wasted…The message is clear - there is plenty of scope for 
improving efficiency and quality simply by taking waste out of construction” 
(Egan, 1998, p.15). 
 
Empirical evidence points to ‘waste’ in excess of 50% of the activities performed (what 
we do) in construction projects (Figure 1.1), where ‘waste’ is defined as anything that is 
not required to create value for the customer/client or end-user. This is primarily process 
waste with some physical waste. In the construction industry, the idea and 
understanding of 'waste' among practitioners is typically synonymous with physical 
waste (i.e. on-site material waste). Construction managers and practitioners have for a 
long time focused their attention on the transformation of activities, while giving much 
less consideration to the flow of activities across the whole project process (Koskela, 
1992; Sarhan and Fox, 2013; Sarhan et al., 2018).  
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The concept of flow in construction was first presented by seminal work of Koskela 
(1992) “Application of the new production philosophy to construction”. It views 
production (i.e. design and construction) as a ‘flow’ composed of value adding activities 
(i.e. transformation) and non-value adding activities (Koskela, 1992; Koskela, 1999; 
Kraemer et al., 2007). The main objective of the flow concept is to eliminate or reduce 
non-value adding activities (or process waste) from production; thereby leading to 
production improvements including lead time reduction, increased transparency, and 
variability reduction (Koskela, 2000). Non-value-adding activities can be divided into 
two categories: supporting activities and unproductive activities (i.e. waste), as shown 
in Figure 1.1. Supporting activities are work elements that do not directly add value, but 
cannot be removed, as they are essential in carrying out an operation. These include for 
example: logistic activities, accounting and cost-estimating activities, reading drawings, 
cleaning up the workplace and so on. Unproductive activities on the other hand, are 
those wasteful activities that are not necessary and can be eliminated from the 
production flow without diminishing the value of the work. 
 
 
The fact that much of the waste, illustrated in Figure 1.1, is common to many projects 
suggests that there are systems and structural arrangements that support and/or 
encourage wasteful activities in construction. To say that waste is created due to human 
error is unhelpful; blame arguably fails to facilitate learning to ‘do better’ and similarly 
fails to lead us towards effective methods of reduction or prevention. As Dr Deming 
taught us: ‘94% of troubles and failures are attributed to the system (responsibility of 
management), 6% are due to special cases (such as human mistake)’ (Deming, 1984, p. 
315). Human behaviour is always influenced by the environment in which it takes place. 
Without a deep understanding of the economic, social and environmental issues 
contributing to poor decision-making, it is very likely that similar flawed or risky 
decisions will recur. As emphasised by Levensen (2011) “without changing the 
environment, human error cannot be reduced for long. We design systems in which 
human error is inevitable and then blame the human and not the system design” (p. 61).  
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e.g. 
Delay, waiting, Rework, 
Accidents, 
Over-ordered materials, 
Damaged materials, 
Multiple handling of materials, 
Making-Do, 
Poor payment systems, 
Duplicate insurance cover, 
Settling disputes after project 
completion, 
Tendering, 
Procuring services on cost, 
What 
 the 
customer 
wants 
What we have to do to 
enable us to create what the 
customer wants 
e.g. 
Procurement 
Taxes 
Insurance 
Logistics 
Accounting 
Cost estimating 
Commercial management - 
for clarification see: 
Zimina & Pasquire (2011) 
Figure 1.1: Analysis and examples of waste in construction [Proportions based on 
studies by Diekmann et al. (2004) in the US and unpublished studies in the UK by 
Cameron Orr, AWD and Construction Excellence, as cited by Mossman (2009)]. 
Diagram adopted and modified from Mossman (2009) 
 
 
From the analysis and examples presented in Figure 1, it appears as if the construction 
industry is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting different results. 
The observation of this intriguing fact that 'much of the waste produced in construction 
is common to many projects and keeps recurring' motivated the study to look for 
behavioural explanations to this phenomenon. It also supports recent arguments for 
obtaining a better understanding of the concept of waste in construction (Koskela et al., 
2013; Bølviken et al., 2014; Formoso et al., 2015; Bølviken and Koskela, 2016). 
Compellingly, the concept of waste-reduction has been fundamentally used as a key 
driver for improvement in the manufacturing industry, and arguably led to great 
achievements; but it has not yet been a prevalent concept in construction literature or 
practice (Koskela and Ballard, 2012; Koskela et al., 2012; Bølviken and Koskela, 
2016). The next sections formulate the research problem, highlight gaps in knowledge, 
and present the research questions, aim and objectives of this study. 
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1.2 Research Problem and Gaps in Knowledge 
The construction industry is often criticised for being wasteful, confrontational, and for 
lacking trust and capacity for learning and improvement (See for example, Zaghloul and 
Hartman, 2003; Rooke et al., 2004; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Hartmann and Dorée, 
2013; Sarhan and Fox, 2013). These characteristics are attributed to a number of factors 
including fragmentation (Latham, 1994; Egan, 1998); an adversarial hierarchical 
structure (Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 2011; Sarhan and Fox, 2013); obsolete 
procurement methods (Eriksson and Laan, 2007); confusing and treacherous contractual 
arrangements (Cox and Thompson, 1997; Sebastian., 2011; Hawkins, 2012); a highly 
competitive, cost-driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000) and the sequential 
organisation of construction processes (Koskela, 2000). In general, increased trustful 
collaboration between project parties is argued to be a suitable remedy for many of the 
industry’s problems (See for example Tookey et al., 2001; Eriksson et al., 2008; Xue et 
al., 2010; Sebastian, 2011; Zimina et al., 2012; Daniel et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2017). 
However, the prevailing project-procurement processes are thought to be a root-cause 
for many of the aforementioned industry problems (Latham, 1994; Rooke et al., 2003; 
Osipova and Eriksson, 2011) and to adversely affect the extent of cooperation and trust 
needed for project success (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004; Eriksson and Laan, 
2007; Tezel et al., 2018). 
 
Different solutions have ben proffered by various industry reports and academic studies 
for delivering the industry-wide reform needed, including the use of partnering and 
framework arrangements, new models of construction procurement, Building 
Information Modelling (BIM), and Project Bank Accounts (PBAs) to support 
collaborative procurement practices (Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2016).  
However, despite the many criticisms and the different solutions promulgated, the 
construction industry persistently resists the radical change demanded of it (Garvey and 
McDermott, 2017). There seems to be a particular project delivery mind-set embedded 
in the organisational fabric of the industry that prevails regardless of the attempts to 
address the recognised inadequacies – the question is why does this mind-set prevail? 
In 2013, the UK Government created a set of challenging construction targets for 2025, 
including 33% lower costs, 50% faster delivery, 50% lower emissions, and 50% 
improvement in exports (HM Government, 2013). It then produced the Government 
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Construction Strategy 2016-20 report to build on progress made in the previous 2011-15 
strategy, and to seek new targets of achieving efficiency savings of £1.7 billion over the 
course of the current Parliament (Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2016). However, 
it is suggested, based on the proportions and examples of waste that commonly occur in 
construction (illustrated in Figure 1.1), that prevailing ‘business as usual’ will not meet 
these targets.  
 
Eliminating waste (process and physical) from construction design and delivery, as 
advocated by lean ideals, could help towards achieving the aforementioned targets. 
However, it is suggested that waste-reduction understood simply as improving current 
processes, rather than fundamental system design, will not be enough. Obtaining a 
wider understanding and conceptualisation of waste in construction is crucial, in order 
to prepare the industry for the radical change demanded of it. One aspect of this 
conceptualisation is the consideration of the wider institutional, procurement and 
commercial environments that surround the design and delivery of construction 
projects. It is this aspect which led to the formulation of the study’s research problem, 
and motivated the author of this study to explore whether there is anything in the 
institutional, procurement and commercial contexts surrounding construction that is 
blocking radical new production system design and therefore pinning the prevailing 
wasteful system in place.  
 
There is a broad consensus among social and economic researchers that ‘institutions’ 
matter (see for example, North, 1994; Williamson, 2000; Scott, 2001; Meyer, 2008; 
Peng et al., 2009; Scott, 2012). Institutions influence beliefs, norms and actions; thus 
they shape performance and outcomes. According to Nelson and Sampat (2001), the 
term ‘institution’ is generally used or defined by scholars in three different ways and 
causal levels: (1) Standardised behaviour patterns (Institutionalised behaviour or 
routines); (2) Factors and forces that constrain or support these customary (expected or 
habitual) behaviour such as: norms and belief systems, or rules of the game, or 
governing structures (Institutions or institutional forces/factors/processes); and (3) 
Broader social and cultural context within which particular rules and organisational 
forms take shape (Institutional environment). Interestingly, the concept of institutions is 
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not well established in construction management research, specifically in waste-related 
literature. 
 
Many of the problems that lead to the occurrence of waste in construction are strongly 
related to lean theories adopted in production management. However, it can still be 
argued that waste is created primarily from project-organisational and contractual 
problems (Williamson, 1991, pp.78-79); and as such, a focus on waste reduction in 
production (design and delivery of design) alone would be insufficient. As emphasised 
by Matthews et al. (2003), it is difficult to maximise value and minimise waste at the 
project level if the prevailing contractual structure hinders coordination, constrains 
collaboration and innovation, and sub-optimises performance and goals. Similarly, it is 
proposed in this study that procurement systems, as institutional arrangements, are 
designed to assign liabilities and authorities to people and organizations (Love et al., 
1998) at the project and programme levels, and thus structure the borders that shape ‘the 
play of the game’ (Williamson, 2000). From a production management perspective, 
organisation and contracts are essential parts of the production system design (Koskela 
and Ballard, 2012); therefore it makes sense to suggest that poorly aligned procurement 
and commercial arrangements may cause waste and impact on project outcomes.  
 
A small but growing number of studies have attempted to investigate the influence of 
procurement processes on the generation of waste in construction projects (for example 
see Jaques, 2000; Gamage et al., 2009).  However, most of these studies, if not all, have 
limited their attention to physical (material) waste; other important considerations such 
as process waste and value creation or loss in relation to procurement have been hardly 
explored. In the construction management literature, there are hardly any studies that 
have sought to explore the institutional, procurement and commercial environments that 
surround the design and delivery of construction projects, and how these may contribute 
to the generation and persistence of process waste. This study, therefore, hopes to 
contribute to the overall understanding of waste in construction, by addressing these 
gaps in knowledge. The underlying premise here is that if we can understand the 
apparent causes of coherence for the prevailing construction model and reveal the 
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consequential wastes, then the adoption of more efficient and collaborative business and 
project delivery models in construction may become more effective and widespread.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Based on the foregoing discussions, the following overarching research question has 
been developed: 
RQ: Why is the prevailing construction model so embedded and so entrenched, 
despite the substantial attempts to address its recognised inadequacies? 
 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to develop a conceptual model of ‘institutional waste in 
construction’, which has the potential to provide different predictions and/or 
explanations to the occurrence and entrenchment of wasteful behaviours and activities 
in construction projects in the UK. Accordingly, the following research objectives have 
been developed: 
1. To critically review the current understanding of the concept of ‘waste’ in 
construction 
2. To conceptually analyse theories from other disciplines outside both 
construction and manufacturing (e.g. social science and economics), which can 
help to predict and explain the reasons for the establishment, process and 
outcomes of several forms of institutional and organisational arrangements 
3. To investigate the relationship between construction procurement and waste in 
construction 
4. To explore the factors (root-causes) leading to the prevalence and persistence of 
inefficient procurement practices in construction 
5. To develop and evaluate a conceptual model of ‘institutional waste’ that 
contributes to the overall understanding of waste in construction 
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1.5 Research Design and Methodology  
This study adopted an 'interpretivist' epistemological position supported by a 
‘constructivist or relativist' ontological position. These philosophical stances were seen 
to be essential, in order to enable the study to discover the underlying motives and 
meanings in human behaviours and actions, and also to allow for a better understanding 
of contextual factors (Gaddon, 2010). Accordingly, these aforementioned philosophical 
positions dictated the use of a qualitative research strategy. This strategy aligns with the 
exploratory nature of the research and responds to widespread criticisms related to the 
extensive use of quantitative methods in construction management research (for 
example, see Seymour and Rooke, 1995; Seymour et al., 1997; Koskela, 2017). 
 
The study adapted a reflexive grounded theory methodology (GTM), which draws upon 
the legitimacy of the evolved approach to grounded theory (GT) (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998) and the abductive intent of the constructivist GTM (Charmaz 2008). In this sense, 
the study was supported by the theoretical strand of evolved GTM, which argues that 
previous knowledge about the world and scientific theories (prior to data collection) are 
useful (Reichertz, 2010). The study was also informed by Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
formal coding scheme (open, axial and selective coding procedures) using NVivo 10 
software for qualitative data analysis. Furthermore, the study was guided by the 
interpretative stance of both evolved and constructivist approaches to GT that 
recognises the role of the researcher in theory building. At the same time, the research 
was inspired by Charmaz’s (2008, 2009) explicit adoption of abductive logic during 
data collection and analysis stages. However, this study adopted an Abductive–
Deductive–Inductive–Abductive (A-D-I-A) approach to theory building (see section 3.5 
in Chapter 3), at which abduction was adopted during data collection and analysis to 
foster theoretical innovation, but also used during research initiation to pave the way 
towards the contextual choice of topic guides. The research methodology of this study is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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1.6 Research Scope and Setting 
The scope of this study is commercial and industrial construction as well as smart-
motorway infrastructure projects in the UK. The primary data collection method used 
for this study was in-depth and iterative interviews with 24 senior professionals within 
the UK construction industry, using a GTM. This also included a review of supporting 
documentation provided by the interviewees. The participants of this study represented 
a wide range of professions and organisations (e.g. owners, client representatives, 
project managers, architects, designers and engineers, consultants, main contractors, 
sub-contractors and suppliers). However, the nature of contracting in the UK 
construction industry tends to be multi-layered, due to the fragmentation of the industry 
(Egan, 1998; Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2005; Mokhtariani et al., 2017). This research is 
therefore limited to exploring the contractual and commercial relationships that take 
place between construction buyers and their first and second suppliers. It is important, 
however, to stress that a qualitative study guided by GTM does not seek 
representativeness to achieve statistical generalisability; but instead aims to explain and 
sometimes perhaps predict phenomena based on empirical data. It is also important to 
note that in GT, the unit of analysis is not the individual participants themselves, but 
incidents in the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Breckenridge, 
2012).  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is organised into nine chapters as illustrated in Figure 1.2. A summary of the 
content of each chapter is presented below.  
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Figure 1.2: Structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
This chapter provides an overview of the context of the thesis. It describes the research 
background, states the research problem, and identifies gaps in existing knowledge. The 
chapter also presents the research aim, objectives and overarching questions. In 
addition, a summary of the research design and scope of the study is provided. Finally, 
an outline of the structure of the thesis is presented, followed by a note about the place 
of literature within the overall structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review  
This Chapter is the starting point of the study’s inquiry strategy (A-D-I-A). It starts by 
using a 'selective abduction' reasoning approach (Magnani, 2001), which allowed the 
study to select appropriate theories and research topics that were seen to have the 
potential to provide useful guidance and novel explanations to the research problem 
under investigation. Four theories were targeted and reviewed for this purpose, namely 
(1) The concept of waste in construction; (2) Transaction cost theory of economics; (3) 
Neo-institutional theory of social science; and (4) The construction procurement 
context.  Considering, the researcher's background as a civil (site) engineer with limited 
prior practical and theoretical knowledge related to pre-construction activities and 
processes, the use of theory, tentatively, at this stage was seen to be important to aid the 
researcher during data collection and analysis stages. According to Schweder (2015), 
the use of theory in 'interpretative' research allows the researcher to “see things 
differently than either their subjects or they would have without it” (p. 845). Following 
this, deduction reasoning enabled the study to outline the concept of ‘institutional waste 
in construction’, formulate six (guiding) propositions, and to develop a preliminary 
conceptual model to provide some focus to the study prior to data collection.  
 
Therefore, the use of abduction paved the way for contextual choices of theory due to 
observation of surprising or interesting facts, in comparison to pre-determined selection 
of theories in case of a purely deductive approach. In this study, the fact that 'much of 
the waste produced in construction is common to many projects and keeps recurring' 
motivated the study to go beyond previous investigations, and to seek different 
explanations drawing up on theory from disciplines outside both construction and 
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manufacturing, such as economics and sociology. This approach, accordingly, led to an 
abductive exploratory logic, which aligns with the study’s motives and objectives, 
rather than a deductive confirming logic. A summary of the outline of this chapter is 
provided in Figure 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: An outline of the contents and outcomes of the study’s contextual review 
 
Chapter 3: Research Design and Philosophy 
This chapter explains and justifies the research philosophy, methodology and methods 
adopted for this study. This includes a detailed explanation of the sampling, data 
collection and analysis techniques used in the study. The Chapter also presents a 
critique on the limitations of the adopted research methodology, and outlines the 
strategies used for complying with the stringent guidelines for ethical conduct of 
research set by the Nottingham Trent University’s Graduate School. Finally, the criteria 
used for evaluating rigour and quality in interpretative grounded-theory research are 
defined and discussed.  
An Overview of the 
Concept of Waste 
in Construction 
Necessary for achieving 
research objective no. 1 
 
 
 
A Review of Behavioural 
Explanations (i.e. TCE and 
Neo-Institutional Theory) 
Necessary for achieving research 
objective no. 2 
 
 
 
An Overview of the 
Construction 
Procurement Context 
Contributes towards 
research objective no. 3 
 
 
 
A Preliminary Conceptual Model of ‘Institutional Waste in Construction’ 
 
This preliminary model consisting of six guiding propositions was useful in terms of: 
• Providing guidance and focus for the research, whilst leaving the scope open for the 
generation  of unintended findings or even new hypotheses; 
• Enabling the researcher to discover issues or effects which have not been considered before 
the investigation began; and 
• Allowing the study to makes sense of the disparate information provided by various 
respondents during analysis stages (Ali and Birley, 1999). 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Contextual Literature Review 
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Chapter 4: Prevalent Inefficient Procurement Practices in Construction 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the analysis and findings of the study that led to the 
development of the conceptual model of ‘institutional waste within the UK construction 
industry’. The three chapters combine together to provide a systematic analysis of the 
four principal categories and the constituent sub-categories of the developed conceptual 
model, including the established relationships between the four categories (See Figure 
4.1 in Chapter 4). However, Chapter 4, in particular, is focussed on describing the 
coding structure that led to the emergence of the category titled ‘Inefficient Procurement 
Practices’ out of the primary data collected for the study. The chapter also provides 
explanations to eleven constituent sub-categories that evolved from the data. The 
chapter therefore draws up on direct quotes extracted from the raw data, whenever 
possible, to demonstrate the logical connection between the developed categories, 
subcategories and the collected primary data. The analysis of the empirical data 
presented in this chapter led to an identification of various inefficient procurement 
practices and arrangements that prevail in the construction industry. 
 
Chapter 5: Impact of Inefficient Procurement Practices on Project Performance 
and Outcomes 
This chapter illustrates the impacts of the identified procurement arrangements 
(presented in Chapter 4) on project-team performance and behaviour. Accordingly, the 
chapter therefore describes the coding structure that led to the emergence of the 
category titled ‘Inefficient Performance and Behaviour’, and provides brief explanations 
to each of its ten constituent sub-categories. The analysis presented in this chapter led to 
an identification of various wasteful behaviours and commercial practices that lead to 
consequential wastes. Concomitantly, the chapter also illustrates the analytical process 
that led to the development of the category titled ‘Consequential Waste’. This category 
was developed based on the emergence of four main classifications of waste that are 
detailed within the chapter. 
 
 
Chapter 6: Institutional Factors Influencing Procurement 
This chapter introduces various institutional factors that have been found to influence 
construction procurement choices and practices. It is argued that these identified 
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institutional factors provide novel explanations as to why inefficient procurement 
practices prevail and persist in the construction industry. The chapter therefore describes 
the coding structure that led to the emergence of the category titled ‘institutional 
factors’, and provides brief explanations to each of its twelve constituent sub-categories. 
 
Chapter 7: Evaluation of the Developed Conceptual Model 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of an evaluation exercise that was 
conducted with various academic and industry experts to critically assess and provide 
feedback on the rigour and quality of the developed conceptual model and the main 
findings of the study. The chapter commences by describing how the evaluation 
exercise took place, and then provides a detailed analysis of the received feedback. The 
results of the evaluation exercise demonstrated that the developed conceptual model has 
met the quality criteria outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 8: Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature 
This chapter discusses the main findings of the study and the developed conceptual 
framework, in line with the study’s aim and main objectives. The chapter refers to 
relevant extant literature and feedback received during the evaluation exercise, 
whenever appropriate, to augment the main arguments of the study and delineate how 
the emergent findings relate to previous work. The chapter also includes discussions 
about the theoretical perspectives underpinning this study, and the theoretical and 
practical implications of this research study.  
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study. The chapter 
commences by providing a summary of how research objectives were achieved, 
followed by a summary of the main findings. The main conclusions of the study are 
then presented before discussing the study’s theoretical, methodological and practical 
contributions to knowledge. Subsequently, a reflection on the research limitations is 
provided. Finally, publication plans out of this thesis are itemised, and various 
recommendations for future research are provided. 
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1.8 A Note on the Place of Literature Review within the Structure of this Thesis 
For PhD students employing GT as a research methodology, the issue of ‘how, when 
and where’ to incorporate a literature review within the overall structure of their thesis 
is often confusing (Dunne, 2011; El Hussein, 2017). GT students are expected to 
minimise predetermined ideas to ensure that their emergent concepts or theories are 
grounded in the data, but at the same time are required to conduct a literature review to 
comply with institutional ethical and scientific requirements for doctoral progression or 
research grant applications. Debates about the role of literature in GT are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. This study supports the arguments of the ‘evolved’ 
version of GT (i.e. Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), which 
advocate an early review of literature. As summed up by Coffey and Atkinson (1996): 
“The open-mindedness of the researcher should not be mistaken for the empty 
mindedness of the researcher who is not adequately steeped in the research 
traditions of a discipline. It is after all, not very clever to rediscover the wheel, 
and the student or researcher who is ignorant of the relevant literature is always 
in danger of doing the equivalent” (p. 157). 
 
There is a fine line between not conducting a literature review at the beginning of a GT 
study and being informed so that a study is focused enough (McCallin, 2003). For this 
reason, a substantial amount of studies have been conducted with the aim of providing 
PhD researchers with advice and strategies for GT literature integration (see for 
example, McCallin, 2003; Andrews, 2006; Hallberg, 2010; Dunne, 2011; El Hussein, 
2017). Of these, for example, Andrews (2006) suggested that novice GT researchers 
need to accept that they may well end up doing two literature reviews: (1) a preliminary 
review that puts the study into some context, and (2) a detailed review of extant 
literature that is used as data to fully integrate the emergent theory.  
 
The place of presenting the literature within the structure of a thesis, however, is often 
problematic for PhD students (Dunne, 2011). Students may get advised by their PhD 
supervisors to follow the traditional ‘literature review → findings → discussion’ 
structure, but this linear approach may not fit the logical presentation of the study and 
may contradict how the actual research was conducted. Likewise, incorporating 
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theoretical concepts and explanations into research findings may lead to excessively 
long chapters and undermine the flow of the study. Conversely, the decision to postpone 
the engagement with extant literature until after the study’s empirical findings have 
been presented “might be met with confusion by examiners or reviewers who may be 
experts in the substantive field, but not necessarily experts in grounded theory”(Dunne, 
2011, p. 120). There is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to this challenge; nevertheless 
“whatever decision is taken, it is imperative that the researcher clearly articulate this 
issue from the outset and cogently outline and defend the preferred option in order to 
minimise the potential for misunderstanding between the author and the reader” 
(Dunne, 2011, p. 121). 
 
In this thesis, a preliminary literature review was conducted to provide the research with 
focus and contextualisation (presented in Chapter Two) prior to data collection, rather 
than a traditional literature review. However, detailed engagement with extant literature 
was not conducted until the data analysis chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six.) were 
completed. Therefore, the decision was to integrate extant literature to the overall 
discussion of the findings of the study in Chapter Eight, and to clearly refer to this in the 
introduction and data analysis chapters of the thesis. 
 
1.9 Summary  
This introductory chapter provided an overview of the research study’s context and 
structure. The research background revealed an interesting fact that ‘much of the waste 
produced in construction is common to many projects and keeps recurring’. It is this 
aspect that led to the development of the study’s research questions, which in turn paved 
the way towards the contextual choice of theories and literature to review. The purpose 
of the following chapter (Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review), therefore, is to 
provide the study with focus, whilst leaving the scope open for the generation of 
unintended findings or even new hypothesis from data collection and analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CONTEXTUAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter (Chapter 1) provided an introduction to the thesis highlighting the 
research gap, aim, objectives and overall structure. This chapter considers the 
theoretical context. It begins with a critical review of the concept of waste in 
construction. This is followed by an analysis of theories, from outside both construction 
and manufacturing, which can provide an insight into the establishment, process and 
outcomes of several forms of institutional, organisational and commercial arrangements. 
In particular, two principal theories are conceptually analysed for this purpose: (a) 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) and (b) Neo-institutional theory of organisational 
studies. Subsequently, an overview of literature pertaining to the construction 
procurement context is provided. Finally, an outline of the concept of ‘institutional 
waste in construction’ is presented and six guiding propositions are developed based on 
the aforementioned contextual literature review. 
 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, the preliminary literature review presented in this chapter 
(Chapter 2) was undertaken to enable the study to identify gaps in existing knowledge, 
and to provide context and some focus to the study prior to data collection. A more 
detailed and in-depth review was conducted towards the end of the data collection and 
analysis process, in order to compare the emergent concepts and developed categories 
with extant literature (see Chapter 8, Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature). 
 
 
 
2.2 An Overview of the Concept of Waste in Construction  
The concept of waste-reduction has been fundamentally used as a key driver for 
improvement in the manufacturing industry, and arguably led to great achievements; but 
it has not been as prevalent in construction economics or management (Koskela and 
Ballard, 2012; Koskela et al., 2012; Bølviken and Koskela, 2016). Research efforts 
aimed at understanding waste are relatively limited when compared to other topics in 
construction, and many waste-related studies continue to focus on the causes rather than 
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the root causes. Two subsequent systematic literature reviews on empirical studies that 
relate to waste-minimisation in construction (Viana et al., 2012; Formoso et al., 2015) 
found that the number of papers focusing on the concept of waste in construction is 
relatively small, considering its relevance and significance for the field of construction 
management. They also indicated that many of the studies they reviewed do not present a 
clear definition of waste, either explicitly or implicitly. The findings of their reviews 
revealed that research is broadly focused on addressing three different categories of 
waste:  
(1) Construction material waste (physical waste);  
(2) Non value-adding activities (process waste); 
(3) Specific sorts of waste (such as accidents and rework). 
 
 
Many studies in construction literature have concentrated on ‘waste-management’ 
strategies and implementation efforts on construction project sites (for example, see 
Peng et al., 1997; Mcdonald and Smithers, 1998; Lawson et al., 2001). These studies 
have broadly focused on identifying and assessing strategies for re-using and recycling 
construction material waste, waste-quantification, waste management mapping to help 
with the handling of on-site waste, investigating the impact of legislation on waste 
management practices, suggesting improvements for on-site waste management 
practices, and developing on-site waste auditing and assessment tools (Osmani, 2012).  
The current and on-going approaches to research in the field of construction waste-
minimisation are mainly focused designing out waste (e.g. Keys et al., 2000); waste 
minimisation guides for architects and designers (e.g. WRAP, 2009); attitudes and 
perceptions of practitioners towards construction waste minimisation (e.g. Osmani et 
al., 2008); the need for improved supply chain integration (e.g. Dainty and Brooke, 
2004; Taggart et al., 2014); and procurement waste-minimisation strategies (e.g. 
Gamage et al, 2009).  
 
 
There are also some other research studies that have focused on specific types of waste 
such as: rework and design error reduction (for example see, Busby and Hughes, 2004; 
Love et al., 2009, 2011a, 2013; Feng and Tommelein, 2009) knowledge flow and 
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integration in different construction working environments (e.g. Ruan et al., 2012), 
designing for construction worker safety (e.g. Toole and Gambatese, 2008), reducing 
waste by appropriate coordination mechanisms (Sandberg and Bildsten, 2011), and 
project disputes causations (Mitropoulos and Howell, 2001; Love et al., 2011b). 
Interestingly, it can be noted that most of the studies that have investigated process 
waste and non-value adding activities, have been undertaken by members of the lean 
construction community. There are many general classifications of process waste as 
defined in lean thinking. For example, they include Tachii Ohno’s seven wastes: 
transportation, inventory, motion, waiting, over-production, over-processing, and 
defects (Ohno 1988, pp. 19-20). In addition, the waste of human potential - e.g. ‘Not 
speaking, not listening’ by Macomber & Howel (2004), and the ‘Making-do’ waste 
presented by Koskela (2004) is included within this category. Making-do, in particular, 
has been argued by Koskela et al. (2013) to be a core waste in construction with 
substantial negative impact on the production system. Nevertheless, making-do is not 
widely recognized or used as a focus for improvement in construction projects 
(Formoso et al., 2015). The next section, therefore, provides more details about the 
'making-do' category of waste and its possible antecedents and consequences.  
 
 
 
2.2.1 Making-do as a prevalent source of waste in construction 
Making-do is an invisible form of waste (Koskela, 2004) that has been confirmed in 
recent empirical studies to be prevalent in construction (see Formoso et al., 2011, 
Brodetskaia et al., 2011; Emmitt et al., 2012; Fireman et al., 2013). It refers to starting a 
construction task before its preconditions are ready, or continuing a task although at 
least one of its standard inputs has ceased (Koskela, 2004). This wasteful activity often 
occurs for keeping the utilization of capacity high and also for the sake of schedule 
compliance (Koskela et al., 2013). As a result the task is not fully completed, leading to 
inefficiencies and unnecessary re-work (Emmitt et al., 2012). These preconditions 
necessary for starting and executing a task are described by Koskela (2000) as the seven 
types of flow in construction: (1) information; (2) space; (3) interdependence of tasks; 
(4) manpower; (5) materials; (6) equipment; and (7) external conditions. Thus, 
according to Formoso et al. (2011) Making-do could be defined as a reduction of 
performance that results from the fact that a task is started or continued even though one 
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or more of its standard inputs, required for its completion, are not available. Making-do 
can actually can be regarded as the opposite of buffering, hence work starts without the 
minimum amount of resources (inventory) for carrying out a task to completion 
(Koskela, 2004). 
 
 
Interestingly, a study by Emmitt et al. (2012) sought to improve the attitude of the 
trades’ workers, foremen and site managers towards completing their work packages, so 
that the work flow and quality could be improved. Their study found that waste can 
occur due to lack of common understanding, amongst trades involved, about what 
constitutes a completed task. Consequently, work by Pasquire (2012 & 2013) suggested 
that 'common understanding', has to be managed as a soft flow in the same way as 
Koskela's (2000) seven flows mentioned above. She describes this as follows: 
"In their paper about inappropriate processing, Emmitt et al. (2012) claim that 
the phenomenon of doing only just enough to allow the next trade to start 
necessitating operatives to come back to finish work...This waste should be 
included within the category of ‘making-do’ (Koskela 2004) but currently falls 
outside because it doesn’t arise as a result of starting work before all flows are 
in place. If understanding were one of the flows, then it can be argued more 
strongly that leaving work before it is at the best stage of completion is a form of 
making-do because in this example, a proper understanding of the hand-off 
stage was not present" (Pasquire, 2012, pp. 6). 
 
 
According to Formoso et al. (2011), making-do is a result of the poor management of 
upstream processes, which may result in the execution of tasks under sub-optimal 
conditions. Consequences of making-do, as reported by Ronen (1992), Koskela (2004) 
and Formoso et al. (2011), Emmitt et al. (2012), and Fireman et al. (2013) include: 
• More work-in-progress, and longer lead time;  
• Decline in overall productivity;  
• High negative impact on site safety conditions;  
• Decline in workers' motivation;  
• Poor quality;  
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• Increase in the share on non-value-adding activities;  
• Unnecessary increased costs (e.g. due to need for re-work); and  
• Material waste.  
 
 
Furthermore, a study by Formoso et al (2015) demonstrated through a causality 
framework that making-do, as a major category of waste in construction, can lead to the 
generation of a complex network of inter-related wastes. According to Ronen (1992), as 
cited in Koskela (2004), the possible causes of making-do are: 
• The Efficiency syndrome: the urge to have the resources utilised as much as 
possible, based on the assumption that overall productivity increases if all 
workers and equipment have a high utilization rate; 
• The pressure for an immediate response - based on the belief that by starting 
early, even if with an incomplete kit, the task will also be completed earlier. 
Another motivation could be to start the work just for getting the job. Also for 
trying to comply with the master plan; and 
• Improver division into levels of assembly - a situation where the number of 
components per kit grows to an uncontrollable level, leading to high variability 
 
 
Koskela (2004) accepts Ronen's conclusions; however he argues that the high 
occurrence of making-do in construction is not just caused due to a failure in 
implementing a conventional managerial system. Instead making-do is fundamentally 
caused by the phenomenon of variability in production. He criticised a number of 
underlying concepts adopted in construction, which in his opinion lead to the 
persistence of making-do in construction. These are as follows: 
• The transformational view of production (Koskela, 2000), which characterises 
traditional construction, where managerial focus is on value-adding activities 
(transformation), while giving much less attention to the relationship between the 
activities (flow);  
• Variability in task execution and upstream flows are often neglected and not 
properly managed;  
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• Using a standard utilisation rate as a performance measure may provide wrong 
incentives to managers;  
• The conventional one-way top-down communication approaches, which are 
insufficient for managing highly complex production systems, such as construction 
projects. 
 
 
Last Planner System (LPS) for production control (Ballard, 2000), is deemed to be an 
effective way for protecting production from upstream variability (Ballard and Howell, 
1998), and therefore avoiding making-do waste. However the findings of an empirical 
study by Formoso et al. (2011) provided some empirical light on the limitations of LPS 
in avoiding making-do. For example, much of the work carried out by crews and 
workers in construction sites is done informally; thus not included in formal short term 
look-ahead and constraint analyses plans (Fireman et al., 2013). Furthermore, Bølviken 
et al. (2014) argue that from the perspective of the production system as a whole, 
focussing merely on reducing making-do can be counter-productive. That is because it 
can result in root-causes not being addressed; thus by that way increasing rather than 
decreasing the negative consequences (Bølviken et al. 2014). These arguments suggest 
the need for obtaining a better understanding about the fundamental paradigms that 
underlie wasteful behaviours and practices construction, and which also obstruct waste-
minimisation efforts. Accordingly, the next section provides a review of various 
fundamental factors impeding waste-reduction and improvement efforts in construction. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Barriers to waste-reduction in construction 
Construction is already one of the most booming industries worldwide. In the UK, the 
construction sector is a fundamental part of the economy, contributing to 8.2% of Gross 
Value Added (Pryke, 2009). It is also one of the largest sectors of employment in the 
UK, accounting for about 7.5 % of total UK employment (UKCES, 2012). However, 
the construction sector is commonly criticised for being wasteful and adversarial 
(Koskela, 2000; Dassault Systems, 2014; Sarhan et al., 2014; Bølviken and Koskela, 
2016). Over the past eighty years, several reports have been commissioned on the 
construction industry with the aim of raising concerns and suggesting means for 
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improving performance and productivity (for example see Bossom, 1934; Simon, 1944; 
Banwell, 1964; Latham, 1994; Egan, 1998; Wolstenholme et al., 2009; UK 
Government, 2012; Farmer, 2016; Infrastructure and Projects Authority, 2016). Of 
these, the Egan’s report emphasised the significance of adopting and implementing the 
concept of ‘waste-reduction’ as a strategy for improving efficiency and productivity in 
construction, by stressing that: 
“Recent studies in the USA, Scandinavia and this country suggest that up to 
30% of construction is rework, labor is used at only 40-60% of potential 
efficiency, accidents can account for 3-6% of total project costs, and at least 
10% of materials are wasted…The message is clear - there is plenty of scope for 
improving efficiency and quality simply by taking waste out of construction” 
(Egan, 1998, p.15). 
 
It is therefore paradoxical how that waste-reduction has not yet become a prevailing 
strategy for improving the productivity of the construction industry. There are hardly 
any studies that have explicitly sought to investigate this paradox. However, in an initial 
attempt to explore this issue, a review study by Bølviken and Koskela (2016) has 
offered eight possible reasons as to why waste-reduction has not conquered 
construction; these are as follows: 
1. Construction management is focussed on management of contracts rather than the 
management of production; 
2. The fire-fighting culture and mentality to solving problems in the construction 
industry; 
3. The prevalence of the task-centred view to construction, as opposed to the flow 
perspective, has effectively shifted attention away from waste; 
4. Ohno's classical seven wastes are context-specific; and thus are not fully relevant for 
construction; 
5. The complexity of the construction process results in waste being a more complex 
phenomenon to tackle; 
6. The low degree of stability and repetitiveness in construction flows 
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7. Temporary organizations and the fragmented value chain 
8. Integrated management of income, cost and risk 
 
 
According to Bølviken and Koskela (2016), these reasons indicate that the slow uptake 
of waste-reduction in construction is not simply due to lack of interest or lack of skills 
in the industry. Instead it's mainly attributed to two fundamental reasons: (1) focussing 
on management and economics approaches while giving less attention to production 
theory; and (2) treating construction projects as something we buy and sell, rather than 
something we make (production). Additionally, a series of recent studies (Viana et al., 
2012; Koskela et al., 2013; Bølviken et al., 2014; Formoso et al., 2015; Bølviken and 
Koskela, 2016) have urged the need for a better understanding and conceptualisation of 
waste in construction. According to them, these construction-related lists of wastes 
should be conceptually compatible with construction, persuasive and motivating for 
action. For these reasons, the next section provides an overall analysis of trends and 
existing gaps in literature pertaining to the ‘concept of waste’ in construction. Following 
this, a theoretical rationale for obtaining a more thorough understanding and wider 
conceptualisation of waste in construction is presented. 
 
 
 
2.2.3 An overall analysis of the concept of waste in construction literature 
An overall analysis of waste-related literature in construction reveals five critical issues. 
First, researchers have gradually shifted their attention and studies from merely 
focussing on waste-management strategies that are mainly concerned with the 
consequences of waste, to instead focus on waste-minimisation strategies, as a more 
sustainable approach able to eliminate or reduce construction material waste at its 
source. Secondly, most of these waste-minimisation approaches, if not all, were directed 
towards finding means for reducing construction material waste (physical waste) as 
opposed to process waste. Other important issues such as time waste and value creation 
are much less explicitly explored.  
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Thirdly, it appears that many of the problems that lead to the occurrence of waste in 
construction are strongly related to lean theories adopted in production management. 
However, it can still be argued that waste is created primarily from project-
organisational and contractual problems (Williamson, 1991, pp.78-79); and as such, a 
focus on waste reduction in site-based production alone would be insufficient. As 
emphasised by Matthews et al. (2003), it is difficult to maximise value and minimise 
waste at the project level if the prevailing contractual structure hinders coordination, 
constrains collaboration and innovation, and sub-optimises performance and goals. 
Similarly, it is proposed in this study that procurement systems, as institutional 
arrangements, are designed to assign liabilities and authorities to people and 
organizations (Love et al., 1998) at the project and programme levels; and thus structure 
the borders that shape ‘the play of the game’ (Williamson, 2000). From a production 
management perspective, organisation and contracts are essential parts of the production 
system design (Koskela and Ballard, 2012); thus it makes sense to suggest that poorly 
aligned (imperfect) organisational and institutional arrangements may cause waste and 
impact on project outcomes  
 
 
Fourthly, a small but growing number of studies have attempted to investigate the 
influence of procurement processes on the generation of waste in construction projects 
(e.g. Jaques, 2000; Gamage et al., 2009). However all of these studies have only 
focused on the relationship between different procurement systems and the generation 
of construction material waste. Finally, very limited, if any, waste-related studies have 
devoted attention to exploring performance-shaping mechanisms (i.e. systems and 
structural arrangements), as well as the institutional context in which human actions and 
decisions are constituted. To say that waste in construction is created merely due to 
human error is unhelpful; blame arguably fails to facilitate learning to ‘do better’ and 
similarly fails to lead us towards effective methods of reduction or prevention. Instead, 
an institutional perspective provides insight. Institutional theory focuses on the context 
and could enable us to reveal the underlying fundamental paradigms influencing our 
decision, actions and behaviours. 
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A comprehensive study by Wearne (2008) provided a summary on how the industry, 
public clients, and the project management community have learned from their previous 
experiences and ideas through a 30 years period. The study showed how attention has 
gradually shifted from focusing mainly on time and cost over-runs of delivery projects, 
to taking into consideration other significant issues such as quality, safety, risk 
management, organizational behaviour, supply-chain management, and project 
definition. This continuous cycle of learning and development should have increased 
the ability in anticipating project-related problems, and thus led to a reduction to their 
negative consequences. However, a recent study by Wearne (2014) reviewed the 
problems of project management as reported by 1,879 individuals employed in the 
construction, manufacturing, process, and service industries in North-West Europe over 
23 years. Interestingly, when reviewing the data collected, the same categories of 
problems appeared to remain the main concern of project management. This finding led 
to the rise of the question as to why many categories of project management problems 
persist. The analysis of his empirical study revealed that: 
 “More than 75% of the problems reported by the participants are due to 
institutional practices within organizations rather than inherent in their 
projects. Many of these problems of project management could therefore be 
avoided, or at least reduced by early attention to their causes. As a result much 
of what is called “fire- fighting” in project management—urgent actions on 
problems that should not have been allowed to occur—could be prevented” 
(Wearne, 2014, p. 72).  
 
The findings of Wearne’s (2014) empirical study support recent arguments for 
improvement in the ‘front end’ decisions on project objectives, plans and governance 
arrangements (for example, see Edkins et al., 2012). Accordingly, these findings and 
advices support this study’s rationale for exploring the institutional factors that 
influence early-project decisions and condition project procurement and governance 
arrangements. In the construction management literature, there are hardly any studies 
that have sought to investigate the role played by the institutional, procurement and 
commercial contexts  in generating and/or embedding waste in construction projects. 
Waste here can be in the form of monetary, time, effort or value-loss, and can exist prior 
to or post contractual stages.  
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2.2.4 A rationale for obtaining a wider conceptualisation of waste in construction 
The formal adaptation and transfer of the new production philosophies into construction 
projects has been ongoing since the early 1990’s (Koskela, 1992). These philosophies 
were characterised as “lean” from the study of Toyota (Krafcik, 1988), and the term 
‘Lean Construction’ rose to prominence with the formation of the International Group 
for Lean Construction1 in 1993. The concept of lean was formally recommended to the 
UK construction industry by a Government report (Egan, 1998). Traditionally, the term 
'waste in construction' is usually limited or intuitively linked to physical (material) 
waste. The concept of material waste in construction has been widely addressed but the 
widened understanding introduced by the seven process wastes identified in the Toyota 
Production System (TPS) (Ohno, 1988) has struggled to be transferred. Process waste is 
directly associated with executing tasks and conforms to the current understanding of 
project management as ‘a specific set of operations designed to accomplish a singular 
goal’ (Project Management Institute2). In this way, production is defined as 
transforming resources towards the finished product or project and waste can be seen as 
the inefficient use of resources in the execution of tasks. The disadvantage of this 
understanding of waste is that it drives the improvement of current processes rather than 
radical new system design.  
 
 
 
Koskela (2000) advanced the definition of lean production to the combination of 
transformation tasks (T), flow (F) and value creation (V). This definition of production 
as TFV creates two additional dimensions to the conceptualisation of waste as the 
inefficient use of resources in tasks. The first additional TFV dimension, flow (F), 
reveals the interdependency of activities across the whole project process. The 
consideration of flow brings the supply chain and the logistics of getting resources to 
the point of transformation into focus. Elevating flow to a project production driver also 
alters the classification of process waste within tasks. For example, waiting within one 
task may now be necessary to expedite tasks downstream – this waiting is therefore no 
longer a waste and results in one task being sub-optimised in order to optimise the 
                                                          
1 www.iglc.net 
2 www.pmi.org 
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 
 
Page | 28  
 
project. Consequently the pursuit of waste within transformation activities can itself 
become a cause of waste if it disrupts flow. Erratic and disrupted flow of processes 
provide further sources likely to cause waste recognised within TPS in two ways - the 
unevenness of workflow (Mura) and the related concept of the overburden of capacity 
(Muri) (Liker, 2004). 
 
The second additional TFV dimension is created by considering value creation (V) and 
brings the customer into focus. The construction sector typically identifies clients and 
more recently users and stakeholders – the term customer is not commonly used. 
However, the inclusion of value creation into project production moves the 
conceptualisation of waste towards identifying what causes value-loss, and questions 
from whose perspective (Koskela et al., 2013). This conceptualisation will vary from 
project to project and from customer to customer meaning the understanding of what 
constitutes value and how it is created becomes an important part of the design of the 
project production system (delivery including logistics, design and procurement) and 
the project product (the physical facility or asset created and what it achieves). One 
important aspect of this conceptualisation, yet underexplored, is the consideration of the 
institutional, procurement and commercial environments surrounding the design and 
delivery of construction projects. It is this research gap that led the author of this study 
to explore whether there is anything in the aforementioned environments that is 
blocking radical new production system design and therefore pinning the prevailing 
wasteful construction model in place. 
 
The understanding of value and value loss (or waste) within these wider organisational, 
commercial and institutional environments is more difficult to determine not least 
because it requires a critical evaluation of the activities of different professions, for 
example lawyers, accountants, human resource managers, quantity surveyors to name a 
few. These environments and the professions within them also exhibit varying cultures, 
structures, systems and behaviours. Such an evaluation also needs to draw upon theory 
from disciplines outside both construction and manufacturing such as economics and 
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sociology if it is to begin to explain the apparent coherence, and yet wastefulness, of the 
current prevailing approaches to construction project delivery. 
 
 
To begin to explore the identified research gap, the study analyses theoretical 
explanations to the establishment, process and outcomes of several forms of 
institutional and organisational arrangements, in particular those provided by 
‘Transaction Cost Economics’ (TCE) and ‘Neo-Institutional Theory’ of organisational 
studies. TCE is explored, as according to Williamson (2000) “any issue that arises as or 
can be reformulated as a contracting issue can be examined to advantage in transaction 
cost economizing terms” (p. 599, 608). Within construction procurement, TCE offers a 
useful mechanism to analyse conflicting interests among contracting parties (Li et al., 
2013) and to understand the hidden costs associated with pre- and post-contract work 
(See for example Li et al., 2014; Rajeh et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2016). Additionally, an 
overview of institutional theory of organizational studies is provided. Institutional 
theory gives significant consideration to context (Oliver, 1991) and could also help to 
reveal the underlying cultural/cognitive assumptions that influence decisions and 
consequently behaviors and actions (Scott, 2008).  
 
 
Next, a contextual review of construction procurement literature is presented, where 
construction procurement systems, is conceptualised within this study, as ‘institutional 
arrangements’. Subsequently, it is demonstrated in the study how neo-institutional 
theory, a branch of organizational sociology, has the potential to be used as an analytical 
lens to deliver a more explicit theory of waste relating cause and effect within the wider 
aspects of construction procurement systems and relationships. Following this, an 
outline of the concept of ‘institutional waste’ within construction is defined, and a 
preliminary conceptual model that consists of six guiding propositions is presented. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, the aim of developing this preliminary conceptual model and 
guiding propositions is to provide some focus and context for the research, whilst 
leaving the scope open for the generation of unintended findings or even new 
hypotheses during data collection and analysis. 
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2.3 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction cost (TC) theory is part of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 2000) and seems to provide insight into the 
relationship between construction procurement and waste or value-loss in construction 
projects. According to Williamson (2000) “Any issue that arises as or can be 
reformulated as a contracting issue can be examined to advantage in transaction cost 
economizing terms” (p. 599, 608). TCE can be used to provide insights into many of the 
construction industry’s challenges that occur at both pre contract and post contract 
stages. Areas of application included for example: providing explanations to the causes 
of opportunistic behaviours that often occur between project partners, especially 
between clients and contractors (Yong and Mustaffa, 2011); offering insights into the 
analysis of the costs of organising the procurement of construction work in different 
ways (Hughes, 2003; Hughes et al 2002, 2003, and 2005); helping us understand how 
and why the practice of subcontracting is very prevalent in the construction industry 
(Chau and Walker, 1994); offering economical explanations of why construction project 
organisations are structured in such (and in different) ways (Reve and Levitt, 1984; 
Walker and Wing, 1999); giving insights into contractor selection methods (Lingard et 
al., 1998); helping us to understand unnecessary and hidden transactions costs (i.e. 
waste) within construction commercial environments (Ancell, 2005); helping us decide 
on the most efficient contractual arrangement against a number of alternatives (Chau 
and Walker, 1994); evaluating the efficiency of construction business markets and 
systems in different countries (e.g. Winch, 1989; Sha, 2004).  
 
 
Conversely, TCE has been criticised by various scholars, including Koskela and Ballard 
(2006, 2012), founders of lean construction (LC), who argued that the economic theory 
lacks a proper conceptualization of production and waste. Therefore, the aim of this 
section is to critically review the behavioural explanations provided by TCE, in relation 
to the establishment of institutional, organizational and commercial arrangements and 
how they may impact on project processes and outcomes (e.g. reduce or lead to waste). 
The review will start by providing a brief background to the emergence of TC theory, 
followed by an explanation to the theory’s conceptual framework and fundamental 
assumptions, governance mechanism, contextual domain of applications and levels of 
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analysis. Subsequently, a critical discussion upon the main critiques and limitations of 
TCE, as identified by this study, is provided. Finally, an overview of the basic features 
of NIE is presented and reflected upon.  
 
2.3.1 Background 
Transaction cost theory, emerged to overcome shortcomings of the traditional 
neoclassical economics (NCE) which is dismissive of institutions (North, 1994; 
Williamson, 2000). In neoclassical microeconomic analysis, transaction costs are 
assumed to be equal to zero (Walker and Wing, 1999); that is as resources and 
economic activities are allocated and coordinated using the pricing system based on the 
assumption that all actors in the market are fully informed (Williamson, 2000). This 
assumption is flawed because, in reality, all transactions occur within an uncertain 
environment; and thus there are monetary, time and effort costs associated with making 
a choice (Williamson, 2000; Sha, 2004). By neglecting transaction cost, NCE 
accordingly ignored the influence of institutional arrangements, e.g. firms, 
governments, and commercial arrangements (Chau and Walker, 1994) on economic 
performance (North, 2004). Douglas North summed this up in his Nobel-prize lecture, 
by emphasising to us that: 
“Only under the conditions of costless bargaining will the actors reach the 
solution that maximizes aggregate income regardless of the institutional 
arrangements. When it is costly to transact, then institutions matter. And it is 
costly to transact” (North, 1994, p. 360). 
 
 
It is Coase’s seminal article ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) which explicitly introduced 
the concept of transaction costs into economic analysis. It drew to our attention that 
there are transaction costs that had been assumed to be zero in prior theorizing; this 
implied that the market mechanism is not necessarily perfect (Koskela and Ballard, 
2012) and also clarified the reason for why firms exist. Coase (1991), cited in Walker 
and Wing (1999), however argued that in order for a firm’s existence to continue it has 
to perform its co-ordination function at a lower cost than what would be gained if it 
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were achieved by means of market transactions; and also at a lower cost than this same 
function could be conducted by another firm. 
 
 
According to Coase (1937), without transaction costs, all else being equal, economic 
exchange would always take place in the market (Tate et al., 2014). Coase, accordingly, 
proposed that firms and markets are competing governance mechanisms that differ in 
their transaction costs. He suggested that transaction costs were the key influence on a 
firm’s decision to make or buy (Hughes et al., 2005). In some cases, the costs of 
conducting economic exchange in a market may exceed the costs of managing the 
exchange within a firm, and vice versa (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In this context, 
the choice between different institutional and organisational arrangements that owners 
have to make aims to reduce transactional (institutional) costs. According to Chau and 
Walker (1994, p. 2) “transaction costs include all costs of using an institutional 
arrangement and are therefore sometimes referred to as institutional costs”. This 
assertion is based on economist Cheung’s (1987, pp. 55-58) description of transaction 
costs in ‘The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics’: 
"Transaction costs may be viewed as a spectrum of institutional costs including 
those of information, of negotiation, of drawing up and enforcing contracts, of 
delineating and policing property rights, of monitoring performance and of 
changing institutional arrangement. In short, they comprise all those costs not 
directly incurred in the physical process of production". 
 
 
It is important, though, to stress here that the ultimate aim of TC theory is to reduce the 
total costs, which incorporates both transactional (or organisational) costs and 
productivity costs (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Perman, 2005). This point is 
controversial, and thus will be elaborated later on in more detail when discussing the 
critiques of TCE (see section 2.3.5).  
 
 
In short, Coase’s (1937) initial propositions has generally been applied in transaction 
cost analysis (TCA) from the perspective of the buying firm to decide whether it is more 
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economical to vertically integrate (make) or to use the market (buy) (Tate et al., 2014). 
Coase (1960) was also the first to make the critical connection between institutions, 
transaction costs, and neoclassical theory (North, 1994). However, Oliver Williamson 
has subsequently added remarkable refinements to Coase's general arguments (see 
Williamson, 1975, 1985, and 2000). These included, for example, developing a 
theoretical model for the choice of an optimal governance structure for six different 
types of transactional exchanges. He also added to our attention that transactional costs 
consist of both ‘direct costs’ and ‘opportunity costs’ which may arise at ex-ante and/or 
ex-post stages (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Additionally, it is widely acknowledged 
that the phrase of ‘The New Institutional Economics’ is coined by Oliver Williamson 
(Coase, 1998). Having provided a synopsis to the background and origins of TCE, the 
study now explores TCE’s fundamental assumptions that have advanced over time. 
 
 
2.3.2 TCE’ conceptual framework and fundamental assumptions 
Transaction costs are the costs of specifying what is being exchanged and of enforcing 
the consequent agreements (i.e. contractual arrangements) against the exchange partner 
(North, 1994; Ting et al., 2007). Williamson (1975) categorises transaction costs into 
‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ costs. Ex-ante costs comprise the costs of tendering, negotiating 
and writing the contract (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997); while ex-post costs include the 
costs of: monitoring and measuring performance, implementing quality control systems, 
cost accounting, establishing layers of the managerial hierarchy, and dispute resolution 
processes (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Lingard et al., 1998).  According to Dietrich 
(1994, p. 33) transaction costs can be classified into: 
• Information-seeking costs – these refer to the investment of time, effort and other 
resources associated with researching possible alternatives (Tate et al., 2011, 2014); 
• Bargaining and decision related costs – the costs of developing an agreement, 
negotiating, documenting, selecting potential exchange partners and establishing a 
contract (Tate et al., 2011, 2014); 
• Enforcement related costs – e.g. management, inspection and monitoring costs as 
well as costs incurred to resolve disputes arising from the contracted work (Walker 
and Wing, 1999; Tate et al., 2014). 
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According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), Williamson's (1975, 1985) micro analytical 
framework is underpinned by the interaction between two fundamental assumptions of 
human behaviour (i.e., opportunism and bounded rationality) and two key dimensions 
of transactions (i.e., asset specificity and uncertainty). The complete TCA framework 
also includes risk neutrality as a third behavioural assumption (Chiles and McMackin, 
1996), and transaction frequency or relational exchange as a third transactional 
dimension (Yong and Mustaffa, 2011). However, Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) assert 
that both of these constructs have received limited attention in literature. Their assertion 
seems reliable as it was based on their review of 45 empirical TCA articles published 
from 1982 to 1996 in a variety of academic journals in marketing, management, 
strategy, law, and economics. Despite of this, these two constructs (i.e. frequency and 
risk neutrality) will still be taken into our consideration when analysing the limitations 
and critiques of TCE (see section 2.3.5) 
 
 
Williamson (1985, p. 47) defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile". This 
implies that given the opportunity, decision makers may deceitfully seek to serve their 
self-interests. Muris (1981, p. 521, cited in Ting et al., 2007) adds to this and argues that 
opportunism arises when a party “behaves contrary to the other party’s understanding 
of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms, leading 
to a transfer of wealth from one party to the other.” In reality, opportunistic behaviours 
are part of human nature, and therefore they often exist in exchange-relationships (Ting 
et al., 2007). However, it can be argued that although opportunism may, initially, lead 
to increased outcomes for the opportunistic party, but it actually has the potential to 
restrict value creation and decrease revenues for both parties in a relationship (Wathne 
and Heide, 2000, cited in Wang and Yang, 2013); that is because considerable amounts 
of resources would then have to be spent on enforcing monitoring and controlling 
functions instead of employing those resources for productive purposes (Ting et al., 
2007). 
 
 
Bounded rationality simply means that decision makers act rationally but have 
constraints on their cognitive, analytical and data-processing capabilities, especially in 
uncertain and complex environments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 199; Walker and Wing, 
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1999). According to Dietrich (1994, p. 19), the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ in 
transactions is based on two principles. First, that there are limits on human’s ability to 
process information without error. Secondly, that it is not wise to suggest that past 
experience can help in every situation encountered. 
 
 
Asset specificity refers to investments (transaction specific assets) that have a ‘lock-in 
effect’ (Tang et al., 2007) because they make it difficult to terminate a relationship and 
select other parties without acquiring losses (Yong and Mustaffa, 2011). Rindfleisch 
and Heide (1997) suggest that assets with high level of specificity can be regarded as 
sunk costs; that is because they have little or no value outside the focal exchange 
relationship (Williamson, 1985). There are six main types of asset specificity as 
identified by Williamson (1991, cited in Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997): (1) site 
specificity, (2) physical asset (e.g. plant) specificity, (3) human asset specificity (4) 
brand name capital, (5) dedicated assets, and (6) Temporal specificity. 
Uncertainty can be defined in its simplest form as ‘what is known in comparison to 
what needs to be known’. According to Achrol and Stern (1988, cited in Ting et al., 
2007) there are three components of uncertainty: 
• The adequacy of available information required for making key decisions; 
• The predictability of the potential consequences of these decisions; 
• The level of confidence of decision-makers when making these decisions. 
 
During transactions (ex-ante and post-ante contractual stages), two types of uncertainty 
are encountered: behavioural and environmental transaction uncertainty.  TC theory 
conceptualises ‘behavioural uncertainty’ as the amount of difficulty associated with 
monitoring and evaluating the performance of the exchange partners against established 
contractual agreements (Williamson 1985). ‘Environmental uncertainty’ is theorised as 
unanticipated changes in circumstances and the associated complexity surrounding the 
transaction context (Yong and Mustaffa, 2011). 
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In summary, the TC theory assumes that the greater the transaction uncertainty and asset 
specificity and the lower the transaction frequency, the higher is the transaction costs 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Yong and Mustaffa, 2011). It also suggests that exchange 
cannot be fully specified ex-ante and that contractual performance cannot be easily 
verified ex-post, due to bounded rationality and uncertainty factors (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). Therefore, Williamson developed Coase’s theory further to suggest that 
economic agents should primarily seek to economise on transaction costs (Lingard et 
al., 1998) by deploying efficient governance structures and strategies. Having provided 
an explanation to the theory’s constructs and main assumptions; the next sub-section 
provides a discussion about the consequences of the interplay that occurs between these 
constructs, which in turn lead to a number of governance challenges. 
 
2.3.3 The governance mechanism 
According to the TC theory, there are three main types of governance problems that 
occur during transactions (Williamson, 1985). These are: 
• The safeguarding problem; 
• The adaptation problem; 
• The performance-evaluation problem. 
 
 
A ‘safeguarding problem’ arises when a firm deploys transaction-specific assets and 
worries that its exchange-partner may opportunistically try to exploit these unique 
investments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Accordingly, it can be concluded that asset 
specificity and opportunism are the antecedents of the safeguarding problem. An 
‘adaptation problem’ occurs when a firm, whose decision makers are constrained by 
bounded rationality, struggles with modifying contractual agreements to unanticipated 
changes in the transaction environment (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Therefore, the 
consequence of the interaction between bounded rationality and environmental 
uncertainty is an adaptation problem. Similarly, a ‘performance evaluation’ problem is 
created when a firm,  whose decision makers are constrained by bounded rationality, 
faces difficulties in monitoring and evaluating the degree of contractual compliance of 
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its transaction partners with established agreements (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
Therefore, the consequence of the interplay between bounded rationality and behaviour 
uncertainty is a performance evaluation problem. 
 
Four types of governance structures are generally conceptualised to overcome 
governance problems, and thus reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1985; Bradach 
and Eccles, 1989). These are: 
• The ‘market’ governance structure (e.g. outsourcing);  
• The ‘hierarchy’ governance structure (e.g. in-house production and internal 
organisation);   
• The intermediate ‘hybrid’ mechanism (e.g. cooperative arrangements or using 
qualification procedures); and 
• Plural forms’ that integrate different government structures (See Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989) 
 
 
According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), the basic premise of TCA is that if those 
three governance problems described above are absent or low, decision-makers will 
accordingly favour market governance to vertical integration (the make-or-buy 
decision). Alternatively, if the transaction costs required for overcoming the governance 
problems exceed the production cost advantages of the market, firms will favour 
internal organization to the market solution (Coase, 1937). McNeil (1985) introduced 
the concept of ‘relational thinking’ in legal scholarship as a more positive and 
sustaining form of governance. This can be used to augment the conventional approach 
to transaction economising and solves governance problems through behavioural norms 
rather than potential sanctions (Ting et al, 2007). From this review to governance 
mechanisms, it seems useful to conclude by what Bradach and Eccles (1989, p. 99) have 
asserted: 
“Coase's insight has been extended and refined by many scholars, but the basic 
argument remains the same: transactions will be governed by the institutional 
arrangement that is most efficient”. 
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2.3.4 Contextual domain of applications and levels of analysis 
The TC approach has received substantial attention from scholars of various academic 
disciplines beyond economics, such as: marketing, political science, organisational 
theory, contract law, business strategy, corporate finance, and tentatively in construction 
management. They have applied TCA to investigate a wide range of exchange-related 
issues. A review by Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) to 45 empirical TCA articles 
indicates that these studies can be categorised within one of the following four main 
contextual domains: 
• Vertical integration – these studies are the most common and focus principally on 
the ‘buy or make’ decision.  
• Vertical inter-organisational relationships – similar to studies on vertical 
integration, but instead focus on how governance problems can be managed without 
complete ownership. 
• Horizontal inter-organisational relationships – uses TC analysis to understand and 
explain a variety of relationships between firms that exist at the same level in the 
value chain. 
• Tests of TCA’s assumptions – investigates the validity of TCE’s assumptions; for 
example the antecedents and consequences of opportunistic behaviour (see Wang 
and Yang, 2013). 
 
 
With regards to the level of analysis, Williamson (1981, cited in Walker and Wing, 
1999) believes that the TC approach has been applied at three levels of analysis: 
• The first level looks at the overall structure of the enterprise and is concerned with 
how the operating parts are related to one another; that is a direct reflection of the 
systems approach to organisation design. 
• The second level focuses on the operating parts and asks which activities should be 
performed within the firm and which outside it and why. 
• The third level is concerned with the manner in which human assets are organized to 
match internal governance structures (the new institutional economics). 
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2.3.5 Critiques and limitations of TCE 
This sub-section provides a critical discussion upon six major critiques and limitations 
of TCE, which have been identified through the study’s critical review of the theory: 
• The opportunism assumption debate 
• The asset specificity critique 
• The productivity vs. transaction costs argument 
• Measurement concerns 
• The risk-neutrality assumption critique  
• The unit of analysis limitation 
 
The opportunism assumption debate: 
Opportunism is the assumption that, given the opportunity, decision-makers may 
dishonestly seek to serve their self-interests (Williamson, 1985). There are at least five 
possible consequences of entrepreneurs’ opportunism: transaction costs; trust; 
commitment; performance; and cooperation (Ting et al; 2007; Wang and Yang, 2013). 
Thus, TCE aims to control opportunism in order to reduce waste. Nevertheless, TCE's 
assumption of opportunism has been subject to substantial debate (e.g. Ghoshal and 
Marshal, 1996; Ghoshal, 2005). It has been argued, by opponents of TCE, that 
opportunism takes a dismal view of human nature; that is because it implies that people 
will not self-enforce promises, but instead some of them lie and cheat when it suits their 
purpose (Ghoshal, 2005). Accordingly, TCE’s focus is on “how organisations need to 
be managed so as to prevent these ‘bad’ people from doing harm to others” (Ghoshal, 
2005, p. 85). Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argued that there is sufficient evidence that the 
likely outcome of such (negative) management approaches, is to support or increase 
opportunistic behaviours rather than reducing or controlling them. Building on the 
concept of double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1984) that distinguishes the link between 
theory and practice in social domains, Ghoshal (2005) argued that TCE’s pessimistic 
assumptions about human nature, and like-wise theories, have had a negative influence 
on practice: 
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 
 
Page | 40  
 
“Combine agency theory with transaction cost economics, add in standard 
versions of game theory and negotiation analysis, and the picture of the 
manager that emerges is one that is now very familiar in practice: the ruthlessly 
hard-driving, strictly top down, command-and-control focussed, share-holder 
value obsessed, win-at-any-cost business leader...This is what Isaiah Berlin 
implied when he wrote about absurdities in theory leading to dehumanisation of 
practice” (p. 85) 
 
 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) disagreed with Ghoshal and Marshal’s (1996) arguments. 
They argued that TCE does not assume that all social actors are opportunistically 
minded; instead it just suggests that some actors may behave opportunistically, and that 
it is difficult and costly to know a priori whose trustworthy and whose not (i.e. identify 
opportunistic partners ex ante). Compellingly, Williamson’s (1985, p. 392) own 
response to this recurring criticism, came as follows: 
 “This unattractive view of human nature nevertheless generates numerous 
refutable implications. The view that individuals are opportunistic does not, 
moreover, preclude the possibility that they will forge durable alliances”. 
 
 
Asset specificity critique: 
Asset specificity is regarded within TCE framework as sunk costs (that have a lock-in 
effect), which can encourage opportunism. These assets may include, for example, 
investments that a client employs for the purpose of supply chain development. 
According to TCE, this may encourage some members of the supply chain to exploit the 
situation. Thus a safeguarding problem arises because the market competition no longer 
restrains opportunism (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). It can be concluded here that the 
higher the asset specificity, the greater the loss becomes when altering a partnership 
(Yong and Mustaffa, 2011). Thus, asset specificity is viewed here as a factor that 
increases transaction costs and potential for opportunism. However some studies have 
found that asset specificity is negatively correlated with opportunism (see for example, 
Ting et al., 2007; Wang and Yang, 2013). This finding therefore indicates that asset 
specificity can be used as a means for reducing transaction costs. These studies suggest 
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that when asset specificity is within the advantage of the client, it can be used as a 
control mechanism to decrease opportunistic behaviour. In such situations, the investing 
parties tend to ensure relationship continuity, in order to secure payoffs of their 
transaction specific investments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997); this in turn enhances 
cooperation. Thus, it becomes obvious that the time dimension (i.e. transaction 
frequency) plays an important role in determining the impact of asset specificity on 
transaction costs. 
 
 
The production costs vs. transaction costs argument 
TCE has the objective of total cost minimisation (Winch, 1989; Tate et al., 2011, 2014). 
It aims to reduce both transaction and production costs (total costs). Williamson 
developed Coase’s theory of the firm to suggest that economic actors should primarily 
seek to economise on transaction costs. It is however recognised in TCE that making 
decisions about government structures encompasses a trade-off between transaction and 
production costs (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). As proclaimed by Williamson (1981): 
 “Although transaction cost economizing is an important and greatly neglected 
topic, such economizing cannot proceed regardless of the production cost 
ramifications. Put differently, transaction cost economizing needs to be located 
within a larger economizing framework and the relevant trade-offs need to be 
recognized” (p. 552). 
 
In addition, there seems to be inconsistency among scholars about deciding on whether 
transaction or production costs have a stronger impact on the choice of governance 
structures (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  In specific industries, like construction, it 
may be the case where the role (and magnitude) of production costs is more significant 
than transaction costs. It has been argued by Koskela and Ballard (2006, 2012) that TCE 
lacks a proper conceptualisation of production and waste, and thus they questioned the 
relevance of TCE in the construction sector.  According to them:  
“It is hardly possible to isolate transaction costs completely from production 
costs, as assumed in transaction cost economics. The transaction behaviour of 
the supplier impacts the production costs in situation-specific and complex 
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ways, but this is not taken into account in transaction cost economics because 
production costs are considered constant” (Koskela and Ballard, 2006, P. 157). 
 
Furthermore, it is assumed in TCE that economic actors should primarily focus on 
choosing an optimal governance structure, in order to ensure efficient transactions and 
avoidance of waste. However, it could be simply argued that that no matter how 
efficient the chosen governance structure could be, there is no optimal/perfect mode of 
governance. Thus, the extent of non-optimality is waste that needs to be tackled through 
economising on production activities (Koskela and Ballard, 2012). From these 
arguments provided above, in relation to TCE’s poor conceptualization of production 
and optimality assumption, it is therefore suggested that, in the construction sector, 
project organisation and governance structures (construction procurement 
arrangements) should be crafted to support production system requirements and 
improve flow processes, rather than being based on transactional cost and risk-averse 
considerations. 
 
Measurement-related concerns 
Difficulty of obtaining data is a problem often highlighted as a key obstacle to testing 
TC theory (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Hughes et al., 2005; Klug and Pietrzak, 2006). 
A review of 45 empirical TC analysis studies by Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) revealed 
that the main data collection methods that have been used to investigate TCA are: 
• Mail surveys - the most commonly used approach; 
• Secondary data publications, e.g. industry trade publications; 
• Records of contractual agreements (obtained from databases or through 
interviews with key informants); 
• Experimental methodologies. 
 
 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), however, reported that many of the studies they reviewed 
faced significant measurement-related challenges. Environmental uncertainty was found 
to be the most difficult construct to be measured amongst all TCE constructs. This 
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finding seems to support Klem’s (1997, pp. 58; cited in Klug and Pietrzak, 2006) claim 
that transaction costs are difficult to measure, because TCE theory is more qualitative 
than quantitative. Similarly, a prolonged research project by Will Hughes and his 
fellows (2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005) also raised concerns about the difficulty of 
measuring transaction costs. Their project aimed to quantify the relationship between 
forms of construction procurement, project types and the costs of the commercial 
process. In order to achieve this objective, they divided the commercial process into 
four stages (marketing, establishing agreements, monitoring of works, and resolving 
disputes); but their study highlighted the difficulty of obtaining data as a key obstacle to 
testing the reliability of TCE in general, especially in the construction industry. The 
temporary nature, highly commercially sensitive information associated with 
construction tendering and contractual processes, and the fear that the data could 
eventually be revealed to competitors or end up in the public domain, are all reasons 
that make it difficult for researchers to negotiate access into firms for the purpose of 
collecting data (see Layea and Hughes, 2011).. According to Dalrymple et al. (2006), 
the main barriers to understanding construction tendering costs include:  
• Difficulty in determining resources allocated to tendering costs,  
• Difficulty or reluctance to implement,  
• Greed and blatant corruption  
 
Having all of these said, difficulties in measuring transactional costs in construction 
should not still be a valid reason for claiming the failure of TCA in construction, and 
thus ignoring its explanatory power. As Rindfleisch and Heid (1997) have shown, for 
example, through their comprehensive review of 45 empirical examinations of the TCE 
framework, many researchers from different industries have been able to test and 
validate the TC theory. TCE can provide fruitful insights and economical explanations 
to contractual and institutional issues in construction, whenever appropriate. According 
to Chau and Walker (1994, p. 372): 
 “Provided that the type of transaction costs can be identified and the way they 
vary under different circumstances can be specified, the transaction cost 
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minimization paradigm can successfully explain most real life phenomena 
related to the choice of institutional arrangement”  
It is important, however, to stress that not all institutional and organisational 
arrangements are developed based on cost considerations (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; 
Klug and Pietrzak, 2006). The theory of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983), for instance in contrast to TCE, proved that many organisational 
arrangements and relationships are not necessarily formed based on efficiency 
considerations. Instead, some are also formed due to imitation throughout an 
organisational field (see Section 2.4.3 below). This phenomenon of institutional 
isomorphism seems to explain many of the prevailing (imperfect) construction 
procurement practices in the UK. For example, the above-mentioned research project by 
Will Hughes and his fellows (Hughes et al., 2005) ended up concluding that there is no 
correlation between costs of tendering and the way the work is organized (i.e. 
procurement type). Their study found that the costs of negotiation within collaborative 
arrangements are almost equal to the costs of tendering and establishing deals in 
competitive arrangements. Despite this, competitive procurement arrangements 
continue to prevail, despite their widely criticised inadequacies. For these reasons, 
amongst others, they questioned the relevance of TCE to the construction industry by 
claiming that  
“High transaction costs may imply that it would be economical to bring inputs 
in-house and avoid the costs of arranging sub-contracts. Theoretically, there 
should be a movement towards the internal labour market and away from sub- 
contracting. But in the UK the trend is the other way, questioning the relevance 
of TCE in the construction sector” (pp. 215-216). 
 
Risk-neutrality assumption critique 
In economic theories (i.e. game theory and neo-classical economics), three types of risk 
preferences are considered: risk acceptance, risk neutrality, and risk aversion (Chiles 
and McMackin, 1996). However, the TCE framework implies that all partners of a 
transaction have a neutral attitude towards risk (Williamson, 1985). Although risk 
preference is regarded as one of the important determinants of economic behaviour, it 
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has received less attention in literature in comparison to other behavioural assumptions 
of TCE (i.e. bounded rationality and opportunism). Williamson (1985) offered three 
defenses for his treatment of the risk neutrality assumption. The third and most 
compelling reason, according to him, for the use of risk neutrality assumption is that is 
allows us to focus on the core concepts of TCE, whereas an assumption of risk adversity 
may be misleading. He then provides a justification to his claim by explaining that: 
 “Risk aversion often deflects attention from core efficiency purposes and related 
institutional features that are more readily discerned and more accurately 
assessed if, at this early stage in the development of the New Institutional 
Economics at least, a risk neutrality assumption is maintained” (Williamson 
1985, pp. 388-390). 
 
A theoretical study by Chiles and McMackin (1996) criticised Williamson’s (1985) 
defense and suggested three reasons for why they believed a closer examination of risk 
neutrality is essential. They argued that: 
• Keeping TCE’s analogy consistent with that of neoclassical economics is 
essential for enabling comparisons to be conducted; 
• Results of psychological studies suggest that risk preferences of a single firm 
vary in a systematic way, influenced by a variety of contextual variables 
• The governance mechanisms predicted by the TCE framework will differ 
according to the risk preference of the firm. 
 
Chiles and McMackin (1996) concluded their study by arguing that many of the 
perceived limitations of TCE are in part a result of the inadequate treatment of risk and 
trust in earlier versions of the work. They offered a number of propositions that 
demonstrate how that risk and trust can be incorporated into TCE’s theoretical model 
with ease; but there have not been sufficient empirical examinations to support their 
arguments. 
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Unit of analysis limitation 
One of the most significant critiques of TCE is concerned with its unit of analysis: the 
individual transaction. According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997, p. 49), “this implicit 
tendency of the theory to focus on single transactions and relationships ignores the 
temporal nature of inter-organisational relationships”. For example, TCE does not 
explicitly consider how that past relationships and expectations about future 
transactions (i.e. path dependency) may influence the way current exchanges are 
organised (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Accordingly, it can be suggested that 
perspectives from TCE and game theory could probably supplement each other. 
However this suggestion is criticised by Kreps (1999, P. 122), cited in Williamson 
(2000, p. 605), who argued that: 
“If Markets and Hierarchies have been translated into game theory using 
notions of information economics, it is a very poor translation . . . In particular, 
mathematics-based theory still lacks the language needed to capture essential 
ideas of bounded rationality, which are central to . . . transaction costs and 
contractual form. Anyone who relies on the translations alone misses large and 
valuable chunks of the original”. 
 
 
It can be argued that the ‘transaction frequency’ construct within the TCE framework 
addresses this individual transaction or firm limitation/critique to some extent; but as 
Coase (1998, p. 2) emphasised “we cannot confine our analysis to what happens within 
a single firm… What we are dealing with is a complex interrelated structure”. Coase 
(1998) suggested that TCE’s unit of analysis should be expanded to consider and 
include:  
• Interactions with other firms within the supply chain; 
• Institutional forces (e.g. influence of laws, culture, and social system); 
• The effects of technological advances (e.g. digital revolution) which lead to a 
dramatic fall in information costs - a major component of transaction costs. 
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In short, it seems that expanding TCE’s unit of analysis beyond single transactions has 
significant implications. This, subsequently, led to the emergence of the concept of 
‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE). The next subsections will provide an overview of 
the agency theory in economics, followed by an outline of the background and the main 
principles of NIE. 
2.3.6 Agency Theory  
Agency theory is a branch of transactional cost economics (TCE) that aims to devise 
efficient ways to constrain the opportunistic behaviour of agents (Walker and Wing, 
1999). The focal point of agency theory is the goal conflict inherent when individuals 
(or organisations) with different preferences, risk attitudes and division of labour engage 
in a cooperative effort (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, the unit of analysis is the contract, the 
theory seeks to determine the most efficient contractual mechanism governing the 
principle-agent relationship. According to Eisenhardt (1989), TCE and agency theory 
have similar dependent variables; hierarchies roughly respond to behaviour-based 
contracts, while markets correspond to out-come based contracts (see Figure 2.1 below). 
The main difference between the two theories, however, is that agency theory’s 
emphasis is on ex-ante incentive alignment and efficient risk bearing, while TCE is 
mainly concerned with governing ex-post stages of contract (Williamson, 2000). Table 
2.1 summarises the similarities and contrasts between the fundamental assumptions of 
agency theory and other organisational theories. 
Table 2.1: Comparison between agency theory's assumptions and other organisational 
theories (Adopted from Eisenhardt, 1989) 
Assumptions 
Theoretical Perspective 
Political Contingency 
Organizational 
Control 
TCE 
Agency  
Theory 
Self-interest  X   X X 
Goal conflict X   X X 
Bounded Rationality  X X X X 
Information asymmetry  X  X X 
Pre-eminence of efficiency  X X X X 
Risk aversion     X 
Information as a commodity      X 
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Agency theory broadened risk-sharing literature by attempting to resolve two 
governance problems in the principal-agency relationship where one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the Agent) to perform the work (Eisenhardt, 
1989). At the heart of Principal-Agent theory is the trade-off between the: (a) Cost of 
measuring behaviour; and the (b) Cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to 
the agent. According to Walker and Wing (1999), the principal’s choice would require a 
consideration of the cost of constraining the agent's behaviour (or of the agent's 
opportunistic behaviour if the cost of constraining it is higher) as well as the cost of loss 
in productivity and flexibility as a result of the constraint.  
 
 
     Antecedents Governance Problems Governance Solutions 
Figure 2.1: A simplified model of the Principal-Agency relationship problems 
 
 
In particular, the theory seeks to identify whether a behaviour-orientated contract is 
more efficient that an outcome-orientated contract. Agency theory conceptualises 
information as a commodity that has a cost and can be purchased. Thus, the principal 
has two main options (Eisenhardt 1989). Firstly, to monitor and discover the agent's 
behaviour by investing in information systems (e.g. monitoring and reporting 
procedures, additional layers of management). Secondly, to contract on the outcomes of 
the agent's behaviour. The out-come based contractual arrangement might help to 
improve performance and behaviour by co-aligning the agent's interests and incentives 
with those of the principal, but at the price of transferring risk to the agent. Based on the 
principles of the Agency theory and TCE, Figure 2 below illustrates the variables 
influencing the principal's choice, in the form of propositions. 
 
 
Conflict in goals and 
desires between P&A 
Difference in attitudes 
towards risk between 
P&A 
Hybrid/Intermixed (e.g. cooperative 
arrangements such as IPD and TVD) 
Markets or outcome-based contracts   
(e.g. outsourcing and using contracts 
with incentives) 
Verification of the 
Agent's behaviour is 
expensive or difficult 
The Agency 
Problem 
The Risk-sharing 
problem 
or 
Hierarchies or behaviour-based 
contracts (e.g. In-house production 
or investing in information systems) 
or 
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 
 
Page | 49  
 
The Principal-Agency relationship is a typical problem that seems to be deeply 
institutionalised in our current prevalent construction business model (e.g. client – main 
contractor relationship). Further, prevailing construction procurement governance 
arrangements seem to be in consistence with the two options offered by Agency theory: 
(1) contracting on the outcomes of the agent's behaviour (outsourcing and relying on the 
buy-it solution); and/or (2) monitoring and controlling behaviour (i.e. relying on the use 
of contractual governance solutions). These transactional-based and risk-averse 
approaches to construction procurement prevail in the construction industry, even 
though it could be more appropriate and efficient to use a vertically integrated “make-it” 
or production-led approach, where interests are safeguarded through “in-house” or 
“hybrid” production (i.e. make-it solution). 
 
Figure 2.2: Conceptual model showing the relationship between transactional variables 
and governance arrangements [Modified from Esienhardt (1989)] 
 
 
2.3.7 New Institutional Economics  
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm was developed to enable economists 
to take the wider aspects of the institutional environment and arrangements into their 
scope of analysis. It was Ronald Coase (1960) who made the crucial connection 
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 
 
Page | 50  
 
between institutions, transaction costs, and neoclassical theory. Additionally, it is 
acknowledged by Williamson (1990) that North and Davis (1971, pp. 6-7) have 
significantly contributed to institutional economics by distinguishing between the 
institutional environment and the institutional arrangements. These two branches of NIE 
were defined by them, as follows: 
“The Institutional environment is the set of political, social and legal ground 
rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution… 
An institutional arrangement is an arrangement between economic units that 
governs the way these units can cooperate and/or compete”. 
 
 
The expression of "the new institutional economics" was however coined by Oliver 
Williamson to differentiate the subject from the old (or original) institutional economics 
(Coase, 1998). The old school of institutional economics is founded on the tradition of 
Thorstein Veblen (1899), and suggests that institutions emerge spontaneously as the 
result of an uncoordinated evolutionary process (Nelson and Sampat, 2001; Parada 
2002). While, the new school postulates that institutions involve conscious and 
coordinated planning. North (1994, p. 360) defines institutions, within the NIE 
paradigm, as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction”. 
According to him, institutions are the admixture of formal constraints (e.g., rules and 
laws), informal constraints (e.g., norms and routines), and their enforcement 
characteristics. For a controversial review about debates related to the commonalities 
and distinctions of the old and the new institutional economics, see for example, 
Hodgson (2000), Nelson and Sampat (2001), Dequesh (2002), and Parada (2002).  
According to Dequesh (1998; cited in Dequesh, 2002), several institutionalists from 
both schools have identified at least three types of influence that intitutions have on 
economic behaviour:  
• Contraints on economic behaviour (i.e. restrictive function);  
• Influence on perception or reception of reality (ie. informational-cognitive function);  
• Influence on end goals that people pursue (i.e motivational or teleological function).  
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Williamson (2000) provided a sketch of four hierarchical and interconnected levels of 
social analysis (which describe the framework for the economics of institutions), where 
the higher level imposes constrains on the level immediately below: 
1. Embeddedness (the highest level) – represents informal institutions, such as 
customs, norms, traditions and religion. Institutions at this level change very slowly 
and are often non-calculative. Thus, this level is outside the scope of institutional 
economics. Instead it is undertaken by social scientists and economic historians. 
2. Institutional Environment (1st order economising) – the formal rules of the game, 
and is mainly concerned with property rights (e.g. rules, laws, policy, judiciary, and 
bureaucracy). At this level of analysis, the purpose is getting the institutional 
environment right. This can be undertaken using economics of property rights or 
positive political theory.  
3. Institutional arrangements or Institutions of Governance (2nd order economising) – 
the play of the game, and is mainly concerned with contracts (i.e. aligning 
governance structures with transactions). At this level of analysis, the purpose is 
getting the governance structures right.  This is undertaken using transaction cost 
economics.  
4. Resource allocation and employment (3rd order economising) - prices, quantities and 
incentive alignments. At this level of analysis, the purpose is getting the marginal 
conditions right. This is undertaken using neoclassical economics and agency 
theory. 
 
In summary, NIE is principally concerned with Levels 2 and 3 of the four levels of 
social analysis described above (Williamson, 2000). These are the levels of the 
institutional environment and the institutions of governance – i.e. rules of the game and 
play of the game, respectively. Although ‘informal’ institutions are important for 
economics, as it is believed that they define the boarders that constrain the way in which 
rules and regulations are created and related enforcements are carried out (North, 1984, 
cited in Sha, 2004), they remain an underdeveloped part of NIE (Williamson, 2000). 
The next sections, therefore, explore the background of institutional theory and its 
development over time from a social scientific thinking and perspective. 
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2.4 Neo Institutional Theory  
Having considered TCE and NIE economic explanations to the establishment, process 
and outcomes of several forms of institutional and organisational arrangements, the shift 
now moves to an exploration of ‘neo-institutional theory’–a branch of organizational 
sociology. This theory provides a social perspective to the formation of institutional and 
organisational arrangements. In particular, the theory argues that many organisational 
arrangements are ‘not’ necessarily formed based on efficiency considerations only. 
Instead, some are also formed due to imitation and mere ceremony  (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), or the fact that that they are widely shared, disseminated, and taken for granted 
throughout an organisational field (e.g. the construction industry) (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
 
 
2.4.1 Background of the institutional theory 
Institutional theory has a long and complex history dating back to the mid-nineteenth 
century and incorporates the pioneering insights of seminal scholars of the social 
sciences, such as Max Webber (Scott, 2005). Old institutional arguments relied on 
notions that ‘institutional contexts structure action’. According to Meyer (2008) 
‘Individuals were seen as creatures of habit groups as controlled by customs and 
societies as organized around culture’ (p. 790). Theories stretched from the economic 
to political and religious fields, emphasising more organisational or cultural forms of 
control. However, in general, the nature of institutions and their forms of control over 
action were always subject to a lack of clarity and consensus in social scientific thinking 
(Meyer, 2008). 
 
The old institutionalism was encountered by constant debates about free will and 
determinism; as it saw humans, groups and organisations as naturally embedded entities 
in broad cultural and structural contexts. In brief, the old institutionalism was 
marginalised by the rise of the social sciences of modernity, where conceptions were 
built around notions of society being comprised of empowered, fairly rational, and 
rather free actors (Meyer, 2008). These actors include individuals, governments, and the 
organisations created by people and governments. In addition, much of the work 
focused on institutionalism from these periods was subsumed in the storming advances 
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of neoclassical theory in economics, behaviouralism in political science, and positivism 
in sociology. Further development by John Meyer and his colleagues at Stanford 
University led to a significant revival for the ideas of institutionalism from 1977, with 
the formulation of neo-institutional theory (Scott, 2005; 2008). 
 
2.4.2 The development of neo-institutional theory 
The neo-institutional theory developed in response to specific processes and structures 
(i.e. causes of structural change in organisations) that were not adequately explained by 
prevailing rational-actor and contingency theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Mahalingam and Levitt, 2007). For example, bureaucratic organisations continued to 
follow rules that in some cases conflicted with the organisations’ own goals. The 
general argument advanced by the foundational work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) was 
that formal organisational structures reflected institutional forces instead of 
technological requirements and resource dependencies. They argued that many of the 
models giving rise to organisations are based on rationalised myths and rule-like 
frameworks that depend for their efficacy on imitation and the fact that they are widely 
shared and disseminated.  
 
In brief, conventional neo-institutionalism literature, in replication of the old 
institutionalism, emphasised the ways by which institutions constrained and directed 
people (now perceived as bounded, purposive and empowered actors) to behave in 
certain regular, relatively rational, but homogeneous and expected ways (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). With more than 30 years of progress since neo-institutional theory 
penetrated organisational sociology, the theory has been subject to various 
developments including reformulation of some of its arguments. Next, three significant 
areas of development, which are most relevant to the study, will be briefly highlighted 
(for a fuller review, see Scott, 2008). 
 
2.4.3 Institutional Isomorphism 
In the 1970s, when research efforts were focussed on understanding the reasons for 
variations amongst the kind of organisations (i.e. structural features), seminal work by 
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983) sought to explain homogeneity of organisations and 
practices rather than their variations. Their contention was that "highly structured 
organisation fields provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with 
uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, 
culture, and output" (p. 144). They described this phenomenon as ‘institutional 
isomorphic change’, which occurs through three mechanisms:  
(1) ‘Coercive isomorphism’ that results from political forces and legitimacy issues;  
(2) ‘Mimetic isomorphism’ occurring due to standard responses to uncertainty; and 
(3) ‘Normative isomorphism’ associated with professionalisation.  
 
 
‘Organisational fields’ can be defined as those independent actors (i.e. persons and 
organisations), within somewhat circumscribed arenas, that produce similar services or 
products and constitute a shared culture and social sub-system (Scott, 2008, 2012). The 
logic for applying work at organisational field levels is that it provides us with a more 
systematic level of analysis; as attention is shifted from focussing merely on 
'organisations in environments' to focussing on the 'organisation of the environment', 
with particular consideration to organisations as the key players of the field (Scott, 
2008).  
 
2.4.4 The move towards a comprehensive conceptual schema 
Institutional theory has been widely employed among social, economic and political 
sciences to examine systems ranging from micro-interpersonal interactions to macro 
global frameworks. Despite the fact that the theory had multiple roots; there is a wide 
consensus that institutions matter (Peng et al., 2009). Nevertheless, social scholars were 
adopting the theory in various ways, and there seemed to be a crucial need to move 
from a looser towards a tighter conceptualisation. For this reason, sociologist W. 
Richard Scott provided a comprehensive conceptual schema (see Table 2.2), based on 
his extensive survey to institutional literature, that guides directions for pursuing such a 
theory. Scott defined institutions as: ‘regulative, normative, and cultural/cognitive 
systems and structures that, together with associated activities and resources, provide 
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stability and meaning to social life’ (Scott, 2001, p. 48). His aim was not to provide a 
new integrated theory of institutions, but instead to better enable us to capture both the 
commonality and the diversity of past and present conceptions of institutional theory 
(Scott, 2008).  
Hence legitimacy is a primary requisite of any stable social order, the three pillars are 
analytically distinguished to stress that although interrelated, but they work through 
varying mechanisms and distinctive motives for compliance (Scott, 2012). For instance, 
a 'regulative' perspective evaluates legitimacy according to the extent that systems 
operate in conformance to relevant legal or quasi-legal requirements. Alternatively, a 
'normative' view asserts a moral basis for evaluating legitimacy; while a cultural-
cognitive conception refers to the orthodox and taken for granted features of social life 
that widely shared beliefs within a community make possible (Scott, 2012). 
Table 2.2: Scott’s Typology of Institutional Pillars and Carriers (Scott, 2001) 
Pillars 
Carriers Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Symbolic 
Systems 
Rules, laws Values, expectations 
Categories, 
typifications, schema 
Relational 
Systems 
Governance & power 
systems 
Regimes, authority 
systems 
Structural 
isomorphism 
identities 
Routines 
Protocols, Standard 
Operating Procedures 
Jobs, roles, 
obedience to duty 
Scripts 
Artifacts 
Objects complying with 
mandated specifications 
Objects meeting 
conventions, 
standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
 
2.4.5 Strategic responses to institutional pressure 
Institutional theory pays significant attention to the context (Oliver, 1991). It considers 
the processes by which structures including rules, norms, and routines become 
established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. Much of the early studies of 
institutional theory emphasised that organisations and actors, operating within a specific 
context, were pressurised to conform to the requirements and constraints of their 
institutional environment (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organisations’ self-
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interested rewards obtained from conformance to these institutional forces include, for 
example, legitimacy, enhancing likelihood of survival, social support, stability, access 
to resources, acceptance in professions, and expedience to avoid questioning (Oliver, 
1991). For these reasons, the prevalent language used was one of ‘institutional effects’, 
thereby inferring a determinant ‘top-down’ argument (Scott, 2005).  
 
This unilateral perspective based on obedient organisations defocussed attentions of 
institutional scholars away from the fact that social structures are continuously modified 
by the individual and collective actions of social actors. Thus, according to Scott 
(2008), one of the important advances to the progress of institutional theory is the 
introduction of agented actors and accordingly the rise of interactive arguments, which 
suggest that ‘institutional processes’ can operate in both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
directions. This was important because it allows us to also identify the social actors who 
held the widely shared beliefs, or were enforcing taken for granted norms (Scott, 2005).  
 
It was the seminal work of Oliver (1991) who affirmed the role of organisational self-
interest and active agency within institutional contexts, by cleverly integrating resource-
dependence predictions of organisational strategy with the more limited responses to 
institutional pressures that traditional institutional models provoked. She pointed out 
that although acquiescence to institutional processes is the most likely response by 
organisations and their leaders; strategic responses could range from passive to active 
resistance as follows: acquiescence; compromise; avoid; defy; and manipulate. 
Accordingly, organisational reactions to institutional pressure towards conformity will 
depend on five institutional antecedents (Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3: Institutional antecedents of strategic responses (extracted from Oliver, 1991) 
Institutional 
Factor 
Research Question Predictive Dimensions 
Cause Why is the organisation being 
pressurised to conform to 
institutional rules or 
expectations? 
• Legitimacy or social fitness; 
• Efficiency or economic fitness 
Constituents Who is asserting the 
institutional pressure on the 
• Multiplicity of constituent 
demands; 
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organisation? • Dependency on institutional 
constituents 
Content To what norms or requirements 
is the organisation being 
pressurised to conform? 
• Consistency with organisational 
goals; 
• Discretionary constituents 
imposed on the organisation; 
Control How or by what means are the 
institutional pressures being 
exerted? 
• Legal coercion or enforcement; 
• Voluntary diffusion of norms; 
Context What is the environmental 
context within which 
institutional pressures are being 
exerted? 
• Environmental uncertainty; 
• Environmental 
interconnectedness 
 
Having considered the explanations provided by neo-institutional theory of 
organizational sociology and TC theory of economics, in relation to the formation, 
process and impacts of several forms of institutional and organisational arrangements, 
next the study explores the construction procurement context. 
 
2.5 The Construction Procurement Context 
The aim of this section is to explore literature pertaining to the construction 
procurement (CP) context. This commences by clarifying how this study defines a 
construction procurement system (CPS), before reviewing the background and 
evolvement of various project delivery approaches. Next an outline of major 
procurement arrangements (system, sub-systems and options) used in construction is 
illustrated. Following this, the study conceptualises CP arrangements as ‘institutional 
arrangements’, and explores their influence on project performance and outcomes. 
 
2.5.1 Construction procurement systems 
A common theme of construction literature is the proliferation of definitions of a 
procurement system (see for example, Sharif and Morledge, 1994; Love et al., 1998; 
Masterman, 2002; Watermeyer, 2012). Both terms: `contractual arrangement’ and 
`procurement system’ are often used synonymously (Love et al., 1998). Similarly, 
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procurement approaches and additional contract price provisions (e.g. lump sum, 
guaranteed maximum price, target cost, and cost plus) are also commonly regarded as 
closely related (Oyegoke et al., 2009). Interestingly, a study by Tookey et al. (2001) 
found that, in practice, clients do not adhere to rigid prescriptive procurement guidance 
and definitions, which regard construction procurement as a set of rationalistic decisions 
taking place within a closed environment (mechanistic-thinking approach); instead 
counterintuitive decisions are the norm, leading to the formation of hybrid structures. It 
is, however, important to define terms and concepts that are critical in communicating 
the intent and context of the research, so as to establish a common understanding 
between the author and his readers. Thus, for convenience and clarity, this study defines 
a construction procurement system as ‘a project-organisation system that arranges and 
governs the way that the parties involved can compete and/or cooperate in order to 
achieve their agreed programme and/or project goals’.  
 
 
Inspired by Masterman’s (2002) fourfold categorisation of procurement methods, Love 
et al's (1998) classification of building procurement systems, Kumrasawy and 
Dissanayaka's (1998) hierarchy of procurement options, and Watermeyer's (2011) 
framework for developing a construction procurement strategy, this study 
conceptualises major construction procurement arrangements as illustrated in Figure 
2.3, and Table 2.4 below.  
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Figure 2.3: Major construction procurement arrangements (systems and sub-systems) 
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Table 2.4: Major options available within construction procurement subsystems 
Procurement subsystem /Procedure Possible Options 
Work packaging 
• Break down based on contract value (e.g. large packaging to be employed for the purpose of high 
price competition, or small packaging if specialist expertise is required) 
• Divisions based on geographical divisions or functional and disciplinary divisions of contracts 
• Design based on sequence or interdependence of activities 
• Design based on Project risks and the allocation of responsibilities, or project needs 
Form of contracts  
• Standard un-amended set of contract forms and conditions from recognised bodies (e.g. FIDIC, 
NEC3, ICE, JCT,  contracts)   
• Amended standard forms of contract which include special conditions of contract (e.g. special risk 
transfer/allocation, length of guarantee and additional insurance) 
• Multi-party agreement forms of contract (e.g. PPC2000) 
• Discrete/Bespoke contracts (custom-made)  
Selection methodologies (Bid-evaluations) 
• High weight on tender price  
• Equal weight on price and soft parameters  
• High weight on soft parameters (e.g. competence, reputation, capacity, collaborative-ability, and 
experience) 
Payment mechanism  
• Advanced payments 
• Milestone payments 
• Interim payments (e.g. Monthly payments) 
• Stage payments 
• Incentive/disincentive payments 
• Shared gain/pain arrangements/Target cost  
Insurance systems  
• Traditional insurance arrangements;  
• Single project-insurance option 
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Warranties  
• Collateral warranties; or  
• latent defect insurance 
Tendering approach  
 
• Competitive open bid procedures with or without post-qualifications (one or two stage tendering);  
• Selected- limited bid invitation - with or without pre-qualifications; (one or two-stage tendering)  
• Direct negotiation with one preferred supplier (no tender) 
Pricing strategy 
• Price-based (e.g. Lump sum; Guaranteed maximum price; Bills of quantities; Price list/schedule; 
Activity-based scheduling) 
• Cost-based (e.g. cost-reimbursement; Target cost; and Target value design) 
• Mixed 
Performance evaluation mechanisms  
• Output control by client - inspection of the outcome 
• Process control by client - ongoing monitoring 
• Social control - Self-control by contractor  
Strategy for achieving ‘Secondary Objectives’  
(e.g.  promoting sustainability, enhancing health 
&safety performance beyond statutory 
requirements, and poverty alleviation) 
• Through the use of incentives that are provided in the form of tender evaluation points 
• Through financial incentives for attaining key performance indicators 
• Via obligations and mandatory contractual subcontracting requirements 
Dispute resolution mechanisms (DRM) 
• Conventional DRMs (i.e. litigation, arbitration, adjudication) 
• Alternative DRMs (e.g. Mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, Partnering) 
Bondings / Financial governance approaches 
• Performance/Surety bonds  
• Bank Guarantees  
• Standby letters of credit  
• Cash retentions  
• Parent company guarantee 
• No need for use of bonds as a means of safeguarding - Instead the focus is on pre-qualifications, 
direct negotiation, single project insurance and  collaborative/relation-based delivery approaches 
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From ancient construction to separated delivery methods 
Throughout ancient times, the construction process used to be executed from inception 
to completion by master builders who retained responsibility for both design and 
construction (Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 2010). Examples include the 'Egyptian 
Pyramids', that were built by the pharaoh's builders in a span of 85 years between 2589 
and 2504 B.C (Bonani et al., 2001); the 'Parthenon Temple' in Greece that was built in 
the fifth century B.C by the master builders Ictinus and Callicrates, and the 'Dome on 
the Florence Cathedral' constructed in the twelfth century by master builder Filippo 
Brunelleschi (Garrison, 2013).  The increasing complexity of construction projects has 
initiated an era of specialization and the separation of processes that were previously 
undertaken - from initiation to completion - by one master builder (Oyegoke et al., 
2009). According to Garrison (2013), this separated method of organising design and 
construction is mainly influenced by the varied events surrounding the industrial 
revolution. Growth of cities, the need for specialised types of buildings and knowledge 
expertise are all factors, amongst others, that have maximised the role and need for 
professional architects and designers. Additionally, improved communication enabled 
designers to create specifications and drawings from anywhere, while builders had to 
remain localised (Garrison, 2013). Furthermore, Garrison states that: 
"Maybe the most important effect resulted from a change in thinking that 
occurred during the Industrial Revolution. Frederick Taylor introduced his 
Scientific Management in 1911. It divided work into tasks, and because of the 
drastic difference between the design process and the physical work of 
construction, they were a target for separation" (Garrison, 2013, p.1). 
 
 
Taylor's approach in principle aimed to improve economic efficiency by the means of 
task management (Koskela, 2000). It stemmed from the reductionist view of the world 
that has shaped the Western thinking at least since 17th century, when the French 
philosopher Rene Descartes suggested that the best way to deal with complexity is to 
divide a problem into separate parts and then tackle those parts one by one in a rational 
and linear manner (Chapman, 2004, p.18; cited in Pekuri et al., 2014). These ideas 
served as the rationale for the transformation view of production which holds that 
production can be broken down into separate sub-processes, and that the total cost of the 
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 
 
Page | 63  
 
production process can thus be optimised by minimising the cost of each sub-process 
(Koskela 2000a). 
 
 
Consequently, the hierarchical system adopted in the construction industry became 
subject to reform over time. Designers became the managers of the project who dictate 
materials and details, leaving contractors with a very limited opportunity to bring in 
their expertise into design (Garrison, 2013). In the early 20th century, most projects 
were delivered through this separated, architect-led, procurement system using lump-
sum contracts, with an exception to some limited contractor-centred approaches (i.e. 
design and build) developed in the private sector in attempts to improve project delivery 
and outcomes (Oyegoke et al., 2009). Since the 1940s, Public procurement policies 
have greatly embraced design-bid-build (traditional procurement), making it the most 
widely used project delivery method in the United States (Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 
2010), and most countries worldwide including the UK. This traditional approach led to 
the formation of multiple subcultures and stereotypes within the construction industry, 
causing high levels of fragmentation (Egan, 1998), intra-team boundaries (Moore and 
Dainty, 2001), inefficiencies and high costs of insufficient interoperability (Kent and 
Becerik-Gerber, 2010). Additionally, this separated project delivery approach often 
results in a sequential construction process, where various parties just get temporary 
involved at certain project phases; thereby focussing on their own part of the work 
rather than the whole project (Osipova and Eriksson, 2011). This point raises the 
question: why has the traditional procurement method gained such popularity, spread all 
over the world, and is still commonly used in various countries? This is a valid 
fundamental question, as there are substantial trends towards establishing collaborative 
ways of working as a means for improving project performance and outcomes (see for 
example, Eriksson et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Sebastian, 2011; Walker et al., 2017) 
 
 
According to Watermeyer (2012), this traditional way of organising, delivering and 
managing construction work was originally established in the UK in 1768 by John 
Smeaton, who is considered as the founder of civil engineering; entrenched by Sir 
Joseph Bazalgette who developed a standard form of contract in the 1860's , which later 
on served as the model for the first edition of the Institution of Civil Engineer's standard 
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form of contract published in 1945 (Barnes 1999), and then passed on from the UK to 
its colonies. This Traditional separated procurement approach, described by 
Watermeyer (2012) as a "master–servant" model, remained in use for the majority of 
civil engineering projects in the UK for more than two hundred years, and is still in use 
till now in many projects especially in developing Anglophone countries. However, 
although the UK Government since 2003 stressed that traditional (non-integrated) 
procurement routes should no longer be used, unless it can be evidenced that they offer 
best value for money (OGC 2003); several research studies and UK industry-wide 
reports have revealed that traditional procurement systems are still very prevalent and 
adopted by many organisations, despite not being approved by UK Government 
guidance anymore (e.g. RICS, 2004; CIOB, 2010; Oyegoke et al., 2009; Eadie et al., 
2013). Interestingly, many studies have focussed on explaining the disadvantages of 
traditional procurement systems (see for example, Proverbs et al., 2000; Osipova and 
Eriksson, 2011; Love et al., 2011b) and the barriers to implementing collaborative 
procurement approaches (e.g. Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Phua, 2006; Eriksson et al., 
2008). However, very few, if any, studies have been able to offer convincing 
explanations, based on a sound theoretical framework, to this issue concerning the 
dominance and persistence of the use of (inefficient) traditional procurement routes in 
construction projects. 
 
 
Construction management delivery methods 
Separating design from construction, in terms of responsibilities and risks, was not a 
serious concern while buildings were relatively simple. However, technical revolutions 
after the Second World War created more demanding systems (e.g. HVAC, elevators 
and curtain walls) that required architects and engineers to manage and coordinate their 
efforts with the construction team (Garrison, 2013). This led to the development of a 
variety of newer project delivery methods to address this problem. The first of these was 
the Construction Management (CM) procurement method which was introduced in the 
1960s as an antidote to the problems resulting from the separated delivery approach 
(Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 2010). According to Oyegoke et al. (2009), CM fully 
developed in the UK in the 1970s due to the economic recession at that time; where CM 
has been used since then as a driver to achieving value for money for owners. 
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Nevertheless, the use of CM has not overcome the underlying problem of fragmented 
project teams and information (Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 2010). For instance, within 
the CM delivery method, the owner often selects his preferred trade contractors and 
makes decisions in isolation from the construction manager, leading to inefficiencies 
and disputes (Ancell, 2005). Thus, this reason, amongst others, led to the rise of more 
collaborative and integrated forms of project delivery such as ‘design and build’ and 
‘partnering’. 
 
 
Design and Build delivery methods 
Contrary to Taylor's approach which led to sub-optimisation, Edwards Deming argued 
through his 'systems thinking' approach that if we wanted to achieve better results, we 
would then have to work on the entire process as a system; this obviously requires 
collaboration between project-parties (Seddon and Caulkin, 2007; Garrison, 2013). 
Deming's arguments, which started during the 1950s, led to great achievements in the 
manufacturing industry; but had little effect on the construction industry. According to 
Seddon and Caulkin (2007), the Toyota Production System (TPS) created by Ohno is 
the most remarkably successful example of systems thinking applied to business 
organization. It was not until the 1990s when design-build (DB) was developed in the 
US (Kent and Becerik-Gerber, 2010) as a collaborative way of project delivery. It then  
gained popularity all over the world.  DB is characterised in its conventional form by its 
design and construction integration, single point responsibility and guaranteed 
maximum price (Griffith and King, 2003). Its primary benefits include improved build-
ability of the design and thus fewer claims and disputes, more cost certainty and less 
risk for the client, and time savings (Love et al., 1998; Al-Rashid and Kartam, 2005; 
Opisova and Eriksson, 2011). DB was, and probably still remains, subject to significant 
challenges associated with its use in the public sector. This stems from concerns about 
the subjective and negotiated manner of justifying the evaluation process to the public 
(Al-Rashid and Kartam, 2005). There have also been concerns about the sheer expense 
of complying with the tender and prequalification procedures associated with its use 
(Hughes et al., 2001). However, DB is one of three procurement options approved by 
the Office of Government Commerce (OGC, 2008) for use among public sector 
departments. The OGC is an independent office of the HM treasury, which was set up 
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 
 
Page | 66  
 
by the UK Government for improving value for money. It provides guidance and policy 
standards on procurement best practice in the UK, and since 2010 became part of the 
‘Cabinet Office’ efficiency and reform group.  
 
A procurement survey undertaken by the Royal Institution of British Architects (RIBA, 
2013) among its members, revealed that although traditional contractual arrangements 
remain the most prevalent form of procurement used by 86% of architects’ practices 
that responded to the survey, DB forms of procurement have grown in popularity, with 
40% of responding practices indicating that they use both one stage and two stage 
tendering procedures. It is important however to clarify that the UK recognises several 
variations of DB (Konchar, 1997). In traditional DB, the contracting firm would utilise 
in-house design capabilities or seek outside design assistance. This approach would not 
differ much from separated procurement methods, if the design work is subcontracted 
out to external consultants with little or no follow up (Sarhan and Fox, 2012). In 
architect novation arrangements, once the initial project information is developed by the 
client's consultant (e.g. the architect) and the contractor gets selected; then from this 
point, the employed architect becomes novated or assigned to the selected contractor to 
complete the post-contract design work (Kochar, 1997; Griffith and King, 2003). 
However, a study by Griffith and King (2003), which adopted a grounded theory 
methodology to examine the dynamics of DB novation, identified various imperfect 
practices and arrangements that exist within this novated approach, and can lead to 
detrimental project outcomes. These included for example: the no-scheme-no-fee basis 
payment systems for pre-novated architects, dual loyalties on architects' post-contract 
design and communication routes, biased contractor-selection decisions, and increased 
contingencies in contractors’ bids as a result of unfair risk allocation. Thus, they 
concluded by suggesting that despite the advantages of DB novation and its growing 
popularity, it could create considerable fragmentation and value-loss in what is 
supposed to be an integrated procurement approach. Thus, DB novation was regarded 
by them as an imperfect solution to overcoming problems associated with the use of 
separated procurement methods. 
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Partnering arrangements 
Partnering and framework agreements, based upon the concepts of teamwork, integrated 
teams and collaborative working arrangements, became more prominent in the UK 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Oyegoke et al., 2009). Partnering, in particular, 
was endorsed by the Egan's Report (1998) that was heavily influenced by the principles 
of lean production (see Womack and Jones, 1996). This led to a major shift in the nature 
of the relationship between clients and their supply-chain. For instance, parties working 
under a partnering arrangement commit themselves to more openness and transparency, 
in working as a one team, from the forefront of the project. This is supported by the use 
of alternative (non-adversarial) dispute resolution mechanisms (Mante et al., 2012). The 
selection of architects and consultants for the supply of design services, based on direct 
negotiation rather than competitive tendering, implied longer and repeated relationships 
(Winch, 2000b). The main difference between partnering arrangements and D&B is that 
clients play a more active role in the procurement and delivery of the project. Clients 
and key project team members are brought together under a single multi-party contract; 
this can help to reduce transaction costs through eliminating the need for clients to sign 
different bilateral contracts. Partnering projects are delivered based on shared risk and 
reward mechanisms, thereby increasing the motivation for innovation and collaboration 
between project team members. Indeed, the whole concept behind this collaborative 
way of working is to align everybody in the project's best interest, as opposed to the silo 
individual interest of traditional procurement arrangements. In other words, it could be 
regarded as a move away from a transactional-based procurement to a relational-based 
procurement.  
 
The industry has seen, in the early 2000s, an increasing number of leading Tier-1 
contractors professing that most of their work was being delivered through partnering 
arrangements. However, there was no real evidence that this actually included an 
improvement in relationships and behaviours. For this reason, a study by Greenwood 
(2001) was conducted during that time to investigate whether there have been any real 
change in attitude of main contractors to their subcontractors and suppliers through the 
use of partnering. Interestingly, the results of the study revealed that typical contractor – 
subcontractor relationships remained traditional, cost-driven, and relatively adversarial. 
In general, the benefits and challenges associated with partnering implementation have 
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been well documented (see for example, Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Eriksson et al., 
2009). It comes with its own problems, costs and risks. The UK Government, being one 
of the main advocates of the relational agenda and partnering gradually retracted from 
the partnering agenda. However, framework arrangements became the more desirable 
collaborative approach for public sector procurement, and they are still being used by 
some of the major players like the NHS and Highway England. As a result, the UK 
industry has seen partnering agreements losing its momentum and going back to lowest 
price tendering (Walthamstow et al., 2009),  especially  during the recession period 
between 2008 and 2009. This fact seems to support the findings of Greenwood’s (2001) 
empirical study, which argued that some main contractors were adopting sub-contractor 
partnering approaches mainly for mere-ceremony purposes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), 
rather than being based on efficiency incentives.  
 
 
2.5.2 Construction procurement subsystems and options 
Procurement subsystems or/and procedures are identical terms that are commonly used 
in literature. Previous studies have integrated specific procurement sub-systems to their 
hierarchy of procurement systems, when investigating the relationship between 
procurement systems, project parameters, and certain aspects of project-performance 
such as: time, cost, quality, work environment, and innovation (Kumaraswamy and 
Dissanayaka, 1998; Love, 2002; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Eriksson and Westerberg, 
2011). For example, the main procurement sub-systems conceptualised by 
Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka (1998) are: work packages; functional groupings (i.e. 
separated, integrated and management-led); payment modalities; standard sets of 
contract forms or conditions; and selection methodologies. Similarly, Watermeyer 
(2012) suggested that procurement and contracting arrangements comprise: 
procurement selection strategy; procurement evaluation strategy; contracting strategy 
(functional groupings); pricing strategy; and form of contract.  
 
 
In a conceptual study by Eriksson and Westerberg (2011) which developed a 
hypothetical procurement framework that examines how various procurement-related 
factors affect project performance criteria, procurement procedures at the buying stage 
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were divided into three categories according to their relation to: competition, co-
opetition and cooperation. These procurement procedures consisted of: design; 
tendering; bid evaluation, subcontractor selection; payment; use of collaborative tools; 
and performance evaluation. Thus, for instance, subcontractors’ selection-decisions 
made by either the contractor or the client would be related to competitive procurement 
procedures; joint selection with single responsibility would be a co-opetitive procedure; 
while joint selection with shared responsibilities would be regarded as cooperative.  
 
 
Very limited studies in construction management have explicitly considered and 
integrated, as part of their hierarchy of procurement systems, other critical procurement 
subsystems such as: insurance arrangements, bonds, collateral warranties, and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, despite their significant importance and 
influence on project-teamwork performance. Building on the work of Wordley (1991); 
Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka (1998), Love et al. (1998); Hughes et al (2000); Sherif 
and kaka (2003); Eriksson and Laan (2007); Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber (2011); 
Masterman (2011), Eriksson and Westerberg (2011); Mante et al. (2012); Ndekugri et 
al. (2013); and Pasquire et al., (2015), Table 2.3  provides the major options available 
within procurement sub-systems, as conceptualised within this study. 
 
 
There is no doubt that the deployment of efficient procurement arrangements (i.e. 
procurement systems, sub-systems and options) may increase the likelihoods of ’project 
success’ and overall client satisfaction in a particular project context (Kumaraswamy 
and Dissanayak, 1998). However, in order to optimise the whole, it is important to 
consider the influence of the interactions between the sub-systems on the output of the 
main procurement system (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayak, 1998). It is also critical to 
ensure the compatibility of the chosen procurement options from within each sub-
system with the selected project delivery system, client and project needs, and other 
contextual conditions that bear on the project (Kumaraswamy and Dissanayak, 1998). 
For instance, it may be unsuitable to choose a cost-reimbursement pricing option for a 
traditionally procured project (Love et al., 1998). Similarly, it would be inefficient to 
adapt a bid evaluation strategy based on lowest tender price for the selection of project 
team members of a partnering project (Eriksson et al., 2008). Thus, it is suggested that 
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procurement arrangements should be crafted to support production system requirements 
and improve flow processes, rather than being based on cost and risk-averse 
considerations that may lead to sub-optimisation. The premise here is based on 
'optimising the whole' rather than 'optimising the parts'.  
 
 
Based on these arguments, it is thus ironic how that an empirical survey (Zaghloul and 
Hartman, 2003), that was conducted in the Canadian and the United States construction 
industries, revealed that  inappropriate risk allocation through disclaimer (exculpatory) 
clauses in contracts is still the general traditional practice in the construction industry; 
and that their use is prevalent to an extent that they continue to be utilized in some of 
the newer contractual agreements such as partnering/alliances. Similarly, it is of interest 
how that clients of many projects that have been procured using an integrated project 
delivery (IPD) or a Building Information Management (BIM-enabled) system still rely 
on the use of performance/surety bonds and traditional insurance arrangements, despite 
the latter in particular being identified by many academics and leading industry 
professionals as one of the main obstacles for the adoption of IPD to its full capacity 
(for example see, Kent, and Becerik-Gerber, 2010; Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 2011; 
Eadie et al., 2014). That is because it was found that traditional insurance products 
impose liability issues on each project-party separately and thus make collaboration 
complicated. The same has been asserted by expert construction professionals in the UK 
who suggested that conventional arrangements for providing insurance cover add 
unnecessary costs to constructions projects, and can also obstruct collaboration between 
supply chains (Ndekugri et al., 2013). According to Mossman et al. (2010, p. 11)  
"If each party to a relational agreement is required to have its own insurance 
and there is a claim during design or construction, an insurance company could 
force parties to sue one another in order to trigger insurance coverage, 
threatening relationships".  
 
 
These examples suggest the existence of serious disparities in bargaining-power within 
the construction market place; this in turn allows actors with bargaining-power, and 
who may have vested interests for the wide-spread use of some imperfect procurement 
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arrangements, to dictate the rules of the game - the way we do business (Sarhan et al., 
2017). Winch (2000a) suggested a number of different factors, yet often working in 
combination, which could allow some actors in a business system to become relatively 
powerful compared to others. These were identified by him as those possessing the 
following capabilities: 
• Ability to solve complex problems for the client - e.g. the traditional role of the 
architect and the consultant engineer in the British system which provides them with 
the privilege to solve complex problems for the client through the briefing process. 
• The blessing of the state (e.g. statutory protection) - For instance, in many countries 
(e.g. France and Germany) only the architect can apply for building permissions. 
• Ability to manage risk for the client - This includes control actors, such as the 
quantity surveyor, in the UK, whose role was developed to mediate the power of the 
general contractor on behalf of the client. 
 
2.5.3 The significance of procurement as institutional arrangements 
Construction business systems are regarded as institutions (Winch, 2000a&b; Sha, 
2004) that are created in countries to specify ‘the rules of the game’, and regulate the 
relations and interactions between the different parties involved in the industry. The 
evolution of these business systems are path dependent and also heavily reliant on the 
cultural and regulative context within each country (Sha, 2004; Matos-Castano et al., 
2014). In other words, the national context leads to the formation of specific business 
systems, which in turn influence the orientation, strategies and performance of 
individual firms in nationally distinctive ways (Winch, 2000a). Similarly, this study 
argues that procurement systems, as institutional arrangements, are designed to assign 
liabilities and authorities to people and organizations (Love et al., 1998) at the 
programme and project levels; and thus structure the boarders that shape ‘the play of the 
game’ (Williamson, 2000). Inappropriate procurement arrangements may lead to time 
and cost overruns, adversarial relationships between project parties, and ultimately the 
failure of projects (see Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka, 1998; Mante et al., 2012; 
Watermeyer, 2012; Sarhan et al., 2017). Thus, there is a wide agreement among 
scholars and many clients on the fact that getting the construction procurement context 
right is central to project success (see for example, Latham, 1994; Love et al., 1998; 
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Tookey et al., 2001; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Oyegoke et al., 2009, Osipova and 
Eriksson, 2011; Vilasini et al., 2011; Pekuri et al., 2014; Sarhan et al., 2017).  
 
The construction industry has been subject to substantial criticism for its opportunistic 
relationships, with conflicts and disputes, and lack of trust, collaboration and customer 
focus often cited as significant amongst its various shortcomings (Egan; 1998; Rooke et 
al., 2003; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Love et al., 2010). Hence, traditional procurement 
arrangements (e.g. separated methods) are potential root causes for the opportunism and 
lack of cooperation that characterise many construction projects (Eriksson and Laan, 
2007; Osipova and Eriksson, 2011), the industry has been urged to start using new and 
less familiar procurement systems (e.g. partnering, alliancing and IPD) that are believed 
to be capable of enhancing collaboration, commitment and trust between project parties 
(Egan, 1998; Rahman and Kumrasawy, 2004; Eriksson and Westerberg, 2011; Zimina 
et al., 2012; Ballard and Tommelein, 2012). 
 
However, despite the strong advocacy for the use of partnering and of the potential 
benefits that it could attain, its implementation in the construction industry generally 
remains patchy rather than widespread (Phua, 2006; Eriksson et al., 2008; Challender et 
al., 2017; Hosseini et al., 2018). The same applies to other innovative delivery 
approaches such as the integrated project delivery (IPD) system (Kent and Becerik-
Gerber, 2010; Rowlinson, 2017). This leads to the rise of the question as to why 
traditional procurement arrangements remain very prevalent in the construction industry 
(RICS, 2004; CIOB, 2010; RIBA, 2013), and have not, yet, been replaced by 
collaborative/relation-based procurement arrangements (e.g. partnering, alliancing and 
IPD) that are thought to be more efficient. Even when partnering is utilised, the 
relationship between contractors and subcontractors is often seen as ‘mere ceremony’ 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and instead aimed at signalling legitimacy to key observers 
(Greenwood, 2001). Thus, the question raised, in relation to reasons for the prevalence 
of traditional procurement practices, is fundamental; that is because it supports the  
current and substantial trends towards promoting collaborative ways of working as a 
means for improving project performance and outcomes (See for example Dainty and 
Brooke, 2004; Eriksson et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Sebastian, 2011; Zimina et al., 
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2012; Gottlieb and Haugbølle., 2013; Namadi et al., 2017; Daniel et al., 2017; Walker 
et al., 2017). 
 
An empirical survey study of 87 professional construction clients in Sweden was 
conducted by Eriksson et al., (2008) to identify the critical barriers to partnering; and to 
analyse the correlations between clients' perceptions of these barriers, and their actual 
behaviour in the form of procurement procedures. The study found that the clients' 
desired objective of increasing cooperation between project parties does not affect the 
way they deploy their procurement procedures. Clients perceive partnering and 
cooperative arrangements to be significant and beneficial, but still heavily rely on the 
use of procurement procedures that foster competition and adversarial relationships. The 
authors offered two possible explanations for this contradiction between desires and 
actual decisions and actions. First, that clients may not be aware of how their 
procurement decisions and procedures can affect their likelihoods of creating a 
cooperative environment (Eriksson et al., 2008), and thus impact on project 
performance and outcomes. Secondly, that clients may not be incentivised enough to 
adapt less familiar procurement arrangements that are potentially more efficient than 
conventional approaches (Eriksson et al., 2008).  
 
This lack of incentive for the use of partnering in particular and other collaborative 
modalities in general (e.g. lean construction) has been attributed by scholars to several 
factors such as: inadequate awareness and understanding (Erikkson et al., 2008; Sarhan 
et al., 2013; Tezel et al., 2018), lack of top management commitment (Sarhan and Fox, 
2013), and the fact that the construction industry operates in a very competitively cost-
driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). This issue could also be linked to the 
phenomena described by Bresnen and Haslam (1991) as "habituation", which occurs as 
experienced clients establish a 'close-minded' approach to building, thereby merely 
utilizing those procurement procedures that are most familiar to them (Love et al., 
1998). Additionally, it could be argued that many clients conform to conventional 
procurement procedures, due to institutional pressure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Most construction clients are inexperienced or one-off procurers of construction projects 
(Love et al., 2010); and as such, they invariably rely on professional advice from 
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consultants, financiers and legal advisers. These professional advisers may have a 
vested interest (i.e. social and/or economic motivations) for the wide-spread use of 
specific procurement arrangements that may be inefficient in comparison to other newer 
alternatives. 
 
Apart from purely economic-based determinants, very few studies in the construction 
management literature have been conducted to investigate the role played by 
institutional determinants in predicting the establishment of project-organisational 
arrangements, of which partnering as a collaborative procurement system is one. To fill 
this gap, Phua (2006) carried out a survey study completed by 526 firms covering 
various industry disciplines in Hong Kong, in order to shed some empirical light on the 
reason for the apparent limited use of partnering arrangements in the construction 
industry. More specifically, the study focussed on investigating whether using an 
institutional framework could help to provide some useful explanations as to when 
partnering is likely to occur. Compellingly, the findings have shown that ‘institutional 
forces’ far outweigh the significance of ‘economic forces’ in determining whether or not 
firms will adopt partnering. It was found that none of the financial incentives in terms of 
increased profitability, competitiveness or likelihood of increased resource acquisition 
and reallocation had any significant impact on firms’ decisions to adopt partnering at 
all. Instead, the results showed that the majority of construction firms have not adopted 
partnering as an alternative to traditional procurement methods, due to the lack of strong 
institutional partnering norms in the industry. According to Phua (2006, p.622): 
"Because the benefits or more precisely the economic and management 
advantages that firms could gain from using partnering are still debatable and 
difficult to measure, there is no a priori reason to expect firms to favour its use 
over other procurement methods other than the fact that there are obvious 
institutional norms that propel firms to use it". 
 
The premise of institutional theory (as presented in section 2.4) is that individual (i.e. 
persons) and collective (i.e. organisations) social actors are expected to comply with 
institutional forces imposed on them, because those that conform 'are rewarded through 
increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities’ (Scott, 1987, p. 498).  When 
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the same institutional forces continue to exist over time, firms within relatively 
circumscribed fields that are bounded by shared understandings and mutual dependence 
(Scott, 2012) become more homogenous (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); and thus a 
dominant organisational arrangement, or 'proto-institution' (Lawrence et al., 2002), is 
likely to occur (Phua, 2006). Thus, as a corollary, it is argued that the extent to which 
actors are inclined to the use of imperfect procurement arrangements (e.g. traditional 
procurement systems), that are deemed to be inefficient in comparison to other more 
innovative and collaborative approaches, is a function of how deeply entrenched the 
institutional environment is with respect to rules, technologies, norms, beliefs and 
expectations that are associated with the concerned practices.  
 
Having explored literature pertaining to the construction procurement context, defined 
what the study means by a construction procurement arrangement (system, subsystems 
and options within each sub-system), and highlighted the significance of 
conceptualising construction procurement as institutional arrangements; the focus now 
shifts to introducing an outline of the concept of ‘institutional waste’ in construction.  
 
2.6 The Concept of Institutional Waste within Construction: An outline 
Based on the rationale provided by the study—that there are systems, structural 
arrangements and cognitive undergirding assumptions that support and encourage 
wasteful activities in construction (refer to Chapter 1, for background details)—and 
building on the seminal studies of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) institutional 
isomorphism, Scott’s (2001) three pillars of institutionalism, and Oliver’s (1991) 
topology of strategic responses; this study conceptualises ‘institutional waste’ as: 
‘the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions that the 
construction industry, as an organisational field, accedes to in the form of 
habitual, imitation or compliance, in order to achieve legitimacy, security and/or 
survival  at the price of production efficiency and effectiveness’.  
Effectiveness refers to the extent to which a right target is achieved with resources 
applied (i.e. value and client satisfaction). Efficiency is the evaluation of how 
economically the resources are utilised to meet client requirements, based on production 
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flow perspectives (Koskela, 2000). By habitual, here, the study means: adhering to 
invisible, widely shared and taken for granted norms that have been historically 
repeated; by imitation: consciously or unconsciously mimicking what other more 
successful organisations do and strictly following imperfect advice from consulting 
firms and professional institutions; and by compliance: obeying imperfect institutional 
requirements. This could include imposing more control in contracts and structural 
arrangements, for example, as a response to problems of a lack of trust. To elaborate 
and demonstrate the conceptualisation of ‘institutional waste’ within the context of 
construction, the following preliminary conceptual model (Figure 2.4) and guiding 
propositions have been formulated. 
 
Proposition 1: The higher the degree of social legitimacy, stability, and/or survival 
capability conceived by social actors, to be attainable from acquiescence to imperfect 
institutional pressure, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within 
construction. 
An example of institutional waste (or institutional sources of waste) could be the 
adherence of the construction industry to using short time-frame and price-
competitive tendering processes, as a widely shared and taken for granted 
practice, despite it being associated with many flawed risk assumptions and 
criticised cost estimations (Laryea, 2011). Adding to this, is the use of extensive, 
time consuming and unnecessarily expensive prequalification procedures 
(Hughes et al., 2001) in public projects,  e.g. questionnaires (PQQ), that may 
lead to wasteful activities such as cover-pricing. In particular, the use of PQQs 
for procuring projects below the European Union threshold (approximately 
£100,000) restrains many SMEs from applying for public contracts (i.e. waste of 
human potential) and substantially increases tendering costs and time (HM 
Government, 2013). This also includes the textual complexity and unnecessary 
formality in contract wordings of some contract conditions (i.e. FIDIC, 1999 and 
NEC, 1993) that are very difficult to read, and require at least college-level 
reading skills to correctly interpret them (Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 2007; 
Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). It is important to emphasise here that lawyers 
and specialist surveyors are not the primary users of a contract; it is the project 
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parties’ ability to capture their meaning which is fundamental for contract 
performance (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). 
Proposition 2: The higher the degree of financial benefit, protection and guarantee, 
and/or vested interest rationalised by social actors, to be attainable from conformance 
to imperfect institutional processes, the greater the likelihood of waste to be 
institutionalised within construction.  
Examples of institutional waste include the heavily reliance of construction 
parties on the deep-rooted practice of using standard forms of contracts 
(Eriksson and Laan, 2007) as safeguards.  The heavy reliance on the use of these 
standard contracts bring with it lots of formality and rigidity that stifles 
cooperation and focuses on the individual parties and their responsibilities; 
thereby driving a distance between project parties and encouraging opportunistic 
behaviour (Cox and Thompson, 1997; Eriksson et al. 2008). Other examples 
include the traditional use of disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses in construction 
contracts (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003). This unfair risk allocation approach 
leads to increased costs of projects in the form of unnecessary contingencies and 
insurances (i.e. cost wastage), restricted bid-competitions (i.e. waste of human 
potential), and potential disputes (i.e. time waste). Similar imperfect 
procurement arrangements include the use of high rates of cash retentions on 
short contracts (Hughes et al., 2000); and requirements for performance bonds 
that are often disproportionate and may restrict SMEs aiming to bid for public 
contracts (HM Government, 2013). More obvious examples include architects' 
and quantity surveyors' biased preferences for the use of traditional lump-sum 
procurement systems with provisional quantities (Love et al., 1998). 
 
Proposition 3: The higher the degree of dependency of social actors on imperfect 
institutional processes, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within 
construction.  
An example of institutional waste in construction could be associated with how 
many organisations depend on obtaining their funding through bank loans, and 
as a result may pay more attention to their funders’ requirements rather than 
their customers’ needs (Chiang and Cheng, 2010). Another example could be 
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clients' over-reliance on conventional insurance arrangements which add 
unnecessary costs to constructions projects and can also obstruct collaboration 
between supply chains (Ndekugri et al., 2013). This could also be associated 
with the way that clients’ advisors often set the ‘rules of the game’ (i.e. 
procurement type and construction periods stated in tenders) and then everyone 
else has to work within these rules, which could sometimes be dysfunctional. 
This problem is often a result of discrepancies in bargaining power that exist 
among major players in the industry and within project coalitions (Winch, 
2000a). 
 
Proposition 4: The higher the degree of consistency of organisational goals and 
purposes with imperfect institutional pressures and norms, the greater the likelihood of 
waste to be institutionalised within construction.  
It is not unusual for construction organisations, because of competitive pressure, 
to rely on making their profits solely through commercial processes and 
manipulating roles with others, rather than struggling to improve production 
efficiency (Zimina and Pasquire, 2011b). Thus, the dependence of making 
profits in construction through commercial activities rather than production 
improvement, could be classified as an example of institutional waste. As an 
interviewee in a study by Chiang and Cheng (2010) commented, contractors 
could only make profits, in this highly price-competitive industry, if they 
concentrated their efforts on three issues: (1) procurement of building materials; 
(2) cash flow management with their downstream supply chain; (3) planning for 
and application of claims. Thus, this suggests that it is important, for further 
studies, to identify clients' and construction organisations' characteristics, 
strategies and tactics, that make them more or less obedient to imperfect 
institutional processes. 
 
Proposition 5: The higher the degree of voluntary diffusion of imperfect institutional 
rules, routines or norms, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised 
within construction.  
Chapter 2: Contextual Literature Review 
 
Page | 79  
 
This proposition is mainly associated with mimetic institutional waste. An 
example could be the (inefficient) norms, job duties and responsibilities diffused 
by professional institutions and trade associations, with which its members are 
requested to conform. In such cases of very widely taken-for-granted 
understandings of what constitute genuine practices, it is highly likely that 
practitioners will conform because it does not occur to them to do otherwise 
(Oliver, 1991). Labour/trade unions are also powerful actors that influence the 
culture in the construction industry. They were identified in an empirical study 
by Eriksson et al. (2008) as industry barriers to change in general, and increased 
cooperation in specific, due to their conservative and defensive culture that 
encourages upholding of the status quo. An example of imperfect institutional 
pressure diffused by trade unions, as identified by Eriksson et al. (2008), was 
their requirement for fixed piece rates, regardless of time, for blue-collar 
workers, which in turn undermined collaboration between different crafts. 
Another example of mimetic institutional waste could be associated with how 
decision makers tend to simply copy what others have thought to work for them  
(e.g. traditional procurement methods or critical-path planning technique which 
is described by Koskela et al. (2014) as a push-system technique); thereby 
restricting innovation. 
 
Proposition 6: The higher the degree of environmental uncertainty, the greater the 
likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within construction.  
Environmental uncertainty in the construction industry can include, for e.g., 
fluctuations in the state of the economy comprised of factors such as inflation, 
changes to government macroeconomic policies and periods of instability of 
funding. Under such conditions, it is more likely for organisations to adhere to 
imperfect institutional regulations, norms & requirements imposed on them by 
governmental management, funders, professional association and public media 
pressure for the sake of survival, legitimacy, and protection from environmental 
turbulence (Oliver, 1991). 
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Figure 2.4: Preliminary conceptual model for the study
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2.7 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter provided a theoretical context for the study. It started by critically 
reviewing the ‘concept of waste’ in construction’. An overall analysis of waste-related 
literature revealed five main issues: (1) research efforts aimed at understanding the 
concept of ‘waste’ are relatively limited when compared to other topics in construction; 
(2) most academic and industry efforts are directed towards finding means for reducing 
construction material waste (physical waste); much less attention has been given to 
other important factors such as time waste and value-loss; (3) Focusing on waste 
reduction in production (design and construction stage) is insufficient; there is a need to 
minimise waste caused by poor project-organisational and contractual arrangements as 
well; (4) very few studies have attempted to investigate the relationship between 
construction procurement and waste in construction; however, most of these studies, if 
not all, have limited their attention to physical (material) waste as opposed to process 
waste and value creation or loss; and (5) very limited, if any, waste-related studies have 
devoted attention to exploring performance-shaping mechanisms (i.e. systems and 
structural arrangements), as well as the institutional context in which human actions and 
decisions are constituted.  
 
Consequently, it was argued that there is a crucial need for obtaining a wider 
understanding and conceptualization of waste in construction. One aspect of this 
conceptualisation is to consider the wider institutional, procurement and commercial 
environments that surround the design and delivery of construction projects. The 
understanding of waste or value-loss within these aforementioned environments is, 
however, more difficult to determine not least because it requires a critical evaluation of 
the activities of different professions, for example lawyers, accountants, human resource 
managers, quantity surveyors to name a few. These environments and the professions 
within them also exhibit varying cultures, structures, systems and behaviours. Such an 
evaluation also needs to draw upon theory from disciplines outside both construction 
and manufacturing such as economics and sociology if it is to begin to explain the 
coherence and yet wastefulness of the current prevailing approaches to construction 
project delivery. 
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For these reasons, two principal theories were reviewed and conceptually analysed 
within this chapter (i.e. TC theory of economics and neo-institutional theory of 
organisational sociology), in order to seek explanations for the establishment, process 
and outcomes of several forms of institutional arrangements. This allowed the study to: 
(1) develop a conceptualisation of construction procurement governance problems and 
solutions; and (2) demonstrate how neo-institutional theory has the potential to be used 
as an analytical lens to deliver a more explicit theory of waste relating cause and effect 
within the wider aspects of construction procurement systems and relationships. 
Subsequently, an overview of literature pertaining to the construction procurement 
context was conducted. This enabled the study to define the major constituents of a 
construction procurement arrangement (system, subsystems and options within each 
sub-system), and highlight the significance of conceptualising construction procurement 
arrangements as ‘institutional arrangements’ (rules of the game) that may influence 
project-performance and outcomes.  
 
As a result, these research steps and findings summarised above enabled the study to 
outline the concept of ‘institutional waste’ in construction. In addition, six (guiding) 
propositions were formulated and a preliminary conceptual model was developed, in 
order to provide focus for the research and to guide the researcher during data 
collection, whilst leaving the scope open for the generation of unintended findings or 
even new hypotheses. The next chapter (Chapter 3) will critically discuss the research 
philosophy and methodology underpinning this study, including a detailed explanation 
of the research methods and procedures used for data collection and analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
A research methodology is much more than just fitting research methods to a particular 
study. Indeed, research methods cannot be viewed in isolation of the rationale and 
philosophical assumptions that underlie the study – the epistemological and ontological 
positions adopted by the researcher (Dainty, 2008; Creswell, 2009). 'Ontology' is 
concerned with what constitutes reality (Scotland, 2012), while the term ‘Epistemology’ 
refers to what should be considered as acceptable knowledge (Knight and Turnbull, 
2008). 'Methodology' could be defined as the strategy which underlies the choice and 
use of particular methods (Crotty, 1998). 'Methods' are the specific techniques, tools 
and procedures used to collect and analyse 'qualitative or quantitative' data (Spencer, 
2012). Figure 3.1 provides a summary of the four main components of a research 
paradigm. It is of vital importance for researchers to understand the impact that 
alternative research paradigms may have on their contribution to knowledge, and the 
way the research is going to be designed and conducted (Dainty, 2008). Therefore, the 
aim of this chapter is to explain and justify the research philosophy, methodology and 
methods adopted for this study. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Components of a Research Paradigm [Adapted from Hay (2002)] 
Ontology Epistemology Methodology Methods 
What’s 
out there 
to know? 
What and 
how can 
we know 
about it? 
How can we 
go about 
acquiring 
knowledge? 
What 
procedures can 
we use to 
acquire it? 
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3.2 Research Philosophy 
Researchers need to take a stance regarding their philosophical assumptions and 
perceptions of reality (ontology), how they know something (epistemology). Their 
ontological and epistemological assumptions create a holistic view of how they view 
knowledge, how they see themselves in relation to this knowledge, and the 
methodological strategies they use to discover or construct it (Guba, 1990). It is 
essential for researchers to ensure that their methodology and combination of methods 
are consistent with the theoretical perspective that they chose to take (Crotty, 1998). 
Thus, research philosophies need to be identified and discussed, as they set the context 
for the research study (Ponterotto, 2005), and enable us to recognize others’ positions 
and defend our own contribution to knowledge (Knight and Turnbull, 2008).   
 
 
3.2.1 Ontology 
The philosophical term ‘Ontology’ generally refers to the nature and conceptions of 
reality or what exists (Runeson and Skitmore, 2008). Knight and Turnbull (2008, p.64) 
state that ontology is “concerned with existence or being and what we assume to exist 
clearly has implications for what we claim to know, and vice versa”. In other words, 
ontological assumptions are concerned with what constitutes reality (Scotland, 2012). 
According to Dainty (2008), discussions of social ontology mainly revolve around 
whether social entities should be regarded as ‘objective realities’ that exist 
independently of social actors, or ‘social constructions’ where reality is subjective and 
only exists in our minds as a construct, and thus is subject to constant revision 
depending on who views it. These two perceptions generally fall into the two following 
positions: 'Objectivism or Realism' and the 'Constructivism or Relativism' position. 
'Objectivism' is the view that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence 
that is independent of social actors (Bryman, 2012). It claims that reality exists 
independently of the researcher, and thus requires 'discovery' using appropriate means 
(Scotland, 2012). On contrast, 'Constructivism' is the view that social phenomena are 
'constructed' by the social actors concerned with their existence (Bryman, 2012). Thus, 
it assumes that there is no single reality or truth.  
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The term 'Constructivism' is used interchangeably with 'Social Constructionism'. 
According to Andrews (2012), the two philosophical terms tend to be subsumed under 
the generic term ‘constructivism’ particularly by Charmaz (2000, 2006). They do share 
a common heritage, but they saliently differ on whether construction of knowledge is an 
individual cognitive or a social process (Young and Collin, 2004; Andrews, 2012). 
Social Constructionism, however, makes no ontological claims, restricting itself to the 
social construction of knowledge, and thus confining itself to epistemological 
arguments only. This study take a stance more close to 'Constructivism'  which views 
society as existing both as objective and subjective reality. The subjective view of 
society is based on the concept of multiple realties (Crotty, 1988). However the 
objective view of reality is influenced by Berger and Luckmann (1991) ideas related to 
the nature and construction of knowledge. Their view of society as ‘subjective and 
objective reality’ is described by Andrews (2012, p.41) in a simple way, as follows: 
"The former is brought about through the interaction of people with the social 
world, with this social world in turn influencing people resulting in routinisation 
and habitualization. That is, any frequently repeated action becomes cast into a 
pattern, which can be reproduced without much effort. This frees people to 
engage in innovation rather than starting everything anew. In time, the meaning 
of the habitualization becomes embedded as routines, forming a general store of 
knowledge. This is institutionalised by society to the extent that future 
generations experience this type of knowledge as objective". 
 
 
 The ontological term 'Constructivism' is also commonly associated with the term 
'Subjectivism'. However, it is argued that a 'Subjectivism' perspective presents a 
complete denial of any objective reality, while 'Constructivism' portrays that social 
actors try to make sense of the situation they are in, and therefore construct or create 
their own subjective representations of objective reality. Gray (2009, p. 18) describes 
this as follows: 
"In contrast to constructivism, for subjectivism, meaning does not emerge from 
the interplay between the subject and the outside world, but is imposed on the 
object by the subject. Subjects do construct meaning, but do so from within”  
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3.2.2 Epistemology 
The term ‘Epistemology’ refers to what should be considered as acceptable knowledge 
(Dainty, 2008). It is mainly concerned with theories which attempt to provide answers 
to questions surrounding the nature of knowledge, its limits and how we attain it 
(Knight and Turnbull, 2008). In other words, epistemology refers to a person’s view of 
social reality, what can be known about, and how it can be acquired reliably 
(Loosemore, 1999; Hay, 2002). Researchers must specify their epistemological stances, 
as it clarifies whether their aim is to test or generate theory (Loosemore, 1999). 
Additionally, their epistemological view influenced by the ontological assumptions, will 
frame their knowledge-seeking approach. For example, if the researchers believe that 
knowledge is governed by laws of nature, they will take an objective approach to 
measure and discover reality. However, if they believe that there is no single reality or 
truth and that reality needs to be interpreted, they will interact with what they are 
researching in order to explore the underlying meanings of social activities. 
 
 
Knight and Turnbull (2008) specify two dominant traditions of epistemology: the 
'normative tradition' and the 'naturalistic tradition'. According to them, the naturalistic 
tradition is associated with positivism, while the normative tradition is associated with 
foundationalism or coherentism. In construction management research, epistemological 
perspectives are generally expressed in relation to ‘positivism’ and ‘interpretivism’ 
(Dainty, 2008; Runeson and Skitmore, 2008). 'Positivism' is an objective approach 
which directly applies methods of natural science to studies of social phenomena, 
independently of the knower and his perspective (Denscombe, 2010). It is often referred 
to as quantitative research (Runeson and Skitmore, 2008). The researcher in such case is 
considered an ‘outsider’ (Creswell, 2012). In positivist reserach, theory is the source of 
hypotheses and propositions, which are then tested using empirical data (Schweber, 
2015). According to Skitmore (1999, p. 10) 
“Those adopting a positivist stance see reality as an inert amalgam of facts 
which can be released by the right methodology. They believe that there is one 
best methodology to do this and their aim is to get as close to it as possible. 
Their structured view of the world creates a belief that theories can be tested 
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with complete certainty. That is, the assumption is that all intervening variables 
can be controlled”. 
 
On the contrary, 'interpretivism' stresses the importance of understanding and 
considering the subjective influence on findings related to social processes (Dainty, 
2008). Interpretivists avoid rigid methodological frameworks as they believe that reality 
is multiple and relative. According to them, objective reality should be seen in a 
subjective way. The researcher, therefore, needs to interacts with the object of 
investigation as an ‘insider’ (Creswell, 2012), so as to explore underlying motives, 
meanings,  reasons and social experiences (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988) through constant 
dialogue and interpretation (Ponterotto, 2005). It is often referred to as qualitative 
research (Runeson and Skitmore, 2008). In essence, the ultimate goal of interpretivists 
is to understand and interpret the meanings in human behaviour so as to generate theory, 
rather than to test theory and predict causes and effects (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; 
Skitmore, 1999). According to Schweber (2015, pp. 845), "in interpretivist research, 
theory is a tool to displace the researcher’s own common sense and to draw attention to 
processes and meanings which, while hidden from view, are essential to understand 
observed outcomes". Having discussed the main approaches for knowledge acquisition, 
the next section provides a summary of prevailing reasoning and inference approaches. 
 
 
3.3 Theorising and Reasoning Approaches 
One of the important features of research design is the approach to reasoning that it 
incorporates. Theorising approaches in social science are anchored to three main 
reasoning approaches: deductive, inductive and abductive (Dubois and Gadde, 2002;  
Reichertz, 2004; Pries-Heje et al., 2011; Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). Theorizing 
here refers to the process of constructing a theory (Weick, 1989). In general, a theory 
can be defined as a set of systematically interrelated concepts, definitions and 
propositions, which predicts and/or explains social phenomena (Turner, 1982). In his 
model of engaged scholarship, Van de van (2007) argued that multiple reciprocal cycles 
of the three aforementioned types of reasoning are needed to build a theory.  Asvoll 
(2013) showed how that integral relationships between the three reasoning concepts, 
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could be relevant and useful to interpretative case studies. These assertions are also 
supported by Gregory and Muntermann (2011, p. 8) who claim that: 
"Most scholars from the social sciences would probably agree that any type of 
theorizing involves to some degree induction, deduction, and abduction. The 
differences among theorizing methods and approaches can be explained by the 
sequence in which these three types of reasoning or inquiry are carried out and 
the dominance of any one of the three approaches". 
 
Deductive and inductive reasoning are, arguably, the most two dominant theorising 
approaches in many research disciplines (Reichertz, 2004; Thomas, 2006; Pries-Heje et 
al., 2011). The main difference between them is that deductive research approaches aim 
to test theories, while inductive ones tend to generate theories emerging from data. 
Deduction begins with a universal view of a situation going to particulars (deductive 
proof); in contrast, induction moves from fragmentary details to an abstract and 
generalisable view of a situation (Inductive discovery) (Gray, 2009) In many cases, it 
might be useful for a research study to use or integrate both approaches (see for 
example, Ali and Birley, 1999; Thomas, 2006; Fereday, J. & Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  
 
 
Abduction reasoning seems to be less prevalent in literature in comparison to deduction 
and induction, but is argued to play an important role in any theorising strategy (Locke 
et al., 2008; Gregory and Muntermann, 2011; Asvoll, 2013). Abduction is a creative 
type of inference that assigns special status to explanatory considerations (Park, 2015; 
Douven, 2017). Abduction is most often associated with design-science research (see 
for example, Pries-Heje et al., 2011; Gregory and Muntermann, 2011). The use of 
abductive inference is also becoming more popular in grounded-theory studies (see for 
example, Richardson and Hans-Kramer, 2006; Charmaz, 2008; Reichertz, 2010; 
Timmermans and Tavory, 2012).  
 
3.3.1 Deductive approaches 
Deduction has a long history in the philosophy of science, where it was seen as a way 
for establishing natural laws in science (Gray, 2009). The origin of deductive reasoning 
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dates back to ancient philosophy, Plato, who argued that logical deduction is the only 
valid method for developing theory (Pries-Heje et al., 2011). In the methodological 
literature of social science, Miller and Brewer (2003, p. 67) define 'deduction' as: 
"An approach to data analysis, explanation and theory that sees empirical social 
reserach as conducted on the basis of a hypothesis derived from social theory 
which is then tested against empirical observations and then subsequently used to 
confirm or refute the original theoretical propositions. This approach is called 
deduction because research hypotheses are deduced from theory by a process of 
logical reasoning. It is associated with positivism and natural science models of 
social research and is the inverse of induction". 
 
Deduction involves going from generals to particulars, deriving conclusions based on a 
process of logical reasoning (Miller and Brewer, 2003; Gregory and Muntermann, 
2011). The general form of deductive reasoning involves inferring that if: 
"All A are B. 
C is A. 
Thus, C is B" (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012, p. 171). 
 
 
Deduction is regarded as a 'top-down' approach to theory building (Gregory and 
Muntermann, 2011). Theorists using a deductive approach tend to deduce hypotheses 
from existing predetermined theories and concepts (Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Daniel et 
al., 2017), and then to move forward towards hypothesis testing (Gray, 2009). At the 
heart of deductive reasoning is the principle of 'refutation' (Miller and Brewer, 2003), 
which suggests that a theory can never be proven to be right, but only be shown to be 
wrong and thus rejected. Theorists, therefore, attempt to falsify or confirm their firmed-
up hypotheses in a variety of settings and scenarios, where surviving ones are deemed to 
be more complete. This structured analytical process allows for the generalisation of 
findings. Deductive research approaches, however, have been criticised for their limited 
ability to explore new ideas and concepts in social life (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012) 
because researchers restrain their data to pre-existing concepts and assumptions (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967); thereby finding only what they expect to find (Thomas, 2006). 
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3.3.2 Inductive approaches 
Induction was recognised by Aristotle as a valid approach for generating knowledge 
(Pries-Heje et al., 2011); it involves working from observations towards an inference. 
Inductive reasoning evaluates or constructs inductive arguments based on specific 
observations (Gregory and Muntermann, 2011). In essence, the premise of an inductive 
theoretical approach is inferring a general conclusion from a particular observation. 
According to Miller and Brewer (2003, p. 154): 
"Induction is an approach in social research which argues that empirical 
generalisations and theoretical statements should be derived from the 
data...Induction is associated with qualitative research and naturalism, where the 
intent is to be 'true to the data themselves', allowing the data 'to speak for 
themselves'...As an approach to theory building, it is associated with 'Glaser and 
Strauss' formulation of grounded theory in which theory is the outcome of the 
research. As an approach to qualitative data analysis, it is expressed by the idea of 
'analytical induction' in which empirical generalisations develop from the data 
instead of being used to interpret findings".  
 
In contrast to deductive approaches, induction starts with specific observations (raw 
data as opposed to existing knowledge), and proceeds by examining the collected data 
to find any emerging patterns and relationship between variables (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane, 2006; Gregory and Muntermann, 2011). Based on these observations and 
interpretations, it may be possible to generate general conclusions and theories 
(Thomas, 2006; Gray, 2009). Thus, with 'induction', raw data are collected and a theory 
many be discovered or generated as a result of the data analysis. The general form of 
inductive reasoning involves inferring that if: "All observed A are C. Thus, all A are C" 
(Timmermans and Tavory, 2012., pp. 171). To ensure a degree of reliability and more 
certainty, and avoid hasty inferences or conclusions, the researcher often relies on the 
use of multiple cases or instances (Gray, 2009; Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). 
 
Inductive reasoning is exploratory in nature and is regarded as a 'bottom-up' approach to 
theory building; that is because abstractions and theories stand at the end of the research 
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process, rather than the beginning (Gregory and Muntermann, 2011). It could be argued 
that the use of inductive reasoning is appropriate when new knowledge needs to be 
explored whereas deductive reasoning could be used to test and modify existing 
knowledge (Pries-Heje et al., 2011). The primary principle of the inductive approach is 
to allow research findings and theory to systematically emerge from data (Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002), without the restraints imposed by rigid methodologies (Thomas, 2006) or 
the influence of existing knowledge (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). As explained by 
Miller and Brewer (2003, p. 154) "a priori assumption and theoretical ideas should not 
be used to interpret data, rather the social meaning inherent in the data alone should be 
used as the basis for any empirical generalisation or theoretical statement.  
 
Qualitative inductive approaches allow us to find in collected data, new versions of 
what is already known (Reichertz, 2010). Thus, one of the most important features of 
inductive reasoning is its potential to extend our current knowledge or understanding of 
a social phenomenon, by deriving general conclusions or concepts that are more than a 
refinement of the premises of existing theories (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). In 
other words, inductive reasoning has the potential to construct or generate new theory. It 
overcomes the limitation of deductive reasoning where specific conclusions are based 
on the general, thereby restraining the potential of building new theory. Another main 
advantage of inductive approaches is that it allows the researcher to get close to the 
social phenomena under investigation; so it allows for the generation or construction of 
theory that 'represents reality' and is perceived to be highly 'relevant' by the researched 
stakeholders. On the other hand, it has been argued that inductive reasoning leads to 
probable forms of inference, rather than logical ones (Reichertz, 2010). Thus, the 
limitations of induction include the challenge of reaching generalization and prediction 
based on the observation of particular instances, cases or events (Timmermans and 
Tavory, 2012). 
 
3.3.3 Abductive approaches 
Both deduction and induction are two dominant ways of generating research 
hypotheses, either from theory or observations respectively (Miller and Brewer, 2003). 
Abduction is a third method of reasoning that was proposed by the American 
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Philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, to overcome the limitations of deduction and 
induction (Krupnik and Turek, 2014). Pierce described abduction as the “process of 
forming an explanatory hypothesis” (Peirce 1934:171). Within the context of research, 
'abduction' refers to a creative inferential process aimed at producing new hypotheses 
and theories based on surprising research evidence (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). Its 
purpose is not to deduce a hypothesis from the existing body of knowledge and then test 
it in a closed system (deductive theorising); nor does it intend to induce a general 
conclusion or theory from observation in an open system (inductive theorising). Instead, 
'abduction' encourages researchers to look for causes and plausible ways for explaining 
their observations. In other words, the logic of abductive theorising is to infer satisfying 
explanations for surprising observations (Aliseda, 2007); thereby generating new 
knowledge. According to Peirce (1903, p. 205): 
 “All the ideas of science come to it by the way of Abduction. Abduction consists 
in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is 
that if we are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way”  
 
 
In literature, the term ‘abduction’ is generally used in two related but different 
approaches: traditional and modern versions (Douven, 2017). In both approaches, 
abduction refers to some sort of explanatory reasoning. However, in the traditional 
version which represents Peirce's logic abduction, explanatory reasoning is used for 
'generating' hypotheses. In this case, abduction is viewed as a "leap of faith" from 
observations to hypotheses (Morgan, 2007). This form of abduction is commonly used 
as a logic of discovery in grounded-theory studies (see for e.g. Richardson and Hans-
Kramer, 2006; Charmaz, 2008; Reichertz, 2010). In this sense, abductive reasoning 
invokes imaginative interpretations of the observed data (Charmaz, 2008), and thus 
helps the researcher during the coding process to reach higher levels of abstraction 
(Reichertz, 2004). This is described by Charmaz (2008, p. 57) as follows: "the 
researcher imagines all possible theoretical accounts for the observed data and then 
forms and checks hypotheses until arriving at the most plausible interpretation of the 
observed data". On the other hand, abduction in modern versions refers to the place of 
explanatory reasoning in 'justifying' hypotheses. This sense of abduction seems to be 
associated with design-thinking related studies, in which the researcher makes-sense of 
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a set of observations through drawing inference to the best explanation. The researcher 
in design science is usually confronted with a large number of possible explanations for 
phenomena; abductive reasoning, therefore, helps the researcher to decide on which 
possible explanation to look at first. Action is then taken to test that inference, based on 
making deductions on it, until a satisfying solution for a particular design problem is 
reached. Another example for the use of modern versions of abduction is Morgan's 
(2007) pragmatic approach to social science research, at which abuction reasoning 
moves back and forth between induction and deduction.  
 
The logic of abduction, however, is distinct from induction and deduction. Abduction 
starts with consequences and then constructs reasons. This is described as follows: 
"The surprising fact C is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is a reason to suspect that A is true". (Peirce 1934, p. 117) 
 
In other words, abduction starts with surprising observations and then produces reasons 
that would explain those observations. According to Peirce (1958, pp. 217–18), 
abduction seeks a theory, while induction seeks for facts. In a discussion with Professor 
David L. Morgan on the main difference between induction and abduction, the 
following answer was received: 
"A lot of social scientists misuse the logic of induction, which should be "I have 
observed this; therefore, I conclude that...", where the conclusions are stated 
entirely in terms of the observations...Abduction, in contrast, relies on a conclusion 
that is outside the strict range of observations, so that it includes a "leap" of insight 
to interpret the observations. Hence, almost all of the reasoning in qualitative 
coding is actually abductive"
1
. 
                                                          
1 A reply by Professor David. L. Morgan to a question asked by the author on a social networking site for 
scientists and researchers to share papers, ask and answer questions and find collaborators. The question 
raised was titled: What is the difference between an "Integrated (deductive-inductive) research approach" 
and an "Abductive approach" in social science? - Page 2. Available from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/post/What_is_the_difference_between_an_Integrated_deductive-
inductive_research_approach_and_an_Abductive_approach_in_social_science2 [accessed May 11, 2017]. 
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Abduction, as noted by Peirce, provides less certainty than induction; but abduction has 
more innovative potential than deduction and induction (Timmermans and Tavory, 
2012, p. 171; Tavory and Timmermans, 2014, p. 38). Abductive inference is seen by 
many researchers as a systematised creativity or an intuitive leap in research to develop 
new hypothesis or theory (for e.g. see Taylor et al., 2002; Dubois and Gadde, 2002; 
Kovács and Spens, 2005; Richardson and Kramer, 2006; Suddaby (2006); Charmaz, 
2008; Reichertz, 2010; Krupnik and Turek, 2014). According to Morgan (2007), 
knowledge can only be produced by testing that inference. This requires "actions" based 
on deductions from it; but those "actions" may consist entirely of thoughts about the 
proposed hypothesis. It is important, however, to stress that although “deduction is the 
only mode which guarantees the truth of the conclusion given the truth of the premises” 
(Svennevig, 2001, p. 4), but abduction is the “only logical operation which introduces 
any new idea" (Peirce, 1903, p. 216).  
 
Abduction is often described as inference to the best explanation (IBE); however this 
sense of abduction is debated on the basis that there is no consensus on what counts as 
the best explanation (Douven, 2017). A critical review study on the classifications of 
abduction (Park, 2015, p. 215) argued that Peirce's original abduction is for generating 
hypotheses or theories, while IBE is for their evaluation as well as generation. 
Interestingly, the study tentatively concluded that "IBE is induction rather than 
abduction" (Park, 2015, p. 215). On this debate up on the classifications of abduction, 
Aliseda (2007) suggests that abduction can be taken either in its weaker or stronger 
sense. The latter is reasoning is to the minimal or best explanation, while the former is 
reasoning from the fact to one of its potential explanations. Similarly, Magnani (2001) 
provided two distinct classifications of abduction: 'selective' and 'creative'. As a 
metaphor, Magnini used the contrast between 'medical diagnosis' where a hypothesis is 
selected from a well-defined hypotheses space, as an example of 'selective abduction'; 
while 'medical research' where new diseases and their causes are discovered was 
considered to be a result of 'creative abduction'.  
 
Abduction, as Peirce argued, can be considered as the first step in any methodological 
process of scientific inquiry. The aim of abductive reasoning is to understand surprising 
research evidence in a new way, and to suggest a novel theory in the form of new 
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hypotheses or propositions (Kovács and Spens, 2007). Abductive reasoning is used in 
research in different ways. For example, Dubois and Gadde (2002) called for ‘theory 
matching', in which data is collected simultaneously to theory building. This process 
allows the study to interpret and understand a surprising observation from the 
perspective of a new conceptual framework. Asvoll (2013) suggested the use of two 
alternative strategies for interpretative case-study research, namely: abduction–
deduction–induction (A–D–I) and deduction–induction–abduction (D–I–A). The latter 
can be dictated by theory-testing, while the former by theory-building. According to 
him, the A–D–I strategy can be extended to an A–D–I–A strategy to ensure explicit 
forms of abduction. Kovács and Spens (2005) conducted a literature review on 
abbductive research approaches, and proposed a framework for adopting abduction in 
logistics research (Figure 3.2). They stressed, however, that abductive reasoning 
concludes with theory suggestion, as the last step can be characterised as a deductive 
part of the research process (Kovács and Spens, 2005, p. 139).  
 
Figure 3.2: A proposed abductive research process (Kovács and Spens, 2005) 
 
3.4 Modes of Producing Scientific Knowledge 
An important step in the design of any research project is to determine the overarching 
objective of the research, in terms of mode of producing scientific knowledge. 
According to Voordijk (2011), two kinds of scientific research in construction 
management can be distinguished: ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’. The former is a 
‘knowledge-producing’ activity that is aimed at understanding different aspects of 
construction management and is mainly associated with natural and social sciences. 
Prescriptive, on the other hand, is a ‘knowledge-using’ activity that corresponds to 
‘design science’, which aims at improving practice by designing solutions to complex 
practical field problems. These two approaches have created a debate among scholars 
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over what constitutes legitimate science in the field of construction management 
(Voordijk, 2011). Recognising the difference between these two research types can 
provide several significant benefits to the researcher, including selecting the right type 
of research approach for the situation and avoiding the use of inappropriate 
methodologies (Koskela, 2008). 
 
Design science is a well-established approach that is widely used in information 
technology (IT) research. Interestingly, IT research is concerned with studying artificial 
phenomena in contrast to natural phenomena (March and Smith, 1995). Therefore, IT 
research has a dual nature; that is because artificial phenomena can be both studied and 
devised. Scientists contribute to these two conflicting activities through adapting two 
distinctive, but rather complementary, types of scientific research: (1) Design science 
research (DSR); and (2) Natural science research (NSR). Koskela (2008) has argued 
that the use of DSR in construction management can help to solve many problems 
facing this discipline, including the problem of relevance, while simultaneously 
contributing to knowledge. Koskela mentioned, however, that 'explanatory' construction 
management studies would definitely remain to be significant. Similarly, Voordijk 
(2009) suggested that design science should be the common ground on which research 
in construction and management meet. It appears from literature that the use of DSR in 
construction management research has grown in popularity, especially among 
proponents of lean construction, in an attempt to strengthen the link between theory and 
practice (see for example, Rocha et al., 2012; Brady et al., 2012 & 2013; Smith, 2015).  
 
Despite the distinctive differences associated with each approach (Table 3.1), it is, 
however, important to appreciate their interactions and complementary role. For 
instance, DSR creates artifacts giving rise to phenomena (e.g. BIM) that can be the 
targets of studies for natural (social) science researchers. Similarly, NSR creates 
theories and scientific knowledge which design science researchers could utilise to 
improve practice and technology. The complementary research cycle between DSR and 
NSR stems from a pragmatist philosophy that claims that reality (justified theory) and 
utility/value (artifacts that are effective) are two sides of the same coin; and thus 
practical relevance and rigour of scientific research should be evaluated equally (Hevner 
et al., 2004).  
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Table 3.1: Comparison between Natural (Social) Science and Design Science Research 
Criterion 
Natural (Social) 
Science Research 
Design Science 
Research (DSR) 
Source of 
information 
Research 
Domain 
Traditional research in 
physical, biological, 
social and behavioural 
domains  
Design Science in IT, 
engineering, 
Medicine, & design-
related fields 
Venable (2006); 
March and Smith 
(1995) 
Research 
Motivation 
To study and understand 
how and why things are 
The desire to know 
how to improve the 
way things are 
Hevner (2007); 
March and Smith 
(1995) 
Research 
Aim/Objectives 
Explaining, 
understanding and 
predicting reality 
Creation of artifacts to 
solve real-world 
problems 
Hevner (2007); 
March and Smith 
(1995);  
Object of Study 
Natural and Artificial 
Phenomena 
Artificial Phenomena 
March and Smith 
(1995); Niehaves 
(2007) 
Research Intent 
Descriptive/Explanatory 
(Problem-understanding 
paradigm); Basic or 
Applied science 
Prescriptive (problem-
solving paradigm); 
Applied science 
March & Smith 
(1995); Hevner 
et al. (2004) 
Research 
Approach 
Hypothetico-deductive, 
inductive or both 
(integrated) 
Situational, 
Hypothetico-
deductive  
Ali and Birley 
(1999); March 
and Smith 
(1995);  
Ontological 
perspective 
Objective reality or 
constructivism  
Objective reality 
(Pragmatic 
philosophy)  
Dainty (2007); 
Hevner (2007); 
Epistemological 
position  
Positivism or 
Interpretivism 
Positivism or 
Interpretivism 
Dainty (2007); 
Niehaves (2007) 
Relation to 
Knowledge 
Knowledge-Producing Knowledge-Using 
March and Smith 
(1995) 
Main Research 
Activities 
Discovery and 
Justification 
Build and Evaluate 
March and Smith 
(1995) 
Research 
Output(s) / 
Product(s) 
Laws, causality models, 
hypotheses and theories 
Solution concepts 
(technological rules), 
methods or systems 
March and Smith 
(1995); 
Voordijk, (2009; 
2011);  
Evaluation of 
Research 
Outputs 
Evaluated against norms 
of truth, or explanatory 
power 
Evaluated for their 
situated utility and 
effectiveness  
Venable (2006); 
March and Smith 
(1995) 
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3.5 Rationale and Philosophy Underlying this Research 
A research design process involves reciprocal connections between philosophical 
stances, strategies of inquiry and research methods adopted in a study (Creswell, 2012). 
This study aims to explore the influence of imperfect institutions and paradigms, if any, 
on the deployment and persistence of wasteful procurement arrangements in 
construction. Therefore, a 'Constructivist or Relativist' ontological position, outlined in 
section 3.2.1, is seen appropriate for the social phenomena under investigation. 
Constructivism assumes that there is no single truth or reality (Bryman, 2012); instead, 
social actors tend to make-sense of situations that they experience by constructing their 
own subjective interpretations of objective reality (Gray, 2009). This constructivist 
ontological stance also supports the qualitative nature of the study. At the same time, 
this study hopes to explore the impact of the widely accepted use of inefficient 
construction procurement arrangements on performance, behaviour and outcomes, 
based on the real-life experiences of professional buyers and suppliers.  
 
Thus, an 'interpretivist' epistemological position, described in section 3.2.2, is deemed 
to be essential in this case, so as to enable the study to discover the underlying motives 
and meanings in human actions and behaviours. It also allows for a better understanding 
of contextual factors (Gaddon, 2010). This interpretivist epistemological stance aligns 
with the constructivist ontology of meaningful reality (Crotty, 1988) adopted for this 
study. The philosophical positions outlined above dictated the use of a qualitative 
research strategy, which adapts a constructivist/interpretivist approach to grounded-
theory (Staruss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2008). This approach aligns with the 
exploratory nature of the research and responds to widespread criticisms related to the 
extensive use of quantitative methods, associated with positivism, in construction 
management research (for example, see Seymour and Rooke, 1995; Seymour et al., 
1997; Koskela, 2017). Explanations about the choice and justification of the adapted 
methodology shall be outlined in detail in the following sections.  
 
Based on the discussion above on modes for producing knowledge (section 3.4) and the 
comparison between N(S)SR and DSR presented in Table 3, within the context of our 
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proposed study of institutional waste, it has been concluded that an exploratory SSR 
approach is deemed to be more appropriate for our proposed research study. Social 
research projects can be broadly classified into three categories: exploratory, 
explanatory and descriptive. However, an individual study may sometimes have 
multiple purposes. Exploratory research typically seeks to create hypotheses rather than 
test them. The goal of exploratory research is to formulate problems, clarify concepts, 
and form hypotheses; it does not intend to offer final and conclusive solutions to 
existing problems (Sanders et al., 2012).  
 
This study adopted an Abductive-Deductive-Inductive-Abductive (A-D-I-A) approach 
to theory building (Asvoll, 2013), instead of a classical inductive approach, or a static 
theory-directing Deductive-Inductive (D-I) strategy (Asvoll, 2013). In other words, this 
study used abduction besides a deductive-inductive strategy, so as to provide pre and 
post theoretical hypotheses during the empirical research process. Researchers generally 
distinguish between inductive and hypothetico-deductive research based on the presence 
or absence of theory (Ali and Birley, 1999).  
 
 
The decision to use abduction besides a D-I approach, rather than using abduction 
besides induction only, was based on arguments that assert that it is impossible to 
isolate theory from research (See for example, Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Pink et al., 
2010). These arguments imply that empirical investigations cannot be understood or 
interpreted without theory and vice versa (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). It has been 
stressed by Strauss and Corbin (1990) that it is not viable to enter into research 
situations with a blank mind; instead they asserted that some 'technical knowledge' is 
necessary. Theory in interpretative research can help the researcher to separate between 
what could be classified as speculations or opinions and what could be considered as 
empirical facts. According to Åsvoll (2013, p.300) "observations independent of theory 
will impede the researcher from making observations early on in the research process". 
That is because the use of theory can help to direct attention to important processes and 
meaning which might be hidden from view (Schweber, 2015). 
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At the same time, excessive use of theory can lead to a dominant deductive strategy, 
which may not lead to the construction of new theories or hypothesis. Therefore, one of 
the important cautions of adapting an integrated (D-I) approach is specifying 
relationships between variables. By referring to our six guiding hypotheses 
(propositions), it is clear that they are composed of ‘constructs’ rather than ‘variables’. 
To simplify this important distinction between the two terms, a study by Ali and Birley 
(1999), which adapted an integrated approach to investigate the ways in which 
entrepreneurs use trust to mediate customer perceived risk, used ‘performance’ as an 
example of a ‘construct’ and ‘sales or return on investment’ as a ‘variable’. Therefore 
using our six propositions (guiding hypothesis), as a priori specification of constructs, 
could potentially provide the study with the following advantages (Ali and Birley, 
1999): 
 Enable the researcher to discover issues or effects which have not been considered 
before the investigation began.  
 Provide a guiding focus for the research but also leave the scope open for generating 
unintended findings or even new hypotheses. 
 Allow the study to makes sense of the disparate information provided by various 
respondents during analysis stages. 
 
 
However, the use of Abduction as part of a deductive-induction approach to theory 
building can be considered as a 'safeguard' against the theoretical hypotheses becoming 
too constraining or leading during data collection and interpretative processes (Asvoll, 
2013). The use of abduction paves the way for contextual choices of theory due to 
observation of surprising or interesting facts, in compared to pre-determined selection 
of theories in case of a D-I approach. In this study, the fact that 'much of the waste 
produced in construction is similar to many projects and keeps recurring' motivated the 
study to look for new or different explanations to this phenomenon. A few explanations 
related to these phenomena have already been offered through the use of theories of 
production as an analytical lens. In particular, Bølviken and Koskela (2016) have 
offered eight possible reasons so as to why waste-reduction has not conquered 
construction. The use of abduction as a starting point of the inquiry strategy (A-D-I-A), 
allowed the study to go beyond previous investigations, and to seek different 
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explanations drawing up on theory from disciplines outside both construction and 
manufacturing such as economics and sociology. Thus, leading to a more abductive 
exploratory logic which aligns with project motives and objectives rather than a 
deductive confirming logic. As a consequence, a primary research question was 
formulated, which influenced the selection of literature and theory to review: 
 'Is there anything in the commercial and institutional environments surrounding 
construction that is blocking radical new production system design and therefore 
pinning the prevailing wasteful system in place?’ 
 
Furthermore, extending the inquiry strategy from A-D-I to A-D-I-A has enabled the 
study to go beyond inductive empirical findings and facts and to seek novel 
explanations; thereby ensuring that the theoretical world is developed further in line 
with the empirical one (Asvoll, 2013). This will be demonstrated in the Data Analysis 
and Discussion Chapters. 
 
The study starts by using a 'selective abduction' reasoning approach (Magnani, 2001), 
which allowed the study to select appropriate theories that were seen to have the 
potential to provide useful guidance and explanations to the research problem. Four 
theories were targeted and reviewed for this purpose, namely (1) the concept of waste in 
construction; (2) Construction Procurement; (3) Neo-institutional theory of social 
science; and (4) Transaction cost theory of economics. Considering that the researcher's 
background as a site engineer with limited prior practical and theoretical knowledge 
related to pre-construction activities and processes, the use of theory, tentatively, at this 
stage was seen to be important to aid the researcher during data collection and analysis 
stages. According to Schweber  (2015, p. 845), the role of theory in 'interpretative' 
research is to: 
"displace the researcher’s own common sense and to allow them to see things 
differently than either their subjects or they would have without it. Similarly, the 
role of data (while partly informed by theory) is to push back against the 
researcher’s own common sense, limiting what can and cannot be claimed. In 
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both cases, this depends on the researcher’s awareness of their own 
assumptions and the way in which they shape the analysis (reflexivity)". 
 
So, the role of ‘abduction’ was to pave the way towards the contextual choice of 
theories and literature to review. Following this, deduction enabled the study to 
formulate six propositions (guiding propositions) and to develop a preliminary 
conceptual model (Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2) prior to data collection. The study then used 
a qualitative research strategy, which adapts a constructivist grounded-theory 
methodology (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006) for data collection and 
interpretation. Consequently, the preliminary conceptual model got substantially 
modified and developed, mainly as a result of unanticipated empirical findings, but also 
due to theoretical insights gained during the process. As explained by Charmaz (2008, 
p. 157): 
"Grounded theory starts with an inductive logic but moves into abductive 
reasoning as the researcher seeks to understand emergent empirical findings. 
Abductive reasoning aims to account for surprises, anomalies, or puzzles in the 
collected data. This type of reasoning invokes imaginative interpretations because 
the researcher imagines all possible theoretical accounts for the observed data 
and then forms and checks hypotheses until arriving at the most plausible 
interpretation of the observed data" 
 
The type of abductive reasoning mentioned by Charmaz (2008) in the quotes above 
aligns with what Magnani (2001) classified as 'creative abduction', as it leads to the 
formulation of novel theories or hypotheses. This reasoning method has been adopted in 
this study following Peirce's logic abduction approach for generating hypotheses. The 
hypotheses were then deduced and tested 'implicitly' through analytical reflections and 
thoughts, and 'explicitly' through an evaluation exercise that was conducted with a small 
sample of academic and industry experts. Having discussed the philosophical and 
theoretical assumptions underpinning this study, the next section will provide detailed 
explanations and justifications to the choice of research methodology and methods used 
for this study. 
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3.6 Research Methodologies 
In general, research designs tend to be either: qualitative, quantitative, or mixed. 
Creswell (2009) provided a useful distinction which is useful in choosing and when 
adopting an approach, as summarised in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: A comparison between research approaches (Creswell, 2009) 
 Qualitative  
approaches 
Quantitative 
approaches 
Mixed-methods 
approaches 
Use these 
philosophical 
assumptions 
(Knowledge claims) 
 Constructivist 
 Advocacy 
 Participatory 
 Post-positivist  Pragmatic 
Employ these 
research 
methodologies 
 Phenomenology 
 Grounded theory 
 Case study 
 Ethnography 
 Narrative 
 Surveys and 
experiments 
 Sequential, 
 Concurrent 
 Transformative 
Employ these 
methods 
 Open-ended 
questions 
 Emerging 
approaches, 
 Text or image 
data 
 Closed-ended 
questions, 
 Predetermined 
approaches, 
 Numerical data 
 Both open and 
close-ended 
questions 
 Both emerging 
and predetermines 
approaches 
 Both qualitative 
and quantitative 
data analysis 
 
 
A qualitative research approach is typically suitable for studies aiming for an in-depth 
understanding of the subject or problem under investigation. It is mainly concerned with 
exploring the meanings embedded in people’s experiences rather than testing 
predictions (Bryman, 2008). Thus, an exploratory qualitative research approach was 
considered most appropriate, as it also aligns with the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning this study (see section 3.5). Although different qualitative research 
methodologies exist, this study focused on considering the five main qualitative 
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research traditions identified by Creswell (2009), because they are the most commonly 
used in social science research. A comparison between these five main research 
methodologies is summarised in Table 3.3 
Table 3.3: Qualitative research methodologies (Creswell, 2009, 2012) 
Type of 
research 
methodology 
Ethnography  Case Study  
Grounded 
Theory  
Phenomenology 
Narrative 
Case Study  
Focus  
Describing and  
interpreting a  
cultural or  
social group  
In-depth  
exploration of   
single or 
multiple  
cases  
Developing 
an abstract 
theory that is  
grounded in  
empirical 
data 
collected 
from the 
field 
Investigating the  
essence of  
human 
experiences about 
a phenomenon, as 
described by 
participants 
Studying the 
lives of 
individuals  
Disciplinary 
origin  
Cultural 
anthropology  
Political 
science  
Sociology  Psychology  Anthropology  
Data 
collection  
Observations 
and interviews 
during 
extended 
fieldwork (e.g.  
6m-1yr)  
Multiple  
sources  
including  
documents,  
interviews,  
artefacts  
Interviews  
with 20-30  
individuals  
to saturate  
categories  
and detail a  
theory  
Statements,  
meanings,  
themes, general  
descriptions  
Interview and 
documents  
Data analysis  
Description,  
analysis,  
interpretation  
Description,  
themes,  
assertions  
Open, axial,  
selective  
coding, and 
constant 
comparison 
of data 
Statements,  
meanings,  
themes, general  
descriptions  
Stories,  
epiphanies,  
historical  
context  
Narrative 
form  
Description of  
cultural  
behaviour of  
group or  
individual  
In-depth  
study of case  
or cases  
Theory or 
conceptual 
model  
Description of  
essence of  
experience  
Detailed  
picture of  
individual’s  
life  
 
 
The methodology to be adopted for this study should lead to a holistic explanation of 
the underlying motives and behaviors associated with the use of imperfect construction 
procurement and commercial arrangements, along the extended construction industry 
supply chain. This pointed the study towards qualitative methods and a choice between 
the use of grounded theory and multiple case studies. The case study approach was 
discounted because of several reasons. First, commercial studies can be notoriously 
difficult to mine truth from, especially if attempted through direct observation of live 
procurement processes. People are sensitive about the issues they disclose and the 
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implications for their immediate or future commercial positions. The author negotiated 
access of a case study with ongoing local public projects, but the Strategic Director of 
the projects refused due to commercial sensitivity reasons. A similar response was 
obtained from a major tier-1 UK contractor. The company was hesitant to allow the 
author gain access to any of their commerical or supply-chain contractual practices. As 
mentioned by one of the interviewees of this study:  
“This may be a key area of ‘Waste’ in that ‘Accurate Shared Learning’ is rarely 
obtainable in relation to commercial issues…People will share good news but 
not necessarily the bad. And the links between cause and effect in the case of 
both are rarely accurately assigned” (Fellow of the Institute of  Civil Engineers  
(FICE), Senior Consultant,  UK, 8
th
 September,  2015, E-mail message). 
 
Secondly, a case study route would have confined the study to a limited number of 
projects agreed upon at the outset by either clients or main contractors. Additionally, 
there is the risk that participants in the down-stream supply-chain would not remain 
anonymous when investigating links between causes and consequences, unless project 
parties were willing to collaborate in sharing lessons learned. Thus, a grounded theory 
(GT) approach avoided these issues by allowing the coverage of a wide variety of 
projects while at same time ensuring that all informants remain anonymous. 
 
GT is a useful means to study a topic of interest or problem area that is under-explored 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It is, therefore, particularly appropriate to this study, as little 
is known in existing literature about the imperfect institutional factors influencing the 
choice and deployment of wasteful construction procurement practices  (as discussed in 
chapter 2). A GT approach can also facilitate an in-depth understanding of the impact of 
the use of imperfect procurement arrangements on project-team performance and 
behaviour, grounded in the interpretations of the participants’ construction procurement 
experiences in the UK; thereby ensuring that the developed theory or conceptual model 
provides a close representation of social context. The next section provides a 
background to the grounded theory methodology (GTM) and a discussion upon the 
fundamental guidelines common in three main variants to GTM. Following this, a 
detailed description of the research methodology adapted for this study is provided. The 
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subsequent sections define the research methods and procedures for data collection and 
analysis of this study. 
 
3.6.1 Grounded theory methodology 
Grounded theory (GT) originated in the 1960s in the fields of health and nursing studies 
by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. Their influential book 'Discovery of Grounded 
Theory' challenged predominating quantitative research paradigms at the time, by 
catalysing a methodology which aims for 'creating new theory' rather than 'testing 
existing theories' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). A grounded theory methodology (GTM) is 
exploratory in nature and typically seeks to generate a theory, through inductive 
reasoning, that is grounded in the empirical data from which it has been derived 
(Gasson, 2004). A GT, however, is not attained passively, but through an interactive, 
exhaustive and ongoing process where the researcher keeps moving back and forth 
between data collection and analysis. This process continues until a conceptual theme is 
developed from empirical facts in a way which provide a clear representation of social 
reality (Loosemore, 1999). In this sense, GT tends to involve the researcher in a journey 
of discovery rather than a confirmatory process of linking pre-conceived hypotheses 
with reality (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 40) describe the 
essence of when it is mostly appropriate to use GTM for a research study, as follows: 
"If someone wanted to know whether one drug is more effective than another, 
then a double blind clinical trial would be more appropriate than grounded 
theory study. However, if someone wanted to know what it was like to be a 
participant in a drug study, then he or she might sensibly engage in a grounded 
theory project or some other type of qualitative study."  
 
 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) stated a number of characteristics that GTM has in 
common with other qualitative approaches. These include:  
 Inquiry as an interactive process between researcher and respondents 
 Valuing participants' perspectives and relying on people's words 
 Focus is on real life experiences 
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However, GT is of particular value when the research challenge is to interpret complex 
social processes where holistic explanations are lacking (Hinton and Hamilton, 2015). 
In other words, GT is appropriate for use when the researcher hopes to develop a 
conceptual overview of the social phenomena under investigation. The inductive focus 
of GT makes it suitable for exploring a topic of interest or a substantive problem area 
that there is little known about it (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It positions research 
problems in a social context, and provides a useful means for learning about 
individuals’ perceptions, behaviours and actions regarding the particular problem or 
subject under exploration (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2008). Nevertheless, in 
GT, the unit of analysis is not the individuals themselves, but incidents in the data 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967). Theoretical sampling and constant data comparison are 
examples of techniques used within the GTM to support a systematic generation of 
theory, grounded in the data.  
 
GT has evolved over time in the past five decades, and has become a widely utilised and 
accepted qualitative approach, in particular within social science disciplines (Mills et 
al., 2006; Fernie and Tennant, 2013) Development in GT took place due to a spiral of 
philosophical arguments and methodological advancements (Mills et al., 2006). This 
section provided an overview of the background of GT and its main characteristics, and 
its purposes for use. Apart from choosing GT to guide this study, in light of the different 
philosophical stances underlying GT, it is therefore necessary to take a look at three 
critical variants of GTM. 
 
3.6.2 Variants of grounded theory methodology 
GTM has been subject to continuous development since its origination in the 1960s in 
the United States.  This led to the development of three distinct versions of GT that vary 
in their philosophical underpinnings: 
 Glaser and Strauss' (such as 1967, 1978) 'classical/traditional GTM',  
 Strauss and Corbin's (such as 1990, 1998) 'evolved GTM', and 
 Charmaz's (e.g. 2006, 2008) 'constructivist GT approach'.  
 
Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 
 
Page | 108  
 
The Classical GTM 
Grounded theory was first articulated by Glaser and Strauss (1967) as a general 
qualitative methodology that seeks to generate theory through inductive analysis of 
data. Their influential work emphasises that the researcher should start collecting data 
with a 'blank mind'. This means that data-collection is initiated without reviewing 
literature to avoid preconceptions, and thus ensure an inductive approach to theory-
building. This original version of GT, therefore, suggests that theory is contained in the 
collected data and just needs to be 'discovered. This 'discovery' nature of this classical 
GT approach assumes "the researcher uncovers something that is already there" 
(Charmaz, 2008, p. 45). This implies that the researcher should somehow take a passive 
stance during data analysis; thereby allowing the theory to emerge from the empirical 
data, without any previous theoretical input that might be of little relevance. According 
to this stance, the researcher only has to discover the theory inherent in the data by 
means of appropriate methods and inductive analysis. This perspective, therefore, 
assumes that different researchers would make same observations to facts in the data 
and reach same conclusions, as the theory will eventually become apparent to every 
researcher in some form of objective reality.  
 
Thus, despite the qualitative nature of the classical GTM, it has been criticised by many 
scholars to remain close to positivism and objectivism paradigms (see for example, 
Pidgeon 1996; Bryant, 2003; Charmaz, 2008; Reichertz, 2010). However in recent 
writings by Glaser, he argued that classical GTM does not necessarily assume the 
objectivity of the researcher, instead the rigorous application of the methodology, for 
example through writing memos and constant comparisons of incidents, plays a crucial 
role in revealing biases and enabling the researcher to take corrective actions; thereby 
reducing as much variation in the data as possible (Glaser 1998). Additionally, Glasser 
(2002) classified classic grounded theory as a perspective methodology; however 
perspectives are not explored through an interpretative approach, but with the aim of 
raising these perspectives and ongoing patterns of behaviour to a conceptual level. 
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The Evolved GTM 
In Strauss and Corbin's (for example 1990, 1994, 1998) writings, they disagreed with 
Glaser's assumption of a 'pre-existing reality out there'. Instead they developed an 
evolved version of GT which assumes that 'truth is enacted' (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, 
p. 279). aAs discussed earlier, the classical GT assumes that 'theory is discovered', and 
thus the same pattern of facts inherent in the data should appear to every researcher, if 
the right methods and procedures are utilised. However, the evolved version of GT 
argues that the researcher has to actively obtain theory from data. In research practice, it 
is most likely that each researcher will tend to focus on different aspects of the collected 
data depending on their background, previous experiences and values.  
 
The main differences between the evolved and classical versions of GT seem to be 
centred around the relationship between GTM and existing literature, and the role of the 
researcher during data collection and analysis. Classical GT gives significant 
consideration to ensuring and maintaining theoretical sensitivity during collection and 
analysis. Thus Glaser argues that researchers should avoid reading relevant literature, as 
it may influence lead to ‘forcing of data’; thereby limiting the researcher's their 
innovation while conducting initial coding of data. Once data collection reaches a 
developed state, extant literature can then be used to validate the emergent theory 
grounded from the data (Hunter and Kelly, 2008). In contrast, Strauss and his student 
Corbin believe that researchers construct theory as a result of their interpretation of the 
participants' words and narratives (Mills et al., 2006). They also argue that "we all bring 
to the inquiry a considerable background in professional and disciplinary literature" 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 48). Thus, data verification should be accomplished as an 
ongoing process, through continuous iteration between data collection and extant 
literature, until a theory is constructed. Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
emphasised the need to follow a set of procedures and formal coding schemes that they 
defined, as a way of reducing bias and ensuring consistency and quality of findings.  
 
It has been argued by various scholar that the evolved version of GT (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) sits into a post-positivism inquiry paradigm, and that it is located in a 
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mixed philosophical stance: an 'objectivist' approach which aims to inhibit bias during 
data collection and analysis, and a 'constructivist approach' which acknowledges the 
researcher's role in concept or theory construction (Charmaz, 2003; Mills et al., 2006). 
Critics of the evolved GT orientation argue that Strauss and Corbin's (1998) structured 
approach and heavy emphasis on the application of strict procedures during the coding 
process, may lead to the ‘searching or imposing of data’, and so by this way distract the 
GT researcher from the original intent and the emergent and inductive characteristics of 
GTM (Glaser, 2002a, 2002b). 
 
 
The Constructivist GTM 
Constructivist grounded theory can be implicitly traced from the work of Strauss and 
Corbin (1990, 1994, 1998), as underpinned by their belief that theory is constructed as 
an outcome of the researcher’s interpretation of the voice of the participants (Mills et 
al., 2006). However, Charmaz (2000, 2006, and 2008) is the first researcher to explicitly 
describe and confirm her constructivist intent. This approach to GT acknowledges that 
theory is constructed through interaction between participants and the researcher rather 
than being discovered or objectively emerging (Hinton and Hamilton, 2015). According 
to Charmaz (2006, pp. 130–131): 
“The constructivist approach means learning how, when, and to what extent the 
studied experience is embedded in larger and, often, hidden positions, networks, 
situations, and relationships” 
 
In line with constructivist paradigms, researchers adopting a constructivist grounded 
theory approach view truth as becoming apparent through their construction of people’s 
experiences, interpretations of the experiences and the subjective meanings they give to 
these experiences (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Thus, this strand of GTM assumes that the 
interaction process between the researcher and participants “produces the data, and 
therefore the meanings that the researcher observes and defines” (Charmaz, 1995, p. 
35). A constructivist GT approach, therefore, requires researchers to go beyond the 
surface in terms of seeking meaning in the data, by questioning tacit meanings and 
searching for underlying values, motives and beliefs (Mills et al., 2006). For this reason, 
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Charmaz emphasised in her recent writings the importance of adopting abductive 
reasoning (see for example Charmaz, 2008) as part of a constructivist GTM. According 
to her: 
 “Grounded theory begins with inductive analyses of data but moves beyond 
induction to create an imaginative interpretation of studied life. We adopt 
abductive logic when we engage in imaginative thinking about intriguing 
findings and then return to the field to check our conjectures” (Charmaz 
2009:137–38).  
 
As such, abduction allows for ‘constant comparison’ recommendations of classical and 
evolved versions of GT, where researchers are advised to move back and forth between 
data and theory iteratively. However, Charmaz’s perspective positions abduction as 
secondary to induction, and thus can be criticised for limiting abduction’s potential to 
foster theoretical innovation from the beginning of the research inquiry (Timmermans 
and Tavory, 2012). 
 
3.7 The Methodological Approach Adapted by this Research Study 
This study uses a qualitative research approach, which adapts a grounded theory 
methodology (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz 2008). As stated by Mills et al 
(2006), within the GTM tradition, there are various points of departure along a spiral of 
methodological development; the stance taken among the different variants of GT 
should therefore depend on the researcher’s ontological and epistemological beliefs. 
Based on the philosophical assumptions underlying this research (see section 3.5), the 
strategy chosen for this research draws upon the legitimacy of the evolved approach to 
GT, and the abductive intent of the constructivist GTM. In this sense, the study 
acknowledges the influence of literature during research initiation; nevertheless, the 
author would claim to remain sensitive to the danger of ‘forcing of data’  
 
The study supports the theoretical strand of evolved GTM, which argues that previous 
knowledge about the world and scientific theories (prior to data collection) are useful 
(Reichertz, 2010). Data analysis was also informed by Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 
 
Page | 112  
 
formal coding scheme (open, axial and selective coding procedures). The study was 
guided by the interpretative stance of both evolved and constructivist approaches to GT 
that recognise the role of the researcher in theory building. Additionally, the research 
was inspired by Charmaz’s (2008, 2009) explicit adoption of abductive logic during 
data collection and analysis stages. However, this study adopted an A-D-I-A approach 
to theory building (see section 3.5), at which abduction was adopted during data 
collection and analysis to foster theoretical innovation, but also used during research 
initiation to pave the way towards the contextual choice of topic guides (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: A Reflexive Grounded Theory Approach (Gasson 2004) 
 
The debate between classical and developed versions of GTM (evolved and 
constructivist) seems to be centred up on whether the researcher believes that their work 
should be defended from a positivist or interpretive perspective. It has also been 
suggested by Reichertz, (2010) that the controversy between Glaser and Strauss can be 
partially characterised as one between induction and abduction. The researcher 
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disagrees with Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) positivist stance and emphasis on avoiding 
literature prior to data collection. As argued by Timmermans and Tavory (2012, p. 170): 
“Their commitment to an inductive approach created an epistemological and 
practical dilemma: Researchers were admonished to generate new theory 
without being beholden to preexisting theories, but they still required theoretical 
sensitivity based on a broad familiarity with existing theories to generate new 
theories”. 
  
Various scholars have debated classical GT’s stance on ignoring prior knowledge. 
Whilst admitting their appreciation for inductive GT, they have also raised their concern 
on ignoring literature. For example, Strauss and Corbin (1998) argued that theoretical 
pre-knowledge inevitably flows into the data’s interpretation. In other words, they 
claimed that observation and theory development are necessarily always already theory-
guided (Reichertz, 2010). From the same perspective, Andersen and Kragh (2010) 
questioned that researchers can ever engage in any inductive research, whether it is GT 
or not, with an ‘empty head’ or from a ‘blank state’. Similarly, Dey (2007) has 
cautioned qualitative researchers not to confuse an “open mind with an empty head” 
(p.176). Based on these arguments, Pigeon (1996) suggested that some tentative use of 
existing theory is needed, in order to aid the researcher with understanding of the 
phenomena under investigation, and to guide the researcher in what data to collect. 
According to him, the emergence of theory results from constant interplay between data 
(partly informed by theory) and the researcher’s emerging conceptualisations (deductive 
↔ inductive reasoning). This perspective resembles with Schweber’s (2015) arguments 
related to the role of theory in interpretative research. 
 
In a study by Loosemore (1999) that aimed to develop a grounded theory of 
construction crisis management, an ‘indicator model’ was constructed from existing 
literature prior to data collection. According to the author, the value of that abstract 
model was that it indicated preliminary propositions which helped to guide the research 
effort, through refinement, to the development of a grounded theory. In another study 
by Hinton and Hamilton (2015) which sought to understand how and why the 
construction industry in New Zealand persists with competitive tendering, despite the 
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known inefficiencies of that procurement model. The first author acknowledged the 
existence of early influencers (i.e. extensive pre-experience in the construction 
industry), and thus they adopted a constructivist GTM as it values the role of the 
researcher (including pre-existing knowledge) during data collection and analysis. 
These arguments thus support this study’s justification for the tentative use of literature 
and guiding propositions as part of its interpretative A-D-I-A GTM. The next sections 
explain the research methods and procedures adopted for data collection and analysis. 
 
3.8 Research Methods  
This section details how the principles of the grounded theory approach are practically 
applied in this study. It begins with the illustration of data collection procedures 
including the research scope and ethical considerations, sampling and data collection 
methods. The coding processes and data analysis and interpretation issues follow as 
well as a critical discussion on the choice and use of Nvivo– A qualitative data analysis 
software package. Finally a summary and a reflection on the limitations of GTM is 
provided. 
 
Grounded theory is more distinctive than other qualitative approaches, due to its 
emergent, comparative and interactive attributes (Charmaz, 2008). Based on an 
extensive literature review of grounded-theory studies, work by Sbaraini et al. (2011) 
identified a number of fundamental components of a grounded theory study, as shown 
in Table 3.4. These components will be discussed in the following subsections. 
Table 3.4: Fundamental components of a GT study [adapted from Sbaraini et al. (2011)] 
Component Stage 
Openness Throughout the study 
Theoretical sampling Sampling and data collection 
Analysing immediately Data collection and analysis 
Coding and data comparison Analysis 
Memo-writing (sometimes also drawing 
diagrams) 
Analysis 
Theoretical saturation Sampling, data collection and analysis 
Production of a substantive theory Analysis and interpretation 
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3.8.1 Research scope and setting 
The scope of this study is commercial and industrial construction as well as smart-
motorway infrastructure projects. The fragmented nature of the industry meant that a 
large number of cases would be needed. However, it is important to stress that a 
qualitative study guided by GTM does not seek representativeness to achieve statistical 
generalisability but instead aims to explain and sometimes perhaps predict phenomena 
based on empirical data. In a GT studies, data collection typically encompasses the use 
of in-depth interviews but can also include other sources of data such as existing 
research literature, focus groups, supporting documentation, and even quantitative data. 
In GT “all is data” (Glaser, 2007); it is up to the GT researcher to figure out what data 
they need to acquire (Glaser and Holton, 2004). 
 
The primary method of data collection used in this study was in-depth semi-structured 
interviews. These 19.2 hours of interviews (with 24 senior professionals within the UK 
construction industry) were recorded and transcribed into around 340 pages of primary 
qualitative data. Interviews lasted from 100 minutes to 15 minutes, with an average of 
48 minutes. Initial interviews lasted longer and centred on wide-ranging issues relating 
to typical examples and causes of process waste and value-loss encountered in projects, 
and imperfect construction procurement and contractual experiences and their 
consequences. As concepts emerged and approached saturation, interview questions 
became more specific and targeted. 
 
3.8.2 Ethical considerations 
This research adheres to the guidelines for the ethical conduct of research set by the 
Nottingham Trent’s Graduate School. Ethical approval was obtained from the Research 
Ethics Committee at Nottingham Trent University (NTU). The author was informed on 
16
th
 October 2015that the Joint Inter College Ethics Committee (JICEC) at NTU was 
happy to confirm that in its judgement there were no outstanding ethical concerns that 
required further discussion or exploration prior to data collection related to the research 
study. The study ensured that participation was voluntary and that participants are free 
to withdraw at any time. This was clearly stated in the invitation sheet sent to research 
participants (See Appendix 1), which clearly stated what the research was about, what it 
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involved, and ensured data protection. Informed consent for participation and recording 
of interviews was taken by email from respondents willing to participate and then verbal 
acceptance was taken once again prior to recordings of interviews. In addition, all 
information collected for this study was kept strictly confidential and full anonymity of 
participants was ensured during the collection, storage, analysis, and publication of 
research material in accordance with NTU’s policies and procedures.  
  
3.8.3 Preliminary purposive sampling 
Grounded theory studies are characterised by the use of theoretical sampling, but this 
has to be based on some initial data collection and analysis. The sampling process, 
therefore, has to start purposively, as in most qualitative studies, in order to allow the 
study to adopt a theoretical sampling strategy (Sbaraini et al., 2011). Thus, this study 
initially used a generic purposive sampling approach (Bryman, 2012) before theoretical 
sampling was possible. Purpose sampling is a non-random technique that does not 
demand a set number of participants (Etikan et al., 2016). Instead, it puts the research 
questions under investigation at the forefront of sampling considerations (Bryman, 
2012). Through this approach, the researcher decides what needs to be known, and 
deliberately chooses suitable participants who can and are willing to provide the 
information by virtue of their knowledge or experience. Based on these considerations, 
a set of open-ended questions were formulated for semi-structured interviews (See 
Appendix 2). The interview guide was examined by the Joint Inter College Ethics 
Committee (JICEC) at NTU and obtained ethical clearance prior to data collection 
(Appendix 3). The set of questions included in the preliminary guide was structured to 
achieve the three following objectives that were also mentioned in the invitation sheet: 
1. Exploring the factors influencing the selection of construction procurement 
arrangements  
2. Investigating the influence of procurement arrangements on project-team 
interaction, behaviour, and performance;  
3. Seeking evidence for practical examples of waste or value-loss arising from 
construction procurement and commercial practices.  
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Prior to data collection, a pilot study was conducted with professional industry 
practitioners. An invitation sheet was sent to six reviewers by e-mail, at which four of 
them responded back on time (two contractors and two consultants). The reviewers 
were asked to: 
 Provide feedback up on the 2-page cover/invitation sheet for interviews which 
included the research project information as well as ethical information.  
 Review the proposed set of questions prepared for interviews (interview guide). 
While doing so, the reviewers were requested to pay particular attention to the 
following: 
o Whether they believe or not that the set of questions included could 
enable help the study to achieve its objectives? Any suggested questions 
to be added, removed or rephrased? 
o If the language/questions used are relevant and simple so that industry 
practitioners would easily understand? 
o If they think that any of the proposed questions are leading, biased or 
my make interviewees feel uncomfortable? 
 Recommend, if possible, potential participants whom they think might be 
interested in contributing to the study. 
 
Feedback received was positive and helped to improve the relevance and clarity of the 
terms and questions included in the semi-structured interview guide. An example of 
feedback received is as follows: 
“I looked at your research and interview questions. They seem pretty good and 
should provide some exploratory data for your research...The procurement 
methods may dictate: responsibility, liability, payment, governance structure, 
on-boarding time, ability to communicate, etc. I think that the governance 
structure, liability, payment, and inability to communicate may be the factors 
that directly lead to waste in a project… I suspect that it may not be the 
procurement system themselves that cause waste but the practices that they may 
intentionally or unintentionally advocate...There are other context factors such 
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as the owner, complexity, and size of the project that influence the choice of a 
procurement method” (Consultant, 30th September,  2015, E-mail message). 
 
In addition, from feedback received, it appeared that the term ‘procurement’ has various 
meanings in the minds of construction professionals, and that is commonly limited to 
the procurement of materials and goods. To overcome this issue, a supporting appendix 
which includes a diagram that defines the study’s wider understanding of construction 
procurement systems (CPSs) was devised. This virtual definition provided was regarded 
as important, as it helps to establish shared understanding between the researcher and 
interview participants around an important theme within the topic under investigation. 
Following this, the study initially targeted four industry experts with at least 13 years of 
extensive relevant practical experience in construction, as part of a generic purposive 
sampling strategy (Bryman, 2012).  
 
The first interview was conducted on the 13
th
 October 2015 with an experienced 
turnaround project manager. The second interviewee is a senior consultant and a fellow 
member of the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE). The third is a president of a lean 
consultancy company, while the fourth works as a certified senior project manager. The 
average duration of these three in-depth interviews was around 1 hour and 15 minutes. 
‘Memo-writing’ took place ‘immediately’ after each interview was completed. This 
‘memoing’ process included reflections on how the interview went, and taking notes on 
critical themes and topics discussed during interviews. Subsequently, full transcription 
of each interview was carried out by the researcher, and data was then qualitatively 
analysed using NVivo 10 software.  
  
3.8.4 Theoretical sampling and interviewing technique 
One of the distinctive features of grounded theory is that its sample relies on theoretical 
considerations rather than statistical considerations (Bryman, 2012). This means that the 
sample size cannot be pre-determined in advance. Instead an on-going and iterative 
sampling technique called ‘theoretical sampling’ is employed. Glaser and Strauss (1967, 
p. 45) define theoretical sampling as a “process of data collection for generating theory 
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whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides what data 
to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges”. 
After initial data collection and analysis was completed, the study employed theoretical 
sampling to determine who to sample next and what questions to ask during interviews, 
until theoretical saturation was achieved. Therefore, at this stage, the researcher did not 
adhere to the semi-structured interview guide used for initial data collection any longer. 
Questions were continuously modified or altered based on prior data analysis and 
depending on information needed for data comparison and saturation of categories. 
Table 3.5 provides an overview of the sample characteristics of this study. 
 
In addition, the selection of potential interviewees was not pre-determined. Instead data 
collection was controlled by emerging theoretical categories, in the course of analysing 
data that have been collected. So for example, interviewee no. 4 (in Table 7) is a project 
manager who was asked to talk to the researcher about practical examples of waste or 
value-loss that he as a project manager believes are challenging, repeated or are typical 
in projects that he is engaged in. So his response was as follows: 
“There is one point which in my experience that each and every construction 
site suffers. It is about recesses…Recesses in walls, in brick works, ceilings and 
so on. So it is exactly the interface between the technical parts of the building 
and the civil works or the plastering works or whatsoever. And during the 
planning stage, the design and planning team is stinging-off the pipes and the 
cablings and so on. And building up and designing special ways. Usually they 
are not able to put the recesses in aright order or in the right size. And usually 
they are making them much bigger.  And when it comes to the execution, in some 
cases they are either in the wrong place because the contractors coordinated 
their works on-site with the construction management, and then they shifted 
some parts of the installations, and so recesses are not in the right place” 
(Certified senior project manager, 3
rd
 November, 2015, Skype interview). 
 
As a result, the researcher asked more probing questions in relation to the context of the 
situation, consequences of the incident, and possible root-causes of the problem from 
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the interviewee’s perspective. When asked about whom he believes to be mainly 
responsible for the occurrence of this typical example of value loss relating (i.e. 
inaccurate design and installation of wall recesses), his answer was as follows:  
“I would say that the answer is of the designer. Once there is a problem on site 
and I tell him it was your fault as you did not consider that and that and that, 
and he would say (the usual answer is) I did not have that information at that 
point in time. This is the most common answer I would get; and, and in most 
cases, he is right! And that is what the partnering and collaborative methods try 
to minimise - That these information are really lacking at that point, at that 
moment, the design documents are prepared” (Certified senior project manager, 
3
rd
 November,  2015, Skype interview). 
 
The data collection, coding and analysis there guided the researcher to decide to 
interview a senior designer for deeper investigation and data-comparison purposes. 
Therefore, based on theoretical sampling principles, the following interview was 
arranged and conducted with a senior architect and a director of framework 
arrangements in a leading construction company. The interviewee was informed about 
the story related to the design and installation of recesses and asked whether he 
experienced a similar situation. The interviewee’s response came as follows: 
“Yeah, yeah I would say that's fairly common. I would push it a lit bit further 
back. It is not the designers that are the problem; it is the client. The client is not 
prepared to pay for the detailed design and investigation that might be needed to 
be able to get things right. I think part of the problem as well is lack of 
integration in the team. So I'll split into two issues: one is design coordination 
and the other one is actually incomplete design” (Head of Innovation and 
Director of National Frameworks (Senior Architect), 8th November, 2015, 
Skype interview). 
 
Consequently, the rest of the semi-structured interview with the senior architect 
focussed on investigating factors that lead to poor design coordination and incomplete 
design from the participant’s point of view, in addition to a number of other questions 
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that emerged from data analysis of previously collected and coded data. This evolving 
process of interviewing and coding and analysis of data continued till the study reached 
a state of theoretical saturation. 
Table 3.5: Sample information 
Seq. Professional Role / Title 
duration 
(mins) 
Data 
collected 
1 Turnaround Project Manager 100 S+E 
2 Senior Consultant (FICE)  69 P+E+D 
3 President of a lean consultancy company 60 S 
4 Certified Senior Project Manager  (PMP, MRICS)  65 S+E 
5 Head of Innovation and Director of National Frameworks 
(Senior Architect) 
57 S 
6 Project manager - Subcontractor 51 S 
7 Head of Supply-chain at a leading contractor 60 S 
8 Senior Procurement and Performance Consultant (PhD) 90 P 
9 Managing Director and Principal Consultant at a Rail 
consultancy company  
50 S 
10 Senior QS at a leading contractor 39 P 
11 Site manager working  for small contractor and Lean Specialist 75 S 
12 Senior Cost Consultant (MRICS) 56 S 
13 Director and Project Manager at a specialist subcontractor 
(Trenchless drainage repairs) 
33 P 
14 Senior Design Coordinator at a leading contractor 45 P+D 
15 Business Development Manager at a major contractor 30 P 
16 ECC Project Manager  (CEng, MICE) 36 P 
17 Senior Architect & BIM Manager (MCIAT, PMP) 45 S 
18 Site Agent  (CEng) at a leading contractor 40 P+F+D 
19 Associate Director at a leading cost consultancy and QS 
company – Financial governance 
35 P+D 
20 Deputy ECC Project Manager (CEng, MICE) 33 P+E 
21 Sub-agent at a leading contractor  
27 (S+E+D) 
22 Project Planner agent at a leading contractor 
23 Principal Design Engineer 40 P 
24 Senior Project Manager and Consultant 15 P 
* Seq.= sequence; S= skype video interview, P= phone interview, E= follow-up questions by e-mail, F= 
follow-up by phone , D= supporting documents sent by e-mail 
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This study relied on the use of qualitative semi-structured interviews, as part of an 
adapted grounded theory methodology, instead of participant observations. Each of 
these two contrasting methods has its own merits and demerits. However, there are a 
number of issues which can make qualitative interviewing exhibit advantages over 
participant observation. For instance, in this study, there are various issues that are 
simply not amenable to observation, so that asking participants about them represents 
the only possible means for finding about them within a qualitative research approach. 
Examples of these include issues associated with commercial sensitivity, reasons for 
inclusion of special contractual clauses, opportunistic practices, contingency values and 
so on. Other important factors include: ethical and confidentiality considerations, 
allowing for reconstruction of events, avoiding reactive effects due to observation, and 
greater breadth of coverage in terms of access to wider variety of situations and people 
(Bryman, 2012, pp.495-496). 
 
The two main options for conducting qualitative research interviews are face-to-face or 
by telephone. The former is the most common, and probably the best, mode in which to 
conduct interviews (Oltmann, 2016). However, telephone interviewing is likely to have 
certain advantages when compared to face-to-face interviewing (Irvine et al., 2010); 
most obviously, minimal travel time and cost. Furthermore, using telephone 
interviewing can be a more effective mode when asking sensitive questions, as it can 
help interviewees to feel less intrusive or distressed about answering when the 
interviewer is not physically present (Bryman, 2012, p. 488). However, there are a few 
concerns related to lack of ability to access visual or non-verbal cues and technical 
issues associated with quality of phone line (Irvine et al., 2010).  
 
 
At the same time, advances in technology and internet-based methods of 
communication are becoming increasingly important and popular in qualitative social 
science research. According to Sillivan (2012), the use of video conference can allow 
researchers to interview a wide range of geographically dispersed individuals with a 
recorded interaction that at least mimics face-to-face interactions. Based on these 
considerations, this research study conducted interviews via telephone and Skype video-
conferencing rather than face-to face-meetings, as shown in Table 3.5 above. Skype 
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video conferencing was the favoured approach; however telephone interviews were 
conducted when this was not possible. 
 
On some occasions, follow up questions were sent to participants by e-mail or discussed 
through the phone, when needed, to ask for clarifications on the accuracy of unclear 
parts of transcriptions or when the researcher needed the interviewees to probe on some 
of their answers provided during interview. Although, Forbes and Henderson (2005) 
advise researchers to take careful considerations about the ethical and epistemological 
implications of sharing transcripts with participants, the experience in this study has 
been quite different and positive. First of all, the researcher did not share full transcripts 
with participants. Instead, participants were only asked to check the accuracy of the 
researcher’s transcription to very few words or sentences. Therefore, the aim in this case 
was to avoid guessing, and thus ensure accuracy of meanings and interpretations. On 
other case, the aim of these follow ups was to ask participants for more detail or to 
request for supporting evidence or documents. This practice is encouraged by Charmaz 
(2006) as it aligns with her recommended intensive interviewing technique for grounded 
theory studies. Examples of supporting documents received from participants include: 
 Form of agreement and contract data of an ongoing infrastructure project (268 
pages) 
 Samples of planning sheets related to resource quantities and scheduling 
 Samples of weekly work plans and consolidated as-built Percentage Plan 
Completed (PPC) charts and diagrams, including analysis of reasons for non-
completion (RNC). 
 Template of tool-kit used for measuring supply-chain performance 
 Power-point presentation about a leading consultant firm’s strategy and major 
commercial services 
 
3.8.5 Coding procedures 
Coding is one of the core processes in grounded-theory (Bohm, 2004; Holton, 2007).  It 
entails analysing the data that we have collected and assigning meaningful codes to 
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parts of it (keywords, terms, phrases) that seem to be of theoretical significance and/or 
appear to be salient within the social context of the phenomena under investigations 
(Bryman, 2012, pp. 568). As described by Charmaz (1983, pp. 186), codes serve as 
“shorthand devices to label, separate, compile, and organise data”. In terms of stance 
toward coding, Charmaz (2006, p. 50) recommends grounded theorists to remain open, 
stay close to data, and compare data with data. This study followed Strauss and 
Corbin’s (1998) three stages of coding: open, axial and selective coding. These stages 
gradually cluster codes in collected data and refine emerging theoretical concepts and 
categories (Gasson 2004) through continuous memoing and constant comparison until 
theoretical saturation is achieved, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. A more detailed 
illustration of the coding analysis is provided in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 (Data analysis) 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Coding processes in grounded theory (Jones and Alony, 2011) 
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3.8.6 Memo writing  
Memo-writing (Memoing) is an ongoing technique that allows grounded theorists to 
record and reflect on their understandings of and insights into the data. This reflective 
technique helps to refine emerging categories and to systematically guide theory 
development (Charmaz, 2006). Memos were written throughout the data collection and 
analysis processes of this study. It enabled the researcher to record his analytical 
thinking and to reflect up on the context within which the study’s conceptual model was 
developed. This included writing memos about reflections on interviews, ideas about 
codes and their relationships, analysis of evolving categories and the relationships 
between cases and categories as the study progressed. In these memos, the researcher 
raised questions that need to be answered in following interviews, and also made 
comparisons between cases, codes and categories in order to find relationships. Figure 
3.5 provides a snapshot screen of some of the memos that the researcher created within 
NVivo. 
 
Figure 3.5: Snap shot of memos 
 
3.8.7 Data Comparison and Theoretical Saturation 
Grounded theory is developed through constant comparison of data collected from 
theoretical sampling, which entails this methodological approach its analytic power and 
grounds the developed theory in the data (Charmaz, 2006). The constant comparative 
method enables the researcher to develop categories and concepts by coding and 
analysing data simultaneously (Kolb, 2012). As themes and categories start to 
accumulate, constant comparison compels the researcher to reflect on the data and 
emerging conceptual models, usually through writing memos (Jones and Alony, 2012). 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the process of constant data comparison. 
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Figure 3.6:  Constant Data Comparison (Jones and Alony, 2012) [Derived from Glaser, 
1978; 1992; 1998; 2001; Glaser & Strauss, 1967] 
 
Throughout data collection and analysis of the study, data comparison was constantly 
conducted at each coding level and across different levels until the conceptual model 
was developed and saturated. This entailed comparing the raw data during the initial 
(open) coding process within interviews and between interviews. The purpose of this 
sense-making comparison process was to identify any trends, similarities and 
differences, in order to form meanings and to develop theoretical concepts and 
categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It was also used to compare between data 
selection within categories and check whether selected data fit to existing categories or 
not.  
 
‘Theoretical saturation’ is achieved when the data collected for the study no longer 
suggests new dimensions of theoretical categories or new insights to emergent theory 
(Bryman, 2012, pp. 421). In this study, data was collected and analysed in an iterative 
and ongoing process until the study reached a point where new data were no longer 
leading to the formation of new categories or providing new insights to the developed 
conceptual model. 
 
3.8.8 The choice and use of NVivo as a CAQDAS for this study 
Data analysis in qualitative research entails systematically organising and making sense 
of raw data that is collected by the researcher to gain a better understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Wong, 2008). The process of analysing qualitative 
data basically involves coding large amounts of interview transcripts, observational 
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notes or other non-textual material (e.g. pictures and videos), followed by searching for 
significant patterns in the data, and subsequently identifying themes and developing 
categories. Traditionally, data coding and categorising was conducted manually with the 
use of coloured pens, papers, note cards, and a pair of scissors to mark, cut and sort the 
data. Other traditional processes for qualitative data analysis included manually 
counting the frequency of words or collections of words (King, 2008). In general, such 
manual processes could be very time consuming and complicated. 
 
Over recent years, researchers increasingly make use of computer assisted qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS). The use of CAQDAS is seen as significant in terms 
of increasing the efficiency and speeding up the process of categorising and retrieving 
coded data— something that has been previously manually daunting (King, 2008; 
Salmona and Kaczynski, 2016), especially when dealing with large amounts of 
qualitative data. It is also regarded as useful in aiding the researcher in keeping record 
and providing an audit of the entire data analysis process (Bringer et al., 2006); thereby 
enhancing the transparency and quality of the research (Welsh, 2002; Salmona and 
Kaczynski, 2016). Nevertheless, it is important to stress that CAQDAS programs do not 
analyse the data for the researcher (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; King, 2008). It is the 
researcher who decides what to code, collate, categorise, and draws meanings from the 
data, rather than the software program used (Wong, 2008; Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 
2011).  
 
There are however some concerns and downfalls associated with the use of CAQDAS. 
For instance, the time investment needed in order to learn and become familiar with the 
CAQDAS package is a significant factor worth consideration (Welsh, 2002; Salmona 
and Kaczynski, 2016). That is because CAQDS may not be appropriate for use when 
dealing with small amounts of data (The University of Northampton, 2017). There is 
also the danger of researchers ‘getting too close to the data’ without giving the distance 
needed to reflect and consider the bigger picture (King, 2008); a phenomenon that is 
described as the ‘coding trap’ (Gilbert, 2002). The main concern here is that 
overreliance on the CAQDAS may lead to overuse of coding and thus losing 
perspective (e.g. by taking extracts or quotes out of context) (King, 2008; The 
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University of Northampton, 2017). In addition, there is also a concern that overreliance 
on CAQDAS may lead researchers to focus merely on procedural criteria (e.g. 
providing an audit trail and checklists as a safeguard) without due consideration of the 
underlying philosophical and methodological criteria (Salmona and Kaczynski, 2016). 
For example, Kelle (1997) argued that many researchers claim to be adopting a 
grounded theory methodology for their studies, when in fact they are just applying a 
‘coding paradigm’ using a CADQAS. It is therefore important for researchers to focus 
on providing a transparent account of both their analytical and methodological 
processes (Bringer et al., 2004), so as to enhance the quality and credibility of their 
research work (Salmona and Kaczynski, 2016). As recommended by King (2008): 
“it is important to remember that CAQDAS is not an end in itself and if users 
become overly focused on the software itself in a misguided attempt to find a 
‘right’ way of analysing data, it is likely that they will become entrenched in the 
detail and potentially reduce the ability to build theory. As building theory is the 
ultimate goal of most qualitative research we need to ensure that we continue to 
operate at a deeper level and consider the methodological and philosophical 
issues relating to the research design” (p. 141). 
 
The decision about whether to use CAQDAS, or not, is ultimately that of the researcher. 
It is important, though, that researchers recognise the value of both manual and 
computer assisted methods in qualitative data analysis (Welsh, 2002). Accordingly, it is 
suggested that researchers should remain open to, and make use of, the advantages of 
each (Welsh, 2002). The University of Northampton (2017) provides a basic guide that 
could help researchers to decide if they should use a CAQDAS (e.g. NVivo), or not, for 
analysing their qualitative data (Table 3.6) 
Table 3.6: A guide for helping researchers to choose between the use of CAQDAS or 
manual methods [Adapted from The University of Northampton (2017)] 
Question CAQDAS Manual Analysis 
The amount of data you are 
collecting? 
Big amount – More than 10-
15 interviews/ texts / images, 
etc. 
Small amount – Fewer than 
10 interviews/ texts / images 
etc. 
Length or size of your pieces 
of data (interviews/ texts / 
Interviews last at least 45 
minutes or an hour each / text 
Interviews under 30 minutes / 
text under 2-3 pages each / 
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images)? over 5 pages each / large 
complex images 
small simple images 
Collecting different types of 
data? 
Yes – e.g. video, images, 
audio, observation notes, and 
interviews 
No – just interviews OR texts 
Richness or complexity of the 
collected data? 
Each interview/ text / image 
has loads of key themes and 
interesting points I want to 
pick up on  
Each interview / text / image 
has one or two key themes or 
points for my analysis 
Will your analysis require 
linking different parts of the 
data together? 
Yes, different themes will 
probably come up under 
different questions / topics 
No, I can just deal with each 
question / topic separately 
* The numbers provided within the Table are rough estimates only  
 
Considering the large amount, different types, and richness of data collected for this 
study (see section 3.8.1 and Table 3.5) as well as the holistic characteristic of the topic 
under investigation (i.e. Institutional waste within the UK construction industry), it was 
decided to use a CAQDAS to help the researcher with managing and organising the 
qualitative data collected for this study, while following the grounded-theory guidelines 
and procedures (outlined in sections 3.7 and 3.8). 
 
A wide range of CAQDAS packages are nowadays available for researchers, such as: 
Atlas.ti. MAXQDA, NVivo, HyperRESEARCH, QDA Miner, Qualrus and Leximancer 
(King, 2008; Gibbs, 2013; Sotiriadou et al., 2014). According to Gibbs (2013), almost 
any of the popular CAQDAS programs could be utilised for any research project 
entailing straightforward coding and thematic analysis (Gibbs, 2013). However, an 
informed assessment of the different software choices would need to be made, if the 
research project requires additional features (e.g. the ability to share projects in a team). 
There are, however, other factors that frequently serve to influence the researcher’s 
decision as to which software package to use. These factors include the researcher’s cost 
and time constraints, the software package that the researcher’s university is already 
using, what help and expertise is available for the researcher, recommendations offered 
by colleagues, and the philosophical and methodological assumptions taken by the 
researcher as well as the analytic approach adopted for the research project (Welsh, 
2002; King, 2008; Gibbs, 2013; Sotiriadou et al., 2014; Salmona and Kaczynski, 2016).  
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The qualitative data analysis program NVivo 10 program (QSR, 2014) was chosen as 
the CAQDAS program to be used for this study for various reasons. Firstly, because “it 
is designed to facilitate common qualitative techniques for organising, analysing and 
sharing data” (QSR International, 2014, pp. 5); thus it is suitable for a researcher 
aiming to develop new concepts or hypotheses using a ‘grounded theory’ approach 
(Bringer et al., 2006; Hutchison et al., 2010) — as is the case for this study. Secondly, 
NVivo is the main qualitative analysis software already in use at Nottingham Trent 
University (NTU). So, the author of this study was able to attend a training course for 
academic members of staff and doctorate students at NTU to learn how to use the 
NVivo software program. Thirdly, the second supervisor of this study had prior 
experiences with conducting thematic analysis using NVivo. This was useful as his 
expertise with the use of NVivo was used to interrogate how the researcher coded, 
synthesised and interpreted meanings from the data (see section 3.10.1). Fourthly, QSR 
International (Melbourne, Australia), the developer of NVivo, provides a wide range of 
tutorials, guides, forums, and resources for self-help on their website. Fifthly, NVivo is 
one of the most commonly used CAQDASs that is mentioned in published academic 
studies (see for example, Welsh, 2002; Bazeley, 2007; Wong, 2008; Wiltshier, 2011; 
Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Sotiriadou et al., 2016). All of these above-mentioned 
reasons combined together to drive the decision to use NVivo 10 in assisting the 
researcher with managing and analysing the qualitative data collected for this study. 
 
 
The use of Nvivo 10 helped the researcher to take the qualitative data analysis much 
further than it would have been have been possible manually, in the time available. For 
example, NVivo helped the researcher in: 
 Organising and managing a large dataset systematically – Nvivo enabled the 
researcher to import different types of data into the research project (e.g. interview 
transcripts, follow-up email texts, supporting documents) and group them in 
different ways using folders and cases; thereby allowing the researcher to access, 
organise and manage raw data easily. Nvivo also allowed the researcher to view 
which parts of the raw data have been coded, and retrieve them, whenever needed at 
a glance. It also made it possible for the researcher to create ‘thematic nodes’, which 
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act as coding containers. These nodes were then organised and merged to create 
hierarchies using parent and child nodes; thus by this way supporting the 
development of themes and categories. Additionally, the use of NVivo enabled the 
researcher to explore the content of any node (i.e. coded references and the name of 
the source that was coded) whenever needed; thereby allowing for an efficient 
review of coded data. 
 Data linking – NVivo allowed the researcher to easily connect relevant data 
segments and documents to each other using hyperlinks. More specifically, Nvivo 
enabled the researcher to attach external files, links, and internal annotations to any 
piece of text in the transcripts or coded data, to record referential information that 
may be significant for context. This data-linking ability also made it possible for the 
researcher to create more seamless links between literature review notes, coded data, 
and reflective commentaries and ideas recorded in memos. 
 Carrying out such a search electronically – This tool helped the researcher to locate 
keywords or segments of texts easily, leading to more reliable and accurate search 
results than doing it manually simply because human error is ruled out. The search 
tool was also useful in terms of enabling the researcher to interrogate and gain an 
overall impression of the data, whenever required. For instance, while conducting 
‘constant data comparison analysis’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 
1998), it helped the researcher to find relevant information and codes throughout the 
large dataset of this study in a speedy manner. 
 
 Using queries to explore and analyse coded data – Nvivo allows the researcher to 
conduct various queries, such as: (i) Coding Query; (ii) Matrix Coding Query; (iii) 
Coding Comparison Query; (v) Compound Query; and (vi) Group Query (see QSR 
International, 2014). This study exploited the ‘Matrix Coding Query’ tool, which 
enabled the researcher to interrogate the data, ask questions, and to seek 
explanations based on the resulting patterns in the data (see Table 8.1 and Figure 
8.7). 
 Creating models or generating graphs to visualise connections in the data – This 
option is significant, as it helped the researcher to explore and make-sense of 
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connections in the data, and to visualise and present the findings and conclusions in 
the form of models or charts. 
 Sharing the research project using NVivo Server and managing secure backups in 
multiple locations – The sharing option is significant as it allowed the researcher to 
share his work with his supervisor. This allowed the supervisor of this study to gain 
immediate access to the work whenever needed by the researcher. The use of Nvivo 
as a CAQDAS also meant that the researcher felt less stressed about any losses or 
damages to the research project in case of merely using a manual analysis approach, 
as the software allows for saving and storing backups in multiple locations (e.g. 
computer folders as well as Dropbox). 
 
 
3.9 Limitations 
This chapter has sought to illustrate how openness was maintained throughout the study, 
and to justify all decisions and choices made in relation to the research design. However 
this research study is not without limitations. This study has been conducted within time 
and cost constraints, both of which have had some implications on the size of the 
research sample and generalisability issues. However, it is important to stress that: 
 The purpose of this study was to develop theory, not to test it; thus theoretical 
sampling is suitable (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) and has helped to 
overcome bias in sampling and to enhance sample coverage (Barbour, 2001). 
 The study focussed on identifying instances and cases that provide ‘explanatory 
sufficiency’ rather than ‘comprehensiveness’. Thus, it is argued that it is “the 
quality of the theoretical inferences that are made out of qualitative data that is 
crucial to the assessment of generalisation” (Bryman, 2012, pp. 406) 
 
Grounded theory methodology (GTM) has limitations like any other research 
methodology. For instance GTM is known to be very complex and time-consuming due 
to the tedious coding processes, constant comparison and memo writing associated with 
data collection and analysis (Bryman, 2012, pp. 574). This study has dealt with this 
practical difficulty by using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (i.e. 
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NVivo 10) to speed up and help with the organisation and analysis of data. Other 
limitations of evolved and constructivist versions of GTM include critiques related to 
the interpretative and subjective influence on coding, data analysis and theory 
development. However, a number of techniques have been employed in this study to 
overcome these concerns. First of all, the study provided a clear explanation and 
justification for the underlying philosophy supporting the adapted research methodology 
(see section 3.5). This has been essential for explaining why an interpretative and 
qualitative approach is appropriate for this particular study, illustrating how the research 
inquiry will be conducted, and indicating how the findings and quality of the study 
should be assessed.  
 
In addition, the researcher has acknowledged how that the tentative use of theory and 
abductive reasoning as part of a GTM has helped to enhance creativity while limiting 
what can and cannot be claimed. The use of an A-D-I-A grounded theory methodology 
(GTM) has helped to mitigate concerns associated with the deductive-conforming logic 
of positivist approaches (e.g. fitting data to prior theories). Instead the adapted version 
of GTM has helped the study to develop existing theory and to construct novel 
hypotheses. Furthermore, the study explicitly followed Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
guidelines for data collection, coding and analysis, so as to enhance the reliability of the 
findings. The reflexivity and openness employed thorough the research inquiry of this 
study contributes to the overall credibility of the study.  More details about procedures 
taken for improving the rigour and quality of the study is provided in the following 
section. 
 
 
3.10 Rigour and Quality in Interpretative Grounded Theory Research 
The application of quality criteria to qualitative research is a widely debated subject 
(Hammersley, 2007). Nevertheless, many scholars accept the need for clear and 
transparent criteria for judging the quality of research (Seale, 1999). By all means, it is 
logic to ascertain that qualitative research should not be assessed based on the positivist 
notion of validity (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). This assertion is justified on the basis that 
the positivist worldview is incommensurable with the interpretive assumptions of reality 
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(Gasson, 2004); and thus alternative perceptions of research legitimacy for interpretive 
studies is essential (Figure 3.7).  
 
Figure 3.7: Research legitimacy in interpretative GT research (Gasson, 2004) 
 
 
There is not, however, any consensus amongst scholars on universal quality criteria for 
qualitative studies.  In other words, there is not a single set of quality criteria that is 
possible for application across all types of qualitative research (Hammersley, 2007). As 
explained by Patton (2002, p.542), variances in philosophical stances or theoretical 
underpinnings and strategies for inquiry generate different criteria for judging quality 
and rigour in qualitative research. Thus, in light of the underlying philosophy and 
underpinning methodology of this research, the study adopted the four quality criteria 
recommended by Charmaz (2006, p. 181-183) for grounded theory studies. These are: 
credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness. According to her, a combination of 
‘credibility’ and ‘originality’ enhances the other two criteria of ‘resonance’ and 
‘usefulness’. The next sections summarise how these four criteria of grounded theory 
research were used to evaluate the findings and the explanatory sufficiency of the 
developed conceptual model of this study. Chapter 7 (Conceptual Model Evaluation) 
revisits these four criteria and addresses how each criterion has been met by this study. 
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3.10.1 Credibility 
‘Credibility’ is the criterion to evaluate whether the findings of qualitative research 
represent a convincing and believable interpretation of the collected data (Charmaz, 
2006). It entails providing sufficient evidence to confirm that findings are representative 
of the situation. In this study credibility was addressed in four different ways. Firstly, 
the researcher discussed the study’s research design in a detailed and transparent 
manner early in this chapter, to allow the reader to form an independent assessment of 
the study. In addition, a detailed illustration of how data analysis was conducted is 
presented in the following chapter (Chapter 4, 5 and 6). Secondly, the use of ‘constant 
data comparison’ and ‘theoretical sampling and saturation’ techniques has allowed the 
study to investigate incidents and cases from different sources; thus by this way 
enabling the study to consider and provide different perspectives and angles to the 
phenomena under investigation. Furthermore, the supplementary documents provided 
by the interviewees of this study have been useful in terms of providing evidence or 
better explanation to claims and arguments raised during interviews. The use of more 
than one data source, resource or method is classified as ‘triangulation’, which helps to 
improve the credibility of qualitative research (Bryman, 2012). 
 
Thirdly as an independent audit trail, a review of the coding and analysis of collected 
data was conducted by the researcher’s academic supervisors at various stages 
throughout the research study. The aim of this audit was to reduce and surface the 
researcher’s biases and assumptions during data interpretation and coding stages. This 
included checking and ensuring that data was not forced to fit to predetermined codes 
and categories; instead concepts and categories were inductively generated from the raw 
data. Fourthly, research evaluation was conducted with various UK industry experts to 
evaluate the study’s developed conceptual model of ‘institutional waste in construction’ 
in terms of its relevance, reflection of the situation in real practice, and explanatory 
sufficiency. The participants were also asked through structured qualitative interviews 
to evaluate the main findings of the study. More details about the research evaluation 
exercise will be presented in Chapter 7(conceptual model evaluation). 
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3.10.2 Originality 
‘Originality’ in Charmaz’s (2006) criteria for grounded theory refers to originality of 
research findings, including an evaluation of whether the developed categories offer 
new insights, the social and theoretical significance of the work, and the extent to which 
the developed theory or conceptual model challenges current ideas, concepts and 
practices. Originality in this study was evaluated by three different ways. First, the 
researcher returned to literature to compare research findings with current knowledge in 
the field, and to identify insights within the developed conceptual model that didn’t 
exist in the topic guide, preliminary conceptual model or in the wider literature. 
Secondly, research evaluation was conducted with industry and academic experts in the 
field, in order to evaluate the originality of the findings and insights offered within the 
developed conceptual model. The outcomes of these assessments are presented within 
the discussions provided in Chapter 7 (Conceptual Model Evaluation), Chapter 8 
(Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature), and Chapter 9 (Conclusions and 
Recommendations). Thirdly, originality was also assessed through publications of this 
study’s theoretical insights and research outcomes into leading peer-reviewed 
conferences and journals (see Section 9.6). 
 
3.10.3 Resonance 
The ‘resonance’ criterion implies evaluating how well the developed conceptual model 
portrays fullness of the studied experience, makes sense to the participants, and offers 
deeper insights about their social world and practices (Charmaz, 2006). The concepts 
and categories of this study emerged inductively from the raw data collected from the 
field. The use of abductive reasoning helped to establish relationships between 
categories. The findings and the final developed conceptual model were tested through 
research evaluation (Chapter 7), at which participants acknowledged that the model 
provides a clear and comprehensive representation of reality. 
 
3.10.4 Usefulness 
The ’usefulness’ criterion is an evaluation of the research’s contributions to knowledge, 
impact on practice, and ability to spark further research (Charmaz, 2006). This was 
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assessed through research evaluation. The study provides a road map for future research 
directions and various recommendations Chapter 8 and 9. 
 
3.11 Summary 
This chapter critically discussed the philosophical stances and methodological approach 
underpinning this study. An 'interpretivist' epistemological position supported by a 
‘constructivist or relativist' ontological position, have been argued and adopted by this 
study. Accordingly, these aforementioned philosophical positions dictated the use of a 
‘qualitative’ research strategy. This qualitative approach aligns with the ‘exploratory’ 
nature of the study. Exploratory research typically seeks to create hypotheses rather than 
test them. The goal of exploratory research is to formulate problems, clarify concepts, 
and form hypotheses; it does not intend to offer final and conclusive solutions to 
existing problems (Sanders et al., 2012). The qualitative research design of this study 
also responds to widespread criticisms related to the extensive use of quantitative 
methods, often associated with positivism, in construction management research (see 
Seymour and Rooke, 1995; Seymour et al., 1997; Koskela, 2017). 
 
The methodology to be adopted for this study should lead to a holistic explanation of 
the underlying motives and behaviors associated with the use of imperfect construction 
procurement and commercial arrangements, along the extended construction industry 
supply chain. This pointed the study towards a choice between five main qualitative 
research methodologies that are commonly used in social science (Creswell, 2009). 
Accordingly, a grounded theory (GT) methodology was chosen. GT is a useful means to 
study a topic of interest or problem area that is under-explored (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). It is, therefore, particularly appropriate to this study, as little is known in existing 
literature about the relationship between institutions, project-procurement arrangements 
and the generation of waste or value-loss in construction  (as discussed in chapter 2). A 
GT approach can also facilitate an in-depth understanding of the impact of the use of 
imperfect procurement arrangements on project-team performance and behaviour, 
grounded in the interpretations of the participants’ construction procurement 
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experiences in the UK; thereby ensuring that the developed theory or conceptual model 
provides a close representation of social context. 
 
Within the GTM tradition, there are various points of departure along a spiral of 
methodological development; the stance taken among the different variants of GT 
should therefore depend on the researcher’s ontological and epistemological beliefs. 
Based on the philosophical assumptions underlying this research, a reflexive grounded 
theory methodology was adopted and adapted for this study. It draws upon both the 
legitimacy of the evolved approach to GT (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), and the abductive 
intent of the constructivist GTM (Charmaz, 2008). In this sense, the study supports the 
theoretical strand of evolved GTM, which argues that previous knowledge about the 
world and scientific theories (prior to data collection) are useful (Reichertz, 2010). In 
addition, the study takes the interpretative stance of both evolved and constructivist 
approaches to GT, which recognises the role of the researcher in theory building. The 
study also follows Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) formal coding scheme (open, axial and 
selective coding procedures), as a means of reducing bias and ensuring consistency and 
quality of findings. Furthermore, the research is inspired by Charmaz’s (2008, 2009) 
explicit adoption of abductive logic during data collection and analysis stages. 
However, this study adopted an A-D-I-A approach to theory building (Asvoll, 2013), at 
which abduction was adopted during data collection and analysis to foster theoretical 
innovation, but also used during research initiation to pave the way towards the 
contextual choice of topic guides 
 
The chapter also provided a detailed description of how the principles of the grounded 
theory approach have been practically applied in this study. This encompassed an 
illustration of data collection procedures, the research scope, ethical considerations, 
sampling and data collection methods. This also included a detailed explanation of the 
coding processes, data analysis and interpretation issues.  Furthermore a reflection on 
the limitations of the GTM and the steps taken for overcoming these challenges has 
been presented. Finally, in light of the underlying philosophy and underpinning 
methodology of this research, the study defined four quality criteria recommended by 
Charmaz (2006, p. 181-183) for assessing the rigour and quality of interpretative 
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grounded theory studies. This included a summary of how these four criteria were used 
to evaluate the findings and the explanatory sufficiency of the developed conceptual 
model of this study (Chapter 7 revisits these four criteria and addresses how each 
criterion has been met by the study). The next chapters (in particular, Chapters 4, 5 and 
6) present the data analysis and findings that led to the development of the study’s 
conceptual model of ‘institutional waste’ within the UK construction industry. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PREVELANT INEFFICIENT PROCUREMENT 
PRACTICES IN CONSTRUCTION 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a critical discussion about the philosophical and 
methodological positions underlying the research study. It also provided a justification 
for the research methods employed for data collection and analysis. Chapters four, five 
and six will illustrate the data analysis of the study, and provide explanations to the 
various key themes and categories that emerged from the collected primary data, 
leading to the development of the study’s conceptual model of ‘institutional waste 
within the UK construction industry’ (see Figure 4.1).  
 
As explained in section 3.8.4 (in Chapter 3), the conceptual model development was 
based on evolving processes of coding and analysis of data collected through in-depth 
interviews with 24 professional practitioners within the UK construction industry. The 
research sample included participants covering various roles, industry sectors and 
supply-chain levels (e.g. contractors, designers, consultants, sub-contractors, supplies, 
owners, and client representatives). These participants were selected based on a 
combination of purposive and theoretical sampling techniques. All participants were 
provided with an invitation sheet, which outlined the research project’s details, ethical 
issues, research aim and objectives, and potential practical contributions. The interviews 
were iterative, semi-structured, exploratory in nature, and controlled by the concepts 
and theoretical categories that emerged through the analysis of the collected raw data. 
 
Chapters Four to Six, therefore, present the ‘Results and Data Analysis’ of the study. 
They illustrate the analytical processes that led to the development of the study’s 
conceptual model that is grounded in the data. Through these three chapters, it is also 
demonstrated how inductive and abductive reasoning approaches have allowed the 
study to move beyond the relatively limited preliminary conceptual model (Figure 2.4 in 
Chapter 2) into a more useful and holistic conceptual model (Figure 4.1). 
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In chapters four, five and six, the four main categories and the constituent sub-
categories of the developed conceptual model will be systematically analysed in detail. 
Whenever possible, direct quotes from the raw data will be drawn up on to demonstrate 
the logical connection between the developed categories and the collected primary data. 
This chapter (Chapter 4) focusses on illustrating how the category of ‘Inefficient 
Procurement Practices’ was developed. Subsequently, Chapter 5 presents the ‘effect’ of 
these inefficient procurement practices on project-team behaviour, performance and 
outcomes; thereby focussing on two categories of the conceptual model, which are 
‘Inefficient Performances and Behaviours’ and ‘Consequential Wastes’. Following this, 
Chapter 6 explores the institutional ‘causes’ for the prevalence and persistence of the 
inefficient procurement practices identified in Chapter 4. The main findings of the data 
analysis (covered in Chapter 4, 5 and 6) will however be discussed in detail with 
reference to relevant extant literature in the ‘Discussion Chapter’ (Chapter 8).  
 
 
4.1.1 A note on the place of the developed conceptual model within the structure of 
the thesis 
This study adopted an A-D-I-A approach to theory building (see section 3.5). Typically, 
it would be expected in many qualitative studies, particularly inductive ones, to place 
and present the main outcome of the study (e.g. theoretical or conceptual model) 
towards the end of or following the data analysis. The advantage of such an approach is 
that the key outcome or final product of the study gets presented in a place that 
relatively fits the logical presentation of the study and aligns with how the actual 
research was conducted. However, in this study, it has been decided to present the 
developed conceptual model of the study at the beginning of the results and data 
analysis chapters (following the introduction to Chapter 4), due to two main reasons. 
Firstly, a large amount of qualitative data were collected, coded and analysed in this 
study, which consequently led to the emergence and development of a wide-range of 
categories and subcategories (as shown in Figure 4.1). Instead of presenting the 
processes and outcomes of the data analysis of this study within one excessively long 
chapter, it was decided to create three chapters within the structure of the thesis 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) to serve that purpose. The point of this decision was to make the 
presentation of the data coding and analysis processes more manageable and 
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comprehensible for the reader. Accordingly, it was also decided to introduce the final 
conceptual model that has been developed in this study at the beginning of Chapter 4, in 
order to enhance the focus of the reader (e.g. by reducing the chances that the readers 
gets lost as they progresses through the chapters).  
 
Secondly, it was decided that providing the reader with the big picture in the first place, 
would allow them to see the patterns and overarching categories of the developed 
conceptual model of ‘institutional waste’ as a whole (i.e. big-picture reading), while at 
the same time motivating them to take a deeper look (i.e. close reading) at the detailed 
analytical processes and content that led to the development of the conceptual model, in 
particular the subcategories of the model. Having explained the reasons for presenting 
the developed conceptual model of this study in the introduction to this chapter, next an 
overview of the conceptual model of ‘institutional waste within the UK construction 
industry’ (Figure 4.1) is provided. 
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Figure 4.1: Developed Conceptual Model (See sub-sections below, and Appendix 4 for an explanation of abbreviated codes within the model) 
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4.1.2 An overview of the developed conceptual model of the study 
The developed conceptual model of ‘institutional waste within in the UK construction 
industry’ reveals the role played by current prevailing ‘institutions’ in generating and 
entrenching ‘waste’ in construction projects. In specific, the model shows that current 
prevailing institutional factors influence construction procurement practices and 
arrangements (i.e. the rules of the game), which can lead to inefficient performances and 
behaviours (i.e. the play of the game), which will lead to consequential wastes. 
Furthermore, the conceptual model suggests that consequential wastes can reinforce 
institutional factors; thus forming a loop that leads to self-perpetuating cycles of waste.  
 
The conceptual model is mainly ‘explanatory’ in nature.  It offers novel explanations as 
to why  the prevailing  construction  model  is so  embedded  and  so  entrenched,  
despite  the  substantial  attempts  to  address  its  recognised  inadequacies. The model 
also provides novel insights into the reasons for the prevalence and persistence of 
wasteful procurement practices and behaviours in construction projects. At the same 
time, the conceptual model also includes a ‘predictive’ dimension, as the findings of the 
study that led to the development of the model indicate that the current (wasteful) 
construction model will persist, and even deteriorate, unless the institutional factors and 
the fundamental paradigms that underlie the prevailing model are addressed. Having 
provided an overview of the developed conceptual model of the study that is grounded 
in the data collected from the field (Figure 4.1), the rest of this chapter provides an in-
depth and detailed description of the data coding and analysis processes that led to the 
development of the category of ‘Inefficient Procurement Practices’. 
 
4.2 Inefficient Procurement Practices (IP) 
The analysis of the primary data of this study led to the identification of various 
inefficient procurement (IP) practices and arrangements that prevail in the construction 
industry. It was also found in the study that these prevailing procurement practices lead 
to wasteful behaviours and actions. This chapter focuses on describing the coding 
structure that led to the development of the category titled ‘inefficient procurement 
practices’ and provides explanations to each of its eleven constituent sub-categories (see 
Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2: Coding structure of ‘Inefficient Procurement practices and arrangements’ 
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4.2.1 Complexity of contractual procedures and Mechanisms (IP1) 
One of the major and common problems associated with construction procurement, as 
described by the participants of this study, is the complexity of contractual mechanisms 
and procedures used in construction projects. Four themes emerged out of the primary 
data that led to the formation of this sub-category; these themes are as follows: 
 Textual complexity, 
 Level of formality or leniency of contracts 
 Complexity of rules and clauses related to obtaining warranted compensation events 
 Unfair or unclear divisions of liability or responsibility. 
 
The complexity of contractual procedures and mechanisms can lead to various non-
value adding activities (e.g. unnecessary heavy admin work load) which could lead to 
waste of human potential. It could also lead to adversarial relationships due to lack of 
common understanding, which in turn could lead to conflicts, which could lead to 
claims and disputes that are very costly and time consuming. In addition, textual 
complexity and the high levels of formality of contracts may encourage project 
participants to engage in opportunistic practices, as will be discussed in section 4.3. 
 
When a senior QS working for a leading contractor was asked about the typical 
commercial challenges they face with their suppliers, he blamed and criticised 
subcontractors as follows: 
“The biggest problem at the moment is that a lot of subcontractors do not 
understand what they sign to. So, in an NEC subcontract, it requires a quite 
depth administration and there are processes to follow and they are not 
particularly good at following those processes” (Senior QS, Nov 2015). 
 
The QS was then asked about the reasons for subcontractors’ poor contract 
administration and whether it is related to lack of experience or not. The QS emphasised 
to the author that most of their suppliers are in long-term relationships with them. They 
also offer them full day courses that are focussed on the main requirements of the 
contract as requested (e.g. the compensation event processes) to try to give them a head 
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start before the job. Instead, the problem seems to him to be associated with resistance 
to change and to some extent linked to self-interest and inefficient habits and ways of 
working. This is described by the QS as follows: 
“I think it is because you’re more used to dealing with other forms of contracts, 
so you are not used to dealing with the different requirements of the NEC. I 
guess maybe the use of JCT sort of mindset as opposed to being opened and 
collaborative, which then tries to drag you off towards that. I think it is a bit of 
that. And I then think that people fully need to understand what they sign for 
before the sign up to something that becomes a surprise to them when it perhaps 
should not” (Senior QS, Nov 2015). 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of this issue, the author interviewed one of the 
subcontractors involved in the same project. The interviewee was asked about his 
opinion up on whether subcontractors find it difficult or not to administer NEC 
contracts, especially when it comes to early notifications and compensation events. The 
response was as follows: 
Right, from our own opinion we are from an Irish-based company so we don't 
deal with NEC contracts until we came to the UK. And with learning terms to do 
with the NEC contracts, hmm the mechanisms within the NEC contracts are a 
bit complicated” (Director and Project Manager at a specialist subcontractor, 
2016). 
 
Interestingly, the subcontractor then blamed their client for using the contract in a 
bureaucratic way. He accused them of using the contractual rules related to assessing 
compensation events as a means to finding reasons to reject their claims, rather than 
using the early notification procedure as a way to solve problems as a team as early as 
possible. This has been mentioned by him as follows: 
“We raise an early warning, we raise them with our main-contractor client, and 
then the problem we have then is them coming back actually looking. Hmm, 
we've raised them from our end but it's waiting for them to come back then from 
their end type of come to an agreement within us…Hmm from our end, end of 
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that we've raised the early warnings…But the fifty percent of them that have 
been dealt with to date, it is the one that I have not had response back from the 
client that is the problem, which will then typically get pushed down towards the 
end of the job and then they will come part of the final account…That’s not good 
to do” (Director and Project Manager at a specialist subcontractor, 2016).  
 
This contradiction in the responses of the QS and the subcontractor demonstrates how 
complexity of contractual procedures could lead to the creation of an adversarial 
environment that is focussed on blame rather than learning. This led the study to refer to 
the senior design-coordinator working for the main contractor, in order to gain a more 
rounded understanding about this phenomenon. According to him: 
“The contract does not distinguish between whether there is a small event or a 
large event. So, in theory, everything requires the same amount of diligence or 
you know going through it, processing it…these things are quiet complex and 
therefore it takes a lot of work to put that case forward….And then clearly when 
you're putting that case doing, you're obviously you've still got your work to do, 
if that makes sense you know”… we work with a variety of subcontractors and 
suppliers. And there are obviously on a different scale and a different size, and I 
think we tend to be more lenient with the smaller suppliers because they are just 
smaller suppliers if that makes sense. They do not necessarily have the full kind 
of office backup to follow the contract as they should. Hmm, I think it can be 
frustrating to some of the QSs at times though” (Senior Design Coordinator, 
2016). 
 
The response above clearly indicates that complex contractual procedures, in the 
absence of relational norms (McNeil, 1985), can contribute to the generation of wasteful 
behaviours and process. To confirm this argument, the author interviewed a senior site 
agent working for the main contractor, to check how contractual complexity could 
impact on compliance with the programme. Interestingly, the interviewee emphasised 
the significance of managing projects from a relational perspective to support 
production rather than through relying on contract formality. This challenge was 
described by the site agent as follows: 
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“The way normally it will work, contractually he could probably say: ‘No, no, 
according to the programme I'm, I'm, I will be due to come here’. Hmm, but it's 
about communication. Making sure you keep in contact with your 
subcontractors. You know communicating with them on a regular basis. With all 
the major subcontractors, we try to have a weekly meeting, hmm either formally 
or informally. I mean we will discuss programme. You know programme is one 
of the key issues we discuss… [it’s all about] having a good communication and 
having a good relationship and being quite open with them” (Site Agent, 2016; 
emphasis in bracket inserted by author). 
 
4.2.2 Exclusion or late involvement of key actors during pre-construction stages 
(IP2) 
This study found that the exclusion or late involvement of key actors during pre-
contract stages may lead to value-loss in design and waste of human potential. It could 
also lead to gaps in design and contracts, and thus encourage wasteful activities (e.g. 
opportunism). Three key themes have led to the emergence of this sub-category: 
 Late involvement of project managers  
 Late involvement of contractors  
 Lack of involvement of specialist subcontractors and suppliers (S&S) in design 
stages 
 
 
Late involvement of project managers  
One of the common, but unnoticeable, inefficiencies in construction procurement, as 
identified in this study, is related to the late involvement of the ‘project manager’ in 
large construction and civil engineering projects. The main responsibilities of a project 
manager in such projects could be described as follows: 
“Under the contract, the project manager is there to administer the contract 
itself. And in the context of the NEC contract that role is quiet an important one, 
due to the timeliness of decisions that have to be made and instructions that 
have to be given to keep the works rolling along” (ECC Project Manager, DEC 
2015). 
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From the quote above, it appears that the main role of the project manager is to 
administer the contract effectively, in order to support the flow of production activities. 
Thus, it would be wise to involve the project manager while drafting the contract to use 
his experience and knowledge in identifying any contractual gaps that may lead to 
conflicts or delays during project delivery. Project managers could also help clients to 
put into consideration the knock-on effects of special contractual clauses that clients 
may wish to introduce.  
 
During data collection stage, the author asked a senior project manager, working on a 
major infrastructure project in the UK, about the stage at which he was involved in the 
ongoing project. Interestingly, the project manager was introduced to the project “pretty 
much after, just after, contract award…It will probably be better in ideal world to be 
involved in a pre-contract for a period of time” (ECC Project Manager, Dec 2015). 
Consequently, the author interviewed the deputy project manager and asked her about 
her opinion upon when they, as project manager, should ideally be involved in a project. 
She was also asked to justify her answer. Interestingly, the interviewed deputy project 
manager has always been appointed to projects following contract award.  Her response 
was as follows: 
“Hmm, I have not thought of that. Anyway I guess, yup, before signing the 
contract probably…and maybe being involved in writing the contract… because 
she is in a better position to identify if there are any gaps or anything that will 
make it easier for him or her to administer the contract later (CEng MICE ECC 
Deputy Project Manager, 2016). 
 
This prevailing approach to procurement (i.e. late involvement of project manager), 
however, typically leads to lots of inefficiencies, such as unnecessary change orders, 
conflicts and disputes; thereby contributing to time and cost-overruns of projects. These 
consequences will be described in more detail in section 4.3 
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Late involvement of contractors  
Most of the interviewees criticised construction procurement arrangements that do not 
allow contractors to be involved during design. According to them, late involvement of 
contractors, simply, leads to waste and/or value-loss. The advantages of early contractor 
involvement could be described as follows: 
“Every time we have a delay it adds to time related costs. If we are able to work 
with our customer and design out the risks that will cause those time 
prolongations before we get on site. And then when we get on site we build what 
we've designed to build, not what we've been forced to build because we've 
encountered unforeseen problems. That is gonna significantly reduce the time it 
takes us to build and significantly reduce the cost” (Business Development 
Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
Lack of involvement of specialist subcontractors and suppliers (S&S) in design 
Most, if not, all of the interviewees who worked for subcontractors or specialist 
suppliers stressed that their lack of involvement in design leads to value-loss. For 
example, a specialist subcontractor explained, to the author, the importance of their 
involvement in design as follows: 
“There is a great interest for us and from the client and the designers to keep us 
part of the design process cause then I could then say look we can do this, this, 
this and this on that line; hmm there is the budget to do it approximate. Is that 
going to be alright with the client? Instead of us coming in at a later stage and 
saying well you can do it this way and it can be cheaper but we can't do this 
because of the problem there. Hmm, so for us it's very important to be involved 
in the design stage and there are huge benefits of being involved in the design 
stage for both us and the client” (Director and Project Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
According to the participants representing S&S, architects tend to focus their attention 
on the  aesthetics of the building, while giving much less consideration to other 
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important issues, such as logistics of the site, ways of gaining access into the building 
(e.g. setting-up scaffoldings) to attach the facades, as well as safety matters. This was 
also emphasised by a senior designer, as follows: 
“Getting information of whose doing what and the equipment they'll be using during 
the detailed design stage is imperative to us, to enable us to do our design properly 
and reducing risks and reducing assumptions" (Principal Engineer, 2016). 
 
4.2.3 Lowest price selection criteria (IP3) 
This is one of the most prevailing construction procurement practices. In construction, 
the client does not buy a ready-made product. Instead, project partners need to 
cooperate to produce the final product (e.g. building or road).  The focus on picking 
lowest price when selecting project parties in construction projects often leads to waste 
and value-loss. In other words,” if you ask for a high ratio of cost then you'll just get the 
cheapest and you won't necessarily get high quality…you’ll get what you've asked for… 
That's the way of thinking about it (Senior Consultant, Nov 2015). 
 
Procuring services based on lowest cost could also drives certain inefficient behaviours 
(e.g. opportunism), but clients and procurement professionals do not necessarily 
understand the behaviours that they will create by the rules that they put in place. This 
has been referred to by the Head of Supply Chain of one of the largest contractors in the 
UK, as follows:  
“Basically the heart of the problem is that traditionally people have been inclined to 
treat a lot of procurement with a transactional approach…You get clients who are 
placing their orders purely on cost. They are not necessarily interested into the 
value that you both agreed. So, that affects our strategy (Head of Supply Chain, 
Nov 2015). 
 
The factors influencing the wide-spread use of lowest price selection criteria have 
been discussed with the participants, in order to investigate the root-causes of the 
problem. The causes mentioned by respondents included, for example, treating 
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construction projects as a commodity. It was also linked to norms of practice and 
mind-set of quantity surveyors, as described by a specialist subcontractor: “we're 
very specialist and it’s the cost mind-set of the quantity surveyors...they don't 
understand what we do” (Director and Project Manager, Dec 2015).  These 
influencing factors will be analysed and explained in more detail in section 4.5. 
 
4.2.4 Non-joint specifications of design (IP4) 
This procurement arrangement is linked to problems associated with late or lack of 
involvement of contractor and subcontractors in design. However the difference here is 
that this sub-category is focussed on how the use of onerous or overly-prescribed 
specifications of design could drive certain behaviours (e.g. lack of commitment, self-
interest, or exploitation of gaps in contracts) and eventually lead to waste. For 
clarification, this was described by some of the participants, as follows: 
“The designer is the one who drafted the contract…Obviously, all the 
specifications are coming from the designer” (Deputy ECC project manager, 
Dec 2015) 
 
“With more traditional construction, the client would be advised by the 
designer, by the architect. So, it's really down to the architect to explain or to 
ask to get the information out of the client as to what specifications they are 
requiring” (Senior Consultant (PhD), Nov 2015). 
 
 “The designer can't specify one type of system or product, so the specification 
has to be wide enough to incorporate any variations if that makes sense, which 
could be quiet problematic sometimes” (Senior Design Coordinator, Dec 2015). 
 
4.2.5 Non-value adding performance monitoring and reporting arrangements (IP5) 
This sub-category was developed based on the emergence of a number of interrelated 
themes: 
 Audit and check of all of the works whoever is providing it 
 Bureaucratic clerk of works 
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 Man-marking suppliers 
 Monitoring and measuring the accuracy of monthly financial projections on spend 
(Cost monitoring & reporting) 
 Relying on lagging numerical performance-based contract measures 
 
These non-value adding performance monitoring and reporting arrangements contribute 
to the generation of waste in construction projects. Obviously, they lead to an 
unnecessary increase in client’s transactional costs. They also lead to an adversarial 
environment and thus they may lead to feelings of mistrust; thereby hindering 
collaboration and encouraging opportunistic behaviours. Interestingly, these inefficient 
cost control practices also lead to hidden costs that the client may not be aware of. A 
senior consultant who specialises in performance-based contracts (and holds a doctoral 
degree in construction procurement) describes this, as follows: 
“It’s something I tried to explain to a client. You can measure anything you like, 
and we can design performance measures that can measure whatever you want 
me to measure, but once you've got that information what are you going to do 
with it? Because if it's just gonna sit in a cupboard, it's of no value and it's 
gonna cost you because every time you ask someone to deliver some data to a 
performance measure, that will be costed and it will be charged through the 
tender. Even though you won't see it in the tender as an item, it will come under 
administrative. It has to be paid for. The client will pay for it!” (Senior 
Consultant (PhD), Nov 2015) 
 
In another interview, a very senior consultant, fellow member of the institution of civil 
engineers (FICE), was asked about why these inefficient contractual governance 
practices prevail. His response helped to reveal some of the main causes of these 
wasteful practices: 
“I think most of this comes in as a contract exercise that tries to compensate for 
not having spent enough time creating certainty before procuring a contract. 
About two years ago I went on a site visit to a road project – a new road into 
Nottingham in fact! I had not been to a live road construction site for about 
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twenty years and the first thing that struck me was the sheer volume of cars in 
the site office car park, matched by the sheer volume of people in the site offices. 
I couldn’t believe how many people were engaged on site building this road and 
I suspect that a lot of the staff were there for precisely this reason” (Senior 
Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015). 
 
4.2.6 Onerous pre-selection of suppliers (IP6) 
Clients’ onerous selection of subcontractors (e.g. named suppliers) could drive the main 
contractors to behave opportunistically. These opportunistic practices include re-
tendering of subcontract packages and selecting subcontractors based on cheapest price, 
which eventually lead to wastes and value-losses. An associate director of a consultancy 
company offering financial governance services to a public client explained this to the 
author, as follows: 
“So the client organisation has already pre-agreed rates and other costs and 
commercial elements with hmm you know a handful of the country's major 
suppliers. So, hmm, so, so, on the contract there is a sort of obligation to use 
those arrangements…but there are get-outs. The main contractor is not forced 
to use them. He can use them or he can make a case not to use them. It's often, it 
seems to me personally that they're usually a cheaper option…If the main 
contractor chooses to go outside the framework, he may well get better rates 
which are in the benefit of the client as well, as the quality is maintained 
because they get a lower cost” (Associate Director, financial governance 
services, 2016) 
 
The response above clearly indicates the (imperfect) cost-based mind-set dictating this 
procurement arrangement. In order to gain a deeper understanding about this 
phenomenon, the author therefore referred to the main contractor to understand how this 
procurement arrangement influences their practice. Interestingly, the author was told 
that this inefficient procurement practice aligns with their company’s commercial 
policy. A senior design coordinator working for a large Tier 1 contractor explained this 
as follows: 
Chapter 4: Prevalent Inefficient Procurement Practices in Construction 
 
Page | 156  
 
It will be the company’s policy to go to hmm different tenderers, so different 
subcontractors to get a price. Because, obviously we need to show that, hmm, 
you know proper evaluation… It is not always done on cost alone, so there are 
quality aspects to it as well. Hmm, sometimes it will be a commercial decision. 
Hmm, we have a situation on here where there has been a commercial decision 
that may not benefit this scheme, but may benefit the company on the long term 
if that makes sense” (Senior Design Coordinator, Dec 2015). 
 
He then explained to the author that the commercial decision taken by his company was 
to use new suppliers in this scheme to gain competitive advantage. Also, to show the 
client that through competition they were able to get better prices. He criticised however 
this commercial strategy because it meant they had to start a new learning curve with 
the new suppliers; thus influencing production efficiency in a negative way. This 
(wasteful) commercial decision has not also allowed them to work with their preferred 
supply-chain members who assisted them during pre-contract award stages. This 
(opportunistic practice) was described as follows: 
So, a subcontractor may well assist us during target price. When we get to 
contract award, those subcontracts are then tendered. So, even though he has 
assisted us, he may not win that work. And sometimes, hmm, it might be because 
he knows too much information if that makes sense” (Senior Design 
Coordinator, Dec 2015). 
 
Therefore, it appears from the discussion above that onerous selection of subcontractors 
may encourage opportunistic behaviours and lead to waste of human potential and 
financial losses. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 will provide more details about these wasteful 
behaviours and their consequences on project time, cost and quality. 
 
4.2.7 Poor payment terms and arrangements (IP7) 
Poor payment systems could lead to inefficient behaviours and influence productivity 
rates. This sub-category was formulated based on four themes that emerged out of the 
data: 
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 Low and late payments to S&S 
 Low payments to designers 
 Payment methods for site labourers based on daily wage 
 Interim evaluations (monthly payments based on traditional BoQ prepared by 
client's QS) 
 
In an interview with a ‘Head of Innovation’ at a contracting company (with an 
architectural background), he blamed buyers for using unfair payment terms and for 
imposing low profit margins on to their suppliers. He considered these poor payment 
practices to be major sources of inefficiencies in construction. According to him: 
“The problem is that clients behave very badly. Now, they'll do something to 
collaborate to a certain extent because there is a lack of resource in the 
industry. And, you know, you see that with main contractors, then, refusing to do 
single stage tenders and only wanting to do two-stage tenders. And equally the 
supply chain members if they were treated badly in terms of payment terms or in 
terms of number of subcontractors on the tender lists.  They will behave exactly 
the same. Treat others the same way you would like to be treated yourself” 
(Head of Innovation and Director of National Frameworks, Nov 2015). 
 
Low payment to designers, through fee competition, has also been identified by various 
participants as very problematic, because it leads to design errors, missing information 
or poor quality and coordination of design works; thus, leading to all sorts of waste. The 
author was told during interview, for example that: 
“Design errors or missing information is a major source of conflict in 
traditionally procured contracts. And I suspect that is due to, you know, 
designers facing an ever increased fee competition. Competition is a good thing; 
but I have been in situations where quite frankly the design has been wrong and 
where the information has been missing. So, you know how can you expect 
somebody to price something in that particular situation if he needs competition 
for it?” (Senior Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015) 
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“You know designer fees have been reducing. You know when I first started my 
career, there used to be a prescribed fee scale, for architects and designers, 
which was in a great deal higher than it is now. And that allowed perhaps more 
resource to be put into the design, which would actually help the designers 
actually coordinate the design better” (Head of Innovation and Senior 
Architecture, Nov 2015). 
 
4.2.8 (Price-based) tendering as an expensive non-value adding activity (IP8) 
Tendering arrangements can lead to wasteful behaviours, unnecessary delays and 
financial losses in construction projects. This sub-category was developed based on the 
emergence of several themes: 
 Competitive fee tendering when appointing professional consultants, 
 Costly and speculative two-stage pre-qualification questionnaires, 
 Lump Sum Price Competitive Tendering, 
 Target-Cost contractual arrangements based on price competition, 
 Tendering exercise regarded as a game, 
 Two stage tendering, 
 Unrestricted (open) bid invitation pro in public procurement 
 
One of the major problems of price-based competitive tendering approaches is that they 
can create zero-sum game situations, where the construction client (buyer) and the 
supplier(s) compete against each other. This in turn obviously leads to wasteful 
behaviours and poor project performance. An interesting example was provided by a 
senior consultant, as follows: 
“I certainly recall a Target Cost scenario held up initially as a model form of 
collaborative contract, which rapidly became very adversarial. This was when a 
contractor had been asked to price the cost of building a railway station 
extension and modification but had not been provided with full details of the 
existing structure. The existing structure was then found to require extensive 
redesign of the intended new roof and a large claim developed. The accusation 
levelled at the contractor was that they had calculated the initial Target Cost to 
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win the job and then maximised their claims in relation to the re-work required 
as a result of finding out the true nature of the existing station structure” 
(Senior Consultant (FICE), follow up email, 2016). 
 
Another major inefficiency of tendering arrangements is the amount of time and costs 
spent on selecting and procuring project partners. It was regarded by some of the 
interviewees as an expensive and time consuming non-value adding activity. Tendering 
expenses are actually hidden transactional costs that many clients may not be aware of. 
This was explained by a business development manager working for a main contractor, 
as follows: 
“I would say that the cost of procurement is increasing the cost of the 
industry…Hmm, and procurement is a non-value added cost…We don't dig any 
hole; we don't pour any concrete; we don't erect any steel for the cost of 
bidding. And, also customers must understand that although contractors don't 
actually send them an invoice for the tender they do actually pay for it…Because 
contractors in the scene of making the profit have all of their costs paid by their 
clients. So every penny they spend on tenders, even the unsuccessful ones, are 
reimbursed by their clients; and more frequently the wrong clients” (Business 
Development Manager, Dec 2015).  
 
In an interview with the ‘Head of Supply-chain’ of a major Tier 1 contractor, the author 
discussed with the interviewee how client’s major procurement arrangements influences 
their own practice with their supply-chain. It appeared from the responses received that 
many clients do not realise how that their desire for seeing competition as a means to 
reducing project costs, may often lead to opposite results. So, competitive tendering can 
restrict major contractors from being able to collaborate with their preferred tier 1 
suppliers during early stages of projects; thereby hindering value-creation. It is also seen 
as a non-value adding activity which consumes unnecessary time and costs. This could 
be summarised, as follows: 
“I think if you want to get value out of the supply chain or the procurement 
exercise, in my opinion, you need to shorten that process as much as you can, so 
you are giving the people at the operational level and the suppliers themselves 
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enough time to come up with the value-added solutions. In some instances, you 
could argue that you should not conduct a procurement exercise traditionally at 
all…I mean we should be in a position where we would appoint people from the 
very outset and develop the solution with them...Projects need to be done 
quicker and with less costs, so if you do it quicker, then in theory the cost drops 
anyway because you have got less preliminaries, etc. And the cost does not 
necessarily be the erosion of somebody's margins” (Head of Supply Chain, Nov, 
2015). 
 
4.2.9 Safeguarding practices in construction procurement (IP9) 
 ‘Safeguarding practices’ refers to client’s construction procurement safeguards 
(governance arrangements) against their perceptions of supplier opportunism and 
exploitation or against their lack of competence (know-how). The ‘Safeguarding’ 
subcategory was developed based on the emergence of the following themes and sub-
themes: 
 Overly formalised contractual governance rather than relational governance 
o Imperfect standard forms of contracts (e.g.  JCT) 
o Making amendments to standard forms of contracts without considering 
impacts on other clauses 
o Amending contracts merely due to what happened in the past or to make it 
look like contracts they have been using in the past  
o Penalty points in DBFO contracts 
o Traditional documental approach for managing ‘Requests For Information’ 
(RFI) 
o Using liquidated and ascertained damages (LADs) clauses as penalties 
 Performance bonds 
 Collateral warranties 
 Aggressive negotiations of rates with Tier 2 contractors 
 Multiple Insurance Arrangements 
 Unfair and Onerous Contractual Clauses and Arrangements 
o Disclaimer, Exculpatory and privileged clauses of contracts 
-‘Unlimited Liability’ 
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- ‘Fitness for purpose’ clauses 
- ‘On demand’ bonds 
o Historical clauses 
o Onerous Z- clauses 
 Using BoQ measured or checked by client's QSs or consultants 
 Overly prescribed specifications as opposed to performance specifications 
o Over-engineering of design 
o Designers using an 'approved similar type'  clause in their specifications 
when employed by contractors to cover themselves 
 
As can be seen in the list above, this study identified various examples of conventional 
(risk-averse) safeguarding approaches to construction procurement. The study, however, 
identified a remarkably onerous Z-clause used in an infrastructure project in the UK. 
The author was initially informed about this unfair contractual clause during an 
interview with a design coordinator working for a main contractor. The author was also 
able to ask for and receive a full copy of the project contract, so he can review the 
aforementioned clause by himself and also to check the contractual conditions in detail. 
Furthermore, the author was able to conduct following interviews with different project 
parties involved in the project. Some of these represented the contractor (i.e. site agent, 
sub site-agent, planner, and QS), while others represented the client (i.e.. the ECC 
Project manager, deputy project manager, and the financial governance consultant) and 
the designer (i.e. principal engineer). The Z-clause is written in the contract as follows: 
‘If the Scheme Outturn Cost is greater than the Scheme Target Price, the 
Contractor pays his share of the excess. If the Scheme Outturn Cost is less than 
the Scheme Target Price, two-thirds of the Contractor’s share of the saving is 
retained and contributed to the Programme Level Incentive Fund and the 
remaining one third (the “remaining Contractor’s share”) is paid to the 
Contractor, provided that the remaining Contractor’s share is paid to the 
Employer if there is a fatality on the site of the Scheme as a result of a reportable 
incident, is paid to the Employer in the event of termination for any of reasons 
R1-R15 or R18 and is reduced for late Completion in accordance with the table 
below’ 
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The project was delivered using an NEC, Engineering and Construction Contract, 
Option D (target cost contract with a bill of quantities). And the clause above simply 
implies that if a fatality occurred on the site of the scheme, the contractor loses his share 
in any savings gained due to delivering the project below the target cost. The project 
also included a number of commercial misalignments which complicated the situation. 
For instance, the client kept the design in-house and thus the contractor was not 
involved in the design. As described by the leader of the commercial team supporting 
the project: 
“The principle with the scheme was that the designs are relatively generic, so 
the client kept the design in-house. Unfortunately, it then uses a form of contract 
which pre-supposes you know the NEC, that it’s a contractor’s design. So it’s an 
uneasy alliance there which leads to a lot of variations” (Associate Director, 
financial governance services, 2016). 
 
Additionally, the designer had his own target cost, so his main incentive was to reduce 
his own target fees instead of reducing total project costs. Thus, it has been argued by 
the contractor that the designer had no incentive to provide timely responses to RFI, 
resulting in major project delays. This, accordingly, forced the client to pay 
compensation events for the designer and the financial governance consultant, in order 
to increase their resources and speed up the process. Compellingly, the author was 
informed that this Z-clause was used because the public-sector client has a requirement 
not to have any fatalities on any of their schemes. This Z-clause however proved to be 
ineffective; because unfortunately, it was not an appropriate measure taken to prevent a 
fatality from occurring because of an accident on site, as acknowledged by the 
interviewees. It also led to many conflicts (see section 4.3.5 below) and project losses, 
as the contractor not only suffered the sorrow and pain resulting from the fatality; but 
also lost any commercial incentive to collaborate with others in order to beat the 
scheme’s target price. 
     
On the other side, some of the prevailing safeguarding practices identified above (e.g. 
performance bonds and multiple insurance arrangements) could directly lead to 
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unnecessary expenses. For example, a senior QS working for one of the largest main 
contractors in the UK criticised the cost-effectiveness of performance bonds, as follows: 
“We have had performance bonds before and when we relied on it, it has not 
turned out to be what we wanted it to be. Never recovered what we should have 
done and we never recovered anything. And we paid for it and repaid for it on 
other subcontractors as well. The cost of that has been absolute waste” (Senior 
QS, 2016). 
 
Interestingly, further interviewing revealed that clients end up paying for the expenses 
of performance bonds, as suppliers (e.g. main contractors) include them as 
contingencies in their tender price. These claims came across as follows: 
“It is a contingency. And so, you talk about embedded waste...well in the public 
procurement process there is a 1% embedded waste right there! as a client why 
would I want to pay 1% of contract cost just for insurance, if when I can pick the 
right team, I can save that 1% and do something better with it” (President of a 
lean consultancy company, Nov 2015) 
Moreover:  
It’s not just a contingency, its cost. Because, you know, if you want a 
performance bond you have to go and buy it in the market ways. Because all the 
performance bond really is: insurance. So, you know, the performance bond is if 
you don't perform. So it's an insurance policy if you don't perform. So you 
explore the market place and you buy that insurance, so it's a cost. So, if they 
want that performance bond, the contractor will go and buy it“(Head of 
Innovation and Director of National Frameworks, Nov 2015) 
 
Clients typically ask for performance bonds as a safeguard in the form an insurance 
policy against poor performance, based on risk-averse and transactional drivers. This 
claim was asserted, for example, by a business development manager working for a 
main civil engineering contractor, as follows: 
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“I can understand why clients want to bond…Hmm, because of the risk that a lot 
of contractors are failing at the moment. And there is a cost to replacing that 
contractor. So, the client is covering that cost by a bond. Although I do accept 
that if this is done through a robust procurement process and established a 
contractor that they believe is the best, then they probably do not need the 
bond” (Business Development manager, Dec 2015). 
 
The quotes and arguments above demonstrate how that various safeguarding practices 
(e.g. performance bonds and multiple insurance arrangements) can lead to hidden 
transactional costs, which are ultimately met by the owner/client. Furthermore, the use 
of safeguarding practices can lead to defensive attitudes between project participants; 
thereby hindering collaboration between project-team members. This eventually leads to 
production losses, which could ultimately lead to project failure. More explanations of 
the general impacts of prevailing safeguarding practices on project-team performance 
are provided in the following chapter (Chapter 5: Impact of inefficient procurement on 
project performance and outcomes). Additionally, a more specific critical evaluation of 
the safeguarding problem in construction procurement will be presented in the 
discussion chapter (Chapter 8).  
 
 
4.2.10 Separated procurement methods (Separating design from construction) 
(IP10) 
 
Separated construction procurement methods have been criticised for being a main 
cause of many of the industry’s problems. Based on the data collected for this study, it 
appears that prevailing construction procurement arrangements, which separate design 
from construction, can lead to waste. In an interview with a senior director at a 
contracting company, he criticised traditional construction procurement methods as 
follows: 
“When I first started my career as an architect, what's now called traditional 
bills of quantities was the prevalent way of building. The idea of that was that 
the architect and the other designers would completely design the building in 
detail, the surveyor would create a bills of quantities, and then the contractor 
would price it and all what they would do is to build what was wrong. So in an 
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ideal world in that model, the design would be complete and there would be full 
coordination of all of the designs. But the reality was that it did not work that 
way; because the designers did not have the build-ability skills to be able to 
coordinate the design properly. And that's partly why Design & Build as a 
contracting form was created; because it was recognised that the contractors 
have got a part to play, and they could help to integrate the designs and make 
sure that issues do not arise”(Head of Innovation and Director of National 
Frameworks, Nov 2015). 
 
It is important however to stress that separated procurement methods are not limited to 
traditional procurement approaches only; instead it includes any project delivery 
approaches, which separate design from construction. Three examples of separated 
procurement methods were coded and identified by this study: 
 Design-Bid-Build (D-B-B) 
 Outsourcing design in ‘Design and Build’ (D&B) projects 
 Novated D&B 
 
For example, in D&B projects where the contractor outsources the design packages, the 
architects become directly contracted to the contractor rather than the client. Thus, the 
architects may become forced to deliver what the contractor wants, instead of what the 
main client wants. This was described by a senior architect as follows: 
“In design and build jobs, basically the contractor employs the designer, and 
then yeah we take it from there. Then we know what the contractor wants. In as 
much as we might want to deliver a lot of quality and good stuff for the client. 
But because we are reporting directly to the contractor, who pays us, we have to 
do what the contractor says”(Senior architect and BIM manager, 2016). 
 
Clients may try to overcome the problem described above through the use of ‘novated 
D&B’ procurement arrangements. However it seemed from the data collected that this 
still does not overcome the problem; as this approach can create situations where there 
might be conflicts of interests between the different project parties. Therefore, it 
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becomes clear that using construction procurement as a means for transferring risks can 
complicate the problem rather than solve it.  
 
It is well known that architects play a major role in D-B-B projects. Accordingly, they 
might have a preference to advice clients to employ D-B-B procurement approaches 
rather than D&B ones that are often dictated by contractors. However, the findings of 
this study suggest that this is not necessarily always the case, as there are other 
important factors which need to be taken into consideration. These include the state of 
the economy, profit margins and risk considerations. So, sometimes, quick wins of 
limited profit could be preferred to higher profits which require longer periods of work 
and higher levels of risk and uncertainty. When a senior architect and BIM manager was 
asked about his company’s preferred procurement approach, he said: 
“I donnu, that's a difficult one because there are advantages and disadvantages 
depending on the different types, isn't it? Because in traditional you do a lot of 
work. Okay? Possibly at the end you might not make enough profit. You might 
not make enough profit, because there will be so much demand on information 
from the contractor. The client and contractor will be requiring lots of 
information from the designer. Where in Design and Build, you can even just do 
a design sketch and the contractor will build it. Okay, because he just wants to 
have an idea. You don't have to go into details but just a sketch is enough for 
him to know what to do. Yeah, so I think that's the only advantage of the Design 
and Build route - the risk is less with the design and time of design”. (Senior 
Architect and BIM manager, 2016) 
 
4.2.11 Sub-optimisation (optimising the parts rather than the whole) (IP12) 
This sub-category was developed based on the emergence of the following three main 
themes. 
 Fragmenting contracts and work packages using a buy-it governance arrangement 
 Optimising performance of individual contracts rather than overall supply-chain 
performance 
 Optimising target fees rather than overall project costs 
 In general, traditional procurement methods could be regarded as an example of 
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sub-optimisation in construction procurement. In a traditional procurement, the client 
breaks down the project into separate pieces (i.e. design and construction). Then, the 
client hopes through the use of competitive price tendering to secure lowest price for 
each of the design and construction services. However, in reality, things don’t work like 
that; because lowest tender price does not necessary mean best value for money. It does 
not also guarantee that the project will be delivered to tender price. Instead it can create 
silos and encourage wasteful activities. As stated by a president of a lean consultancy 
company: 
“Traditional Design-Bid-Build or quantity contracts are pretty tough - 
transactional and separate project parties when protecting their financial 
interests. Rather than trying to optimise the supply chain it optimises the pieces, 
and that creates all the kinds of conflict and embeds waste in the project…The 
whole concept behind integrated project delivery (IPD) is that we are trying to 
align everybody in the project's best interest as opposed to the silo 
independent/individual interest” (President of a lean consultancy company, Nov 
2015). 
 
During the ongoing process of data collection and analysis, it appeared that sub-
optimisation practices in construction procurement remain to be used even when 
collaborative contractual arrangements are deployed.  Clients and their advisers tend to 
be relatively unaware of how their sub-optimisation practices hinders collaboration and 
embeds wastes in their projects. For instance, an NEC3 Engineering and Construction 
Contract Option D, Target Contract, was chosen by a public client for a major UK 
infrastructure project. This type of contract contains a “pain/gain” mechanism and is 
generally designed to achieve a collaborative approach to contracting, rather than the 
traditional JCT style, to reduce the risks in the construction process. However, the client 
used procurement mechanisms which focussed on optimising the target fees of each 
main project party (e.g. main contractor and Designer), while giving much less attention 
to how this may influence overall project performance. As a result of this commercial 
misalignment, the main contractor and designer found no incentive to collaborate 
together to reduce overall project costs; instead each party focussed on finding ways to 
reduce their own costs, even if this came out of the pocket of others. Interestingly, the 
deputy project manager was not aware herself of how this commercial misalignment 
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might impact on project performance. For instance, she said: 
“I see, yes, but everyone is not affecting the other. Like they both have, hmm, the 
target cost. Hmm, there is one target cost for the whole project, then within this 
overall target cost, we have separate items for the contractor’s cost, and 
separate items for the designers and the QSs and others – these are part of the 
auxiliary costs. So although the total target cost will be increased by each party, 
but they both have to manage their own. So, really at the end, each one is not 
affecting the other” (Deputy ECC project manager, Dec 2015). 
 
Through further investigation, it was found that the client kept the design in-house. So, 
instead of using the principle of ‘early contractor involvement’, the contractor in this 
case was not involved in design and just entered into negotiations to agree on target fees 
prior to contract award. Furthermore, the “pain and gain” mechanism of the overall 
project target-cost was only conducted between the client and the main contractor. The 
share of the designer was only limited to their own performance, in terms of how their 
own costs compares with their individual targets. So, the designer had no incentive or 
capacity to provide timely responses to client’s change orders or contractor’s requests 
for information (ROI), which caused lots of delays and compensation events. The 
client’s flawed approaches to procurement that led to these problems, as described by 
the leader of the commercial team providing financial governance services to the 
scheme, included the following: 
”The principle with the scheme was that the designs are relatively generic, so 
the client keeps that design in-house. Unfortunately, the client then uses a form 
of contract which pre-supposes, you know the NEC, that it's a contractor’s 
design. So, it's an uneasy alliance there which leads to a lot of 
variations…because any shortcomings or lateness or delay or change in the 
design automatically becomes a change event” (Associate Director, financial 
governance services, 2016).  
 
The author conducted further interviews to investigate the possible causes of the 
problem of sub-optimisation in construction procurement. Interestingly, it appeared that 
clients’ advisers such as procurement/quantity surveying consultancy firms (PQSs) 
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might have a vested interested for breaking down projects into various small packages, 
because it maximises their roles in projects. This argument was stated, for example, by a 
business development manager of a main contractor, as follows: 
“Yeah we certainly do see certain PQS companies taking a very building 
development approach to civil projects, and break the project into small 
packages which from a civil of contractor's point of view, we would prefer to 
manage the whole project than for us to manage those inter-phases; because 
obviously PQSs managing those inter-phases they get paid for that…so they do 
that so that they can maximise their fees. You also see occasionally where PQSs, 
who have a main building portfolio and were very familiar with the likes of JCT, 
get told they must work in NEC…and a lot of their Z-clauses are trying to make 
NEC work in the same way as JCT. But their customers have chosen NEC 
because they do not want to work in a JCT fashion. And JCT is not very good for 
civils works anyway; because civils works tend to have quite a lot of change in 
the ground conditions and so on, and JCT just cannot deal with that” (Business 
Development Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter illustrated various prevailing inefficient procurement practices that evolved 
out of the empirical data collected for the study.  The next section reveals their negative 
impacts on project performance and outcomes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPACT OF INEFFICIENT PROCUREMENT PRACTICES 
ON PROJECT PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOMES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study conceptualises construction procurement as ‘institutional arrangements’ that 
influence the way that project-parties behave and perform throughout the project. The 
previous chapter (Chapter 4) identified various inefficient procurement practices that are 
commonly used in construction. Subsequently, this chapter reveals the impacts of these 
procurement arrangements on project-team behaviour and performance. The chapter 
also illustrates the consequential wastes. 
 
5.2 Inefficient performances and behaviours (PB) 
This chapter focuses on describing the coding structure that led to the development of 
the category titled ‘inefficient performance and behaviour’, and provides brief 
explanations to each of its ten constituent sub-categories (see Figure 5.1). The study 
found that these behaviours and performances occur as a result of the use of prevailing 
construction procurement arrangements. The study also found that they lead to 
consequential wastes. Thus, the coding structure that led to the development of the 
category titled ‘consequential wastes’ will also be analysed (see section 5.4 below)
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Figure 5.1: Coding structure of ‘Inefficient Performances and Behaviours’  
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5.2.1 Adversarial relationship problems (PB1) 
There is no doubt that adversarial relationships could simply occur in construction 
projects, due to individual confrontational attitudes of people. However, this study 
found that inefficient construction procurement arrangements could also contribute to 
the development of adversarial relationships in projects. Thus, instead of blaming 
individuals, this finding provides a systemic perspective that could help to improve 
construction practice by shedding empirical light on one of the main causes of 
adversarial relationships in construction (i.e. wasteful procurement and commercial 
practices). The sub-category ‘Adversarial Relationship Problems’ was developed based 
on the following five main themes that emerged out of the data.  
 Silo mentality (Acting in the interest of the silo, not the project) 
 Lack of trust 
 Short-term relationships (hit and run) 
 Stereotyping 
 'Them and Us' mind-set and attitude 
 
So, for instance, inefficient procurement arrangements (e.g. safeguarding and sub-
optimisation practices) could drive project parties to act in the interest of the silo, not 
the project. Examples of incidents coded in the collected data include: 
 Contractor disincentivsed from collaborating to minimise overall project costs 
 Contractor not incentivised to inform the client about mistakes in design during 
tendering stage 
 Designer disincentived from collaborating with contractor to maintain workflow 
 Designers not incentivised to conduct site visits 
 Each trade focuses on maximising its own productivity and profit, without giving 
consideration to the impact of what they do on other trades' work 
 Labourers not incentivised to maintain or increase their production rate 
 Subcontractors' lack of commitment to the programme  
 
Thus, clients and decision makers need to be aware that by using inappropriate or 
inefficient procurement options (e.g. unfair contracts), they could be, at the same time, 
also “creating a confrontational working environment that may encourage contractors 
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and suppliers to exploit opportunities that may occur due to unforeseen conditions” 
(Managing director and principal consultant in the rail industry, Nov 2015), and that 
”the procurement process can help to create a mechanism for working together, or put 
everybody in silos they don't cross” (Senior Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015) 
 
5.2.2 Claims (of compensation events) and Disputes (PB2) 
This study found that inefficient procurement practices can lead to many problems, 
including unnecessary claims and disputes. So, for example, it was stressed by a very 
experienced participant that “more often than not, to pick the cheapest price ends up 
more expensive and also involves disputes” (Turn-around project manager, Oct 2015). 
The main reason for that, obviously, is that suppliers that have been selected based on 
cheapest price, often rely on recovering their compensated price and making their profit 
through planning and applying for claims and disputes. Thus, it is vital for clients and 
decision makers to put into consideration the impact of their choices on performance 
and production costs and not just rely on minimising costs of individual contracts. The 
time and costs spent on the process of agreeing the values of compensation events or 
disputes could be very detrimental to the project and all project-parties concerned.  
 
In an interview conducted with a principal engineer, he explained a situation at which 
inappropriate procurement arrangements has led the contractor to behave 
opportunistically, and thus the designer had to raise claims and ask the client for 
compensations. This situation was described as follows: 
“If there are a lot of RFIs being raised and we don't believe they were all 
warranted, and believe that the contractor should be able to adapt to the design 
and does not need the level of details which they are requiring. Well, then we 
make a case to the client and ask for additional resources. And then you'll be 
looking at any compensation events, so we can increase what could have been 
our original target cost or give us another additional sum of money to recover 
the additional work which would be expected to be undertaken in responding to 
the RFIs” (Principal Engineer, 2016). 
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Similarly, in a discussion with a senior consultant about the main impacts of late or poor 
payments arrangements on construction projects, he emphasised that these inefficient 
procurement practices often lead to increased project risks, opportunism and costly 
disputes. He stated that: 
“You know as a contractor, the monthly payments are usually useful from a cash 
flow point of view. And, indeed, if you're not guaranteed that cash flow, then 
you'll put money somewhere else because it's a risk. You know the risk in 
agreeing that you've met your milestone! So, you could end up chasing a 
milestone...and then you end up in dispute” (Senior Consultant (FICE), Oct 
2015) 
 
The discussion above reveals the importance of the use of relational forms of 
contracting, especially in complex projects, as they could help clients to discuss with 
their project partners the commercial terms and arrangements that would help to 
optimise supply-chain performance, and thus reduce overall project costs.  
“I think a critical part of the procurement is the dialogue between the suppliers 
and the client to agree precisely on these kinds of things. It could be a situation 
you've got to address, you know, would you prefer to be paid on a milestone 
basis or would you prefer on a monthly basis? You know and you take a view 
and the project will be evaluated to reach the best commercial whole project-
objective outcome” (Senior Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015). 
 
5.2.3 Commercial Pressure (PB3) 
Inefficient procurement arrangements (e.g. lump sum procurement methods and the use 
of onerous and overly formalised contracts) can impose increased commercial pressure 
on project team members, which in turn could stifle innovation, hinder collaboration 
and embed process-waste within the supply-chain, and eventually lead to project failure. 
A summary of the coding structure that led to the emergence of this subcategory is 
provided in figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Coding structure of ‘Commercial Pressure’ 
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5.2.4 Communication and information-flow problems (PB4) 
 
Inefficient procurement arrangements (e.g. separated procurement methods) can lead to 
many communication and information-flow problems, which in turn lead to 
consequential wastes. This sub-category was developed based on the emergence of five 
main themes (See Figure 5.3). 
 Disruptions in information flow 
 Excessive or Unnecessary duplication of reporting 
 Incomplete, unclear or lack of Information at right time 
 Lack of common understanding between contracting parties 
 Poor coordination between project-team-members during design and project 
delivery 
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Figure 5.3: Coding structure of ‘communication and information-flow problems 
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5.2.5 Conflicts (PB5) 
One of the major impacts of the use of inefficient procurement arrangements is the 
occurrence of conflicts between the project parties. These conflicts could lead to lack of 
trust, wasteful behaviours and eventually disputes. In this study two main classifications 
of conflicts were grounded in the data:  
(1) Goal conflict; and  
(2) Task and process conflict.   
 
‘Goal conflict’ first refers to misalignment of objectives between project parties. So, 
they could be regarded as conflicts that occur at a strategic level. One of the examples 
of this sort of conflict, as captured by this study, occurred when a major public-sector 
client added an onerous Z-clause to an NEC3 contract. This clause caused a goal 
conflict during later stages of the project, leading to poor project-team performance. The 
main cause of this goal conflict was described, as follows: 
“There are various Z-clauses in the contract, and then there is one clause that I 
believe says that 'if there is a fatality then we're not entitled to any gain as part 
of that project'… I don't know whether you know but we had a fatality on our 
scheme, so that means that we're automatically barred from getting any gain on 
this project…We can still go into pain of course, so if we were to go over the 
target then obviously there are penalties on us as well” (Senior Design Co-
ordinator, Dec 2015) . 
 
On the other side, ‘task and process conflicts’ are regarded as operational conflicts. 
Examples of clustered codes relating to this phenomenon include:  
 Conflict between designer and contractor when dealing with prescribed 
specifications 
 Conflict in agreeing on claims and compensations 
 Conflict in agreeing on penalty points in DBFO projects 
 Conflict in agreeing on performance evaluation scores 
 Conflict related to changes in the original Works of Information 
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 Conflicts related to RFIs between contractor and designer 
 Conflicts in measurements and valuations of completed works 
 
 
5.2.6 Design issues and problems (PB6) 
This is one of the most common problems associated with the use of inefficient 
procurement arrangements (e.g. separating design from construction). This sub-category 
was developed based on the emergence of the following themes: 
 Incomplete or lack of clarity of design information 
 Poor design coordination 
 Design errors and omissions 
 Excessive and Unnecessary Technical Design Queries or RFI 
 
A project manager working for a subcontractor explained to the author how that much 
of the project challenges they face are due to design errors. According to him, architects 
focus their attention on the  aesthetics of the building, while giving much less 
consideration to other important issues such as: logistics of the site and ways of gaining 
access into the building (e.g. setting-up scaffoldings) to attach the facades as well as 
safety matters. Thus, he believes that an early involvement of facade subcontractors 
using BIM models could help to mitigate this example of value-loss.  
 
There is no doubt that design errors could be attributed to factors such as shortage in the 
buildability skills and competencies of designers. However, this study sheds empirical 
light on the relationship between inefficient procurement arrangements and value-loss in 
design. There are other institutional, procurement-related and commercial factors which 
influence the way designers do things. As stated by a senior consultant “design errors 
or missing information is a major source of conflict in traditionally procured 
contracts…and that is due to, you know, designers facing an ever increased fee 
competition” (Senior consultant (FICE), Oct 2015). These arguments were emphasised 
by the ‘Head of Innovation’ of a major contractor (who has an architectural background 
in education and practice), as he blamed clients for using inefficient procurement 
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practices which typically lead to design errors and problems. According to him, the 
main causes for common ‘design issues and problems’ in construction projects include:  
 The historical way of procuring projects where clients tend to start project by 
appointing architects and QSs. 
 Client’s reluctance to invest in design (e.g. proper site investigations) 
 Low payments to designers due to the use of competitive fee tendering based on 
lowest price when appointing professional consultants - thus as a response 
designer's may not be able to invest much time and resources into making site 
visits, deeper investigations, and peer reviews while producing their designs. 
 Poor design coordination - not receiving full information on time due to late 
involvement of main contractor and sub-trades  
 
This study also identified another important example of design-related problems 
resulting from the use of inefficient procurement practices, which is the issue of 
‘excessive unwarranted requests for information (RFI)’. Compellingly, when a site-
agent working for one of the largest main-contractors in the UK was asked during an 
interview about the number of RFI raised in their ongoing project and the reasons of the 
queries, he informed the author through a written follow-up email the following: 
 “883 RFI have been raised to date [within just over a year]. Majority of these 
have been raised for design clarification where either insufficient information 
has been provided or the current design is not very clear” (Site Agent (CEng, 
MICE), Email, 2016) 
 
From the comment above, it appears that the number of RFIs raised is huge, and thus is 
very costly. According to a study by Hughes et al. (2013) that examined the impact and 
control of RFIs on construction projects, it was found each RFI would require about 9.7 
median days for response, and that the average total cost (review and response) per RFI 
is $1080 (equivalent to £822). Through further interviewing with different project 
parties involved in the project, it was found that these huge numbers of RFIs led to 
change orders, compensations events to all main project parties involved (main 
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contractor, designer, and the consultancy company responsible for financial governance 
of the scheme), delays, conflicts and adversarial relationships. Interestingly, the deputy 
project manager working on the project declared that the client is responsible for this 
and eventually ends up paying for the consequences of their procurement decisions and 
arrangements.  
“They [the contractors], are having a lot of change in the scope of works…Why! 
Hmm, well it’s due to the client really” (ECC Deputy Project Manager, 2016) 
 
 
5.2.7 Increased risks or failure to mitigate risks at early stages (PB7) 
Inefficient or inappropriate procurement arrangements could impose increased 
project-risks on all project parties including client themselves, or lead to the failure 
to mitigate risks at early stages. Examples of these are illustrated in Figure 5.4, 
which demonstrates the coding structure that led to the development of this 
subcategory. 
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Figure 5.4: Coding structure of ‘Increased risks or failure to mitigate risks at early stages’  
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5.2.8 Making unnecessary assumptions (PB8) 
 
Inefficient construction procurement arrangements can put buyers and suppliers into 
positions where they have to make unnecessary assumptions, which may lead to 
consequential wastes. As summed up by a senior consultant: 
 
I think the biggest source of inefficiency from my view is the lack of common 
understanding developed during the procurement process such that each party 
enters the contract with a whole set of assumptions that might be wrong - on the 
contractor side pricing unclear or unknown information and on the client side 
not knowing exactly what they are buying” (Senior consultant (FICE), Oct 
2015). 
 
When asked about his recommendations for overcoming this prevalent source of waste 
in construction projects, he stated: 
“Eradication during the tender procurement process to eliminate or fully 
understand the assumptions up on which the contract is being priced or 
procured, so the objectives of the contract could be priced and delivered 
accordingly” (Senior consultant (FICE), Oct 2015). 
 
When a senior architect who is also a head of innovation at a contracting company was 
asked about the main causes of common design errors in construction and whether these 
are procurement-related or not, he said: 
“Yes, I think one of the root-causes, it is back to the client though, if the client is 
not actually prepared to make the investment in terms of a proper site 
investigation. Quiet often that can lead to issues of cost as well because they 
have not fully assessed what's actually there, and so the designers are making 
assumption about what's there and what is not, and then that just leads to delays 
or additional costs at a later stage when the reality of the situation is exposed” 
(Head of Innovation and Director of National Frameworks, Nov 2015). 
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This response helped to expose to the author how that ‘making unnecessary 
assumptions’ could be a major cause of waste in construction projects. If the right 
information is not provided to the designer at the right time, then designers would have 
to make unnecessary assumptions, which in turn could lead to consequential waste (e.g. 
re-work, delays, additional costs). The same applies to all project parties concerned and 
that’s what partnering, building information modelling (BIM) and other collaborative 
ways of working try to minimise.  
 
5.2.9 Opportunistic practices (PB9) 
Inefficient procurement arrangements can support and/or encourage opportunism. 
Figure 5.5 captures various examples of opportunistic behaviours captured by this 
study. It also illustrates the coding structure that led to the development of this 
subcategory. In short, the data analysis indicates that if a buyer uses unfair 
contractual conditions, transfers risks or imposes commercial pressure on their 
supplier without an adjustment in opportunity, then it is very likely that that their 
suppliers may react badly. It is, therefore, important for clients to gain a better 
understanding about the effect of their construction procurement choices on 
behaviour and performance. 
  
Chapter 5: Impact of Procurement Practices on Project Performance and Outcomes 
 
 
Page | 185  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Coding structure of ‘Opportunistic practices’ 
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5.2.10 Variations and change events/orders (PB10) 
There is no doubt that inefficient or inappropriate construction procurement 
arrangements could lead to variations and unnecessary change orders, which in turn lead 
to consequential wastes. Many examples which illustrated the possible causes and 
effects of variations and change orders were identified during the data collection and 
analysis of this study. For example, it appeared from the data that variations and change 
orders often occur when clients don’t spend enough time and money during pre-
construction stages, in order to assess risks and develop solutions to problems during 
early stages. For example, an associate director of a consultancy company offering 
financial governance services to a major public client asserted the following to the 
author: 
“One of the problems on this particular job was that the client was eager to let 
it before the old framework expired. And consequently, it was you might say less 
well defined at the time it was let than it ought to be, and that resulted in an 
awful lot of change in the early days” (Associate Director, financial governance 
services, 2016).  
 
In an interview with the ‘Head of Innovation’ of a main contractor, he emphasised how 
that clients should not be hesitant to invest enough money to improve the quality of 
their procurement and tender documentation, which includes design drawings. That is 
because the use of poor procurement information, while using a price-competitive 
tendering approach for example, could encourage tenderers to exploit gaps and errors in 
the contract. He stated that: 
“Depending on the quality of the procurement information, hmm you would 
immediately sort of standard how much waste could be included. You know, 
because if the procurement process is not accurate then it leads to a large 
variation in terms of the approach that people can take and the opportunity for 
people to be able to exploit the weakness in the procurement” (Head of 
Innovation and Director of National Frameworks, Nov 2015). 
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Also, lots of variations and consequential wastes could occur, if clients don’t spend 
sufficient time and money in making proper site investigations and updating and 
maintaining the quality of their As-built records. As stated by a deputy project manager 
working on a major infrastructure project in the UK: 
“There are not good As-built records kept. That's another issue also that leads 
to lots of technical queries and a lot of changes” (ECC Deputy Project Manager, 
2016). 
 
Furthermore, it appeared through during data collection and analysis that late or lack of 
involvement of contractors in the design could lead to design errors, change orders, and 
thus unnecessary consequential wastes. Interestingly, a senior design coordinator 
working for a major tier-1 contractor informed the author that change orders and 
instructions cause them lots of troubles and lead to waste of human potential as they 
enforce QSs to spend most of their time evaluating impacts of changes on their 
profitability rather than offering value-maximising solutions. He stated: 
“I think that so far we are probably just over a year into the contract now, so 
we've had over a three-hundred instructions, so project management 
instructions. And we've had two hundred and fifty odd supervisors' instructions. 
So, that's five-hundred instructions that we've had on this scheme since we've 
started, on a design that is already supposed to be completed. So those 
instructions all have to be evaluated and obviously tie the QSs up” (Senior 
Design Coordinator, 2016). 
 
In follow up interviews to understand the reasons for the huge amounts of change orders 
and instructions provided in the comment above, the site-agent working for the main 
contractor provided the author with the following explanation: 
“There have been a lot of, we call them, Project Management Instructions 
(PMIs) on the project. And it has been for a couple of reasons, because the 
design was not complete or they've missed out quite a lot of details in the design. 
To start off, the project has been live for nearly a year now. And it has been a 
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very slow process of getting responses back for ‘requests for information’ (RFI). 
And this has been highlighted to the client in our meetings with the client, and 
with the designer. You know your response time to our RFI is very slow. And 
they will say that we don't have the resources. And one said, they were accusing 
us of raising too many RFI. And we conquered that argument saying 'well the 
reason we are raising so many RFIs is because the design is not clear'. So, 
which has a sort of indirect impact on the number of PMIs getting raised” (Site 
Agent (CEng, MICE), 2016) 
 
The comment above clearly shows how that inefficient procurement practices can 
support or encourage wasteful behaviours. Clients and decision makers, therefore, need 
to be aware of the impact of their procurement decisions (i.e. change orders) on supply-
chain performance and project outcomes. As declared by the ‘Head of Innovation’ of a 
major contractor who also has an architectural background: 
 “On some projects, it's more rewarding for a contractor to have lots of changes 
in a job. And that's not just that the contractor, that's the supply chain as well 
because all those delays escalates and the percentages of mark-up escalate on 
top of those costs” (Head of Innovation and Director of National Frameworks, 
Nov 2015). 
 
Other implications of change orders include its impact on the downstream supply-chain. 
This might be less or unknown to clients, as tier-2 contractors are usually contracted to 
the tier-1 management contractor. In a discussion with a site manager who works for a 
specialist façade subcontractor, he explained to the author the commercial risks and 
challenges they face due to change orders. These risks could be severe to an extent that 
they could lead to insolvency, which if happened could lead the client to large project 
delays and financial losses. According to the site manager: 
“Contractors’ and clients' change orders cause us lots of risk and pressure due 
to our commitments and plans of delivery with our manufacturers - we need at 
least 3 months of notice prior to delivery. Additionally, facades are expensive 
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and thus cannot be ordered excessively and just stored on site” (Site manager of 
a specialist subcontractor, 2016). 
 
 
5.3 Consequential Waste (W) 
It has been shown in the study that prevailing construction procurement practices can 
lead to or support inefficient performances and behaviours, which in turn lead to 
consequential waste. In this study, the category of ‘Consequential Waste’, as shown in 
Figure 5.6, was developed based on the emergence of four main classifications of waste: 
 Financial losses and cost overruns (Cost waste), 
 Time waste, 
 Quality loss (Value loss in design), and 
 Waste of human potential. 
 
 
During data collection and analysis, all incidents of waste were initially coded in a 
general theme named waste. Then, the four classifications of waste, mentioned above, 
were formulated through clustering of codes, constant comparison and memoing 
processes. Consequently, the ‘consequential waste’ category was developed based on an 
overall understanding of and reflections on emerging themes and concepts. Examples of 
emergent sub-categories and themes that led to the development of the ‘consequential 
waste’ category are itemised below. 
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Figure 5.6: Coding structure of ‘Consequential Waste’ 
Chapter 5: Impact of Procurement Practices on Project Performance and Outcomes 
 
 
Page | 191  
 
5.3.1 Financial losses and cost overruns (W1):  
The sub-category ‘Financial Losses and Cost Overruns’ was developed, based on the 
emergence of the following themes: 
 Client allowing or indirectly paying for unnecessary contingencies 
 Client indirectly paying for expensive performance bonds that are ineffective and 
unfit-for-purpose 
 Unnecessary Compensation events 
 Costs associated with collecting non-value adding reports and data from suppliers 
 Costs associated with excessive and unwarranted documental RFI processes 
 Costs associated with Fighting for claims, disputes and litigation 
 Costs of replacing contractors and suppliers 
 Costs of failure to mitigate the occurrence of strategic risk events at early stages 
(which in turn increases the scheme target price) 
 Duplicate insurance cover 
 Inflated cost due to ‘margin on margin’ (i.e. the Main contractor has a margin to 
make on top of the margins the Tier 2 suppliers make) 
 Profit losses and margin slippage of main contractors and S&S 
 Costs of re-work 
o On-site rework 
o Reproducing design 
o Duplication in reporting 
 Tendering as a non-value added cost 
o Clients indirectly reimbursing contractors for tendering expenses 
o Costs of man-hour that have been put into answering and submitting PQQs 
 Wasteful Year-End Spending (e.g. bringing some big material order to site when not 
needed) 
 
5.3.2 Quality loss (Value-loss in design) (W2):  
The following themes evolved from the analysis of the data, and led to the development 
of the sub-category titled as Quality loss or Value-loss in design: 
 Design errors and omissions 
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 Restrictions to innovation in the choice of materials and adopting cost effective 
ways of working 
 Sub-standard design 
o Cost-cutting 
o Poor specifications 
 Wasted opportunity for improving build-ability of design or offering more cost 
effective solutions 
 
5.3.3 Time waste (W3):  
This sub-category (Time Waste) was developed based on the emergence of the 
following themes: 
 Continuously dealing with variations and change orders and managing their impacts 
on the programme and the  budget as a whole 
 Delay in the commissioning of onsite construction works 
 Excessive and time-consuming reporting of non-value adding or duplicated 
information 
 Lateness in responding to and addressing RFIs (Technical Design Queries) 
 Lengthy and time-consuming  tendering procedures 
 Litigation processes and delays 
 Slow performance due to bureaucratic process control by client 
o Client double checking BoQ prepared by main contractor 
o Over-emphasis on process control procedures and inefficient deployment of 
human resources in public sector projects 
o Slow performance due to bureaucratic documentation via clerks of work. 
 Delays due to re-work 
o On-site rework 
o Reproducing design 
o Duplication in reporting 
 Site related delays (Non-completion of activities) 
o Due to a late start 
o Due to a priority change 
o Due to conflicting demands 
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o Due to Incomplete Enabling Actions (mainly because of insufficient 
collaboration and coordination between disciplines) 
- Poor performance of the subcontractor who might be on the critical path 
- Waiting for design information 
- Waiting for payments that a client needs to make 
- Waiting for safety paper-work that needs signing of 
- Waiting for site clearance 
o Due to Insufficient Time Planned 
o Due to lack of decision on an activity 
o Due to lack of resources 
- Break down of Equipment 
- Unavailability of required manpower on the day of the job to start the activity 
- Waiting for specific materials to arrive 
o Due to project changes 
o Due to 'other' related issues 
 The dragging process of agreeing and valuing compensation events (settling claims) 
 Time spent on building a portfolio of documental evidence for claims 
 
 
5.3.4 Waste of human potential (W4):  
This sub-category (Waste of Human Potential) was developed based on the emergence 
of the following themes: 
 Deploying valuable resources to man-mark suppliers  
 Failure of subcontractors who assisted main contractor during tender stage to win 
the project subcontract 
 Ideal contractor not winning the price-competitive tender contract 
 Lack of continuous learning and improvement (e.g. due to change of suppliers) 
 Not taking advantage of specialist knowledge of contractor and S&S expertise 
during detailed design stage 
 Project-team efforts focussed on contract administration and non-value-adding 
activities 
o Contractor getting on with drainage works 'blindly and having to deal with high 
change in the scope of construction works 
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o Contractor's commercial manager efforts mainly focussed on dealing with the 
reporting of financial performance rather than offering solutions to manage risks 
and  reduce costs 
o NEC Project manager's effort mainly focussed on administrating the contract 
rather than managing production flow 
o Project team members putting too much effort on providing evidence for claims 
and compensation event rather than managing production 
o QS efforts tied up to heavy contract admin work rather than providing more 
valuable risk management and cost reduction activities 
 Waste of effort on tendering instead of collaborative means of reducing delivery 
costs 
 
5.4 Summary  
This chapter illustrated the main themes , concepts and relationships that emerged out of 
the data and led to the development of two main categories of the study’s conceptual 
model; these are: ‘Inefficient Performance and Behaviour‘ and  ‘Consequential Wastes’.  
The next chapter reveals the institutional factors that influence approaches to 
construction procurement. These institutions influence the ‘rules of the game’ and, 
arguably, lead to the generation and persistence of waste in construction.  
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CHAPTER SIX: INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING 
PROCUREMENT 
 
  
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated how transactional-based procurement arrangements 
can influence project-team behaviours and performances, and thus lead to consequential 
wastes. This chapter introduces various institutional factors that have been found to 
influence construction procurement choices and practices. It is argued that these 
institutional factors provide novel explanations as to why inefficient procurement 
practices prevail and persist in the construction industry.  
 
 
6.2 Institutional Factors (IF) 
This chapter focuses on describing  the coding structure that led to the emergence of the 
category titled ‘institutional factors’, and provides brief explanations to each of its 
twelve constituent sub-categories (see Figure 6.1). The study found that these 
institutional factors lead to inefficient procurement arrangements, which lead to 
inefficient behaviours and practices, which in turn lead to consequential wastes. The 
overall findings of this study also revealed that the institutional factors, identified within 
this chapter, combine to create the apparent coherence for the current prevalent 
construction model. The examples provided in the sections below demonstrate how 
these prevailing institutions contribute to the generation and persistence of wasteful 
behaviours and practices in construction.  
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Figure 6.1: Coding structure of ‘institutional factors’  
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6.2.1 Bargaining Power (Power disparities within the construction market place) 
(IF1) 
This study found that bargaining power is one of the major institutional factors that 
influence construction procurement choices and arrangements. There are various 
examples provided by the participants of the study, which have led to the development 
of this sub-category. These included: 
 Major industry players (i.e. Large Tier 1 contractors) pushing for procurement 
strategies that suit them 
o Tier 1 contractors resistance to shared Project Bank Accounts 
o Main contractors refusing to do single stage tenders and only wanting to do 
two-stage tenders. 
 Architects dictating power through the use of overly prescribed design 
specifications 
 High demand in the market for QSs and Engineers 
 Investment Banks influencing contractual governance processes 
 Insurance company dictating processes during warranty period 
 QSs convincing clients to pay for or allow in their budget for additional works and 
contingencies 
 Specialist suppliers dictating contract conditions with subcontractor 
 
 
6.2.2 Bounded rationality or lack of adequate understanding and experience of 
clients (IF2) 
The term ‘bounded rationality’ simply means that decision makers act rationally but 
have constraints on their cognitive, analytical and data-processing capabilities, 
especially in uncertain and complex environments. In this study, four main themes 
emerged out of the data, which have led to the development of this subcategory: 
 
1. Client’s lack of understanding of how their procurement choices impact on 
behaviour and performance.  
2. Client's lack of adequate understanding or experience to realise the inefficiencies of 
some of their procurement practices 
Chapter 6: Institutional Factors Influencing Procurement 
 
Page | 198  
 
3. Client's lack of understanding how risks are transferred down to the supply chain 
leading to inefficiencies 
4. Incompetence and lack of in-house construction expertise within the client's 
organisation 
 
During data collection, various participants provided the author with interesting 
incidents that indicate that client’s may not be aware of how their procurement rules and 
arrangements could drive wasteful behaviours. So for example, a senior consultant who 
specialises in the use of performance-based contracts explained to the author why 
clients remain to have a preference to rely on inefficient contract-performance 
measures, as follows:  
“We have tried to help them and offer them a procurement route with 
performance measures that aid and help them to understand the contract…But 
they were not convinced partly because some people don't understand the 
impact of performance measures on behaviour. And sometimes because they 
have a certain mind-set, so they interpret how they use performance-based 
contracts incorrectly” (Senior Consultant (PhD, Nov 2015). 
 
6.2.3 Buyers’ flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual stage (IF3) 
 
This study identified a number of critical flawed assumptions or errors that buyers make 
during pre-contractual stage; these cultural-cognitive institutions contribute to the 
persistence of inefficient procurement practices in construction. Examples of these 
include: treating construction procurement as a commodity, taking an approach to 
procurement based on risk-considerations rather than process-flow, and treating 
symptoms rather than getting to root-causes. Figure 6.2 below provides a holistic view 
of the emergent themes that led to the development of this sub-category. In addition, 
Chapter 8 (Discussion and Integrated Extant Literature) will provide more detailed 
explanations of this sub-category. 
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Figure 6.2: Coding structure of ‘Buyers’ flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual stage’  
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6.2.4 Construction Economy (IF4) 
 
This study found that the construction economy can influence construction procurement 
practices. There were a number of themes that emerged out of the data and led to the 
formation of this subcategory: 
 Business Environment (e.g. recession and severe competition) 
 Cyclical nature of the industry 
 Fluctuations in market rates and prices 
 Type and nature of the construction market 
 
In a discussion with the ‘Head of innovation’ of a major UK contractor about how the 
construction economy can influence procurement practices, he informed the author 
about how clients took advantage of the UK recession in 2009 and transferred unfair 
risks to desperate contractors. He stated: 
 
“Yeah, it is unfortunately part of the cyclical nature of the industry. It is no real 
surprise but during the recession, when we are coming out of the recession, you 
have all the main contractors reporting large losses on projects; because they 
have taken risks or accepted contracts or terms of conditions that they would not 
normally because they are desperate to get the work. And equally when you get 
out of the recession, it's kind of making 'Hey' because the resources and the 
teams are not there, so it allows contractors to make more money than they 
would normally…because that cyclical nature of the industry drives that 
behaviour as well in terms of the procurement practice. So clients behave badly 
when it is a recession” (Head of Innovation and Director of National 
Frameworks, Nov 2015). 
 
Consequently, he also described to the author how clients’ poor procurement practices 
(e.g. sending tenders to large numbers of competitors and using aggressive price 
negotiations based on direct contact with tier 2 contractors) pushed main contractors to 
behave opportunistically. According to him, this is part of the cyclical nature of the 
industry. The narrative below clearly shows how the construction economy (as a 
regulative institution) can influence procurement practices. It also demonstrates that 
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‘self-interest’ (see section 6.2.9 below), as an institutional norm, contributes to the 
generation and persistence of wasteful behaviours and practices in construction. 
“So, I remember when we went into the recession and a lot of contractors were 
saying we will only bid design and bid projects if we were on a three, and we 
will only do traditional tenders if we were on a four. And we were seeing tenders 
coming out where they would normally go out to eight on a traditional project, 
they will may be even go to eight on a design and build. Because they knew they 
can do that, because people were actually desperate to win work. But, then when 
recession ended, it was very hard to find any contractor with any free people 
and tendering capability, so suddenly clients were saying oh yeah we were 
sending out this tender with six on the list and all the contractors were saying 
‘no we don't want to tender it’. And equally, I remember one bid when the 
council was looking to tender a group of schools. It was five schools I think, and 
they have gone out to the supply chain to find modular suppliers and get the 
prices of them first. And then give those to the contractors and say right give us 
your price then for building this. You know where they have already kind of 
massaged the Tiers 2, if you want, in terms of where the price was” (Head of 
Innovation and Director of National Frameworks, Nov 2015). 
 
A following interview was then conducted with a business development manager to 
gain more insights about how the construction economy influences clients’ construction 
procurement decisions and arrangements. Interestingly, the interviewee criticised 
procurement consultants for using trends of what happened in the past, so as to convince 
clients to utilise safeguarding practices (see section 4.2.9); that is because these 
procurement arrangements can allow consultants to maximise their positions and roles 
in construction projects (see section 6.2.11 about ‘vested interests’ below). He stated: 
 
“I think this arises from the fact that these procurement experts are looking at 
trends based on what happened in the industry over the last five years. And if 
you look at the last five years, contractors have taken a considerably larger slice 
of risk on their customers. However that was consequence of a significant 
recession, when work was very difficult to come by; and contractors took 
decisions that they certainly would not have taken in a stronger business 
Chapter 6: Institutional Factors Influencing Procurement 
 
Page | 202  
 
environment. And also are unlikely to take again, because many contractors 
have had their fingers burnt…Hmm, so I think one of the important issues is to 
understand the direction in which the construction economy is going as opposed 
to what happened in this recent past…So, look ahead rather than look behind 
you” (Business Development Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
6.2.5 Cost-driven environment (sharp focus on reducing costs) (IF5) 
 
Buyers’ and suppliers’ sharp focus on reducing costs was identified as one of the major 
institutional factors, which lead to the persistence of wasteful construction procurement 
practices. In an interview with a senior consultant, he provided the author with an 
example at which a public sector client initiated the use of new types of contracts (i.e. 
Asset Support Contract), with the aim of achieving efficiencies of 25% over the 
following five years. The problem is that the client and the suppliers focused on cutting 
costs rather than maximizing value for money, leading to increased inefficiencies. This 
was described as follows: 
“We had an example with a public-sector client where they altered their style of 
maintenance contracts so that it was looking more at the cost of the item, and 
concentrated more at the costs going through the project. It was a positive move 
because, hmm, there were concerns that projects were costing more than they 
should. There was a big study which showed that roads cost more to be built in 
Britain as opposed to Denmark and Germany, Finland and New Zealand and 
various other places. So there was lots of pressure to say well we need to look as 
the costs we spend on the projects. So, there was a change in the style, in the 
attitude of contracts that was being put out. So, it focussed more on the cost 
running through the project. Unfortunately, what happened was exactly as we 
predicted. We suggested that they did not do it. But what happened was that the 
contractors that were being put on to those projects; then had an army of 
quantity surveyors so they could look at the costs in as much detail as possible. 
But they looked at it from their own perspective and not from the client's 
perspective. So, of course things did not get or help to achieve any better value” 
(Senior Consultant (PhD), Nov 2015). 
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The example above emphasises that main efforts and attention should be focussed on 
finding more efficient ways of working to reduce costs (the focus is on production 
improvements), rather than contractual and cost-cutting practices which may have an 
impact on quality (sharp cost-driven focus).  This interpretation was confirmed by the 
interviewee as follows: 
“Yes. And I think it's the interpretation between the two. If someone says: we 
need to look at the cost of this. What we should be looking at is we should be 
looking at the value that is being delivered for that price. But what people 
invariably misinterpret as is looking at cutting the cost. And that's where the 
mistakes are made. You just look at a percentage being taken-off rather than 
being intelligent about it and saying 'what value is this delivering? Is this part 
not delivering value?' It's almost like doing a process management where you 
look at each individual step through the process and you decide whether it's 
delivering value or not, and then you take out the non-value adding items. The 
problem with the approach they followed is that it only looked at delivering a 
service from the financial point of view” (Senior Consultant (PhD), Nov 2015). 
 
 
A senior project manager was asked about the reasons that his clients have a preference 
for breaking down work-packages into smaller pieces and several individual contracts, 
although such practice often leads to increased risks and fragmentation, his answer 
showed that ‘cost control’ is the main driver for such inefficient procurement practices. 
“I think, bottom line, it's all about money. And apparently, losing influence on 
how their money is allocated to contractors, and how that bunch of money might 
be used to ‘forces of will’. So it's a bit dramatic explanation; but I think this is 
the core of this idea of clients trying to engage in individual contracts” 
(Certified Senior Project Manager (PMP, MRICS), Nov 2015) 
 
 
 
In subsequent interviews, many of the participants complained about the cost-driven 
environment at which they have to operate. For example, the ‘Head of Innovation’ of a 
leading contractor explained to the author how that construction buyers’ sharp focus on 
reducing costs leads to a zero-sum game, and thus can encourage suppliers to behave 
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opportunistically. He stated: 
“I remember one bid when the council was looking to tender a group of schools. 
It was five schools I think, and they have gone out to the supply chain to find 
modular suppliers and get the prices of them first. And then give those to the 
contractors and say right give us your price then for building this. You know 
where they have already kind of massaged the Tiers 2, if you want, in terms of 
where the price was…The problem is that most clients only work on the advice 
of their procurement advisers, which is all these larger companies….and the 
problem is that in any business it has got to be accredit-able for everybody. It 
has got to work for everybody. If you screw the main contractors down so hard, 
then they will try to find other ways in making their money. It's exactly the same 
with the supply chain. You know, everybody has got to make a profit” (Head of 
Innovation and Director of National Frameworks, Nov 2015).  
 
6.2.6 Political forces (Government-related policy and processes) (IF6) 
This study found that political forces can have a negative influence on construction 
procurement arrangements and outcomes. These political issues could be in the form of 
bureaucracy of processes (e.g. excessive reporting requirements), which lead to 
unnecessary delays and expenses. They also relate to other factors such as bias of 
strategic programmes, pushing projects to start without spending adequate time in 
planning for and assessing potential risks, or unnecessary bulk-buying of materials due 
to expiring budgets. In general, this subcategory was developed based on the emergent 
of the following themes and subthemes: 
 Bureaucracy of Governmental processes 
 Change of Policy or Government 
 Constraints on Financial Year Expenditures 
 Expiring Budgets 
 Governing for Deficit Reduction 
o Deferring actions and events to the next financial year 
o Financial Engineering 
 Optimism Bias of the Strategic Programme for Government 
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When asking participants about the causes of commercial misalignments and inefficient 
procurement arrangements that they reported during interviews, they often referred to 
political forces and pressures, as one of the major sources leading to inefficiencies in 
construction and civil engineering projects. In many instances, the responses indicated 
that clients and decision-makers have not been able to invest enough time and resources 
during planning and pre-contractual stages, due to political pressures imposed on them. 
For example, when investigating the main reasons for the vast amount of change orders 
that occurred with an infrastructure project as reported by various project-parties, the 
following response was received:  
“We can and we have on this particular scheme successfully obtained 
compensation events for increased resources as a result of the sheer volume of 
change. One of the problems on this particular job was that the public-sector 
client was eager to let it before the old framework expired. And consequently, it 
was, you might say, less well defined at the time it was let than it ought to have 
been, and that resulted in an awful lot of change in the early days” (Associate 
Director and Leader of commercial team providing financial governance 
services, 2016). 
 
This claim was supported by the deputy project manager, as follows: 
“Obviously politics do affect the project… Well, well, from what I have seen in 
this project, it has put a pressure on everybody to deliver the project faster. And 
that has been difficult because it has been promised politically that something 
will be completed by a certain date; but that has not considered all the changes 
that we had to deal with after. You can understand how much pressure it has put 
on everybody. They still have to finish at a certain date to satisfy the client or the 
Government. But they have to do then quite a lot of more work, which was not 
originally planned. So that really put a lot of pressure on everyone” (ECC 
Deputy Project Manager, 2016). 
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Similarly, a client adviser referred to political pressure when explaining the reasons for 
the existence of commercial misalignments in a trial project that he was involved in. In 
that project, according to him, the tier 2 suppliers exploited the cost-reimbursable 
contracts deployed by the client, which also forced the client to man-mark their 
suppliers.  As a result, these practices led to a confrontational environment and 
consequential wastes. His response emphasised that political pressure has not allowed 
them to spend sufficient time in considering and designing the most appropriate 
construction procurement arrangements for their project. Accordingly, they had to 
enforce governance approaches during the project delivery to control exploitation and 
opportunism, which eventually complicated the problem rather than solved it. 
According to him, these problems occurred and persist “because always there is a 
pressure to get to site and start progress basically. So, there have been a pressure to 
probably go to site maybe a bit earlier than what we were set-up to” (Senior Consultant 
and Project Manager, 2016). 
 
Changes of Government or policy could also influence the way projects are procured, 
managed and operated. Funding and budget uncertainty, due to unstable political 
conditions, could limit the decision makers’ ability to adopt innovative procurement and 
project delivery approaches. It could also make them reluctant to spend lots of money at 
the front end of projects. So, for example, under budget uncertainty clients may tend to 
prefer a separated procurement approach, as opposed to integrated approaches which 
require early contractor involvement and thus increased initial costs. In an interview 
with a senior design coordinator working for a major contractor, he explained to the 
author how political forces have influenced the progress of their project, as follows: 
“You'll probably be aware that the Government obviously has a rogue 
programme. Hmm, so that rouge programme effectively fixes the budget for all 
of these schemes. Now you might (Hehehe) happily be going along and then 
suddenly either there is a change of Government or, hmm, there is a change of 
policy. So, this scheme, I think suffered a change of Government early in the 
stage. So, effectively they have to do a funding review or whatever. So, the 
scheme is then put on hold while they establish whether the money can be spent 
on that scheme or not… Obviously, there is some politics involved in some of 
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that as well, in terms of getting schemes through” (Senior Design Coordinator, 
Dec 2015). 
 
There are also political forces related to expiring budgets and governing for deficit 
reduction, which might lead to the execution of ill-defined projects. In some instances, 
these political forces may also support inefficient procurement practices (e.g. bulk-
buying of materials) and thus lead to consequential wastes. As stated by a senior project 
manager working on a major infrastructure project: 
“The other issue which comes about is when the public-sector client looks at 
their total programme expenditure, for example, of the current financial year. 
And, so they may say ‘collectively we're not spending enough money’. So, they 
may then look for projects to come up with hmm, if you like, ways of spending 
more money in the financial year, which may be possible through hmm pre-
payment on material orders - getting materials to site quicker. Hmm, and 
perhaps paying for some of the long-term site overhead costs in advance. But 
then on the converse of that, sometimes they may come around the other way 
and say we've got too much money forecast for this year, we need to cut back a 
bit” (ECC Project Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
When asked about how the client cuts back in expenses and whether this is achieved 
through making design changes during projects, he said: 
“It’s Aha [laughing] I suppose it's predominately almost through financial 
engineering to be perfectly fair with you; but sometimes it may mean that you 
have to, you may have to, put off hmm bringing some, some big material order 
to site, or you may have to defer that a month or two, so it goes into the next 
financial year; that sort of thing” (ECC Project Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
The arguments above have been supported by author participants. For example, when a 
senior procurement consultant was directly asked about his opinion of why wasteful 
procurement practices persist, he criticised the ‘taken for granted’ approaches to funding 
and procuring public sector projects, as follows: 
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“Partly it's also to do with the way, certainly in public sector, the way that they 
are funded. So we do have and we have had with a number of our public sector 
clients, hmm position around March, February/March, where they've got budget 
to use them. Because if they don't spend the money they have been allocated, it 
gets reduced for the following year. And the following year might be reduced but 
then you don't have as much to spend. You can't do what you wanted to do with 
it. So, they end up spending money just to keep the budget for the following year. 
And it happens through our public sector and in every country…Absolutely 
ludicrous but it's accepted that ‘that's the way it is and we can't do anything 
differently or anything better!’” (Senior Consultant (PhD), Nov 2015). 
 
 
6.2.7 Price-based mind set of procurers (IF7) 
 
This study identified ‘price based mind-set’ as an intuitional norm that influences 
construction procurement choices and practices. For example, in an interview with a 
senior consultant (who specialises in performance-based contracts), he was asked about 
why many clients remain to have a preference for utilising price-competitive tendering, 
despite the strong criticisms by many professionals and academics. He argued that this 
procurement practice persists because of clients’ price based mind-set and poor 
understanding of the implications of the price-quality ratio that they choose.  He stated 
the following: 
“We have had different clients. What we have is called a cost-quality ratio or 
price-quality ratio. And different clients have had different ideas of the ratio. I 
would say the less experienced clients would have a higher cost-quality ratio. 
They may do it 70:30 on cost. Whereas the most experienced clients I would say 
would do it the other way around. They would have a 70% on quality and 30% 
on cost. The reason being is that if you ask for a high ratio of cost then you'll get 
what you've asked for. You'll just get the cheapest and you won't necessarily get 
high quality. The other way around, you'll guarantee getting a higher quality 
and then the cost comes into it less so. But you will get what you pay for. You get 
what you asked for; that's the way of thinking about it” (Senior Consultant 
(PhD), Nov 2015). 
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Consequently, the author interviewed a senior cost consultant, in order to gain a better 
understanding of why many clients and their consultants tend to have a price based 
mind-set and approach to construction procurement. Interestingly, he asserted that this 
is because:   
“They don't know and understand how risks are transferred down to the supply 
chain leading to inefficiencies. It is easier and more tangible for them to 
compare between prices; that is what they can see and understand” (Senior 
Cost Consultant (MRICS), Dec 2015). 
 
Furthermore, when a project manager who works for a subcontractor was asked about 
the typical problems that they face with contracts and commercial arrangements, he 
complained about the prevalence of price competitive tendering approaches. In 
particular, he criticised clients’ consultants (i.e. Quantity Surveyors) for their price-
oriented mind-sets, as follows: 
 “Trying to tender for contracts; but you'll never get them because the quantity 
surveyors or the commercial teams don't understand what they are looking for. 
It's a price based mind-set! We're very specialist and the cost mind-set of the 
quantity surveyors doesn't allow them to understand what we do” (Director and 
Project Manager of a Specialist Subcontractor, 2016) 
 
Given that most of the clients that procure construction projects lack experience and 
may only ever build once or twice; they invariably seek cost and procurement advice 
from quantity surveyors (QSs). These professional consultants are not directly involved 
in the production of construction works, and thus tend to rely mainly on financial and 
legal criteria when making their decisions. As argued above, this ‘price-based mind-set’ 
can lead to flawed construction procurement choices, which in turn can prevent ideal 
suppliers from winning contracts (i.e. waste of human potential), or encourage those 
who secured the job to engage in opportunistic practices in order to compensate their 
compromised contract price. Interestingly, it has been argued by a business 
development manager working for a main civil engineering contractor that QS’s price-
based mind-set could also lead to inaccurate project cost-estimates, which in turn may 
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have a negative impact on clients’ procurement decisions. This has been described as 
follows: 
“I've got some sympathy with cost consultants in that they are quantity 
surveyors; they are counters. They understand the cost of concrete, steel, 
excavation, and so on. What they don't understand is the method-related cost, 
programme, build-ability and so on. And if you look at the cost on a kilometre of 
a highway on five different projects, you'll find very different answers. And the 
correct answer is not the average. It's driven by the method-related cost whether 
it's ground conditions, or location, or choice of plant, or time constraints” 
(Business Development Manager, Dec 2015)  
 
 
6.2.8 Risk-aversity (IF8) 
This study found that ‘risk-aversity’ contributes to the persistence of inefficient 
procurement practices in construction. This institutional norm occurs in two different 
forms. Firstly, it appears, according to the participants’ views, that many clients are 
reluctant to take the risks of trying newer or different construction procurement 
approaches. So, this institutional factor leads to the establishment of a close-minded 
approach to procurement, which is based on familiarity rather than appropriateness – A 
‘habituation’ approach. Secondly, many “clients believe that they are not doing business 
to take on risks; instead, others should take this risk on behalf of them” (Managing 
Director and Principal Consultant in the Rail Industry, Nov 2015). This claim was also 
asserted by the ‘Head of Supply Chain’ of one of the largest tier-1 contractors in the 
UK. He stressed to the author that: “what you have got to recognise is that we as a 
business are very risk-averse to be honest as a business generally” (Head of Supply 
Chain, Nov 2015). Most of the participants criticised clients for pushing risks to their 
suppliers and explained the possible consequences of transferring risks. Interestingly, 
these implications are not just limited to the pricing of risks that the client eventually 
pays for; but more importantly about creating a confrontational working environment, 
which may encourage suppliers to exploit opportunities that may occur due to 
unforeseen conditions. 
 
Chapter 6: Institutional Factors Influencing Procurement 
 
Page | 211  
 
An interview with a business development manager has also allowed the study to gain 
more insights of how risk-aversity leads to inefficient construction procurement 
practices, and thus contributes to the generation and persistence of wasteful behaviours 
and outcomes. For example, the interviewee provided the author with the following 
narrative:  
“We often get customers who come to us and say: we've got the scheme, it has 
been designed and our advisers tell us that we should go Design and Build, 
because we transfer the risk that if our design is wrong you cannot come back to 
us and claim'. Hmm, the problem contactors have then is there is virtually no 
way of managing that risk. It's not our design, there are no means of checking 
the design in the tender period; we just have to say what are the chances of it 
being wrong and put a number against it. Hmm, similarly, we get customers who 
come to us and say: well, you know, other risks are transferred to you e.g. 
ground conditions or, and the problem is that if we don't have a means for 
managing that risk during the tender period, then the selling price, the value 
would be reflected in the selling price which in the current market will not be 
good value for the customer.” (Business Development Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
6.2.9 Self-interest drivers (IF9) 
 
This study identified ‘self-interest’ as one of the major institutional factors which 
contribute to the generation and persistence of wasteful procurement practices in 
construction. Self-interest here was found to be based on two different types of drivers 
or rewards: (1) Commercial incentives; or (2) Social legitimacy considerations or mere 
ceremony. Self-interest influences construction procurement approaches and drives 
opportunism. In other words, self-interest leads to a zero-sum game, as one organisation 
seeks to protects its interests from the opportunism of others whist continuing to exploit 
all opportunities themselves. Figure 6.3 illustrates the themes that emerged out of the 
data and led to the development of this sub-category. 
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Figure 6.3: Coding structure of ‘Self-interested drivers’  
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6.2.10 Uncertainty (IF10) 
 
This study found that ‘uncertainty’ can contribute to the deployment and persistence of 
inefficient procurement arrangements in construction. Uncertainty can be defined in its 
simplest form as what is known in comparison to what needs to be known. In this study, 
the term ‘uncertainty’ was divided into three distinct classifications: 
 Behavioural Uncertainty (and lack of trust) 
 Environmental transaction uncertainty 
 Budget and funding Uncertainty or Constraints 
 
 
‘Behavioural Uncertainty’ refers to the amount of trust between the buyers and their 
suppliers, and it influences the buyers’ safeguarding approach to construction 
procurement. As mentioned previously in section 4.2.9, conventional safeguarding 
practices can support opportunistic behaviours and contribute to consequential wastes. 
When the ‘Head of supply-chain’ of a leading tier-1 contractor in the UK was asked 
about why wasteful procurement practices persist, he simply asserted that “the problem 
of trust comes into it. But you should work closely with the supply-chain that you can 
trust in order to come to the right solution, where you both win”. Similarly, when the ‘’ 
of a major contractor in the UK was asked the same question, he said: 
 
“I would say that there is a trust issue there as well to be fair. You know and 
that goes all the way up and down the supply chain. If there were more trust, 
then may be people will be more honest about the real cost of things, and people 
would not select based on lowest cost; because the problem is that when 
procurement people put their processes in place for selection, they then drive 
behaviours. But, they do not necessarily understand the behaviours that they will 
create by the rules that they put in place” (Head of Innovation and Director of 
National Frameworks, Nov 2015). 
 
‘Environmental transaction uncertainty’ refers to unforeseen circumstances and the 
associated complexity surrounding the project context. This study argues that this type 
of uncertainty forces buyers to imitate or to stick to procurement practices that they 
have already tested in the past, even though they may not be ideal for specific project 
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characteristics and circumstances. It could also drive buyers to deploy inefficient 
safeguarding approaches to construction procurement. Examples of ‘environmental 
transaction uncertainty’ that faced one of the client representatives that this study 
interviewed include: 
“Well, in this particular project, it's really a technology overlay to an existing 
motorway. So, that technology is sort of being developed all the time. So, at the 
time of signing the contract, the client knew that he probably wanted to 
incorporate a system called 'Side Fire Radar' which monitors the volume of 
traffic flow by radar on the side of the road, instead of having loops in the road; 
so it removes maintenance risk in the future. But he wasn't able to confirm the 
design and the extent of scope of that system, so that was a strategic risk event 
which was subsequently confirmed and instructed in. And then another example 
is where on this project, because we are overlaying on an existing 
motorway...we get quite a lot of unknowns that we have to deal with…once we 
get onsite and we expose things or discover new things or things that are not in 
the place that we thought that they were going to be” (ECC Project Manager, 
Dec 2015). 
 
Budget and funding Uncertainty or Constraints could also influence buyers’ approaches 
to construction procurement. In this study, various participants argued that budget and 
funding uncertainty is one of the possible reasons of the traditional sequential process of 
construction projects (Design-Bid-Build). Also, a senior cost consultant claimed that 
“many clients are reluctant to allow early involvement of contractors at the outset of 
projects, due to their uncertainty about proceeding with the project and front-end cash 
flow considerations” (Senior Cost Consultant (MRICS), Dec 2015). These claims have 
also been supported and described by a senior project manager as follows: 
“When you're a client funding some money to the project, and you’re not being 
sure really that you can realise that kind of project…at the beginning you just 
have an idea about the total cost of the project. Then, you allocate let's say a 
project management company and a design team. And they are running through 
the stages. And each and every project phase ends with a cost estimate. It 
becomes much more detailed when it comes to the construction phase; but at the 
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beginning most of the clients are not even sure that they will execute that 
project. And that makes them reluctant to think of introducing contracting 
companies already in the design stage; because they think 'why should I do that 
and spend money on them, because they [the contractors] don’t do it for free” 
(Certified Senior Project Manager (PMP, MRICS), Nov 2015). 
 
From the comments above, it appears that buyers need to gain a better understanding of 
the implications of their construction procurement decisions on project performance and 
outcomes. So, if they don’t invest enough time, money and effort during upfront of 
projects (e.g. invest in design and proper site investigations), in order to assess risks and 
reduce assumptions and uncertainties, then it is very likely that they will end up losing 
much more money than what they saved during early project stages and vice versa. This 
argument was emphasised by a business development manager who provide the 
following advice to construction buyers in general: 
“If you don't spend enough upfront you're not going to get cost certainty, and the 
chances are that your objection cost is going to be higher than if you would 
spend the money upfront” (Business Development Manager, Nov 2015).  
 
 
6.2.11’Vested interests' of professional roles and firms not directly involved in 
production (IF11) 
 
This study found that a number of professional roles and firms could have a vested 
interest in the wide-spread use of some inefficient construction procurement 
arrangements and options. These professional roles and firms as identified by the study, 
include: 
 Accountants and Financial Directors 
 Architects and Engineering Firms 
 Claims Managers 
 Clerk of works 
 Concept Architects 
 Cost consultants (QSs) 
 Insurance companies 
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 Investment Banks 
 Lawyers 
 Procurement advisers and consultants 
 Quantity Surveyors 
 Tier 1 Contractors 
 Turn-around project managers 
 
For example, various participants of this study argued that architects and quantity 
surveyors (QSs) have a vested interest in the use of traditional procurement 
arrangements (e.g. D-B-B with bills of quantities) as opposed to integrated procurement 
approaches; that is because the traditional approach allows them to maximise their 
positions within the project and thus maximise their fees as well. In particular, many 
participants of this study criticised quantity surveyors’ (QSs) mind-sets, attitudes and 
influence on approaches to construction procurement. In an interview with a senior 
consultant and a fellow member of the institution of civil engineers (FICE) in the UK, 
he stated: 
“I have been in situations where I have been operating alongside quantity 
surveying teams and also lawyers. And I would say that where I have been 
working with someone with a heavy quantity surveying background, they would 
advise a route which needed a lot of quantity surveying project management 
attention, because they would want to provide it…I think it's the professional 
services firms, the engineering and the quantity surveying side, that possibly 
need the closest attention to see that they are simply not maximising their own 
position” (Senior Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015) 
 
This argument was supported by a business development manager, working for a main 
civil engineering contractor, as follows: 
“Yeah we certainly do see certain project management-quantity surveying 
(PQS) companies take a very building development approach to civil projects, 
and break the project into small packages…because obviously PQSs managing 
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those inter-phases they get paid for that…so that can maximise their fees” . 
(Business Development Manager, Dec 2015). 
 
Similarly, the ‘Head of innovation’ of a major contractor condemned the role that 
quantity surveying project management firms play in advising clients to adopt risk-
transferring approaches to construction procurement. According to him: 
“Yeah, absolutely, I think that is part of the problem, because quiet often the 
large professional practices; you know the QS/project management practices 
they advise large number of clients on the procurement choices that are 
available to them. And, you know, it was an interesting transition over the last 
couple of years, where during recession the clients were beginning to behave 
more poorly because they knew they could drive the supply chain harder”. 
 
Other participants argued that quantity surveyors have a vested interest in the use of 
overly stringent contract conditions, and criticised them for using and administering 
contracts in such a bureaucratic way.  Interestingly, when an experienced turnaround 
project manager was asked about his suggestions for overcoming problems resulting 
from wasteful procurement practices, he stated in a frustrated manner: 
“It isn’t knowledge of the law which is the important thing; it is actually being a 
lawyer with the ability to out-argue QS’s who are being too greedy!” 
(Experienced turn-around project manager, Oct 2015) 
 
In addition, many clients “rely on external lawyers to vet or even develop their 
contracts” (Associate Director, financial governance services, 2016). And, obviously, 
some lawyers might “have a vested interest in developing contracts with complex 
language and clauses, so they can maximise their roles” (Managing Director and 
Principal Consultant in the Rail Industry, Nov 2015). However, it is fair to argue that 
these professional consultants (i.e. lawyers and QSs) are subject to commercial pressure 
and forced to comply with buyers’ (flawed) assumptions and risk-averse appetite. 
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In a discussion with a senior consultant about the most common wasteful procurement 
practices that he experienced in his career, he referred to the huge amounts of 
unnecessary and non-value reports often required by clients with the intension of 
measuring contract performance of their suppliers (See section 4.2.5 for more details 
about the consequences of these procurement practices). He then explained how 
accountants and financial managers have a vested interest in the use of these 
procurement practices, as follows: 
“I remember having an argument with a Finance Director [The participant 
laughs] and this was years ago. And he was collecting all this financial 
information of this project. And I told him well that's loads of rubbish. They 
won't tell you anything. And he would argue with me for ages and say: ‘well it 
tells me what I need to know’. But it just tells you what happened three or six 
months ago. It does not tell you how to manage your project any better. It's not 
of any use in explaining how you can make more money or become more 
efficient or deliver a better project. He just would not have it, but that's because 
he is a finance person. And finance people like to talk about money. The same 
like a procurement person would like to talk about procurement” (Senior 
Consultant (PhD), Nov 2015). 
 
Overall, an important observation is that none of the professionals or firms listed above 
as having a vested interest in the wide-spread use of prevailing wasteful procurement 
practices is directly involved in production. This suggests that there might be a crucial 
need for a deeper examination of the roles and responsibilities of the professions and 
wider participants involved within the construction procurement context. 
 
6.2.12 Voluntary diffusion of (imperfect) norms 
 
This study found that inefficient procurement practices can exist and persist in the 
construction industry, due to voluntary diffusion of imperfect norms. This diffusion 
could occur via: 
 British Educational System 
 Industry Reports 
 Professional Institutions and Trade Associations 
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In an interview with a very experienced turn-around project manager, he explained to 
the author how that the British construction culture and educational system leads to 
conflicts with professionals' pre-assumptions. According to him, there seems to be a 
crucial need for an increased focus on incorporating interdisciplinary, integrated and 
inclusive courses and principles into the built environment programmes of study. 
Similarly, it has been argued that industry reports play a major role in influencing 
construction procurement strategies and practices. In some instances, there could be an 
element of politics involved. In other instances, there could be misleading 
interpretations of how to achieve the required efficiency improvements. It could also be 
attributed to simply offering inappropriate solutions to problems or overly optimistic 
expectations. However, in all cases, it appears that “procurement practices often mirror 
institutional factors”. An example of how industry reports (as an intuitional force) can 
shape construction models and procurement practices was identified during the data 
collection process of this study, in the following narrative: 
“…The (UK) Government began to be concerned about efficiency and a report 
called the ‘Gershon Review’ was published. This pushed for central and local 
government authorities to become more efficient and set efficiency targets – 
improving efficiency by 2% per annum was a common one…The (UK) Highways 
Agency was held up as an exemplar of…improved efficiency in roads 
management and maintenance. So Local Authorities were then encouraged by 
Central Government to look at this model. The now limited numbers of 
contractors were pleased to extol the virtues of the Highways Agency’s model to 
a local government market which they could also see turning into a market with 
a limited number of players able to deliver large, integrated service contracts. 
Local authorities often asked the market (contractors) what scale of efficiencies 
could be delivered if they were to let a single large integrated manage and 
maintain contract. The contractors usually came back with the same reply, 
“20%”. There was never any real evidence for this. Twenty per cent seemed to 
be a figure all the authorities would like to achieve and the major contractors 
were happy to tell them they could achieve it. So the whole industry created a 
belief that an integrated service contracts delivered by one (Tier 1) contractor 
with a chain of (Tier 2) suppliers was the most efficient form of delivery..." 
(Senior Consultant (FICE), January 17, 2016, E-mail message). 
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Another example was identified during the Lean Construction Institute in the UK (LCI-
UK) Summit in 2015 (Bew, 2015). During this summit, Mark Bew, the Head of the UK 
Government Task Group for BIM delivered a keynote on the synergies between Lean 
and BIM. Interestingly, the delivery and introduction slides of the presentation (see 
Figure 6.4 below) revealed the Government’s main driver for using BIM and Lean. 
Their ultimate focus and view of the benefits of lean and BIM (as shown in Figure 6.4) 
is money – ‘a transactional mind-set’, with little or no reference at all given to other 
important goals and attainable benefits such as: production effectiveness, quality, 
whole-life-cycle costs, sustainability, collaboration, optimisation of supply-chain 
efficiency, improved transparency, health and safety and social and ethical values for all 
parties concerned. 
 
Furthermore, this study also found that professional institutions and trade organisations 
can influence the mind-sets and practices of many of the professionals involved within 
the construction procurement context. These members are requested to conform to the 
norms, job duties and responsibilities diffused by their relevant professional bodies. 
Also, some of the views of these professional institutions could be influenced by other 
institutional factors such as bargaining power, politics and vested interests. When a 
senior consultant was asked about whether he believes that construction industry bodies, 
professional institutions and trade associations have an influence on the use of some 
procurement routes and contracts; he asserted the following: 
“I think they do. I think they listen to their Governments. I have seen things 
sorted down - They need to procure a practice or a general procurement 
strategy…Hmm, sometimes to good effect and sometimes to a bad affect as well; 
because again the industry can be interested in maximising its position. Hmm, 
you'll find many of the major (industry) players on many of the boards. And you 
can find the major players' view is taken on board, because that's the view that 
suits them - it maintains a competitive position. So, I have been in a position 
before as a consultant where actually I thought the model needs breaking; 
because all it's doing in some cases is 'preserving the position of the major 
contractors' and not necessarily giving the best value to the client” (Senior 
Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015). 
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Figure 6.4: Snapshot of keynote 1 (Lean & BIM) presentation at the LCI-UK summit 2015 (Bew, 2015) 
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6.3 Summary 
This chapter identified and analysed various institutional factors that emerged out of the 
empirical data collected in this study. The findings revealed that these prevailing 
institutions lead to inefficient construction procurement arrangements, which lead to 
inefficient behaviours and performances, which in turn lead to consequential wastes (i.e. 
financial losses or cost overruns, time wastes, quality/value losses, and/or waste of 
human potentials). Having illustrated the analytical processes (presented in Chapters 4, 
5 and 6) that led to the development of the study’s conceptual model of ‘institutional 
waste within the UK construction industry’, the next chapter, consequently, presents the 
details and results of an evaluation exercise that was conducted with various UK 
industry experts, in order to critically assess the quality and rigour of the developed 
conceptual model and main findings of the study.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCEPTUAL MODEL EVALUATION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous data-analysis chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) illustrated the analytical processes 
that led to the development of a conceptual model of ‘institutional waste in construction’, 
which is grounded in empirical data collected from the field. This chapter presents the details 
and discusses the results of an evaluation exercise that was conducted with a number of 
academic and industry experts to assess and receive feedback on the rigour and quality (i.e. 
credibility, originality, resonance, and usefulness) of the developed conceptual model (Figure 
4.1, page 143). The definition of each of these quality criteria has been previously provided in 
Chapter 3. 
 
7.2 Method of Evaluation 
The evaluation exercise took place on two stages. The first stage comprised of a 
pilot/preliminary unstructured interview with Professor Glenn Ballard who specialises in lean 
construction and project-production-systems. The aims of this interview were to receive 
detailed feedback on the quality of the conceptual model (Figure 4.1), and to make necessary 
corrections before sending the ‘evaluation’ invitations out to a sample of industry experts. 
Piloting, in general, is good research practice and is part of the research Plan-Do-Check-Act 
process (Lancaster et al., 2004). This pilot interview lasted for around two hours and it took 
place at Nottingham Trent University. During the meeting, the author delivered a presentation 
to the participant about the aim, objectives, methodology and main findings of the PhD study. 
The participant was also provided with printouts of main Nvivo outputs and diagrams, to 
clarify how the author reached the study’s findings and conclusions. This meeting enabled the 
author to make some minor but valuable corrections to the study. Following this, a 15 minute 
recorded call was conducted on the following day to confirm the corrections made. An 
example of suggestions for correction included: 
“You mentioned clients’ habits of risk aversion…but it’s any buyer in the industry. I 
mean general contractors buy the services of sub-contractors. So they’re also in turn 
buying; hence having multiple-tiers in the supply system. The behaviours you are 
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talking about are broadly distributed in the industry” (Professor Glenn Ballard, Feb 
2017, Phone interview). 
 
In addition, when the participant was asked about whether he agrees or not with the study’s 
link between the concepts of ‘institutions’ and ‘waste in construction’, he stated the 
following: 
“Yes, emphatically...I think you may want to refer to the work of Thomas Kuhn. He 
published work in the 60s and 70s. Mostly on history and philosophy of science, but 
he really made visible this idea of paradigms, so this would be something worth 
taking advantage of” (Professor Glenn Ballard, Feb 2017, Phone call interview).  
 
The author referred to the work of Thomas Kuhn as recommended above. A reflection on the 
relationship between Thomas Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigms’ and the concept of ‘institutional 
waste’ that has been developed in this study is provided in the next Chapter (section 8.7).  
 
Consequently, the second stage of the evaluation exercise consisted of structured ‘open-ended 
qualitative’ questionnaires with five experts in the field (four industry professionals and one 
senior researcher with industry experience). Each of these participants was provided with: 
 An invitation sheet that outlined the purpose and included details of the evaluation 
exercise (See Appendix 4) 
 A copy of the PhD presentation used in the pilot interview described above 
 A copy of supplementary material and documents, which supported the development of 
the conceptual model. 
 
The evaluation exercise consisted of five main open-ended qualitative questions, where the 
respondents were asked to provide the author with their written ‘feedback and evaluation’ 
within two weeks of time. Written communication was chosen over face-to face 
communication, to allow the participants to have sufficient time and space to evaluate the 
findings of the study appropriately, without being influenced or intruded by the interviewer’s 
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physical presence. As mentioned previously, altogether, five experts participated in the 
conceptual-model evaluation process. They were all purposively targeted based on their 
expertise, strategic view, and broad experience in construction and civil engineering 
management. More information about their positions, years of experience and professional 
and academic qualifications is provided in Table 7.1 below. 
 
Table 7.1 Characteristics of sample used for conceptual-model evaluation 
Position 
Years of 
experience 
Qualification 
Senior Consultant  30+ BSc (Hons), FICE CEng 
Project / Contracts Manager 30+  PhD, MICE CEng, MCIHT 
Senior Researcher 20+ PhD, MPhil 
Site Manager (subcontractor) & Lean Specialist 20+ BSc (Hons), MPhil 
Construction Manager 12 -15 BSc, MSc 
 
7.3 Analysis and Discussion of Conceptual-Model Feedback 
Feedback received from the five targeted experts who contributed to the evaluation phase of 
this study is analysed and discussed here under four main sub-sections: (1) Relevance and 
usefulness of the model; (2) Credibility; (3) Resonance; (4) and Explanatory sufficiency. 
Participants were also asked to provide suggestions for improving the developed conceptual 
model, future research directions, and potential practical implications; however these 
suggestions will be discussed as recommendations in the final concluding chapter. The 
analysis and discussion of this chapter will be enriched with cross-reference to direct quotes 
from the feedback obtained, whenever possible.  
 
7.3.1 Relevance and usefulness of the developed conceptual-model 
All participants agreed upon the ‘relevance’ and ‘usefulness’ of the conceptual model. 
Interestingly, participants viewed the ‘usefulness’ of the developed model from various 
different angles. For example, the senior consultant argued that looking at the sources of 
waste at an ‘institutional level’ is more efficient than trying to solve waste-related problems 
at a ‘task-level’. He stated the following: 
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“I think it is exceptionally relevant and useful. Exploring the factors that influence 
waste at an institutional level looks at the industrial and social contexts that lead to 
waste as opposed to trying to ‘fix waste’ at a task level. The industrial and social 
contexts in which projects are conceived, promoted, procured and delivered has a 
far greater bearing on efficiency outcomes than task efficiency itself – which is after 
all only acted out in whatever context construct has prevailed” (Senior Consultant 
and Fellow Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 26
th
 March 2017). 
 
The site manager (lean specialist) acknowledged the study’s originality and contribution to 
knowledge by exploring ‘hidden sources and sorts of waste’, as opposed to looking at 
physical wastes. Furthermore, the participant seemed enthusiastic about the study’s novel 
explanations as to why many wasteful practices and behaviours persist in construction 
projects. According to him: 
“This is a really relevant and interesting study / findings to help the AEC sector 
understand the impact of (process) waste on project delivery. In my experience when 
people say “eliminating waste” they are primarily talking about physical wastes and 
not the waste that is hidden in processes and historical cost models that new projects 
are baselined against. I have personally (on site and managing projects) 
experienced many of the factors identified through this research. Projects go round 
and round in circles just like the model, because of past experiences of AEC 
stakeholders and their instance to safeguard against what has happened before” 
(Site Manager and Lean Specialist, 10
th
 April 2017). 
 
The project/contract manager, who holds a doctoral degree, considered the topic of this study 
to be very useful. He also argued that “little research [has been] undertaken in this sphere to 
date”. Similarly, the senior researcher emphasised the usefulness and relevance of this study 
by arguing that:  
“The elimination of waste should be the primary aim of construction management 
research. Currently, the development of efficioent management techniques is far in 
advance of their implementation. Therefore, the study of institutional barriers to 
implementation is vital and timely” (Senior Researcher, 9th March 2017) 
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The comment above clearly indicates the relevance of the findings of this study to the 
construction industry. It also reveals the usefulness of the developed conceptual model, as it 
can be applied to a wide variety of fields and topics, in order to investigate the ‘institutional 
barriers’ to the implementation of any innovative management techniques that require 
trustful collaboration between different project parties (e.g. Building information 
management and integrated project delivery approaches).  
 
In addition, the construction manager provided an interesting distinction between what he 
classified as ‘production’ waste’ and ‘institutional waste’. In other words, he differentiated 
between what he classified as our ‘relatively normal’ understanding of waste resulting from 
inefficient production processes, as opposed to the ‘wider and improved’ understanding of 
waste in construction resulting from imperfect institutional and procurement processes (as 
sources of waste) and their impacts on production. He described this as follows: 
“I consider the topic to be very relevant and useful. Clearly the industry has not made 
any significant advances since the Egan/Latham reports; this is despite more research 
and knowledge in this area. The normal focus on waste is largely attributed to material 
or production waste as opposed to governance and institutional waste. I believe this is a 
key consideration. (Construction Manager, 13
th
 June 2017). 
 
7.3.2 Credibility of the developed conceptual model 
All participants of this evaluation exercise agreed up on the credibility of the main findings of 
this study; however each of them different justifications. For example, the site manager / lean 
specialist focussed on how some professionals have a vested interest in the wide-spread use 
of some imperfect procurement practices. This was mentioned as follows: 
“In short, I agree 100%. As I read through the parent nodes and the child nodes, I 
was nodding my head in agreement. Based on my 21 years AEC sector experience 
and more recently (7 years) with lean project delivery, the findings of the study make 
a lot of sense to me and would be most valuable to clients and owners who are 
already on their lean journey. I suspect there may be a lot of resistance to the findings 
from those not familiar with lean philosophy and those who make their living out of 
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the waste inherent in the AEC sector” (Site Manager and Lean Specialist, 10th April 
2017). 
 
 
The comment above supports the study’s arguments that many imperfect mind-sets, 
behaviours and practices that exist in construction have become ‘institutionalised’, to an 
extent that existing beliefs, values and professional roles have become unopen for 
questioning. Similarly, the project/contracts manager criticised the increasing role and 
influence of QSs, lawyers and procurement consultants in construction projects, and argued 
that this has led to the prevalence and entrenchment of imperfect cost-driven mind-sets and 
business models in construction. His comment on the credibility of the main findings and 
conclusions of the study was as follows: 
“I can't fault any of the research findings, particularly the existence of cost focus 
almost to the exclusion of any other factors. This is driven by the increasingly 
commercial mind set in procurement, influenced by QSs, i.e. get the cheapest price 
and pay the consequences as a project unfolds. The issue of clients’ input is 
important, particularly where we see collaborative type contracts like the NEC 3 
continually ‘Z-claused’ to become less collaborative and more adversarial. The point 
on the increasing influence of external consultants and lawyers is also pertinent.  The 
point of understanding value is relevant, a lot of issues result from a lack of 
understanding of the value proposition by clients and contractors. You mention 
procurement experts, yet I’d question how much expertise many of these have, as far 
as I’m aware there is little formalised training or accreditation in [construction] 
procurement” (Project / Contracts Manager, 20th March 2017) 
 
In the comment above, the project/contracts manager questioned, according to his knowledge, 
whether there are formalised professional training or qualifications to procurement 
consultants in construction. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the Chartered Institution 
of Procurement and Supply (CIPS) offers training and accreditation to its qualified members. 
However, the findings of this study demonstrate that construction procurement should not be 
treated as a commodity. There is no doubt that procurement of materials or ready-made 
products is very different to procuring a construction project where the buyer and suppliers 
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have to cooperate to deliver the final product. Therefore, the trainings and courses provided 
by CIPS may not be relevant to construction professionals.  In construction it is more about 
‘doing the work’ rather than ‘doing the deal’. Furthermore, it has been argued by Pasquire et 
al. (2015) that much of the accepted procurement theory and practice taught in construction 
courses at Universities and recommended by relevant professional institutions (e.g. Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors) is underpinned by imperfect prescriptions offered by 
TCE, which are not ideal for construction (Koskela and Ballard, 2006 and 2012; Koskela and 
Tommelein, 2009) 
 
The senior consultant strongly agreed upon all the relationships that exist within the four 
main categories of the developed framework. Interestingly, he did also provide some 
fascinating explanations as to how consequential wastes can reinforce imperfect institutions. 
According to him: 
“I believe that imperfect institutional factors will lead to inefficient procurement 
practices, which will lead to inefficient performance and behaviours, which will lead 
to consequential waste. The impact of consequential waste on imperfect institutional 
factors may need some explaining. In one sense we might hope that consequential 
waste will feedback to the institution in a way that the institution may learn – this 
depends on the capacity of the institution to learn though. An imperfect institution 
may be one that doesn’t learn very well, having a low absorptive capacity. In 
another sense, consequential waste may impact on the institution in a way that is 
detrimental to its financial performance, which in itself could generate imperfect 
institutional behaviours. Perhaps another view to add to this is to pity the poor 
institution. Can it ever be perfect? And is what is perfect for one point in time is less 
perfect in another, particularly when we consider societal and macro-economic 
contexts of industrial relations referenced in particular by Godard (2011) and 
Ackers (2014)”(Senior Consultant and Fellow Member of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers, 26
th
 March 2017). 
 
The comment above supports this study’s findings and provides three possible explanations 
as to how consequential wastes may influence institutions. Firstly, that learning from 
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complex projects, especially construction projects, is usually difficult (See Williams et al., 
2005). This situation is worse in construction, as many construction clients either lack 
experience or in-house expertise; and thus they often rely on external consultants to help 
them with the decision-making process. These consultants might have a vested interest in the 
use of specific imperfect procurement and contractual arrangements, because they are more 
familiar with them or because those arrangements maximise their roles and positions in 
projects. In addition, most of these consultants, if not all, usually lack production expertise, 
and thus they drive projects through an imperfect transactional mind-set and arms-length 
approach to project delivery. Secondly, poor project outcomes and past performances of 
suppliers may re-inforce imperfect institutional factors (e.g. self-interest and risk-aversity) 
and thus encourage clients to adopt inefficient safeguarding practices, which in-turn lead to 
vicious cycles of wasteful behaviours and practices. Thirdly, it could be argued that 
‘institutions’ are imperfect either due to increasing and changing societal demands and values 
over time (Godard; 2011; and Ackers, 2014) or due to the fact that formal rules within are 
often created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create those rules 
(See North. 1994; and Sarhan et al., 2016) and thus they might not be created to the benefit of 
the ‘all’. 
 
7.3.3 Resonance of the developed conceptual-model 
The evaluation exercise questioned the ‘resonance’ of the findings in two different ways. 
Firstly, this was achieved by asking the respondents to provide an ‘overall assessment’ of the 
logic and relevance of the four main categories of the developed conceptual framework 
(Table 7.2). Then, participants were asked to provide ‘specific and detailed’ feedback on each 
of the four evolved categories and its associated relationships (see Tables 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 
7.6 below). 
Table 7.2: Participant’s evaluation up on the resonance of the overall findings 
Are the relationships between the four main categories of the developed conceptual model 
logical, relevant to the construction industry, and reflective of the situation in real practice? 
Senior Consultant Yes. 
Project/Contracts Manager Yes. 
Senior Researcher Yes. 
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Site Manager/Lean consultant 
Yes, very much so. At first when I looked at it I thought where does 
this start? Then I realised that it is a vicious circle we are in and it 
will keep going around and around unless the institutional factors 
are addressed. It is a good title for the study. 
Construction Manager 
The relationships of the 4 main categories are broadly ok. I do 
however believe that there are many factors which could be rolled 
up, for example, quite a few of the (IF) factors come down to 
commercial views, cost saving, price based mind set etc etc. It 
should be noted that the reason businesses exist is to make a profit, 
there will always be an element of this in any organisation. Relaxing 
this may lead to a high increases in initial costs which might or 
might not offset against any efficiencies 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 7.2 above, all participants agreed with the overall logic and relevance 
of the four main categories of the developed conceptual model. It can also be noted that the 
construction manager claimed that the reason businesses exist is to make profit. So, he raised 
concerns that if organisations followed the study’s criticisms to the imperfect transactional 
approach to construction procurement, then this may lead to high increases in initial costs of 
projects, without a guarantee that these expenses will be offset by the savings that may be 
made due to efficiency improvements.  
 
There are a few responses to the construction manager’s concern mentioned above. Firstly, 
there is no doubt that the underlying assumption of most economic theories, if not all, is that 
firms exist to make money (see for example Coase, 1937), which implies that construction 
companies must make profit to survive. However, it also makes sense to argue that in order to 
sustain this profit, we must also add value. In other words, it could be stressed that “making 
money is a consequence of adding value to external clients and our shared society” 
(Kaufman and Guerra-López, 2013, p. 20). Whist many organisations disdain it, assume it, or 
ignore it, any organisation that hopes to thrive must add value to all of its stakeholders, 
including the wider shared society (Moore et al., 2011).  There is more to business than just 
making money; having a reason and purpose for operating, enables thriving organisations to 
sustain their journey when market conditions, cash flow and customers appear low. This, 
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therefore, brings us to debates on whether we need to stop our obsession with maximising 
profit and start maximising value. The real concern is not whether companies should exist to 
make money or not; but it’s how to make profit in an ethical, value-adding, and socially-
responsible way. For these reasons, there have been substantial industry calls that try to guide 
construction companies and clients towards recognising the importance of corporate social 
responsibility (CRS) issues (see for example, Jones et al., 2006; Muuray and Dainty, 2009; 
Huang and Lien, 2012; CIOB, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, it is important to understand that (construction) projects need to be profitable 
for all. Construction procurement are commercial arrangements need to be created in ways 
which create win-win scenarios between buyers and suppliers. Secondly, buyers shouldn’t 
focus only on minimising initial costs (ex-ante transaction costs), as opposed to overall costs 
(transaction plus production costs). Thirdly and finally, the construction manager himself 
seemed to have correctly answered himself by stating in other parts of his evaluation 
feedback that: 
“The conclusion suggests that clients are reluctant to invest during the pre-construction 
phase, I would agree with this and there is evidence to show that costs at this stage are 
low whilst value is high (through collaboration, ECI and value engineering). I would 
however question why this is the case…” (Construction Manager, 13th June 2017). 
 
 
Participants were then asked to provide feedback on specific components of the developed 
conceptual framework. As appears in Table 7.3, all participants strongly agreed with the 
study’s conceptualisation that institutional factors influence construction procurement 
decisions and arrangements. Interestingly, the comments provided by two of the participants 
(the senior consultant and the site manager) align with the study’s findings that construction 
business and procurement models are path dependent (e.g. use of ‘historical clauses’) and 
influenced by the institutional context. 
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Table 7.3: participants’ opinion on the influence of institutions on procurement practices 
To what extent do you agree that institutional factors influence construction procurement 
choices and practices? 
Senior Consultant 
Broadly agree with the factors illustrated. I think it is also 
worth bearing in mind that organizations will have a history 
that becomes part of the stories substantiating the reasons for 
the way they do things; major accidents on the railway perhaps, 
damning cost reviews by central government, sector client 
expectation norms. All of these things create an organizational 
story for the way things are. They become part of the semantic 
symbolism of organizational culture (Janicijevic, 2011).  
Project / Contracts Manager 
To a large extent, construction procurement is driven by 
organisational values and behaviour  
Senior Researcher Of course. 
Site Manager / lean consultant 
Greatly. Clauses are inserted in contracts (in my experience and 
opinion) to “prevent” similar issues happening again in the 
future even though it is not the same individuals in question. The 
AEC sector is plagued by a culture of claims and manipulating 
contracts to maximise claims. Contractors (not all) usually look 
for every angle to ensure they make a profit and their behaviours 
reflect this. On the other hand, I think that many owners do not 
appreciate that contractors need to make a profit to survive.  
Construction Manager 
I believe that the IFs play a huge role in influencing 
procurement choices and factors.  
 
 
Participants were also asked about their opinion on whether imperfect construction 
procurement and contractual arrangements could support and/or encourage wasteful 
activities. As shown in Table 7.4 below, there is a common agreement that contracts and 
procurement systems can drive certain behaviours. However, it is worth noting that this also 
depends on how people decide to use and exercise contracts. As argued by this study, it is 
important for construction clients and buyers to move away from deploying construction 
procurement systems based on risk-allocation and mitigation considerations; and instead 
consider the impact of their devised construction procurement arrangements on process flow. 
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Table 7.4: Participants’ opinion on the impact of construction procurement arrangements on 
project-team performance and behaviour 
To what extent do you agree that construction procurement and contractual arrangements can 
impact on the performance and behaviour of project team parties? 
Senior Consultant 
In the first instance there is the choice of strategic procurement 
route, say; ‘traditional’ (construction separated from design), 
design and build, or Design, Build, Finance and Operate 
(PFI/PPP). Each route places different obligations and 
expectations of performance for different elements of the asset 
creation process with different actors. Actors will respond 
accordingly according to; a) their knowledge of where those 
obligations and expectations lie; b) their assumptions in relation to 
those obligations and expectations; c) their responses in relation to 
how those obligations and expectations are either met or 
unfulfilled. 
Project/Contracts Manager 
Contractual arrangements such as heavily Z-claused NEC contracts, 
JCT and ICE conditions of contract play a big part on the 
performance and behaviour. When the NEC was introduced initially 
in the 1990’s, I witnessed collaborative behaviour which impacted 
positively on all aspects of procurement, including sub contract 
procurement and behaviours between these parties. Many clients are 
now attempting to shift power back in their favour by amending 
contracts. This shows a lack of understanding of value, with a result 
that win-win scenario is migrating to lose-lose for all parties 
Senior Researcher 100% 
Site Manager/Lean consultant 
Greatly. Contractual terms dictate behaviours and with silo terms 
focused on maximising each parties’ interests who can blame the 
delivery partners for using every trick in the book to make sure they 
make profit and survive. That is only human nature. I do not use the 
term “subcontractor”. This infers that they are below the main 
contractor and language matters. It sets the tone. Therefore, 
contractual language matters in a big way. 
Construction Manager 
There is no question that the procurement and contractual 
arrangements play a part in the performance of the project team 
parties. The operations team always have to deal with the mess 
which often created at contract award stage, this is usually 
because the supply chain has been driven down so much on cost 
that they have no incentive to collaborate, they are looking to boost 
their profit through changes and disputes. 
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Furthermore, participants were asked to evaluate the study’s finding that consequential 
wastes exert pressure upon and thus re-inforce imperfect institutional factors. In particular, 
participants were asked about whether they agree or not with the study’s argument that 
project failures and poor project-performances influence institutions, in particular 
construction buyers’ imperfect paradigms and approaches to procurement. As shown in Table 
7.5 below, all participants agreed with the study’s arguments and findings. However, 
different explanations or interpretations were provided (all these are already considered by 
the study). Interestingly, the senior researcher suspected that this phenomenon is historically 
variable, depending on the balance between the vicious cycles of institutionalised waste and 
the measures taken to fix and de-institutionalise them. The author doesn’t necessarily 
disagree with this argument; however it makes sense to suggest that conditions will 
progressively deteriorate, as long as the scope and magnitude of wasteful reinforcing loops 
remains greater than improvement efforts.  
Table 7.5: Participants’ opinion upon the impact of project failures or poor experiences on 
reinforcing imperfect institutions and paradigms 
To what extent do you agree that client time and cost overruns of construction projects 
reinforce imperfect institutional factors (e.g. clients' flawed assumptions and errors during 
pre-contractual stages)? 
Senior Consultant 
The client can be a ‘learning organization’ and respond 
positively. Or the client can react defensively and negatively on 
the basis of personal or organizational self-interest. Or the time 
and cost overruns can present resource constraints that limit 
ideal response modes.  
Project / Contracts Manager 
To a large extent. As you mentioned parties treat the symptoms 
rather than the root causes, result in bunkered blame game mind 
sets  
Senior Researcher 
This certainly occurs.  I suspect that it is historically variable – 
as the consequences of reinforcement loops increase, measures 
are taken to ameliorate them. 
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Site Manager / lean consultant 
Projects are almost set up expecting cost overruns. One of the 
projects I am supporting now was originally tendered at 2 
million. Re-tendered at 2.5 million after some changes and 20% 
contingency is likely to be allowed on top of this to deal with 
unforeseen conditions. The procurement/negotiations of this 
contract have cost (wasted) a lot of money to “protect” the client 
against risk when all it really boils down to is not trusting the 
contractor and declaring a budget from the outset. Playing one 
contractor off another to secure the lowest price and “best 
value…” 
Construction Manager 
Clearly there is a reason why a large number of projects run 
late and over budget. It is not possible to single out any project 
or factor but it would be a reasonable suggestion that the 
institutional factors play a part.  
 
Finally, participants were asked again about their agreement with the study’s novel 
explanations as to why prevailing imperfect construction business and procurement models 
remain to be so coherent. As shown in Table 7.6 below, all participants (who understood the 
question) agreed up on the study’s novel hypothesis and explanation. Only, the construction 
manager was not able to comment on this question, because he could not fully understand the 
question; however his response in Table 7.5 clearly resonates with the study’s explanations.  
The senior researcher suggested that further research is required to test this novel hypothesis.  
 
Overall, most respondents stated, based on their extensive industry experience, that the 
construction industry is generally renowned for its blame culture (Egan, 1998) and fire-
fighting mentality to problem solving (Bølviken and Koskela, 2016). This assertion aligns 
with many research studies that claimed that the construction industry is often regarded as 
confrontational, risk averse, and lacking trust and capacity for innovation and improvement 
(See for example, Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Rooke et al., 2004; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; 
Eriksson et al., 2008; Sarhan and Fox, 2013). As stressed by Kululanga et al. (1999), the 
construction industry is characterised by a lack of a learning curve, where existing values and 
beliefs are not open for questioning; and this constitutes a general barrier to change, 
improvement and innovation. 
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Table 7.6: Participants’ opinion upon reasons for the coherence of prevailing imperfect 
construction models 
To what extent do you agree with the loop leading to the coherence of the prevailing 
imperfect construction business and project delivery model?   
Senior Consultant 
I’d largely agree with it on the basis that the response to 
manifest waste is often institutionalized by the personal agendas 
of actors within it attempting to preserve or promote their own 
careers. I believe institutional tolerance of personal failure in 
the construction industry tends to be low rather than learning. 
So, the response tends to be to apportion blame, dispense with 
the opportunity to learn from accumulated experience, 
introduce a ‘hero’ with a new approach – repeat.  
Project / Contracts Manager 
To a large extent. Rather than assessing reasons for failure and 
implementing improvements, parties are caught in tribal blame  
Senior Researcher 
This is a difficult question which the study cannot fully answer.  
Generally speaking, practices continue without change simply 
because 'that is the way that it's done'; this is a powerful 
conservative force that should never be underestimated. In 
addition, while inappropriate institutional arrangements are 
reinforced by their own consequences (e.g. attempting to 
control outcome costs through excessive use of competitive 
price tendering, leading to claims planning) they are also 
reinforced by contingent events (e.g. the discovery of 
unexpected ground conditions leading to attempts to transfer 
risk).To adequately answer this question would require a 
participant action research approach in which detailed study 
could be made of chains of consequence in actual real-time 
cases and solutions devised and tested. 
Site Manager / lean consultant Vicious cycle of safeguarding. 
Construction Manager I am not sure that I understand this question fully. 
 
7.3.4 Explanatory sufficiency of the developed conceptual model 
The evaluation exercise included two questions to assess the ‘explanatory sufficiency’ of the 
developed conceptual model. In the first question (Table 7.7), the participants were asked 
whether the category of ‘imperfect institutional factors’ provides sufficient explanations to 
explain why inefficient construction procurement practices persist. In another question (Table 
7.8), the participants were asked about whether they agree or not with the examples/instances 
Chapter 7: Conceptual Model Evaluation 
 
Page | 238  
 
(sub-categories and sub-sub categories) identified within the emergent theme of ‘clients' 
flawed assumptions and/or errors during pre-contractual stage’. 
 
As shown in Table 7.7 below, all participants were satisfied with the conceptual model’s 
explanatory power and sufficiency. The senior consultant, however, questioned whether three 
of the study’s identified institutional factors (price-based mindset, cost-driven environment 
and risk-aversity) should be classified as ‘sources of institutionalised waste in construction’. 
He simply based his arguments on tax-payers’ values and how that they might be delighted to 
know that public-sector client-organisations are risk-averse and take a cost-driven approach 
to procurement.  The author, however, argues that this claim, certainly, supports this study’s 
findings of how institutional norms and cultural-cognitive framework assumptions influence 
construction procurement decisions and practices. 
Table 7.7: Participants’ evaluation of the explanatory sufficiency of how imperfect 
institutions influence construction procurement 
To what extent do the main themes identified within the 'imperfect institutional factors' 
category sufficiently explain why inefficient procurement and contractual practices persist? 
Senior Consultant 
I don’t necessarily think, cost-driven environment, price-based 
mind-set or risk-aversity are a bad thing. The ultimate clients of 
public infrastructure are the tax-payers and I expect that by and 
large they would be very pleased to hear that procuring 
institutions have a cost-driven environment or price-based 
mindset. Perhaps what is missing is a leadership that can 
exercise that mind-set in a way that secures an efficient as 
opposed to an inefficient procurement process…The trick is 
often to set the right goals – and not just set task goals but set 
context goals. And the responses of people to goals set are 
peculiar to the nature of the individuals themselves – what are 
their personalities and motivators…What is wrong with a client 
being risk-averse? Why would anyone not want to be risk 
averse?...The real issue here is the bargaining power of the 
client in relation to the suppliers. Particularly where the clients 
are monopolistic”. 
Project / Contracts Manager 
I think you have identified many of the issues responsible. 
Procurement practice has improved somewhat, with the use of 
supply chains, but much more effort needs to be expended on the 
end to end process 
Senior Researcher To a significant extent 
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Site Manager / lean consultant 
Greatly. People don’t know what they don’t know; and if for 
example QS or owner do not know about a lean project delivery 
model why would they recommend it??? They would have to 
learn and experience it before they recommend it or take a 
“chance” using it. Chicken and egg scenario… 
Construction Manager 
I believe the main themes identify the tip of the iceberg in most 
categories. 
 
 
This study identified a number of imperfect 'normative and cultural-cognitive institutions'; 
and this eventually led to the emergence of a theme named ‘buyers' flawed assumptions 
and/or errors during pre-contractual stage’. Within this theme, a number of imperfect 
fundamental paradigms were identified that, arguably, influence buyers' approaches to 
construction procurement. The participants were asked through the evaluation exercise to 
provide feedback on whether the study succeeded in identifying sufficient 
examples/instances to express the theme to readers (See Table7.8).  
Table 7.8: Participants’ feedback on the explanatory power of the emergent theme of ‘buyers’ 
flawed assumptions and/or errors during pre-contract stage’ 
To what extent do you agree with the examples/instances identified within the theme ‘clients' 
flawed assumptions and/or errors during pre-contractual stage’?  
Senior Consultant 
I think the two most relevant…are ‘Focussing on minimising 
transaction costs and not overall costs’ and ‘Not taking 
advantage of the procurement process to eradicate delivery 
partner assumptions’. By focussing on transaction costs and not 
overall costs clients try to minimise costs associated with full 
understanding of project parameters; ground conditions, 
condition and extent of existing assets etc. The clients then try 
to pass this risk on to the suppliers by making the suppliers 
submit prices that include for that risk. The procurement 
process then misses the opportunity to understand how much of 
the risk the supplier has priced and the assumptions made. The 
attitude towards managing assumptions and risk seems to have 
become quite immature and a function of a power imbalance. 
Clients avoid transactional costs involved in fully identifying 
constraints prior to construction – they then see if they can 
further avoid them by asking the contractors to price them – 
who feel compelled to do so because of the competitive 
landscape.  
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Project / Contracts Manager 
Your use of the phrase imperfect normative and cultural-
cognitive institutions is relevant, as poor practice has been 
normalised and embedded in the industry with little real criticism 
and research into how these norms can be challenged.  I think 
figure 2 has captured most of the issues 
Senior Researcher 
This appears to be a satisfactory summary, which might form 
the basis of a useful check-list of do's and don'ts for procurers. 
Site Manager / lean consultant 
Spending money at the front end on lean design (which = more 
design actually) is seen as waste. There is never time or money to 
do this but always time for re-work on designs or construction or 
worse still after construction to fix the problems.  
Construction Manager 
I agree with most of the identified examples…Clearly an 
intelligent client would have more skills to make more sound 
investment decisions 
 
As shown in Table 7.8 above, all participants provided positive feedback and justified their 
answers. The senior researcher suggested that the findings of this study should be used as a 
basis for a useful guiding check list for procurers. Additionally, the project/contracts manager 
praised the study’s choice of the phrase ‘imperfect norms and cultural-cognitive institutions, 
as he believes that it represents reality. Overall, all participants agreed that the study provided 
satisfactory explanations to this developed theme 
 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter provided an analysis and discussion on feedback received from a number of 
industry and academic experts to evaluate the quality of the study’s developed conceptual 
model (Figure 4.1) and main findings. Four quality criteria were assessed within the 
conducted evaluation exercise; namely: (1) relevance and usefulness, (2) credibility, (3) 
resonance, and (4) explanatory sufficiency. As discussed within this chapter, the results of the 
conducted evaluation exercise demonstrate that the developed conceptual model has met 
these quality criteria. The next chapter presents an overall discussion of the main findings of 
the study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND INTEGRATION OF 
EXTANT LITERATURE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the main findings of the study and the developed conceptual framework 
will be discussed in line with the aim and main objectives of the study. The chapter 
refers to extant literature and feedback received during the evaluation exercise, 
whenever appropriate, to augment the main arguments and empirical findings of the 
study. The chapter starts by providing a summary of the research problem and the main 
steps taken to reach the findings. Next, a discussion of the main findings and arguments 
of the study is provided with reference to relevant literature. This is followed by 
discussions about the study’s potential implications for practice and future research.  
 
 
8.2 The Need for a Wider Conceptualisation of Waste in Construction 
The construction industry is often regarded as wasteful, confrontational, risks averse, 
and lacking trust and capacity for innovation and improvement (for example, see 
Koskela, 1992; Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Rooke et al., 2004; Eriksson and Laan, 
2007; Eriksson et al., 2008; Carrillo et al., 2012). Over the past 80 years, the UK 
Government and many organisations have commissioned several reports, in order to 
review the performance of the construction industry, highlight areas of concern, and 
suggest means for improvement. In particular, Egan’s report (1998), Rethinking 
Construction, called for ‘waste-reduction’ as an improvement strategy. A subsequent 
report, Never Waste a Good Crisis (Wolstenholme et al., 2009), was then conducted to 
assess the progress that the industry has made since Egan’s report, and it was concluded 
that hardly anything had changed. For instance, the UK industry has seen partnering and 
framework agreements losing its momentum and going back to lowest price tendering, 
especially during the recession period between 2008 and 2009. In 2012, the 
UK Government Construction Strategy report introduced three new models of 
construction procurement with the aim of reducing inefficiencies in construction 
projects (UK Government, 2012). These alternative procurement models have been 
examined in trial projects, and demonstrated evidence in achieving cost savings and 
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other intangible benefits (Cabinet Office, 2012b); however, the subsequent adoption of 
these alternative approaches is negligible. In 2013, the UK Government challenged 
construction to achieve 50% faster delivery and a 33% reduction of clients' capital costs 
by 2025. Obviously, prevailing ‘business as usual’ approaches will not meet these 
targets. It is thus questionable why the current construction model is so coherent and so 
embedded, despite the substantial attempts to address its recognised inadequacies.  
 
 
Eliminating (process and physical) waste from construction design and delivery, as 
advocated by lean ideals, is a necessary step towards achieving the aforementioned 
goals. However, waste-reduction understood simply as the improvement of current 
processes rather than fundamental system redesign will not be enough. Obtaining a 
better understanding and conceptualisation of waste in construction is therefore crucial, 
in order to prepare the industry for the radical demanded of it. One aspect of this 
conceptualisation is the consideration of the wider institutional, procurement and 
commercial environments surrounding the design and delivery of construction projects. 
It is this this aspect which led the study to explore whether there is anything in the 
aforementioned environments that is blocking radical new production system design 
and therefore pinning the prevailing wasteful construction model in place.  
 
 
Many of the problems that lead to the occurrence of waste in construction are strongly 
related to lean theories adopted in production management. However, it can still be 
argued that waste is created primarily from project-organisational and contractual 
problems (Williamson, 1991, pp. 78-79); and as such, a focus on waste reduction in 
production (design and delivery of design) alone would be insufficient. As stressed by 
Matthews et al. (2003), it is difficult to maximise value and minimise waste at the 
project level if the prevailing contractual structure hinders coordination, constrains 
collaboration and innovation, and sub-optimises performance and goals. Similarly, it is 
suggested in this study that procurement systems, as institutional arrangements, are 
designed to assign liabilities and authorities to people and organizations (Love et al., 
1998) at the project and programme levels; and thus structure the borders that shape ‘the 
play of the game’ (Williamson, 2000). From a production management perspective, 
organisation and contracts are essential parts of the production system design (Koskela 
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and Ballard, 2012); and thus it makes sense to argue that poorly aligned project-
organisational and institutional arrangements may cause process waste and impact on 
project outcomes. 
 
 
In order to start unpicking the apparent coherence, and yet wastefulness, of the 
prevailing construction model, there is a need to evaluate the wider institutional, 
procurements and commercial context surrounding the design and delivery of 
construction, and to assess the fundamental paradigms and cultural-cognitive 
assumptions that underlie approaches to construction procurement. The institutional and 
commercial environments that underpin project production are enshrined within the 
project procurement processes, and cover every aspect of setting up the transaction from 
identifying the business case and funding through to the appointment of project-
suppliers and monitoring and measuring their performance. Such an evaluation, 
however, needs to draw upon theory from disciplines outside construction. Three 
particular theories, therefore, were ‘abductively’ selected as fit for this purpose (Figure 
8.1).  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Theoretical perspectives underpinning this study 
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The TFV theory of production was used to help the author gain a better understanding 
of the concept of waste in construction. TCE offers a useful mechanism to analyse 
conflicting interests among contracting parties (Li et al., 2013) and to understand the 
hidden costs associated with pre- and post-contract work (See for example Li et al., 
2014; Rajeh et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2016). Thus, the author referred to TCE to gain 
knowledge about procurement dynamics. Neo-institutional theory focusses on the 
context and gives careful consideration to the roles played by normative and cultural–
cognitive systems, which are regarded by the author as vital forces affecting the success 
or failure of construction projects.  
 
A review of these three theories (as presented in Chapter 2), in association with a 
contextual review of construction-procurement literature, enabled the study to formulate 
six guiding propositions and to develop a preliminary conceptual model (see Figure 2.2 
in Chapter 2) prior to data collection. The use of theory, tentatively, at this stage was 
seen to be important to guide the researcher during data collection, whilst also leaving 
the scope open for generating unintended findings or even new hypotheses. 
Subsequently, a reflexive grounded-theory approach was adopted for data collection and 
analysis (refer to Chapter 3, for fuller details).  
 
Consequently, the use of inductive-abductive reasoning approaches led to the 
emergence of new concepts, themes and categories, including the relationships between 
the four main core categories of the developed conceptual model of ‘institutional waste 
within the UK construction industry’ (see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). Thereby, allowing 
the study to move beyond the relatively limited preliminary conceptual model, and 
instead develop a more useful and relevant conceptual model that is grounded in 
empirical data collected from the field. Having summarised the research background 
and processes that led to the developed of the study’s conceptual model, the next 
sections will discuss the main findings of the study, with reference to extant literature.  
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8.3 The Relationship between Construction Procurement and Waste in 
Construction 
The construction industry has, over a long period, been criticised for its short term “hit-
and-run” relationships which are focused on win-lose situations and poor performance. 
The current approach contains many inefficiencies that have been frequently attributed 
to factors such as fragmentation of the industry (Egan, 1998; Sarhan and Fox, 2013), 
adversarial hierarchy structure of construction projects (Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 
2011), obsolete procurement methods (Eriksson and Laan, 2007), confusing and 
treacherous contractual arrangements (Hawkins, 2012; Cox, and Thompson, 1997), the 
highly competitive cost-driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000) and the 
sequential organisation of construction processes (Koskela, 2000). Despite the wide 
recognition of these problems the industry persistently resists the radical demanded of 
it. 
 
In general, increased trustful collaboration between project parties is argued to be an 
appropriate remedy for many of the industry’s problems (See for example Eriksson et 
al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Sebastian, 2011; Pasquire et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2017). 
Since, the extent of cooperation (and trust) is largely influenced by procurement 
arrangements and procedures (Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Pasquire et al., 2015); this is 
considered a key area that requires substantial attention and improvement (Egan, 1998) 
and which is central to overall client satisfaction and project success (Love et al., 1998; 
Tookey et al., 2001; Osipova and Eriksson, 2011).   
 
As emphasised by Matthews et al. (2003, p. 1) “maximizing value and minimizing 
waste at the project level is difficult when the contractual structure inhibits 
coordination, stifles cooperation and innovation, and rewards individual contractors 
for both reserving good ideas, and optimizing their performance at the expense of 
others”. Adding to this, it is suggested in this study that procurement and contractual 
systems, as institutional arrangements, are designed to assign liabilities and authorities 
to people and organizations (Love et al., 1998) at the project and programme levels; and 
thus structure the borders that shape ‘the play of the game’ (Williamson, 2000). Thus, 
inefficient or inappropriate construction procurement arrangements could encourage 
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wasteful behaviours and poor performances, which in turn lead to consequential waste. 
This, therefore, implies that buyers and decision makers need to give significant 
consideration to the impact of their chosen construction procurement arrangements on 
process-flow. 
 
A small but emerging number of studies have attempted to explicitly investigate the 
relationship between construction procurement systems and waste in construction (for 
example see Jaques, 2000; Gamage et al., 2009). However, most of these studies, if not 
all, have limited their attention to physical (material) waste as opposed to process waste 
and value creation. Additionally, very few, if any studies, have sought to investigate 
why prevailing construction procurement practices persist. Furthermore, in the 
construction management literature, according to the author’s knowledge, there are 
hardly any studies that have sought to explore the impact of institutional factors, which 
influence construction procurement choices and practices, on the generation and 
entrenchment of waste in construction projects. Waste here can be in the form of 
monetary, time, effort or value-loss, and can arise during pre or post construction stages.  
 
This study identified a number of procurement and contractual arrangements, which are 
taken-for-granted and impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction (see 
Figure 8.2). These prevailing procurement arrangements were identified by the 
participants of this study as major ‘causes of waste and inefficiencies’ in construction 
projects. Some of the identified inefficient procurement practices have already been 
extensively criticised and acknowledged in literature. These are: separated procurement 
methods; lowest price selection criteria; complexity of contractual procedures; late 
involvement of contractors; poor payment terms and arrangements; non-joint-
specification of design; and onerous preselection of suppliers.  
Chapter 8: Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature 
  
Page | 247  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Prevailing inefficient construction procurement practices in construction 
 
A few others are less prevalent in literature, but mainly recognised by researchers 
belonging to the lean construction community (i.e. sub-optimisation through 
fragmenting contracts using a ‘buy-it’ governance arrangement, exclusion of 
subcontractors from early project stages, tendering, and non-value-adding performance 
monitoring procedures). Nevertheless, to the author’s knowledge, very few studies have 
managed to collate inefficient construction procurement practices in such a way into one 
study. Thus, the findings of this study could serve as a useful compendium for 
researchers and industry practitioners to access, in order to gain a better understanding 
of the impact of prevailing (inefficient) construction procurement practices on project-
team dynamics (Figure 8.3). 
 
Figure 8.3 General impacts of prevailing inefficient procurement practices on project-
team performances and behaviours 
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Moreover, very few, if any, studies have attempted to critically evaluate prevalent 
safeguarding practices in construction procurement. This study contributes to existing 
knowledge by exposing prevailing safeguarding-mind-sets and approaches to 
construction procurement, as a cause of waste hitherto unacknowledged. The findings of 
this study revealed that clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their project-
specific assets, against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment of formal 
contractual arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements and structures 
typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the detriment of the 
project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients and 
decision makers feel they have taken the best course of action. This finding offers a 
novel explanation to the reasons for the prevalence of the current construction model. 
This finding was also supported by the industry experts who were invited to evaluate 
the findings of the study (See Chapter 7). For instance, a site manager with more than 
20 years of industry experience stated: 
I have personally (on site and managing projects) experienced many of the 
factors identified through this research. Projects go round and round in circles 
just like the model, because of past experiences of AEC stakeholders and their 
instance to safeguard against what has happened before” (Site Manager and 
Lean Specialist, 10
th
 April 2017) 
 
Interestingly, while using NVivo matrix-coding query to investigate patterns in the data, 
it was found that ‘safeguarding practices’ in construction procurement has the strongest 
correlation with all other categories and sub-categories of the developed model (see 
Table 8.1). This “quantitizing” approach (Sandelowsk et al., 2009), was not used to 
convert qualitative data into quantitative data, but as a way to look at experiences 
grounded in the data through a numerical rather than word form. It is important, 
however, to emphasise that the intention was not to claim that the result is statistically 
significant, but to find patterns in the data and then refer to the content that shows those 
patterns to look for explanations. 
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Table: 8.1: Results of a QSR NVivo 10 matrix-coding query conducted by this study 
 
Institutional Factors 
(IF) 
Inefficient Performances 
and Behaviours (PB) 
Consequential 
Wastes (W) 
Inefficient Procurement Practices and Arrangements (IP) 128 127 78 
Bulk Buying or cumulative ordering 1 0 1 
Complexity of contractual procedures and mechanisms 9 12 9 
Exclusion or late involvement of Key actors during pre-
construction stages 
5 12 10 
Lowest price selection criteria 17 5 3 
Non-joint specifications of design 3 8 3 
Non-value adding performance monitoring arrangements 27 13 12 
Onerous pre-selection of suppliers 8 8 1 
Poor payment terms and arrangements 5 12 3 
Safeguarding practices  37 46 26 
Separated procurement methods  13 23 10 
Sub-optimisation  9 8 1 
Tendering as an expensive non-value adding activity 32 18 16 
      * The numbers in the Table represent a count of the coding intersections between lists of items 
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The next sections, therefore, explain the ‘safeguarding problem in construction 
procurement’ in greater detail, by referring to extant literature and feedback received 
during the evaluation exercise to augment the empirical findings of the study. The focus 
will particularly be upon how self-interest drives opportunism and influences the 
governance (safeguarding) approaches and how this becomes a dichotomy as one 
organisation seeks to protect its interests from the opportunism of others whist 
continuing to exploit all opportunities themselves. It is proposed that one way to begin 
to break this seemingly irreconcilable and self-perpetuating cycle is to expose it as a 
cause of waste hitherto unacknowledged. Thus, the following sections will start by 
providing a summary of the ‘safeguarding problem’ as conceptualised in TCE (Refer to 
Chapter 2, for fuller details). Following this, a critical discussion upon a number of 
safeguarding approaches that are commonly practiced in construction is presented from 
a lean perspective. Interestingly, it is shown that when these safeguarding approaches 
are viewed through a "lean" lens, it can be observed that they are wasteful and/or create 
waste 
 
8.4 An Introduction to the Safeguarding Problem in Construction Procurement 
Due to the difficult nature of many construction projects, clients and decision makers, in 
practice, tend to allocate risks and seek to safeguard their project-specific investments 
and assets, from exploitation and opportunism, through the deployment of formal 
governance mechanisms contained within the contractual arrangements. This applies to 
all parties across the project chain from high level project funders through to raw 
material suppliers. Since, most of the clients who procure construction projects lack 
experience and may only ever build once or twice (Love et al., 2010); they invariably 
seek advice from lawyers and from those who are familiar with construction contracts 
and the laws related to them (e.g. quantity surveyors). These lawyers or consultants are 
accordingly paid, as part of their agreed fees, for providing means for safeguarding their 
client’s rights and transaction-specific assets. Unsurprisingly, in some cases these 
means can include the use of privileged conditions of contract, where clients may not 
mind protecting themselves from any risks, even if, this occurs at the expense of others 
and ultimately themselves. An example of this can be found in the inappropriate risk 
allocation in the use of disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses which can attract between 8% - 
20% of the total project cost as contingency (Zaghloul and Hartman 2003). This is 
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potentially an example of a contingency that clearly consumes resource without adding 
practical value and thus conforms to the archetypal definition of waste. This study 
reviewed, during the concurrent data collection and analysis stages, a full project-
contract of a major infrastructure project in the UK, which included the following 
onerous clause: 
“The Contractor’s share is paid to the Employer if there is a fatality on the site 
of the Scheme as a result of a reportable incident” (Z-clause within an 
anonymous NEC 3, Option D, target cost contract with a bill of quantities) 
 
However, in most cases, the intention for or on behalf of client’s (experienced or not) is 
to control opportunism and utilise efficient governance of the transaction. Additionally 
there may be little awareness of how these procurement decisions and arrangements 
may affect the likelihood of creating a cooperative environment (Eriksson et al., 2008) 
and thus impact on project performance and outcomes.  
 
8.4.1 A summary of TCE explanations to the safeguarding problem  
According to TCE, a ‘safeguarding problem’ arises when a firm deploys transaction-
specific assets and worries that its exchange-partner may opportunistically try to exploit 
these unique investments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Accordingly, it can be 
concluded that asset specificity and opportunism are the antecedents of the safeguarding 
problem. Figure 8.4 shows a conceptual representation of these governance problems 
and possible solutions. 
 
Figure 8.4: A basic model of transactional governance problems and solutions 
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TCE has the objective of total cost minimisation (Winch, 1989; Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997) because it assumes that transactions will be adequately governed by the 
institutional (procurement) arrangements that are most efficient (Bradach and Eccles, 
1989). According to North and Davis (1971, pp. 6-7; emphasis in original), cited in 
Williamson (1990): “An institutional arrangement is an arrangement between economic 
units that governs the way these units can cooperate and/or compete. It [can] provide a 
structure within which its members can cooperate…or [it can] provide a mechanism 
that can effect a change in law or property rights”. This implies that, according to TCE, 
the institutional arrangement chosen will be that which reduces the total costs 
(transactional or organizational costs plus production costs) of undertaking and 
coordinating those activities (Chau and Walker, 1994).  
 
 
When applied to construction clients deploying their procurement arrangements in 
general, and governance techniques and approaches in specific, this suggests they 
should also consider the impact of their decisions on a project-team’s performance and 
total costs. Not to do so might mean a cheaper transactional arrangement leading to a 
disproportionately higher production cost. This idea now contradicts the previous 
suggestion that economic agents should primarily seek to economise on transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1985). These contradictions, therefore, indicate that it is insufficient 
to expect that the most economic transactional arrangements will implicitly lead to the 
most efficient institutional arrangements.  
 
 
Having, provided an  overview  of the ‘safeguarding problem’ as conceptualised in 
TCE, next the study presents a critical discussion upon a number of safeguarding 
approaches that are commonly practiced in construction. Figure 8.5 illustrates a range of 
(inefficient) safeguarding practices, which inductively emerged out of the data collected 
for this study. However, for reasons of brevity and conciseness, the following 
discussion will be focussed on contractual governance (safeguarding) arrangements, 
because they are more dominant and prevalent in both literature and practice. 
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 Figure 8.5: Inefficient safeguarding approaches commonly used in construction  
 
8.4.2 Prevailing safeguarding approaches to construction procurement 
The prevailing transaction approach taken in construction conforms to the “buy it” type 
of governance where contractual and governance instruments are often adapted from 
other transactions, and performance is evaluated through stringent conditions agreed in 
advance. In this way, it is anticipated that risks and uncertainties are captured and 
managed and parties are protected from the opportunistic exploitation of these risks and 
uncertainties by these governance arrangements. This prevails even though the high 
transaction cost, asset specificity and uncertainty mean that a vertically integrated 
“make-it” or production-led approach is more appropriate where interests are protected 
through “in-house” or “hybrid” production (see Figure 8.4). The prevailing approaches 
for the management of projects and arrangement of transactions are widely documented 
by professional institutions, for example PMI
1
, RICS
2
, CIPS
3
 among others. So the 
contradictory position seems to apply to the execution of many types of projects. 
However, one project domain which conforms more to the “make it” type of governance 
would seem to be film and theatre production although it is not investigated here. 
 
                                                          
1
 Project Management Institute www.pmi.org 
2
 Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors www.rics.org 
3
 Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply www.cips.org 
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In the construction industry the contradictory position is compounded by the prevailing 
institutional arrangements in which the asset specificity and low transaction frequency 
creates an opportunistic culture resulting in a myriad of safeguarding approaches. When 
these safeguarding approaches are viewed through a "lean" lens, it can be observed that 
they are wasteful and/or create waste. Some of the most commonly used safeguarding 
approaches to construction procurement are now critically discussed. 
 
STANDARD FORMS OF CONTRACT  
Construction parties rely heavily on contract formalisation through the use of standard 
forms of contracts (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). Theoretically, standard forms of contract 
optimise the balance of risk and responsibilities between the parties, and eliminate ex-
ante transactional costs required for re-drafting and getting familiar with new contracts 
(Cox and Thompson, 1997). Their main advantage is that they enable a body of 
experience in their use to be developed among the whole industry (Williamson et al., 
2004). This includes the formation of an established body of case law which can assist 
in the drafting and interpretation of contracts (Laryea and Hughes, 2009). Thus, as a 
safeguarding technique, they are supposed to reduce the amount of time and risk 
involved for contract administrators and tenderers as well. However, there are many 
problems related to the use of standard forms of contract. These forms of contract are 
drafted by third parties who focused their formulation of the contracts on specific types 
of projects; thus one of the main problems associated with the use of un-amended 
standard forms of contract is their inability to adapt to the context in which they operate 
(Laryea and Hughes, 2009). This argument was acknowledged by various participants 
of this study, including a ‘Business Development Manager’, as follows: 
You also see occasionally where PQSs, who have a main building portfolio and 
were very familiar with the likes of JCT, get told they must work in NEC…and a 
lot of their Z-clauses are trying to make NEC work in the same way as JCT. But 
their customers have chosen NEC because they do not want to work in a JCT 
fashion. And JCT is not very good for civils works anyway; because civils works 
tend to have quite a lot of change in the ground conditions and so on, and JCT 
just cannot deal with that” (Business Development Manager, Dec 2015, 
Interview). 
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Nevertheless, in practice, clients rarely use standard-form contracts without making 
some amendments to them (Laryea and Hughes, 2009), and the same applies to 
subcontracts (Greenwood, 2001). This argument was supported by a ‘Contracts 
Manager’ with more than twenty years of experience who was invited to evaluate the 
main findings of the study. 
“The issue of clients’ input is important, particularly where we see collaborative 
type contracts like the NEC 3 continually ‘Z-claused’ to become less 
collaborative and more adversarial. The point on the increasing influence of 
external consultants and lawyers is also pertinent” (Project/Contracts Manager, 
March 2017, Evaluation exercise) 
 
 
A study by Laryea and Hughes (2009) which was based on four observational case 
studies in two of the top contracting companies in the UK, showed that these 
amendments made by clients are mostly related to payment issues and legal 
arrangements. Similarly, an exploratory study of 11 Swedish construction projects, by 
Opisova and Erksson (2011), reported that in all 11 projects, clients made amendments 
to the general conditions of contract to transfer more risks to the contractor; many of 
them were applied to the length of guarantee and additional insurance. Laryea and 
Hughes (2009) revealed that a general perception exists among contractors that clients, 
actually, amend conditions of standard contracts and introduce their own special 
clauses, in order to gain an advantage rather than genuinely to suit the project needs. 
Additionally, Hawkins (2012) warns us that users making amendments to standard 
forms of contract at negotiation stages do not always ensure that all the interlinked 
clauses affected by the amendments are also amended. Thus, in the absence of trust and 
collaboration, any amendments to contract conditions may lead to ambiguities and 
encourage opportunistic behaviour. Actually, a study by Love et al. (2010) identified 
onerous and one sided amendments to standard forms, often drafted by lawyers to 
improve their clients’ position, as one of the underlying dynamic factors influencing 
disputes.  
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A number of studies show compounding factors by verifying that some contract 
conditions (i.e. FIDIC, 1999 and NEC, 1993) are very difficult to read, and require at 
least college-level reading skills to correctly interpret them (Rameezdeen and 
Rajapakse, 2007; Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). At the same time, it is important to 
emphasise that lawyers and specialist surveyors are not the primary users of a contract; 
it is the project parties’ ability to capture their meaning which is fundamental for 
contract performance (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). In general, textual complexity 
of standard forms of contract, in terms of readability and comprehensiveness, may lead 
to misinterpretation and lack of common understanding between project parties; thus 
supporting arms’ length relationships and potential time-consuming and costly disputes 
(Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 2007).  
 
Additionally, one of the major critiques concerning the adoption of standard form of 
contracts is associated with the dominance of adversarial dispute resolution mechanisms 
within many of these contracts (Mante et al., 2012). Furthermore, the availability of 
adjudication clauses as contained in standard forms of contract make disputes a less 
disruptive action for the parties concerned (Love et al., 2010); thereby hindering 
collaboration efforts. In a study by Mante et al. (2012) which aimed to review the 
influence of procurement methods on dispute resolution mechanism choice in 
construction, it was found that almost all traditional procurement contracts in the UK 
(e.g. JCT standard building contracts (2005) and the NEC3 Engineering and 
Construction contract) offer adjudication, arbitration and litigation as the primary 
dispute resolution mechanisms. In contrast, standard forms of contract for Project 
Partnering (i.e. PPC 2000) promote a clear preference for non-adversarial methods of 
dispute resolution, by providing a problem-solving hierarchy that starts with the client’s 
representative and ends with legislation as the final means of determining the dispute 
(Mante et al., 2012). The use of the multi-tiered dispute resolution mechanism ensures 
that relationship-based approaches to resolving disputes are exhausted prior to the use 
of any adversarial methods. Similarly, Alliancing Contracts in Australia include a “no 
dispute” clause, in which project participants agree to use an alliance board for 
resolving all disputes as an alternative approach to arbitration or litigation (Jones, 
2000). This allows project participants to resolve any conflicts or issues on site and 
Chapter 8: Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature 
  
Page | 257  
 
within the project team, and consequently facilitates earlier settlement of final account 
(Rahman and Kumrasawy, 2004). 
 
In summary, it seems from the critical discussion provided above that the problems of 
standard forms of contract outweigh their advantages. The heavy reliance on the use of 
standard forms of contract, established by third parties, brings with it lots of formality 
and rigidity that stifles cooperation and focuses on the individual parties and their 
responsibilities; thereby driving a distance between project parties and encouraging 
opportunistic behaviour (Eriksson et al. 2008). According to Cox and Thompson (1997, 
p. 132): 
 “…Standard forms of contract are nothing more than instruments used by the 
parties to seek strict liability and attach blame to events as they occur. 
Nevertheless, the industry's hands are tied to the standard forms and their 
traditional methods of contracting, even though they do not deliver satisfactory 
results. These methods, when linked with the prevailing adversarial culture and 
fragmented structure lead the parties away from 'trust' towards self-seeking 
interest ('opportunism')”. 
 
 
Nonetheless, Eriksson and Laan (2007) suggest that the deep-rooted practice of using 
standard contracts construction is only harmful, if they are used as “safeguards” in the 
absence of strong “relational norms”. Without good relationships between the project-
parties, once a default occurs, they are most likely to refer back to the clauses of the 
standard contract which, in turn, may encourage opportunism and lead to adversarial 
ways of working (i.e. remedies of damages through legal actions). Therefore, it could be 
argued that the criticism is not about the use of standard forms of contracts; but it is 
about what is being standardised within these contracts, as well as how people interpret 
and choose to use contracts. Partnering and alliancing are regarded as practical 
examples of "relational contracting" (RC) principles (Rahman and Kumrasawy, 2004). 
RC-based approaches seem to offer a cost-effective means of achieving total project 
cost minimisation through encouraging mutual trust, collaboration and joint 
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management of risks (See for example Rahman and Kumrasawy, 2002a&b, 2004; 
Eriksson and Westerberg, 2011).  
 
 
DISCLAIMER, EXCULPATORY AND PRIVILEGED CLAUSES OF CONTRACT 
Shifting project risks to other contracting parties is a general practice in the construction 
industry (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003), which may lead to cost wastage and 
opportunistic behaviours (Clegg, 1992). It is common practice for clients to exert most 
project risk, if not all, on contractors and designers (Ahmed et al., 1999; Osipova and 
Eriksson, 2011), in order to have more control whilst passing responsibility. This is 
achieved through the use of disclaimer clauses or exculpatory language in contract 
conditions for risk allocation and as a ‘safeguard’. This argument was affirmed by a 
‘Site manager / Lean Specialist’ who participated in the evaluation exercise of this 
study, as follows: 
“One of the projects I am supporting now was originally tendered at 2 million. 
Re-tendered at 2.5 million after some changes and 20% contingency is likely to 
be allowed on top of this to deal with unforeseen conditions. The 
procurement/negotiations of this contract have cost (wasted) a lot of money to 
“protect” the client against risk when all it really boils down to is not trusting 
the contractor and declaring a budget from the outset. (Site Manager and Lean 
Specialist, April 2017, Evaluation exercise) 
 
 
In 12 case-studies, by Smith and Bohn (1999), which aimed to investigate the factors 
which influence the assumptions of risk and the use of contingency by small-medium 
construction firms, it was reported that “on many occasions designers work with owners 
who believe it is the design engineer’s obligation to protect them against all project 
risks using whatever exculpatory language they can find in defence of their position (p. 
102). An example of this includes imposing ‘unlimited liability’, ‘on-demand bonds’, or 
‘fitness for purpose obligations’ on project-parties in the contract. Such proposed forms 
of warranty, which are used to the employer's advantage, are described by Hawkins 
(2012) as ‘weasel clauses’ that most insurers will eschew. These onerous contractual 
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clauses were criticised by a ‘Business Development Manager’ working for a main civil 
engineering contractor in the UK, who participated in this study, as follows: 
“I think with the NEC contract, there are a couple of errors within the contract. 
One is limited liability and the other is fitness of purpose. There are X-clauses 
(X-15 and X-18) which correct these errors. And my belief is that when we get a 
Fourth Edition, I certainly hope that those errors are corrected…We cannot buy 
insurance to cover ‘unlimited liability’, so we have to ‘put our business on the 
line’...’Fitness for purpose’, well, we're contractors we do not know what the 
purpose is. Hmm, you know, our job is to build the scope. And 'on demand' bond 
is effectively a loan because if our clients can take it on demand, it's classed by 
our banks as borrowing. So, it means there is less money that we can borrow 
from our banks to fund our business” (Business Development Manager, Dec 
2015, Interview). 
 
 
An empirical survey that was conducted in the Canadian and the United States 
construction industries by Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) revealed that inappropriate risk 
allocation through disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses in contracts is a major reason for 
increasing the total cost of a project. The study reported that, under all circumstances, 
whenever disclaimer clauses existed in contracts, contractors always added risk 
premiums to the total cost of a project in order to safeguard themselves against these 
clauses. These attached premiums ranged between 8% and 20% of the total cost of the 
project, depending on various factors including their relationship with the owner, 
contract type and fairness. According to Zaghloul and Hartman (2003), the most 
common exculpatory clauses used in construction contracts in descending order are: 
Uncertainty of work conditions; Indemnification; Delaying events; Sufficiency in 
contract documents; and Liquidated damages. Adding to this list is ‘Site access 
disclaimer clauses’. Site access is classified by Smith and Bohn (1999) as an internal, 
predictable and contractual type of risk that falls within the responsibility of the owner. 
This type of risk can be shared and planned-ahead to secure access; instead of being 
pushed to contractors in the form of disclaimer clauses, leading to unnecessary 
additional costs (in the form of insurance or contingencies, adversarial relationships and 
potential claims and disputes. 
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In short, it is obvious that ‘disclaimer or exculpatory clauses’ often used by clients as 
‘safeguards’ may lead to increased costs of projects in the form of unnecessary 
contingencies and insurances (cost wastage), restricted bid-competitions (waste of 
human potential), and potential (timely-consuming) disputes. Compellingly, as found in 
this study (See Chapter 4), despite all of these, “disclaimer clauses continue to be used 
in some of the newer contractual agreements between owners and contractors such as 
partnering/alliances” (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003, pp. 422). 
 
 
CONVENTIONAL (MULTIPLE) INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS  
Typically, a client would wish to obtain the broadest possible insurance protection from 
project-parties against any loss arising from a project (Cushman, 2003). If insurance 
requirements are too lenient, client's loss exposures may not be covered sufficiently. If 
requirements are set too stringent (e.g. to cover any losses even if even if the fault is 
caused in whole or in part by the indemnified party), the client may have to pay for 
additional premiums or unnecessary contract costs (Cushman, 2003). In general, main 
contractors usually follow the same approach when dealing with their project-supply-
chain. However, it has been suggested by expert construction professionals that 
conventional arrangements for providing insurance cover add unnecessary costs to 
constructions projects, and can also obstruct collaboration between supply chains 
(Ndekugri et al., 2013).  
 
 
This wasted cost, ultimately met by the buyer/client, arises through duplication in 
insurance cover as stakeholders’ policies overlap in the risks that they cover (Ndekugri 
et al., 2013; Mossman et al., 2010). Furthermore, the conventional practice of insuring 
the liabilities of individual project participants rather than the project risks themselves 
often leads to defensive attitudes between project participants; thereby hindering supply 
chain collaboration (Ibid.). As summed up by a Business Development Manager’ who 
participated in this study:  
“Before you look into insurance, you really need to look at the reason for the 
insurance. And the reason for the insurance is risk. And in my experience where 
Chapter 8: Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature 
  
Page | 261  
 
we struggle with insurance, is usually down to an inappropriate risk strategy” 
(Business Development Manager, Dec 2015, Interview) 
 
 
 In a survey study (Kent and Becerik Gerber, 2010) completed by 415 practitioners, 
traditional insurance products were identified, based on the respondents opinions, as a 
main barrier to integrated project delivery (IDP). Subsequently, Ghassemi, and Becerik-
Gerber (2011) conducted a qualitative investigation, through nine IPD construction 
projects in the United States, and revealed that the biggest worry for leading industry 
professionals concerning adopting IPD to its full capacity is insurance and liability 
issues; as it was found that insurance products impose liability issues on each project-
party separately and thus make collaboration complicated. According to Mossman et al. 
(2010, p. 11): 
"If each party to a relational agreement is required to have its own insurance 
and there is a claim during design or construction, an insurance company could 
force parties to sue one another in order to trigger insurance coverage, 
threatening relationships".  
 
It seems, therefore, that a 'project insurance' option (Ndekugri et al., 2013) could be an 
efficient and effective alternative model which enables project participants to optimize 
the project risks as-a-whole. A single project insurance model may incur higher ex-ante 
costs than conventional ones; but would fill insurance gaps and reduce the need for 
litigations and dispute procedures often conducted to determine which member of the 
supply chain to blame once a damage or loss occurs; thereby leading to enhanced 
collaboration and work-flow and reduced post-ante costs. That being said, it is 
important to stress that in order to reap the full benefits of project insurance 
arrangements, there would be a crucial need for making project insurance a mainstream 
option, so that it can become an industry norm. 
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COLLATERAL WARRANTIES 
Collateral warranties are well established, in the construction industry, as contracts 
which are collateral to the main agreement between project parties. The main objective 
for their use is to ‘safeguard’ those parties with a financial interest in the building from 
any consequent losses arising out of building defects which appear after practical 
completion (Wordley, 1991). They usually provide a direct contractual linkage between 
the producing parties and those parties who have long-term interest in the building once 
it is completed (i.e. the owner, the occupier and the financier) (Hawkins, 2012). Many 
forms of these collateral contracts provide that the rights and benefits of the warrant 
(guarantee given) may be passed on, at least twice, to subsequent interested parties 
(Hawkins, 2012; Wordley, 1991).  
 
 
The construction industry, in particular the property sector, has been and is still subject 
to considerable growth in the use of collateral warranties, which are seen as taken for 
granted ‘safeguards’ in procurement arrangements. However, little attention has been 
focussed on assessing their true costs (Wordley, 1991) and effectiveness. Putting into 
consideration the fragmented nature of the construction industry, the predominance of 
outsourcing, and the way in which most construction projects are procured involving 
large numbers of project-participants (e.g. architects, consultants, contractors, sub-
contractors, specialist suppliers), it is obvious that the number of collateral contracts 
that interested parties must obtain in order to protect themselves is enormous. Each of 
these collateral warranties requires careful drafting by lawyers, and each concerned 
party seeks involving its own lawyer in negotiating the content and extent of the 
warranty (Ibid.). Thereby, leading to substantial transactional costs and additional 
management time spent in co-ordinating the responses. It is also worth noting that when 
design consultants provide collateral warrantee, additional premiums are factored into 
their professional indemnity insurance to cover their extension of liability (Ibid.); thus 
increasing the overall cost of the insurance on any one project. 
 
 
Additionally, there are serious concerns about the ability of the collateral warranty 
matrix to meet the interested parties’ objectives in seeking them (Wordley, 1991). First, 
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the assets backing the warranties are not guaranteed. If the contractor or subcontractor 
providing the warrantee becomes insolvent, the value of the remedy gets destroyed. As 
for the designer consultant, the asset backing the collateral warranty is the consultant's 
professional indemnity insurance, which is annually renewed based on a claims-made 
basis. There are many events, at which professional indemnity insurance policies may 
fail to respond to submitted claims (Ibid.). This includes for example, "exhaustion of the 
insured's policy limits during the year in which the claim under the warranty was 
notified due to the policy limits being applied to another claim, also notified during that 
period" (Wordley, 1991, p. 237). This incident for example is outside the influence or 
control of the collateral warranty recipient, and indicates the difficulties inherent in 
relying on the consultant's professional indemnity insurance as an asset that backs 
collateral warrantees.  
 
 
It therefore appears that the latent defect insurance (LDI) options may be a better 
alternative to collateral warranties. The LDI option provides compensation to the 
project-parties as a whole without reference to their contractual liabilities; and thus 
removes the need for any affected party to dispute the issue at fault and to assign blame 
with a resultant costly delay (Wordley, 1991).  
 
 
8.4.3 The need for embedding trust in construction procurement 
According to TCE, economic actors should seek to overcome the 'safeguarding problem' 
that arises during transactions by selecting an efficient governance structure (see Figure 
8.4). Williamson (1985) developed a theoretical model for the choice of an optimal 
governance structure for six different types of transaction, depending on their asset 
specificity and frequency. In general, TCE researchers have conceptualized three 
general types of governance structure (i.e. market, hierarchies and hybrid/intermixed) 
which map into price, authority and trust respectively (Williamson, 1985). A 
comprehensive review by Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), which provided an integration 
and synthesis of 45 empirical TCA articles, found that the use of vertical integration as 
a means of safeguarding specific assets from possible opportunistic behaviour is broadly 
confirmed amongst researchers. However, it was also demonstrated in the reviewed 
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studies that firms can also protect their specific assets by deploying a variety of hybrid 
governance mechanisms, such as partnering, prequalifications, and the development of 
relational norms. Eriksson (2006) developed a TCE-based procurement model based on 
Williamson's (1985) optimal governance model (Figure 8.6) and argued that: 
"According to Williamson (1985), the construction of plant facilities is a typical 
occasional transaction involving high asset specificity, i.e. a type five 
transaction. Overall, most construction projects are of that type. However, some 
projects are significantly less complex than constructing a plant, for example 
production of small houses with modular construction. Such projects may be 
categorized as transactions of type 3 or 4. For construction projects in general, 
the model prescribes medium emphasis on authority, medium to high trust, and 
low to medium emphasis on price" (Eriksson, 2006, pp. 10-11). 
 
 
In Eriksson (2006)'s conceptual study, he suggested that TCE's three main governance 
mechanisms (i.e. price, authority and trust) are strongly linked to three different types of 
control (i.e. output, process and social control). This implies, according to Eriksson and 
Laan (2007) that clients can facilitate different levels of price, authority and trust in a 
transaction relationship through the selection and use of these different types of control. 
In other words, it is argued by them that clients' chosen procurement procedures and 
arrangements involve different types of control, which in turn affect the levels of price, 
authority, and/or trust embedded within a project. For instance, they suggested that bid 
evaluations which focus on tender price represent a price focus through 'output control'; 
while bid evaluations which focus on trust-based soft parameters represent a trust focus 
through 'social control'. It is however important to note that according to Tookey et al. 
(2001), in practice, clients do not adhere to rigid prescriptive procurement guidance and 
definitions, which regard construction procurement as a set of rationalistic decisions 
taking place within a closed environment (mechanistic-thinking approach); instead 
counterintuitive decisions are the norm, leading to the formation of hybrid structures. 
Chapter 8: Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature 
  
Page | 265  
 
 
Figure 8.6: Eriksson's (2006) TCE-based procurement model for governance choice 
 
 
8.4.4 A critical discussion upon the safeguarding problem in construction 
procurement 
In construction, there seems to be two general approaches to selecting a procurement 
system. The first would focus on designing a project-organisation structure including a 
project operating system based on project needs and priorities, and then adapting a 
contractual arrangement that aligns the commercial interests of the project parties (e.g. 
Thomsen et al., 2010) - a production oriented approach which aims to design and 
enhance flow processes (Koskela and Sharpe, 1994).  The second is a risk based 
approach which is mainly concerned with overcoming transactional governance 
problems (see Fig. 1), and considers 'risk' to be the main criterion influencing 
procurement selection decisions. Advocators of this approach (e.g. Hibberd and Basden, 
1996), cited in Love et al. (1998), suggest that contractual arrangements should be 
primarily conducted for risk allocation and mitigation purposes, in that way determining 
the type of the procurement method that would fulfil the client’s objectives. Thus, a 
debate exists in literature upon whether procurement arrangements should be adapted to 
support production system requirements or tailored to transactional characteristics.  
 
TCE has the objective of total cost minimisation (Winch, 1989; Walker and Wing, 
1999). It aims to reduce both transaction and production costs (total costs). TCE, 
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however, recognises that making decisions about government structures encompasses a 
trade-off between transaction and production costs (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). A 
review of 45 empirical TC analysis articles, published from 1982 to 1996, revealed that 
discrepancy exists among scholars about deciding on whether transaction or production 
costs have a stronger impact on the choice of governance structures (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997).  
 
 
Two subsequent studies by Koskela and Ballard (2006, 2012), which aimed to criticise 
the underestimation of the idea of production in construction management and 
economic theories, claimed that TCE lacks a proper conceptualization of production and 
waste; and criticised Williamson’s (1985) work due to its weak and biased justification 
against the optimality assumption. This implies, according to their argument, that no 
matter how efficient the chosen governance structure is, there is no optimal/perfect 
structure. Thus, the extent of non-optimality is waste that needs to be tackled through 
economising on production activities. Finally, they concluded by stressing that an 
“economic organization should aim at minimisation of the sum of transaction and 
production costs, given that different kinds of transactions and productive activities are 
more efficiently governed by different modes of governance” (Koskela and Ballard, 
2012, p. 731).  
 
 
In construction, there is no ready-made product to buy (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). Both 
the client and the project-supply-chain have to interact in order to create the final 
product. Hence, there are substantial trends towards collaborative ways of working as a 
means for improving project outcomes; it is therefore important to consider how 
construction clients and companies tend to protect (safeguard) their project-specific 
interests and assets, against perceived opportunism, during procurement procedures. 
Very little, if any studies, have sought to question the efficiency and effectiveness of 
safeguards crafted by contracting parties in construction procurement. This is an 
important question hence increased trustful collaboration between project parties is 
argued to be an appropriate remedy for many of the industry’s challenges.  Based on the 
inductive findings of this study, followed by a critical review of extant literature, this 
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study identified various safeguarding approaches (Table 6.2) and analysed their impacts 
on supply-chain performance and project outcomes (See Figures 8.3 and 8.7).  
Table 8.2: A categorisation of safeguarding approaches in construction procurement, 
according to their underpinning theoretical perspective and level of prevalence 
 
Conventional  safeguarding approaches 
based on 'risk allocation' considerations 
Less prevalent safeguarding approaches 
based on 'process flow' considerations 
Standard forms of contract Relational contracting 
Use of Disclaimer/Exculpatory clauses Shared risks and rewards 
Traditional insurance arrangements/products Single project insurance  
Collateral warranties Latent defects insurance 
 
 
As critically discussed earlier, these 'risk averse' safeguarding approaches based on 
transactional considerations offer little incentive for cooperation to emerge; instead they 
entrench wasteful processes across the supply chain and throughout the project life 
cycle (e.g. opportunism, unnecessary premiums, claims and disputes). By tailoring 
procurement decisions to 'transactional' characteristics, clients (or focal companies) 
concentrate on formal risk allocation, through contractual arrangements, in an attempt to 
maximise their own profits; thereby neglecting the significance of maintaining and 
enhancing the flow of production processes, and overlooking the interdependency 
between project partners in their efforts to maximise value. For these reasons, this study 
stresses that procurement arrangements should be crafted to suit the chosen project 
delivery system and improve flow processes, rather than being tailored to transactional 
characteristics and dictated by the selected contract type. 
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Figure 8.7: A simplified model of general potential impacts of the use of risk-averse 
safeguarding approaches on project performances and outcomes - Modified from 
Zaghloul and Hartman (2003) 
 
8.5 The Complex and Dynamic Nature of Waste in Construction 
It is important to stress that construction processes are non-linear, interrelated and take 
place within a dynamic environment that includes lots of variables. Thus, relationships 
between different kinds of waste are very complex (Formoso et al., 2015). Figure 8.8 
shows the interconnectedness and dependency nature between different causes of waste, 
which occur as a result of the use of prevailing inefficient procurement practices (Figure 
8.2). This diagram was developed using NVivo matrix-coding query (in association 
with a careful data-verification of the resulting patterns) and sketched using Insights 
Maker (a web-based modelling tool) to reveal the complexity and interactive nature of 
waste existing at the procurement and supply-chain level. Indeed, it was found that this 
dynamic ‘causal network of wastes’ (Figure 8.8) leads to the consequential wastes 
identified by this study (see Figure 5.6 in Chapter 5). 
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Figure 8.8: The dynamic and interactive nature of waste existing at the procurement and 
supply-chain level 
 
 
This phenomenon is relatively similar to what Koskela et al. (2013) referred to as a 
‘chain of wastes’, with one waste acting as a ‘core’ or ‘lead’ waste. In their study, 
‘Making-do’, in particular, was argued by them to be a core waste in construction (at the 
production-level of analysis) with substantial negative impact on the production system. 
Subsequently, Formoso et al. (2015) suggested that by attacking this core, one can also 
eliminate the wastes caused by it. According to them, the causal connections between 
wastes are not necessarily uni-directional; they can also be reciprocal (A leads to B 
while at the same time B leads to A). Thus, devising operational strategies focusing on 
the reduction of the effects would still be useful, as it can help to generate a root-cause 
analysis leading to the core wastes in the system (for example, this could be achieved 
using LPS). They concluded their study by offering a preliminary causal analysis of 
waste generated on site, with a focus on the production (design and construction) stage. 
They also reflected on their reasoning approach as follows: 
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“Our line of reasoning has taken us from the conceptualization of a linear chain 
with clear causes and effects to a complex network with both uni-directional and 
interactive connections between the nodes. In such a complex network we 
maynot be able to identify and analyse all the connections. We see a pattern, but 
are not able to decompose or decode the network in all its components and 
interconnections” (Formoso et al., 2015, p. 457) 
 
 
The conceptual model, which shows the causal networks of waste, developed in this 
study (Figure 8.8) is relatively consistent with the conceptualisations offered by 
Koskela et al. (2013) and Formoso et al. (2015). However, this study adds to their 
works by offering different perspectives and explanations; hence this study was based 
on a different level of analysis (i.e. institutional, procurement and supply-chain level) 
underpinned by various theoretical perspectives (see Figure 8.1), and approached using 
a reflexive grounded-theory methodology (see Chapter 3).  
 
 
Given that construction procurement systems are formed of various procurement 
subsystems and options, leading to hybrid governance structures (see Figure 2.1 and 
Table 2.3 in Chapter 2); it is important to consider the influence of the interactions 
between the sub-systems on the output of the main procurement system (Kumaraswamy 
and Dissanayak, 1998). It is also critical to ensure the compatibility of the chosen 
procurement options from within each sub-system with the selected project delivery 
system, client and project needs, and other contextual conditions that bear on the project 
(Kumaraswamy and Dissanayak, 1998). For instance, it may be unsuitable to choose a 
cost-reimbursement pricing option for a traditionally procured project (Love et al., 
1998). Similarly, it would be inefficient to adapt a bid evaluation strategy based on 
lowest tender price for the selection of project team members of a partnering project 
(Eriksson et al., 2008). Thus, it makes sense to emphasise that procurement 
arrangements should be crafted to support production system requirements and improve 
flow processes, rather than being based on cost and risk-averse considerations that may 
lead to sub-optimisation. The premise here is based on 'optimising the whole' rather than 
'optimising the parts'.  
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This study has shown how inefficient construction procurement governance 
arrangements can lead to a complex ‘causal network of wastes’ at the procurement and 
supply-chain level, contributing to the generation of consequential wastes. Indeed, the 
study has, in particular, identified various prevailing procurement and contractual 
arrangements, which are taken-for-granted and impede efficiency and improvement 
efforts in construction (Figure 8.2). The study also exposed to clients and decision-
makers some of the unnecessary waste they embed into their projects by adhering to 
these prevalent governance arrangements (for example, see Figures 8.3, 8.7 and 8.8 
above, and also Figures 5.1 and 5.6 in Chapter 5). Thus, it makes sense to propose that 
if clients stopped adhering to these prevailing inefficient procurement practices, they 
could by this way eliminate or reduce the substantial negative impacts of these 
inefficient procurement arrangements on the production system; thereby enhancing 
process-flow, eliminating or reducing the consequential wastes, and minimising total 
project costs (transactional plus production costs).  
 
 
That said, it is arguably more crucial to address the institutional factors and underlying 
fundamental paradigms, which influence construction procurement choices and lead to 
the persistence of waste in construction. In other words, it would be unwise to tackle 
procurement processes solely, without exploring the institutions and the context 
influencing the people involved in the construction procurement process. To say that 
waste is created due to human error is unhelpful; blame arguably fails to facilitate 
learning to ‘do better’ and similarly fails to lead us towards effective methods of 
reduction or prevention. Human behaviour is always influenced by the context in which 
it takes place (i.e. broader organisational system or institutional environment). Without 
a deep understanding of the institutional factors contributing to poor decision-making, it 
is very likely that similar flawed or risky decisions will recur.  
 
 
Institutions influence beliefs, norms and actions; thus they shape performance and 
outcomes. According to institutionalists (for example see Dequesh, 2002; Phua, 2006), 
there are at least three types of influences that institutions have on behaviour (Dequesh, 
2002, Phua, 2006): (1) constraints on behaviour (i.e. restrictive function), (2) influence 
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on perception or reception of reality (i.e. informational-cognitive function), (3) 
influence on end goals that people pursue (i.e. motivational or teleological function).  
The next section, therefore, provides a discussion on various institutional factors 
influencing construction procurement, as identified by this study, and explains how 
these prevailing institutions contribute to the entrenchment of waste in construction. It is 
argued that these institutional factors are the main reasons for the persistence and 
prevalence inefficient procurement practices in construction. 
 
 
8.6 Causes of Prevalence and Entrenchment of the Current Construction Model 
This study identified various inefficient procurement and governance practices that are 
common in construction projects (Figures 8.2 and 8.5), leading to frequent 
unsatisfactory performances and outcomes (See Figures 8.3, 8.7, 8.8, 5.1 and 5.6). This 
raises the question as to why these inefficient conventional procurement practices 
remain very prevalent, as opposed to newer and more collaborative forms of 
procurement that are deemed to be more beneficial and efficient. This is a valid 
fundamental question hence there are substantial trends towards establishing trustful 
collaborative ways of working between project parties, as a means for improving project 
performance and outcomes (see e.g. Eriksson et al., 2008; Xue et al., 2010; Sebastian, 
2011; Walker et al., 2017). 
 
 
Previous studies, in main stream construction management or economics literature, have 
provided different explanations that helped to partially explain the reasons of coherence 
of prevailing approaches to construction project procurement. For example, Brensen and 
Haslam (1991) linked this to the "habituation" phenomenon that occurs as experienced 
clients establish a 'close-minded' approach to building, thereby merely utilizing those 
procurement procedures that are most familiar to them (Love et al., 1998). This was 
also related to the fact that the construction industry operates in a very competitively 
cost-driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000). Subsequently, a study by 
Greenwood (2001) investigated whether relationships between main-contractor and 
subcontractors are improving following the Egan’s report, by assessing contactors’ 
compliance with the code of practice for the selection of subcontractors (CIB, 1997) and 
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the Housing, Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act (1996). Compellingly, it was 
found in Greenwood’s study that the typical main contractor - subcontractor relationship 
is still traditional, cost-driven, and potentially confrontational. Evidence from their 
survey revealed that some main contractors were adopting sub-contractor partnering 
approaches but merely for mere-ceremony purposes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977); while 
the majority of the main-contractors were still utilising ‘business as usual’ approaches. 
 
Furthermore, in a study by Eriksson et al. (2008), it was suggested that clients lack the 
incentives for the use of partnering due to inadequate awareness and understanding of 
how their procurement procedures influence their likelihoods of creating a cooperative 
environment. Other reasons found by them included lack of top management 
commitment and resistance to change. Interestingly, Phua (2006) attributed this to the 
lack of dominating industry norms that advocate the use of partnering (e.g. government 
policies and guidelines, technologies, beliefs and expectations).  
 
Studies based on production management perspectives, particularly lean construction 
theories, have also provided useful insights. For instance, Koskela and Howell (2002) 
argued that traditional project management theories and methods are counterproductive 
and “create self-inflicted problems that seriously undermine performance” (p. 11). They 
criticised the theory of ‘projects as transformation’ and theory of ‘management-as-
planning’, which underlie the theoretical foundation of traditional project management 
as advocated in the PMBOK Guide by PMI and widely applied in practice. The 
deficiency of these theories was exposed by comparing them to theories of ‘TFV of 
production’ and ‘management-as organisation’ that were systematically argued to be 
more empirically valid.  
 
Furthermore, a literature review study by Bølviken and Koskela (2016) offered eight 
possible reasons as to why waste-reduction has not conquered construction, in 
comparison to other industries like manufacturing. Four out of their eight reasons could 
be seen as directly related to the relationship between construction procurement and 
waste in construction. The first is that traditional construction management is focussed 
on management of contracts rather than the management of production. This argument 
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aligns with this study’s inductive findings. The second relates to the fire-fighting culture 
and mentality to solving problems in the construction industry. This forms part of the 
current study’s explanations as to how ‘consequential wastes’ reinforce institutional 
factors, leading to vicious cycles of inefficient safeguarding practices. The third 
suggests that the prevalence of the task-centred view to construction, as opposed to the 
flow perspective, has effectively shifted attention away from waste. This explanation 
aligns with the study’s argument that construction procurement arrangements should be 
designed to support process-flow rather than being mainly based on transactional risk-
averse considerations. The forth is attributed to treating the construction project as a 
temporary organisation, which leads to a fragmented value-chain due to lack of long-
term supply-chain relationships. This aligns with the study’s identification of ‘lack of 
continuous learning and improvement due to change of suppliers’ as an example of 
waste of human potential and/or value-loss. Overall, the empirical results of this study 
(See Chapter 4, 5 and 6) are relatively consistent with Bølviken and Koskela’s (2016) 
conceptual explanations mentioned above. However, this study supplements their work 
by providing empirical evidence to their arguments. Furthermore, this study adds to 
previous knowledge by exploring the ‘institutional’ factors influencing approaches to 
construction procurement (Figure 8.9). The findings of this study, as supported by the 
evaluations of various UK industry experts, revealed that these institutional factors 
combine to create the coherent, and yet wasteful, prevailing model for construction 
project delivery (See Chapters 6 and 7).  
 
Figure 8.9: Institutional Sources of Waste in Construction 
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A number of theoretical perceptions exist in literature to predict and explain the reasons 
for the establishment, process and outcomes of several forms of institutional and 
organisational arrangements. Out of these, two principal theories are seen to provide 
profound conceptual insights: (1) Transaction cost economics (TCE) (see for example, 
Williamson, 1975, 1985, 2000; North, 1994); and (2) Neo-institutional theory of 
organisational studies (see for example, Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 2005). Despite the distinctive differences underpinning each of 
these two perspectives, an overarching assumption common to both is that (social or 
economic) actors make rational, albeit bounded, and purposive decisions about the types 
of contractual and organisational arrangements, that they would form or join, depending 
on what they conceive to be most beneficial (Phua, 2006). 
 
 
From an economic perspective, it is easy to understand why economic actors are more 
likely to conform to institutional forces, as this will be based on obvious cost and 
efficiency-based considerations; and also due to the prevailing “norms that provide 
‘legitimacy’ to a set of rules” (North, 1994, p. 366). However, the social perspective 
argues that the compliance with institutional processes is not necessarily based on 
efficiency considerations. Instead, conformance is principally based on social 
legitimacy drivers (Scott, 2012). The premise of institutional theory is that individual 
(i.e. persons) and collective (i.e. organisations) social actors are expected to comply 
with institutional forces imposed on them, because those that conform are rewarded 
through increased legitimacy, survival capability, social support, stability, access to 
resources, acceptance in professions, and expedience to avoid questioning (Oliver, 
1991, Scott, 2005).  
 
When the same institutional forces continue to exist over time, firms within relatively 
circumscribed fields that are bounded by shared understandings and mutual dependence 
(Scott, 2012) become more homogenous (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); and thus a 
dominant organisational arrangement, or 'proto-institution' (Lawrence et al., 2002), is 
likely to occur (Phua, 2006). Thus, as a corollary, it is argued that the extent to which 
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actors are inclined to the use of prevalent procurement arrangements (e.g. traditional 
procurement systems), that are supposed to be inefficient in comparison to other more  
innovative and collaborative approaches, is a function of how deeply entrenched the 
institutional environment is with respect to rules, norms, beliefs and expectations that 
are associated with the concerned field and practices. 
 
 
The findings of this study revealed that many construction buyers conform to prevalent 
(inefficient) procurement procedures, due to institutional pressure imposed on them. 
Furthermore, most of the clients, who procure construction projects, lack experience and 
may only ever build once or twice (Love et al., 2010). Thus, they invariably rely on 
taking professional advice from consultants, financiers, and legal advisers. These actors 
who are relatively powered than other (Winch, 2000a), may have a vested interest (i.e. 
social and/or economic motivations) in the wide-spread use of specific procurement 
arrangements; thereby dictating the rules of the game - the way we do business. 
Furthermore, the findings of the study demonstrated that procurement arrangements are 
often shaped by institutional forces. These forces do not necessarily guarantee better 
value services (North, 1994); they are more likely to serve the interests of large industry 
players (e.g. Tier-1 contractors) with the bargaining power to create new rules. Thus, 
these institutions influence approaches to construction procurement. Consequently, as 
procurement (institutional) arrangements prevail, they influence and govern the way 
that project partners behave and interact, leading to common and repeated unsatisfactory 
performances (see Figures 8.3 and 8.8) and consequential wastes (see Figure 5.6).  
 
 
Furthermore, it was found in this study that institutional factors and procurement 
arrangements can be reinforced by their own consequences (e.g. attempting to control 
outcome costs through excessive use of competitive price tendering, leading to claims 
planning. They are also reinforced by contingent events (e.g. the discovery of 
unexpected ground conditions leading to attempts to transfer risk). The study also 
explored the safeguarding problem in construction procurement, and revealed how 
conventional safeguarding governance and approaches can lead to irreconcilable and 
self-perpetuating cycles of waste. These safeguarding practices, although underpinned 
by the drive to reduce costs, often have the opposite effect causing parties to safeguard 
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their own financial position, leading to margin slippage, adversarial relationships, and 
costly and time consuming disputes.  
 
 
This study also identified buyers’ flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual 
stage (Figure 8.10), and argues that these fundamental paradigms (cultural-cognitive 
institutions) contribute to the apparent coherence, yet, wastefulness, of the current 
prevailing construction procurement and business models. For example, the findings of 
the study revealed that buyers’ general focus on managing construction projects through 
contract-control rather than production-control, leads to what this study has 
conceptualised as inefficient ‘historical clauses’. These historical clauses are formed 
over the years due to treating symptoms rather than getting to the root-causes, resulting 
in the poor functionality of contracts becoming more compounded. This phenomenon 
has been described by various participants of this study in different ways. For example: 
“I will tell you having been an owner for 10 years, I ask those questions: why 
are we doing this? Because we always have...and in many cases it goes back to 
one instance when something did not go the way it was supposed to, and rather 
than addressing the root-cause to that problem, people ended up changing the 
procurement policy and contract in order to never have that problem again. So 
they did not really fix the problem. All they did is to put a bandage on it, and 
sooner or later you start to look like a 'mummy' from all the bandages as 
opposed to really trying to focus on how to address the root-cause of the 
problem” (President of a consultancy company, November 2015, Interview). 
 
Similarly, a senior consultant and fellow member of the Institution of Civil Engineers 
(FICE) asserted the following: 
“Specific clauses grow up within organisations as a history of things which have 
happened to organisations. So, it's a history of things that have gone wrong that 
the client then seeks to address by amending a contract in a particular way; and 
so it becomes a history. I guess the danger at it is that sometimes the reasons 
that something has gone wrong are not always fully addressed. And therefore, 
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the client ends up introducing an inappropriate contract solution for the 
problem. (Senior Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015) 
 
 
Based on the arguments above, it becomes clear that buyers’ habit of adding or 
amending contractual clauses to avoid problems from happening again, without fully 
addressing the root-causes or considering the suitability of the amended clauses in a 
different context, often complicates the problem rather than solves it; thereby, leading to 
vicious cycles of waste. There are various other reasons for how and why the industry 
fails to take appropriate measures to ameliorate the reinforcement loops of waste (as 
shown in Figure 4.1). For instance, the construction industry is generally renowned for 
its blame culture (Egan, 1998) and fire-fighting mentality to problem-solving (Bølviken 
and Koskela, 2016); these factors inhibit the industry’s capacity for improvement. In 
addition, there tends to be less opportunities for learning from project outcomes, due to 
the one-off nature of many construction projects and the short-term focus characterising 
many construction clients and decision-makers, Adding to this, the construction 
industry, as an organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), is particularly 
characterised by its high levels of complexity and industry specific uncertainties and 
interdependences (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). These contextual factors force many 
construction buyers and organisations to adhere to prevailing procurement practices and 
ways of working, imitate each other, and to strictly follow advice from consulting firms 
and professional institutions.  
 
Furthermore, the construction industry is generally characterised by a lack of a learning 
curve (Carrillo et al., 2012; Hartmann and Dorée, 2013), where existing values and 
beliefs are not open for questioning; and this constitutes a general barrier to change, 
improvement and innovation (Kululange et al., 1999). These arguments have been 
validated by five industry experts, who were invited to evaluate the main findings of 
this study (see Chapter 7, for a fuller review); so for example: 
“I’d largely agree with it on the basis that the response to manifest waste is 
often institutionalized by the personal agendas of actors within it attempting to 
preserve or promote their own careers. I believe institutional tolerance of 
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personal failure in the construction industry tends to be low rather than 
learning. So, the response tends to be to apportion blame, dispense with the 
opportunity to learn from accumulated experience, introduce a ‘hero’ with a 
new approach – repeat” (Senior Consultant (FICE), Oct 2015) 
 
Figure 8.10: Construction buyers’ flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual 
stage 
 
Accordingly, it has been shown in this study that the current institutional factors 
surrounding construction procurement context lead to more social legitimacy and/or use 
of risk-averse safeguarding approaches in procurement, which deter attention away 
from core-efficiency purposes (i.e. production); thereby restricting value creation and 
possibly decreasing revenues for all project parties. When the same or similar 
institutional pressures continue over time, isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
leads to (inefficient) construction procurement arrangements becoming more 
homogeneous, and as a result, standardised patterns of (wasteful) behaviours, 
performances and consequential wastes occur. Consequently, as construction buyers 
remain to react defensively on the basis of personal or organizational self-interest, or 
continue in taking inappropriate measures to problem-solving due to their flawed 
assumptions or because of resource constraints that limit ideal response modes, the 
reinforcement loops increase leading to the ‘institutionalisation of waste’ in 
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construction. These findings and explanations are relatively consistent with arguments 
made by Winch (2000a) who stressed, albeit through a relatively limited economic basis 
that lacked empirical evidence: 
"Just as patterns of behaviour become institutionalized so that they act back 
upon the actors through the process of structuration (Giddens, 1984), the rules 
of the game come to be seen as given, normal, the only way to do things. 
Careers and status become dependent upon certain rules; threats to those rules 
become personal attacks". (p. 90) 
 
8.7 A Reflection on Thomas Kuhn’s Conceptual Model of ‘Paradigm Shift’ 
Thomas Kuhn is an American physicist who wrote extensively on the nature and history 
of science. One of his major contributions to knowledge is introducing the conceptual 
model of ‘Paradigm Shift’, which presented a radical view of the philosophy behind 
science. In his influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962), he 
argued that science undergoes periodic paradigm changes, as opposed to progressing in 
a linear, continuous and snow-balling way. In the book’s second edition, Thomas Kuhn 
(1970) used and defined the term ‘paradigm’ in two main, but different, senses.  In one 
sense, he stated that ‘paradigm’ stands for “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 
175). In another sense, it was defined by him as “the concrete puzzle-solutions which, 
employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of 
the remaining puzzles of normal science” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). His work illustrated 
how all scientific fields go through the same basic cycle of ‘paradigm shift’ (Fig. 8.11).  
 
Figure 8.11: An illustration of Thomas Kuhn’s cycle of ‘Paradigm Shift’ (Adopted from 
Thwink, 2014) 
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According to Kuhn’s cycle of paradigm shift, any scientific field begins in ‘Pre-
science’, where scientists and researchers have a problem area of interest but are unable 
to solve it or make much progress. Once they manage to establish a guiding model of 
understanding (i.e. Field’s Paradigm) that works for them, they advance to ‘Normal 
Science’ stage, where they remain most of the time except when their paradigm 
undergoes a cycle of paradigm shift. 
 
 ‘Model drift’ is caused by anomalies, which is described by Thomas Kuhn as 
unexpected discovery of problems that a prevailing paradigm cannot solve or explain. 
Typically a paradigm, in the same way as a theory matures, can be modified to 
accommodate anomalies; however, if too many fundamental anomalies build-up, then 
an advancement to the next stage of ‘Model Crisis’ takes place. At this step of the cycle, 
the scientific field's efforts and attentions are best spent constructing a new model that 
works. However, Thomas Kuhn argued that the route to recognising that a prevailing 
paradigm model is in crisis, and acting upon it, is not direct and is usually delayed due 
to the following reasons: 
In science…novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, 
against a background provided by expectation. Initially, only the anticipated 
and usual are experienced even under circumstances where anomaly is later to 
be observed” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 64) 
 
Thomas Kuhn, deliberately, used the term ‘shared paradigms’ rather than ‘shared rules 
and assumptions’, when attempting to explain the main cause of coherence for normal 
research traditions. One of the main reasons for giving paradigms a status prior to that 
of shared rules and assumptions, as suggested by him is that “rules…derive from 
paradigms, but paradigms can guide research even in the absence of rule” (Kuhn, 
1970, p. 42). This conceptualisation of ‘shared paradigms’ in normal science suggests 
that a (flawed) research paradigm may prevail and persist for a long time, even if its 
central theories can no longer explain discovered anomalies. This prevalence can occur 
as shared paradigms become taken-for-granted, thereby making it difficult for 
researchers to pursue problems beyond the initial layer of observations. It could 
Chapter 8: Discussion and Integration of Extant Literature 
  
Page | 282  
 
possibly also prevail because of internal change resistance (Kuhn, 1970) and vested 
interests of key scholars in the field, as asserted by Bolton (2005, p. 21) as follows: 
“Ironically leading scientists in the field may be the least likely to recognise 
anomaly or to accept a new paradigm because they are entrenched in the 
accepted paradigm. This is due at least in part to their substantial role in 
creating and governing the major institutions of the contemporary normal 
science establishment”. 
 
Subsequently, the ‘Model Revolution’ stage of Kuhn’s cycle occurs once one or more 
competing new theories or paradigm models emerge and find their way out of the crisis. 
This stage is revolutionary is nature, as it requires changes to core assumptions, habits 
and values; it is thus frequently seen as threatening to the roles and norms of 
participants in the field. The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a revolutionary 
model, however, requires radical system-wide change rather than improving the pieces 
as per incremental change. This argument is supported by Kuhn (1970, pp. 84-85), who 
stressed that: 
The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new 
tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process, one 
achieved by an articulation or extension of the old paradigm. Rather it is a 
reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes 
some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many 
of its paradigm methods and applications…When the transition is complete, the 
profession will have changed its view of the field, its methods, and its goals”  
 
The ‘Model Change’ stage then becomes complete when the new paradigm becomes the 
generally accepted and prevailing guide in the field, progressing to the ‘Normal 
Science’ stage where the cycle starts again. It is important here, however, to clarify that 
continuity in a paradigm (a prolonged normal science stage) is not necessarily a bad 
thing, as it enables researchers to share a common understanding and to organise, 
modify and refine the vast amount of knowledge that grows through the cumulative 
process of scientific inquiry. The danger, however, is when the prevailing paradigm 
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becomes so embedded to an extent that any new way of thinking becomes seen as 
incomprehensible and/or unacceptable, and thus resisted or completely rejected. 
 
Having provided an overview of Kuhn’s cycle of ‘Paradigm Shift’, it can be argued that 
Kuhn’s Cycle is not only limited to the field of science; instead it can be applicable to 
any research field or group of professionals using a shared model of understanding to 
solve their problems. It also seems that Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigms’ as the source of 
coherence for normal science and research traditions, resembles with and supports the 
study’s developed concept of ‘institutional waste’, particularly, the institutional factors 
identified within this study as causes for the coherence, and yet wastefulness, of the 
current prevailing construction model (see section 8.6). By referring to this study’s 
conceptual model (Figure 4.1) and main findings, it is suggested that the construction 
industry, as an organisational field, is currently going through a stage that kind of sits 
in-between the ‘Model Crisis’ and ‘Model Revolution’ steps of Kuhn’s cycle. At this 
stage, as demonstrated in this study, the prevailing current construction model has 
become so embedded and so entrenched, despite being so wasteful. Further, as found in 
this study, prevailing approaches to problem-solving (e.g. through conventional 
safeguarding approaches to construction procurement) appear to complicate problems 
rather than solve them, leading to vicious cycles of waste (see section 8.4 above). 
 
Based on the findings of this study, it is proposed that there is a crucial need for 
scholars, practitioners and decision-makers within the construction industry to recognise 
and act upon the prevailing ‘institutional sources of waste’ identified in this study, with 
a primary focus on the underlying ‘paradigms’ or ‘cultural-cognitive institutions’ (e.g. 
construction buyers’ flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual stage). 
Further, it is suggested that the construction industry might advance to ‘Model Change’ 
once alternative ways of looking at the world (e.g. via the lens of the TFV theory of 
production) become more generally accepted and prevalent than the current prevailing 
puzzle-solving approaches based on theories of construction economics that are 
inherently flawed (see Koskela and Ballard 2006 and 2012; Koskela, 2018). 
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8.8 Implications and Future Research 
This study explored the role played by institutional forces within the construction 
procurement context in embedding process waste in construction projects (see Fig 6.3). 
The findings of the study demonstrated that construction procurement arrangements are 
shaped by institutional structures, beliefs and attitudes as well as project characteristics. 
In particular, the study identified various prevailing inefficient procurement practices, 
and found that they often mirror institutional factors. These inefficient procurement 
practices lead to the generation of dynamic ‘causal networks of waste’ (Figure 8.8), 
which contribute to consequential wastes in terms of financial losses or cost overruns, 
time waste, quality loss or value-loss in design, and/or waste of human potential 
throughout the production stage (design and delivery of design) of construction projects.  
 
 
The complex, interactive and reciprocal nature of waste, revealed by this study, is 
relatively consistent with the conceptualisations of ‘waste in construction’ offered 
Koskela et al. (2013), Formoso et al. (2015), and Bølviken and Koskela (2016). 
However, this study contributes to knowledge in two different ways. First, this study 
supplements aforementioned studies by investigating the nature of waste within the 
institutional, procurement and commercial environments surrounding the design and 
delivery of construction projects. Thus, the study investigated waste at a different level 
that is underexplored. Secondly, this study provides a novel perspective to the 
generation and persistence of waste in construction. As stressed by an industry expert 
with more than thirty years of industry experience: 
“Exploring the factors that influence waste at an institutional level looks at the 
industrial and social contexts that lead to waste as opposed to trying to ‘fix 
waste’ at a task level. The industrial and social contexts in which projects are 
conceived, promoted, procured and delivered has a far greater bearing on 
efficiency outcomes than task efficiency itself – which is after all only acted out 
in whatever context construct has prevailed” (Senior Consultant and Fellow 
Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 26
th
 March 2017). 
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At a production level, it has been argued by aforesaid studies that by attacking the core 
wastes, one can also eliminate the wastes caused by it. There can also be good reasons 
to focus on the resulting waste, as focusing on the reduction of the effect can help to 
trigger a root cause analysis leading to the core wastes in the system. As a corollary, the 
findings of this study suggest that research and industry efforts should be focussed on 
addressing the institutional factors and underlying paradigms influencing approaches to 
construction procurement, as root-causes of problems. Clients and buyers in general 
would also benefit from ‘not’ adhering to the prevailing inefficient procurement 
practices identified by this study; as by eliminating these practices they could also 
eliminate the resulting complex network of ‘causal wastes’, which lead to substantial 
negative impacts on production. 
 
 
Remarkably, there has not yet been a commonly agreed list of ‘core waste’ for 
production in construction. However this study managed to identify various regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive institutional factors that contribute to the generation 
and persistence of waste in construction. There have been efforts investigating the 
impact of regulative institutions (e.g. government, political, and market related factors) 
on construction projects (see for example, Winch, 2000; Wijewardana, 2013; Vadali, 
2015). However, less attention has been given to normative and cultural-cognitive 
systems, which are vital forces (Scott, 2012) affecting the success of construction 
projects. As emphasised by an industry expert who participated in evaluating the 
findings of this study: 
“Your use of the phrase imperfect normative and cultural-cognitive institutions 
is relevant, as poor practice has been normalised and embedded in the industry 
with little real criticism and research into how these norms can be challenged” 
(Senior Project/Contracts Manager, 20
th
 March 2017, Evaluation Exercise). 
 
 
This study identified buyers’ flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual stages 
of construction, as a cultural-cognitive institution influencing construction practice and 
leading to the persistence of waste in construction. It is therefore stressed in this study 
that without addressing these fundamental paradigms, wasteful procurement systems are 
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more likely to prevail, persist and even deteriorate. It has been suggested by a research 
expert that these findings could form the “basis of a useful check-list of do's and don'ts 
for procurers”. The author agrees that using these findings as a list of don’ts for 
procurers’ could help to solve many of the industry’s institutionalised problems, but at 
same time, the author believes that a prescriptive list of do’s would require further 
research and considerations. As stated by Sutton and Staw (1995) in their study of ‘what 
theory is not’, the author of this study also stresses that “the problem is more complex 
and the solutions [are] complicated (p. 383, word in bracket added by author). 
 
 
The study, also, exposed the safeguarding problem in construction procurement as a 
cause of waste, hitherto unacknowledged, leading to irreconcilable and self-perpetuating 
cycles of waste. In particular, the study demonstrated how conventional safeguarding 
processes adopted by construction clients as part of their approach to procurement often 
complicate the problem rather than solve it. Furthermore, the study revealed the 
usefulness of using principles of Lean Construction (LC) in association with TCE when 
analysing and deciding on appropriate construction-procurement governance 
arrangements. More specifically, the study demonstrated how that when viewing these 
transactional-based safeguarding approaches through a "lean" lens, it can be observed 
that they are wasteful and/or create waste. These findings enabled the study to develop 
categorisation of various safeguarding approaches within construction procurement 
according to their underpinning theoretical perspective and level of prevalence (see 
Table 8.2). This categorisation could be useful in helping procurers and decision-makers 
to consider alternative procurement arrangements and organisational techniques that 
could be of value and support collaborative ways of working.  
 
There have been moves within the construction industry towards more collaborative 
procurement and project delivery approaches; however a replicable recipe for aligning 
interests and keeping good intentions in place is still missing. This study has shed 
empirical light up on various professional roles and firms that could have a vested 
interest in the wide-spread use of inefficient construction procurement arrangements and 
options. These include lawyers, QSs, accountants, procurement consultants, tier-1 
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contractors, and concept architects (see section 6.2.11in Chapter 6 to view the full list). 
Typically those professionals do not take a central stake in the project outcome, only a 
stake in the process by which the project is delivered. In other words, none of those 
professionals is directly involved in production (design and construction). Thus, it is 
suggested in this study that there is a crucial need to assess the varying cultures, beliefs, 
structures, systems and behaviours of the identified professions and the environments in 
which they operate.  
 
Such an evaluation, however, needs to draw upon theory from disciplines outside both 
construction and manufacturing such as economics, law and sociology, in order to 
unfold the existing deeply-rooted normative and cultural-cognitive institutions leading 
to the coherence and yet wastefulness of the current approaches to construction projects. 
The underlying premise is that by understanding the detailed causes of the apparent 
coherence for the prevailing mind-sets and construction models and revealing the 
consequential waste, then the adoption of more efficient and collaborative business and 
project delivery models may become more effective and widespread. Figure 8.12 below 
provides a proposed guide map of how and where future studies should start. This 
approach resonates with Matos-Castano’s (2014) assertion that providing an enabling 
environment for newer and more collaborative construction business and procurement 
models entails a combination of changing existing institutions influencing project 
procurement and creating supporting institutions that build trustful collaboration 
between and among stakeholders.  
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Figure 8.12: Proposed guide map for future studies 
 
8.9 Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed discussion of the main findings and developed 
conceptual model and the implications of this study on theory and practice. The next 
chapter presents a conclusion to the research and a final reflection on the overall 
research processes. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations of the study of institutional 
waste within the construction industry. The chapter commences by providing a 
summary of how research objectives were achieved. This is followed by a summary of 
the main findings of the study. The main conclusions of the study are then presented 
before discussing the study’s contributions to knowledge. Finally, a reflection of the 
study’s limitations is provided and consequently recommendations for future research 
are discussed.  
 
9.2 Achievement of Research Objectives 
The construction industry is often criticised for being wasteful, confrontational, and for 
lacking trust and capacity for learning and improvement. Numerous industry reports 
have been commissioned by the UK Government and various industry organisations, 
with the aim of calling for industry-wide change and improvement. A wide range of 
different solutions have been recommended in these reports including the use of 
partnering arrangements, project bank accounts, new models of construction 
procurement, and Building Information Modelling (BIM). However, despite the many 
criticisms and the different solutions promulgated by industry reports and academic 
studies, the construction industry persistently resists the radical change demanded of it. 
There seems to be a particular project delivery mind set embedded in the organisational 
fabric of the industry that prevails regardless of the attempts to address the recognised 
inadequacies. These issues led to the development of an overarching research question 
as to why the prevailing construction model is so embedded and so entrenched, despite 
the substantial attempts to address its recognised inadequacies. 
 
Eliminating (process and physical) waste from construction design and delivery, as 
advocated by lean ideals, is a necessary step towards achieving efficiency 
improvements. However, waste-reduction understood simply as the improvement of 
current processes, rather than fundamental system redesign, is insufficient. Obtaining a 
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wider understanding and conceptualisation of waste in construction is crucial, in order 
to prepare the industry for the radical demanded of it. The main aim of this study, 
therefore, was to develop a conceptual model of ‘institutional waste’ in construction, by 
exploring the institutional, procurement, and commercial environments surrounding the 
design and delivery of construction projects in the UK. The underlying premise is that if 
we can understand the detailed causes of prevalence and entrenchment for the current 
construction model and reveal the consequential wastes, then the adoption of more 
efficient and collaborative business and project delivery models may become more 
effective and widespread. Accordingly, five main research objectives were formulated 
and achieved through the application of a rigorous research methodology presented in 
Chapter Three. Table 9.1 presents a summary of how each research objectives was 
achieved and where it has been discussed. The conclusions on each research objective 
are subsequently discussed. 
Table 9.1: A summary of how research objectives were achieved 
ID Research Objective Method of achievement 
Discussed 
in: 
R1 
To critically review the current 
understanding of the concept of 
‘waste’ in construction 
A contextual review of literature on 
waste in construction 
Chapter 
Two 
R2 
To conceptually analyse theories 
from other disciplines outside 
both construction and 
manufacturing (e.g. social 
science and economics), which 
can help to predict or explain the 
reasons for the establishment, 
process and outcomes of several 
forms of institutional and 
organisational arrangements 
A contextual review of theories of TCE 
(including NIE and Agency Theory) and 
Neo-Institutional theory of 
organisational studies. The findings of 
R1 and R2 led to the development of a 
preliminary conceptual model and six 
guiding propositions. 
Chapter 
Two 
R3 
To investigate the relationship 
between construction 
procurement and waste in 
construction 
In-depth and iterative semi-structured 
interviews with 24 senior professionals 
within the UK construction industry, 
using a reflexive grounded theory 
methodology. This included a review of 
supplementary documents offered by the 
interviewees to provide evidence or 
better explanations to their claims and 
arguments raised during interviews. In 
addition, the findings and emerging 
concepts were constantly compared with 
extant literature on construction 
procurement. 
Chapters  
Four, 
Five, Six, 
Seven, 
and Eight 
 
R4 
To explore the factors (root-
causes) leading to the persistence 
of inefficient procurement 
practices in construction 
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R5 
To develop and evaluate a 
conceptual model that 
contributes to the overall 
understanding of waste in 
construction  
The conceptual model of ‘institutional 
waste’ within the construction industry 
was developed based on the analysis and 
findings of the collected data. The 
developed model was then evaluated on 
two stages. First, through a preliminary 
unstructured interview with a 
distinguished Professor. Then, through 
an evaluation exercise that was 
conducted with five industry experts  
Chapters  
Four, 
Five, Six, 
Seven, 
and Eight 
 
 
9.2.1 A review of the concept of waste in construction (R1) 
The first objective was to explore the current understanding of the concept of ‘waste’ in 
construction, in order to seek explanations for the persistence of waste in construction, 
and also to present the study within contemporary academic discourse. In order to 
achieve this objective, the study reviewed waste-related studies in lean construction and 
main-stream construction management and economics literature. This objective was 
achieved and discussed in chapter two. An overall analysis of the concept of waste as 
understood in construction revealed that: (1) research efforts aimed at understanding the 
concept of ‘waste’ are relatively limited when compared to other topics in construction, 
considering its relevance and significance to the field of construction management; (2) 
most academic and industry efforts are directed towards finding means for reducing 
construction material waste (physical waste); other important issues such as time waste 
and value creation are much less explicitly explored; (3) a small but growing number of 
studies have attempted to investigate the influence of procurement processes on the 
generation of waste in construction projects; however, most of these studies, if not all, 
have limited their attention to physical (material) waste as opposed to process waste and 
value creation or loss; (4) the prevailing understanding of waste, arguably, encourages 
the improvement of current processes rather than fundamental system redesign; (5) the 
concept of institutions is not well established in construction management and 
economics research in general, and in waste-related literature in specific; and (6) very 
limited, if any, waste-related studies have devoted attention to exploring performance-
shaping mechanisms (i.e. systems and structural arrangements), as well as the 
institutional context in which human actions and decisions are constituted. Based on 
these findings, it was concluded that there is a crucial need for obtaining a wider 
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understanding and conceptualisation of waste in construction, and developing 
construction-specific lists of wastes that are relevant and motivating for action. These 
conclusions align with the aforementioned aim of this study. 
 
9.2.2 A conceptual analysis of theoretical explanations and predictions in relation 
to the establishment, process and outcomes of institutional and organisational 
arrangements (R2) 
The second objective was to seek theoretical insights that could have the potential to 
explain or predict the reasons for the formation, process and outcomes of several forms 
of institutional (construction procurement) arrangements, and to be used for critically 
evaluating the behaviours and actions of the different professions and organisations 
involved within the construction procurement context. This objective was achieved and 
discussed in chapter two. Two principal theories were seen to provide profound 
conceptual insights: Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Neo-institutional theory of 
organisational sociology. The main outcomes of this analysis are (1) developing a basic 
conceptualisation of construction procurement governance problems and solutions; and 
(2) demonstrating how neo-institutional theory has the potential to be used as an 
analytical lens to deliver a more explicit theory of waste relating cause and effect within 
the wider aspects of construction procurement systems and relationships. These 
processes and outcomes enabled the study to outline the concept of ‘institutional waste’ 
in construction, and develop a preliminary conceptual model that comprises of six 
guiding propositions. This preliminary model was useful in terms of guiding the 
research effort during the collection of primary data. 
 
9.2.3 An investigation of the relationship between construction procurement and 
waste in construction (R3) 
The third objective was developed in order to address an existing gap in knowledge (see 
section 1.2). To achieve this objective, in-depth and iterative semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with 24 senior professionals within the UK construction industry. This 
included a review of supplementary data provided by the interviewees. In addition, the 
findings and emerging themes and relationships were constantly compared with extant 
literature on construction procurement. This resulted in a review of in-depth critical 
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review of 76 construction procurement and contractual related articles, ranging from 
1994 to 2016. Furthermore, the findings were subject to an evaluation exercise with 
various industry experts who were invited to comment on the quality of the findings 
(See Chapter 7).  This objective was achieved and discussed in chapters four, five, six, 
seven and eight. In summary, this study found that construction procurement 
arrangements influence project-team performances and behaviours, and thus impact on 
project outcomes. In particular, the study identified a number of construction 
procurement practices, which are taken-for-granted and impede efficiency and 
improvement efforts in construction (see section 9.3 below for a list of these practices). 
These prevailing procurement practices were identified by the participants of this study 
as major ‘causes of waste and inefficiencies’ in construction projects. Interestingly, it 
was also found that these procurement practices lead to dynamic a causal ‘network of 
process wastes’ (see Figure 8.2 in Chapter 8), which in turn contribute to the 
consequential wastes conceptualised by this study (financial losses and cost overruns; 
time waste; quality-loss; and waste of human potential).. 
 
9.2.4 An exploration of the (institutional) factors contributing to the prevalence 
and persistence of inefficient procurement practices in construction (R4) 
The fourth objective was to seek novel explanations as to why inefficient procurement 
practices prevail and persist. This objective was achieved using the same research 
procedures used for achieving the preceding objective (i.e. iterative interviews, review 
of supplementary empirical data provided by interviewees, comparing findings with 
extant literature on procurement, root-causes of waste in construction, and behavioural 
explanations, followed by an evaluation exercise with a small sample of industry 
experts). Discussions up on the achievements of this objective are presented in chapters 
four, five, six, seven and eight. In summary, the study identified various institutional 
factors (see section 7.3 below for a list of these factors), which influence construction 
project procurement practices and outcomes. These institutional factors combine to 
create the current prevailing model for construction project procurement and delivery, 
and their identification will, arguably, help the development of more efficient and 
effective business and project delivery models.  
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9.2.5 Developing and evaluating a conceptual model that contributes to the overall 
understanding of waste in construction (R5) 
The fifth objective of the study was to develop and evaluate a theory or a conceptual 
model that can contribute to the overall understanding of waste in construction. The 
study achieved this objective by developing a conceptual model of ‘institutional waste 
within the construction industry’ that is grounded in the data collected for this study 
(See Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). The developed conceptual model provides novel insights 
as to why the current (wasteful) construction model is so prevalent and embedded. The 
model also provides novel explanations to the generation and persistence of waste in 
construction projects.  An evaluation-exercise was conducted with a sample of industry 
experts to assess the quality and rigour (i.e. credibility, originality, resonance, and 
usefulness) of the developed model and main findings of the study. The results of this 
assessment demonstrated that the study’s developed conceptual model has met the 
aforementioned quality criteria (See Chapter 7).  
 
9.3 Summary of Main Findings 
The main findings of the study could be summarised as follows: 
• Construction procurement arrangements often mirror institutional forces. The study 
identified various institutional factors that lead to the prevalence and persistence of 
inefficient procurement practices in construction. These are as follows: (1) 
Bargaining power (power disparities within the construction market place); (2) 
Bounded rationality or lack of adequate understanding and experience of clients; (3) 
Buyers’ flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual stage; (4) Construction 
economy; (5) Cost-driven environment (sharp focus on reducing costs); (6) Political 
forces (Government-related policy and processes); (7) Price-based mind set of 
procurers; (8) Risk-aversity; (9) Self-interest (based on social legitimacy or 
commercial drivers); (10) Uncertainty (behavioural, transactional, and budget and 
funding uncertainties); (11) Vested interests of professional roles and firms not 
directly involved in production; and (12) Voluntary diffusion of imperfect norms. 
These twelve institutional factors combine to create the apparent coherence, yet 
Chapter 9: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
Page | 295  
 
wastefulness, of the current prevailing model for construction procurement and 
project delivery. 
 
• Inefficient procurement practices that prevail in the construction industry include: 
(1) Complexity of contractual procedures and mechanisms; (2) Exclusion or late 
involvement of key actors during pre-construction stages; (3) Lowest price selection 
criteria; (4) Non-joint specifications of design; (5) Non-value adding performance 
monitoring and reporting arrangements; (6) Onerous pre-selection of suppliers; (7) 
Poor payment terms and arrangements; (8) (Price-based) Tendering as an expensive 
non-value adding activity; (9) Safeguarding practices in construction procurement; 
(10) Separated procurement methods (Separating design from construction); and 
(11) Sub-optimisation (optimising the parts rather than the whole).  
 
• Clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their project-specific assets, 
against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment of formal contractual 
arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements and structures 
typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the detriment of 
the project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients 
and decision makers feel they have taken the best course of action.  
 
• Safeguarding approaches commonly used in the construction industry include the 
use of: standard forms of contracts in the absence of strong relational norms; 
disclaimer, exculpatory and privileged clauses of contract; traditional (multiple) 
insurance arrangements; performance bonds; collateral warranties; overly prescribed 
design specifications as opposed to performance specifications; and aggressive 
price-negotiations based on direct contact with tier 2 suppliers. These safeguarding 
approaches to construction procurement, based on transactional and risk-averse 
considerations, lead to irreconcilable and self-perpetuating cycles of waste in 
construction projects. 
 
• Construction procurement practices influence the way that project-parties behave 
and perform throughout the project. This study, therefore, identified the impacts of 
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the use of inefficient procurement practices on project-team performances and 
behaviours, as follows: (1) Adversarial relationship problems; (2) Conflicts; (3) 
Claims and disputes; (4) Increased commercial pressure; (5) Communication and 
information-flow problems; (6) Design issues and problems; (7) Increased risks or 
failure to mitigate risks at early stages; (8) Making unnecessary assumptions; (9) 
Opportunistic practices; and (10) Variations and change events/orders. 
 
• Construction procurement practices could lead to or support inefficient 
performances and behaviours, which in turn lead to consequential wastes. Four 
broad classifications of waste emerged out of this study: (1) Financial losses and 
cost overruns (Cost waste); (2) Time waste; (3) Quality loss (and Value loss in 
design); and (4) Waste of human potential.  
 
• Poor project outcomes due to consequential wastes may re-inforce institutional 
factors (e.g. self-interest and risk-aversity); thus encourage clients to adopt 
inefficient safeguarding procurement practices, which in-turn lead to vicious cycles 
of wasteful behaviours and practices.  
 
• ‘Institutions’ can be imperfect, and even deteriorate, due to increasing and changing 
societal demands and values over time (Godard; 2011; and Ackers, 2014), inability 
of the industry to learn from project failures (e.g. due to blame culture, fire-fighting 
mentality, treating symptoms rather than root-causes, vested interests, self-interest, 
uncertainty, risk-aversity, and buyers’ flawed assumptions and approaches to project 
delivery), or due to the fact that formal rules are often created to serve the interests 
of those with the bargaining power (e.g. tier 1 contractors) to create those rules. 
 
• The nature of waste within the construction procurement context is complex, 
dynamic, interrelated, and reciprocal. The use of inefficient construction 
procurement arrangements can lead to the generation of a causal ‘network of process 
wastes’, which in turn lead to consequential wastes. 
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9.4 Main Conclusions of the Research  
The main conclusions that can be drawn out of the findings of the study are as follows: 
• The overall conclusion is that the current prevailing (yet wasteful) construction 
model will persist, and even deteriorate, unless a holistic consideration of the 
institutional, transactional and production aspects of construction is taken. This 
implies that any industry-wide initiatives for improvement (e.g. BIM, Partnering, 
LPDS, LPS and IPD) will stall or at least fail to achieve its full potential, unless the 
prevailing institutional factors (identified within this study) are addressed.  
 
• Waste, as understood in Lean construction, does not feature in modern construction 
economics or management theory. These approaches fail to recognise the (wasteful) 
systems in which entities not only operate inefficiently, but additionally protect 
themselves by adding contingency and behaving opportunistically. The effect of 
these practices is to embed inefficient and wasteful processes across the supply 
chain and throughout the project life cycle. Consequently, they have become part of 
the institution of the construction industry – ‘the way it does business’. 
 
• Whilst safeguarding is critical in construction projects, the drive towards 
economising the transaction cost moves the institutional arrangements away from 
effective 'safeguarding' towards the use of cheaper 'adaptation' and 'performance 
evaluation' as governance methods. This explains why the construction industry 
persists in using the market or “buying” as a solution to project delivery and leads to 
safeguarding. The outcome of safeguarding approaches, based on transactional 
considerations, is a lack of control on opportunistic behaviours and the reduced 
effectiveness of in-house or cooperative arrangements. Inefficient safeguarding 
mind-sets and practices adopted by construction buyers as part of their approach to 
procurement often complicate the problem rather than solve it, and are major 
sources of institutionalised waste in construction. 
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• Construction procurement arrangements should be crafted to suit the chosen project 
delivery system and improve flow processes, rather than being tailored to 
transactional characteristics and dictated by the contract type. 
. 
• The study offers two main explanations for the prevalence and persistence of 
inefficient procurement governance arrangements in construction. First, it was found 
that clients and decision makers, in their attempt to overcome the safeguarding 
problem, mainly focus their attention and efforts on reducing ex-ante (i.e. pre-
construction phase) transaction costs while giving less attention to the impact of 
their chosen procurement arrangements on ex-post costs (production costs). In that 
way, procurement decisions tend to be ultimately focussed on contract 
administration and shifting risks; and, arguably, risk aversion often distracts 
attention away from core efficiency purposes (Williamson, 1985). The second 
explanation is based on an institutional perspective (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Oliver, 1991). By putting the safeguarding problem into context, it appears that 
clients and construction buyers conform to wasteful conventional procurement 
procedures due to institutional pressure exerted on them from third parties (e.g. 
consultants, quantity surveyors, lawyers, insurance companies, and banks). Clients 
rely heavily on professional advice from these third parties who may have a vested 
interest (i.e. social and/or economic motivations) for the wide-spread use of these 
inefficient procurement procedures. The institutional factors, identified in this study 
combine to create the prevailing current model for construction project delivery, and 
their identification will help the development of more efficient and effective 
business and project delivery models. 
 
• Construction buyers’ main flawed assumptions or errors during pre-contractual 
stage are: (1) Treating construction procurement as a commodity; (2) Focussing on 
minimising ex-ante transactional costs and not overall costs; (3) Adherence to the 
use of specific procurement arrangements and forms of contracts  (4) Taking an 
approach to construction procurement based on risk-averse transactional 
considerations rather than process-flow; (5) Dependency on external consultants and 
lawyers; and (6) Treating Symptoms rather than root-causes; and (7) Not taking 
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advantage of the procurement process to fully understand or eradicate the delivery 
partners’ assumptions. 
 
9.5 Contributions to Knowledge 
This research has contributed to the existing body of knowledge in relation to the 
concept of waste in construction, construction procurement, and grounded-theory. The 
next sections, therefore, present the main theoretical, methodological and practical 
contributions of this study. 
 
9.5.1 Theoretical contributions 
The main theoretical contributions of this research study are as follows: 
• The most important contribution to knowledge in this research is the development of 
the new conceptual model of ‘institutional waste in construction’ itself. The 
conceptual model provides a novel perspective to the generation and persistence of 
waste in construction. It also provides novel explanations as to why the prevalent 
current construction model is so embedded and so entrenched, despite the 
substantial attempts to address its recognised inadequacies. The model also provides 
novel explanations as to why inefficient procurement procedures prevail and persist 
in the construction industry.  
 
• Exposing the complex, dynamic and reciprocal nature of waste within the 
construction procurement context. To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the 
first study to explore the concept of waste within the institutional, procurement and 
commercial environments that surround the design and delivery of construction 
projects. 
 
• The study developed a theoretical foundation that demonstrates that 
conventional safeguarding approaches to construction procurement, based on 
'transactional risk-averse’ considerations are sources of waste, hitherto 
unacknowledged - Introducing the concept of the 'safeguarding problem in 
construction procurement'. 
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• To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate the 
usefulness of using principles of Lean construction in association with TCE when 
analysing construction-procurement related issues. In particular, the study shows 
how that the use of a 'lean' lens helps to expose the impact of taken-for-granted 
procurement governance arrangements on process flow. Thus, when viewing these 
transactional-based procurement approaches through a "lean" lens, it can be 
observed that they are wasteful and/or create waste. 
 
• Demonstrating that neo-institutional theory, a branch of organizational sociology, 
has the potential to be used as an analytical lens to deliver a more explicit theory of 
waste relating cause and effect within the wider aspects of construction procurement 
systems and relationships. 
 
• Providing a potential research agenda that supports the development of prescriptive 
conceptual frameworks for causal analysis of waste in construction projects 
(integrating the causes and effects of waste in-between procurement and production 
levels). This could be achieved by integrating the findings of this study, as shown in 
Figures 4.1 and 8.7 (focussed on the nature of waste within the construction 
procurement context) with the findings of Formoso et al. (2015) who investigated 
the nature of waste at the production level. 
 
9.5.2 Methodological contributions 
The aim of this study was to contribute to the concept of waste in construction by 
exploring the construction procurement and commercial contexts that surround the 
design and delivery of construction projects. The philosophical assumptions and 
exploratory nature of the research led the study to adapt a qualitative research strategy; 
thereby challenging predominating quantitative research paradigms. The research 
therefore responded to widespread criticisms related to the extensive use of quantitative 
methods, associated with positivism, in construction management research (for 
example, see Seymour and Rooke, 1995; Seymour et al., 1997; Koskela, 2017).  
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Commercial studies can be notoriously difficult to mine truth from, especially if 
attempted through direct observation of live procurement processes. Construction 
practitioners and companies are sensitive about the issues they disclose and the 
implications for their immediate or future commercial positions. The author tried to gain 
access to several case studies, but all negotiations and requests were refused due to 
commercial sensitivity reasons (See Chapter 3). As asserted by one of the most senior 
and experienced participants of this study:  
“This may be a key area of ‘Waste’ in that ‘Accurate Shared Learning’ is rarely 
obtainable in relation to commercial issues…People will share good news but 
not necessarily the bad. And the links between cause and effect in the case of 
both are rarely accurately assigned” (Fellow Member of the Institute of  Civil 
Engineers  (FICE), Senior Consultant,  UK, 8th September,  2015, E-mail 
message). 
 
 
Thus, a grounded theory (GT) approach helped to overcome these methodological 
challenges by allowing the coverage of a wider variety of cases, while at same time 
putting participants on ease and ensuring that they remain anonymous. It is important 
however to stress that in GT, the unit of analysis is not the individuals themselves, but 
incidents in the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In addition, GT is of particular value 
when the research challenge is to interpret complex social processes where holistic 
explanations are lacking (Hinton and Hamilton, 2015); thus GT is appropriate for use 
when the researcher hopes to develop a conceptual overview of the social phenomena 
under investigation. Furthermore, the inductive focus of GT makes it suitable for 
exploring a topic of interest or a substantive problem area that there is little known 
about it (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Therefore, the use of grounded theory aligned with 
the research motivation, aim, objectives, intent, and exploratory nature of this study. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, there are very few, if any, studies that explored the 
‘concept of waste’ within construction using a grounded-theory methodology.  
 
This study also contributes to the existing body of knowledge in grounded-theory 
literature. Most grounded-theory studies follow either the Glaserian (traditional) or the 
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Straussian (evolved) approaches to grounded theory. The first adopts a purely inductive 
approach to GT, while the later tentatively utilises a deductive-inductive approach. Both 
of those two versions of GT, however, assume that work should be defended from a 
positivist perspective of the world, and both overlook the analytical power of abduction 
in their writings. For these reasons, Charmaz, developed the constructivist version of 
GT and explicitly emphasised the importance of adopting abductive reasoning in GT 
(see for example Charmaz, 2008), so as to enable grounded theorists to move beyond 
the limitations of ‘induction’ and instead develop novel insights based on abductive 
reasoning. According to her “Grounded theory begins with inductive analyses of data 
but moves beyond induction to create an imaginative interpretation of studied life. We 
adopt abductive logic when we engage in imaginative thinking about intriguing findings 
and then return to the field to check our conjectures” (Charmaz 2009:137–38). 
However, Charmaz’s perspective positions abduction as secondary to induction, and 
thus can be criticised for limiting abduction’s potential to foster theoretical innovation 
from the beginning of the research inquiry (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012).  
 
This study supported the theoretical strand of evolved GTM (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
1994, 1998), which argues that previous knowledge about the world and scientific 
theories (prior to data collection) are useful (Reichertz, 2010). Data analysis was also 
informed by Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) formal coding scheme (open, axial and 
selective coding procedures). The study was guided by the interpretative stance of both 
evolved and constructivist approaches to GT that recognise the role of the researcher in 
theory building. Additionally, the research was inspired by Charmaz’s (2008, 2009) 
explicit adoption of abductive logic during data collection and analysis stages. 
However, this study adopted an A-D-I-A approach to theory building, at which 
abduction was adopted during data collection and analysis to foster theoretical 
innovation, but also used during research initiation to pave the way towards the 
contextual choice of topic guides. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are very 
few, if any studies, which have adopted a reflexive A-D-I-A approach to GT. The 
quality of the findings and novel contributions of this study to knowledge, therefore, 
demonstrate the rigour and usefulness of the methodology developed in this study.   
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9.5.3 Practical contributions 
The main practical contributions of this study can be summarised, as follows: 
• The identification of ‘institutional wastes’ in construction could guide the industry 
towards addressing the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions 
influencing approaches to construction procurement and project delivery. By 
addressing these identified institutional factors and underlying paradigms, this could 
also help to eliminate their resulting causal wastes at the procurement and supply-
chain level, and thus eliminate or reduce their substantial negative impacts on 
production. 
 
• This study has shed empirical light on various prevalent procurement arrangements 
that encourage wasteful behaviours and embed inefficient processes across the supply 
chain and throughout the project life cycle. The findings of this study could, 
therefore, serve as a useful compendium for researchers and industry practitioners to 
access, in order to gain a better understanding of the impact of prevailing (inefficient) 
construction procurement practices on project-team or supply-chain dynamics. 
 
• This study analysed the reasons for the apparent coherence of the current 
construction project delivery model. The findings of this study could therefore act as 
useful foundation for preparing a route to the radical change required to move to 
lean methodologies and collaborative project delivery approaches. Currently, the 
development of efficient project-organisation and management techniques is far in 
advance of their implementation. Therefore, the findings of this study could serve as 
comprehensive summary of ‘institutional barriers to improvement’; so clients, 
procurers and decision-makers may benefit from studying the findings and using 
them to inform their practice. The study could also help to increase buyers’ and 
practitioners' awareness of the effects of ‘institutional thinking’ (as opposed to silo-
thinking) on the outcomes they achieve. 
 
• The study exposed to clients and decision makers the amount of waste (and 
unnecessary cost) they create and embed by adhering to (transactional) safeguarding 
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mind-sets and approaches to construction procurement. Thus, the findings of this 
study could enable them to secure better value by reducing the waste generated 
through their suppliers’ reactions to inefficient procurement and contractual 
arrangements. The study has also shed light on alternative procurement arrangements 
and organisational techniques (See Table 6.2 in Chapter 6), based on process-flow 
considerations, which could be of value and support collaborative ways of working. 
 
• This study has shed empirical light on how ‘self and vested interests’ absorb a huge 
proportion of the industry’s intelligence and professional vigour. Thus, the author 
believes that the outcomes of this study can lead to the future re-shaping of the roles 
and responsibilities of the professions and wider participants involved within the 
construction sector, in order to increase the production efficiency and effectiveness 
of the industry. The recommendations out of the initial publications of this research 
study (see section 9.6.2) has already led to an on-going PhD study at Nottingham 
Trent University that aims to investigate collaborative approaches to project costing, 
with a particular focus on examining the role of QSs in collaborative practice.  
 
9.6 Research Publications  
As part of the contribution of this research study to lean construction and construction 
procurement body of knowledge, the following papers have been developed and 
published from this research so far. A list of future publication plans to follow is also 
presented. 
 
 
 
9.6.1 Journal publications  
Three peer-reviewed journal papers have been published out of this research study so 
far, as listed below: 
 
1. Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C., King, A., and Manu, E. (2018) ‘Institutional Waste within 
the Construction Procurement Context’, Engineering Project Organisation Journal, 
8 (January 2018), 36-64 
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2. Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C., Manu, E. and King, A. (2017a) ‘Contractual governance as 
a source of institutionalised waste in construction: a review, implications, and road 
map for future research directions’, International Journal of Managing Projects in 
Business, 10 (3), 550-577 
3. Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C., and King, A. (2017b) ‘The concept of Institutional Waste 
within the Construction industry: A potential theoretical framework', Lean 
Construction Journal, 2017 Issue, pp 12-24 
 
9.6.2 Peer-reviewed international conference papers  
 
Three peer-reviewed international conference papers have been published out of this 
research study so far, as listed below: 
 
1. Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C. and King A. (2014) ‘Institutional Waste within the 
Construction Industry: An outline’, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Conference of 
the International Group for Lean Construction (IGLC-22), Oslo, Norway, June 
2014, pp 895-906. [Selected for 'Plenary Sessions' - Only 9 papers out of 160 
accepted papers were selected for the plenaries]. 
2. Pasquire, C., Sarhan, S., and King, A. (2015) ‘A Critical Review of the 
Safeguarding Problem in Construction Procurement: Unpicking the coherent current 
model, Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the International Group for 
Lean Construction (IGLC-23), Perth, Australia, July 2015 [Selected for 'Longer 
Presentation Sessions']. 
3. Sarhan, S., Pasquire, C., King, A., and Manu, E. (2016). 'Are tier-one contractors 
making their money out of wasteful procurement arrangements?', Proc. 24th Ann. 
Conf. of the Int’l. Group for Lean Construction, Boston, MA, USA, July 2016 
 
 
9.6.3 Future publication plan out of this thesis 
 
Plans for future publications out of this PhD thesis include: 
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1. The Concept of ‘Institutional Waste’ in Construction: A Study Grounded in Practice 
and Theory 
2. Institutional Sources of Waste in UK Infrastructure Projects: An Exploratory Case 
Study 
3. Institutional Barriers to Learning from Project Failures in Construction  
4. Buyers’ Main Flawed Assumptions and Approaches to Construction Procurement 
5. Why do Wasteful Procurement Practices Persist? 
6. A Conceptual Framework for the Prescriptive Causal Analysis of ‘Institutionalised 
Waste’ in Construction 
7. Integrating Abduction, Deduction and  Induction  Approaches to Develop the 
Concept of ‘Institutional Waste’ in Construction 
 
9.7 Research Limitations  
The study included some limitations, which are discussed below: 
• As demonstrated in this study, the nature of waste within the construction 
procurement context is very dynamic, interactive and complex. In such a complex 
network of ‘causal wastes’ leading to reciprocal cycles of consequential wastes, the 
study was not able to analyse all the connections in detail, due to time constraints 
and the complexity of the task. The study was able to observe patterns of waste and 
establish relationships between main categories of the developed conceptual model 
of ‘institutional waste’; but it was not feasible to decompose the model and illustrate 
the cause and effect’ relationships of each individual subcategory (e.g. procurement 
option). This partly, explains why the study recommends addressing the 
‘institutional factors’, as core or main sources of waste in construction procurement. 
Perhaps, the use of simulation models could help to solve this research challenge; 
thereby support decision making. 
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• The conceptual model does not include a measurement of magnitude, which could 
show an increase in the amount and costs of downstream waste (i.e. consequential 
wastes) generated by upstream causes of waste (i.e. institutional and procurement 
arrangements). As mentioned by one of the industry experts involved in the 
evaluation exercise of the developed conceptual model: 
“It is not an easy exercise to measure benefits for changing the current state. It 
is very easy to measure physical wastage (concrete) but no so easy to measure 
institutional waste. I also believe that there would be a lot of reluctance for 
clients to admit that they operate in this manner, there is an unwritten rule that 
the contractor is always to blame for project failures, largely because this is the 
tip of the iceberg, tangible figures which can show profit and loss” 
(Construction Manager, 13th June 2017). 
 
There is almost no doubt that such a cost measurement model could help to 
convince politicians, clients and decision-makers about the benefits for change. In 
general, the number of studies in literature on the development of methods for 
measuring waste is small and mainly limited to measuring construction material 
waste (Formoso et al., 2015). However, it is important to stress that “not everything 
that matters can be measured, and not everything that can be measured matters” 
(Cameron, 1963; Brian et al., 2015). In a trend report published by UNESCO in 
1956 on political sciences in the United States, Dwight Waldo warned about the 
limitations of ‘quantifying true value’ by his statement in the report that “there are 
those who see the movement as diverting political science from important to trivial 
matters simply because the latter lend themselves to study by the fashionable 
techniques (‘what counts can’t be counted’) (Waldo, 1956, p 30). Furthermore, in a 
Noble Memorial lecture in 1974, Friedrich von Hayek reported on how that 
exclusive concentration on quantitatively measureable phenomena has led to the 
production of policies which made matters worse, and how that important economic 
phenomena (e.g. inflation and unemployment problems at that time) were 
disregarded by many mathematical economics because their operation could not be 
confirmed by measures of magnitude (Hayek, 1974, p. 179-184; Hayek, 1989). In 
line with these preceding arguments, this research study revealed how that relying 
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on economic theories and perspectives does not allow us to observe the wastefulness 
of conventional safeguarding procurement practices and their role in embedding 
waste in the system place. 
 
• This study adapted a GTM, which encompassed in-depth and iterative interviews 
with twenty-four senior professionals within the UK construction industry, as a 
primary method for data collection. The main findings of the study were then 
evaluated by five UK industry experts. The scope of this study is commercial and 
industrial construction as well as smart-motorway infrastructure projects in the UK. 
The fragmented and interdependent nature of the industry meant that a large number 
of cases would be needed in quantity, to generalise the findings. However, it is 
important to stress that GTM does not seek representativeness to achieve statistical 
generalisability, but instead aims to explain or predict phenomena based on 
empirical data collected from the field. The relevance, credibility, usefulness and 
explanatory power of the developed conceptual model, as confirmed by the UK 
experts who evaluated the model, suggests that the concept of ‘institutional waste’ 
can be generalised, following a wider deductive empirical examination. At the same 
time, with an exception to the varying regulative context within different countries, 
it could be argued that the construction culture and norms of practice are relatively 
universal (Rooke et al., 2003). Thus, the concept of ‘institutional waste’ has the 
potential to be generalised across the construction industry on a global level. The 
concept may also have the potential to be relevant to other sectors and industries as 
well. Future studies are therefore encouraged to assess the concept’s compatibility, 
relevance and significance to other countries, sectors and industries. 
 
9.8 Recommendations for Future Studies 
• There have been moves within the construction industry towards more collaborative 
procurement arrangements and project delivery approaches; however a replicable 
recipe for aligning interests and keeping good intentions in place is still missing. 
Further studies are, therefore, recommended to examine the roles and 
responsibilities of the professions and wider participants involved within the 
construction procurement context. This study has shed empirical light on various 
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professionals who might have a vested interest for the wide spread use of some 
procurement and contractual arrangements (e.g. QSs, Lawyers, Cost and 
Procurement Consultants, Claims Managers, Concept Architects, Clerk of works, 
Accountants and Financial Directors, Turn-around Project Managers). Typically 
those professionals do not take a central stake in the project outcome, only a stake in 
the process by which the project is delivered. Do they need to have a bigger stake in 
the project outcome? Can we develop new knowledge and competencies that could 
enhance in transforming their functions, and enable their integration into more 
collaborative teams? Further studies are therefore recommended to investigate the 
professional barriers and silos which impede improvement and collaboration in 
construction. 
 
• It was found in this study that consequential wastes (financial losses and cost 
overruns; time waste; quality-loss; and waste of human potential) can reinforce 
institutional factors, leading to vicious cycles of waste. This indicates that there is 
an opportunity for institutions, organisations and the industry as a whole is to learn 
from project losses or failures, and thus improve. However, the threat is of 
becoming progressively worse. A moderating variable may possibly be the 
absorptive capacity of the institution or organisation (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). 
The construction industry has witnessed recently an increasing trend in the use of 
behavioural assessment in public procurement, which (arguably) allows clients to 
estimate how well key individuals within bidding contractors will collaborate and 
behave during project delivery. However, there is no evidence, yet, if this is the 
case. Can behavioural assessments help to solve some of the problems revealed in 
this study? The author’s hypothesis is that such practices do not help to address the 
institutional sources of waste identified in this study, and thus they would probably 
lead to unnecessary transactional costs (i.e. waste) and complicate the problems 
rather than solve it (e.g. increased contingency costs). Further studies are, 
therefore, recommended to investigate the effectiveness of assessing personality 
norms and their relationship with organizational norms in the promotion and 
procurement of major infrastructure programmes.  
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• Further studies are recommended to conduct a participant action research 
approach, in which a detailed study within a learning-sharing organisation could 
take-place. This would allow future studies to record and measure the causes and 
effects of waste in actual real-time cases, and to devise solutions accordingly and 
test them. There is also scope for using the same methodological approach adapted 
in this study to explore the institutional factors in more detail. Additionally, more 
studies can be conducted with a focus on procurement systems and relationships 
between tier 2 contractors and their down-stream suppliers. Furthermore, an 
industry-wide survey is highly recommended to test and validate the findings of 
this study. 
 
• Further studies are recommended to adapt the institutional theory to capture the 
crucial institutional knowledge required to enable an understanding of why and how 
lean construction practices are more successful in some countries, for example the 
United States, than in other developed countries such as the United Kingdom (UK).  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Invitation Sheet for Semi-Structured Interviews  
                                                                                      
Investigating the Relationship between Construction Procurement 
Arrangements and Value Generation/Loss in Construction Projects 
 
Researcher   Saad Sarhan, PhD Candidate, MSc Civil Engineer   
Contact details 
Email:  sarhan_com@hotmail.com; or 
saad.sarhan2012@my.ntu.ac.uk                                                                          
Programme of study PhD in Construction Management 
Faculty/University 
Centre for Lean Projects, School of Architecture Design 
and the Built Environment, Nottingham Trent 
University, United Kingdom   
Project supervisors 
Prof. Christine Pasquire, Director of the LCI-UK 
Dr. Andrew King, Programme Leader for MSc QS 
Dr. Emmanuel Manu, Senior Lecturer at NTU 
Project advisor 
Assoc. Prof. Richard Dawe, Programme Leader at 
University of Plymouth 
Dear Participant, 
You are invited to take part in a research study as part of a PhD dissertation at 
Nottingham Trent University, UK. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully. 
 
 
Is this important? 
Procurement Arrangements Matter! 
              
 
 
 
 
Behaviour of the 
Actors 
Rules of the Game 
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This research study will be conducted through exploratory semi-structured interviews. 
Examples of specific objectives include: 
 Exploring the factors influencing the selection of construction procurement 
arrangements (See Appendix 1). 
 Investigating the influence of  procurement arrangements on project-team 
interaction, behaviour, and performance; 
 Seeking evidence for practical examples of value loss / generation arising from 
construction procurement and commercial practices. 
 
Potential Practical Contributions 
 Helping clients and decision makers to secure better value for their money by 
reducing the waste generated by their suppliers - Enhancing Supply Chain 
Efficiency.  
 Exposing to clients and decision makers the amount of waste (and unnecessary 
cost) they embed by adhering to prevailing unfit-for-purpose contractual 
governance approaches. 
 Helping clients and decision makers to be aware of the institutional factors 
affecting the choice of their procurement procedures, and thus their desired 
project outcomes. 
 Helping decision makers to consider the procurement arrangements and 
organisational techniques that could be of value and support collaborative ways of 
working. 
 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide or not whether or not to take part and you are free to 
withdraw at any time. 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All information collected for this study will be kept strictly confidential and full 
anonymity of participants and employing organisations will be ensured during the 
collection, storage, and publication of research material in accordance with 
Nottingham Trent University's policies and procedures. Participants are free and 
have the rights to withdraw at any point. In cases, where participants provide 
supporting documents, they will be asked to choose and cite a unique identifier, so it 
can be referred to if the find they wish to withdraw their data at a later point. 
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What will happen to the results of this research study? 
The results will be used in a doctoral thesis and participants can request a copy of the 
published research or take part in a debriefing exercise at the end of the project. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you 
may contact the Director of this study (contact details below). 
Professor Christine Pasquire 
Head of the Centre for Lean projects and Director of the LCI-UK 
Nottingham Trent University,  
Tel: +44 (0) 115 848 2095 
Email: christine.pasquire@ntu.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet 
Date  
October 2015 
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Appendix 2: Preliminary Interview Guide  
 
Investigating the Relationship between Construction Procurement Arrangements 
and Value Generation/Loss in Construction Projects 
Researcher: Saad Sarhan, PhD Candidate at NTU 
A set of proposed questions for initial semi-structured interviews with ‘consultants’: 
 
Part A: Factors influencing construction procurement selection decisions 
1. Can you please tell me about the types of projects and size of contracts that you 
typically engage in?  
 
2. Can you please talk to me about the Construction procurement system of one of 
your latest projects? (What is a construction procurement system? - Refer to 
Appendix 1) 
 
2.1. What is your most preferable procurement method (e.g. D-B-B, D&B) and 
choice of contract (e.g. JCT, NEC, Bespoke, PPC2000, ICE, etc.)? And why?  
 
3. What is the process followed by your company for assisting clients on selecting 
suitable procurement methods and procedures? What is good about this process and 
what improvements could be made? 
 
3.1. What are the factors influencing construction procurement selection decisions? 
 
3.2. Who are the internal and external parties involved in the decision-making 
process? And how do they influence the selection process? 
 
4. In your opinion, how and why has the traditional procurement method (D-B-B) 
gained such popularity, spread all over the world, and is still commonly used in 
various countries? 
 
5. What forms of procurement methods and options would you like to see more use of? 
Why? What stands in their way? 
 
5.1. In your opinion, do construction industry bodies and trade associations have an 
influence on the wide-spread used of certain procurement routes and standard 
forms of contracts? If yes, how? 
 
Part B: The influence of procurement arrangements on project-team interaction 
6. How can construction procurement arrangements influence your own practice? 
 
7. Do you believe that procurement systems directly contribute to project outcomes?  
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7.1. If yes, so how? Any examples? 
 
8. Do you believe that increased collaboration between project parties is a suitable 
remedy for many of the construction industry's problems? 
 
8.1. Can procurement decisions and arrangements affect the likelihoods of creating 
a cooperative or competitive/adversarial working-environment? 
 
8.2. How can we enhance trust and collaborative ways of working through 
procurement arrangements? 
 
9. What factors do you take in consideration when deciding to make amendments to 
standard forms of contracts? How do contractors often react as a result of taking on 
more risk? How else might contractors alter their behaviour as a result of taking on 
more risk? 
 
 
Part C: Identifying imperfect procurement practices 
 
10. Can you please talk to me about the main challenges/problems facing you with 
prevailing construction procurement and commercial practices? 
 
a) Given the on-going drive towards collaboration, are there any contractual 
conditions or procurement legislation/regulation issues standing in the way? If 
yes, like what? 
 
b) Do you consider that the types of contracts used or the process of contract 
administration contribute to the increased number of disputes occurring in 
construction? If yes, so how? 
 
c) What are the most common and prevalent safeguarding approaches in 
construction procurement (e.g. collateral warranties, insurance, etc.)? Are there 
better ways? 
 
d) What are the most common procurement practices used to overcome 
unanticipated changes in the transaction environment (e.g. problems associated 
with client or contractor's variations - RFI, Requests for Substitution, Drawing 
Clarification/Plan Clarification)?  
 
11. In your opinion, why do inefficient (wasteful) procurement and commercial 
practices persist? 
12. In your opinion, how can construction procurement arrangements be improved to 
enhance the chances of delivering more successful projects? 
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A set of proposed questions for initial semi-structured interviews with ‘contractors’: 
 
 Part A: Factors influencing construction procurement selection decisions  
1. Can you please tell me about the types of projects and size of contracts that you 
typically engage in?  
 
1. Can you please tell me about the types of projects and size of contracts that you 
typically engage in?  
 
2. Can you please talk to me about the Construction procurement system (CPS) of one 
of your latest projects? What is a CPS? - Refer to Appendix 1 
 
     2.1. What is your most preferable procurement method (e.g. D-B-B, D&B) and 
choice of contract (e.g. JCT, NEC, Bespoke, PPC2000, ICE, etc.)? And why?  
 
3. What are the factors influencing the selection of your supply-chain procurement 
arrangements and decisions? 
 
     3.1. Who are the internal and external parties involved in the decision-making 
process? And how do they influence the decisions and choices made? 
 
     3.2. Does the main Construction Procurement System influence your supply-chain 
procurement arrangements? If yes, so how?  
 
4. In your opinion, how and why has the traditional procurement method (D-B-B) 
gained such popularity, spread all over the world, and is still commonly used in various 
countries? 
 
5. What forms of procurement methods and options would you like to see more use of? 
Why? What stands in their way? 
 
Part B: The influence of procurement arrangements on project-team interaction 
6. How can construction procurement arrangements influence your own practice? 
 
     6.1. During your career, where a ‘less-than-ideal’ procurement route was selected, 
did your company make alterations to contracts in order to incorporate aspects of 
another procurement route? 
 
7.  Do you believe that procurement systems directly contribute to project outcomes?  
 
     7.1. If yes, so how? Any examples? 
 
8.  Do you believe that increased collaboration between project parties is a suitable 
remedy for many of the construction industry's problems? 
 
     8.1. How can procurement decisions and arrangements affect the likelihoods of 
creating a cooperative or competitive/adversarial working-environment? 
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Part C: Identifying imperfect taken for granted procurement practices 
 
9.  Given the on-going drive towards collaboration, are there any contractual conditions 
or procurement legislation/regulation issues standing in the way? If yes, like what? 
 
10. How can clients' amendments to standard forms of contracts sometimes lead to 
increased pressure on contractors? 
 
11. Can you describe to me any practical examples of unfair burdens imposed on 
contractors, sub-contractors or suppliers through imperfect procurement and contractual 
arrangements? 
 
   11.1. How can construction companies absorb or mitigate risks imposed on them?  
 
12. In your opinion, why do imperfect/inefficient/wasteful procurement practices 
persist? 
 
13. In your opinion, how can construction procurement arrangements be improved to 
enhance the chances of delivering more successful projects? 
 
 
Appendix: Major construction procurement systems and sub-systems 
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Appendix 3: Ethical Clearance 
 
 
ADB Research Team <ADBResearchTeam1@ntu.ac.uk> 
Fri 10/16/2015 9:29 AM 
To:Sarhan, Saad 2012 (PGR) <saad.sarhan2012@my.ntu.ac.uk>; 'Saad El Din Sarhan' 
<sarhan_com@hotmail.com>; 
Cc:Pasquire, Christine <christine.pasquire@ntu.ac.uk>; King, Andrew 
<andrew.king@ntu.ac.uk>; 
 
Ethical Approval 
 
Dear Saad 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the JICEC was happy to confirm that in its judgement 
there were no outstanding ethical concerns that required further discussion or 
exploration prior to data collection related to your application: INVESTIGATING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION PROCUREMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS AND VALUE GENERATION/LOSS IN CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTS. It has therefore been approved. 
 
The committee would like to wish you well in the completion of your project. 
 
Best Regards, 
 
Sarah Dossor 
Research Office Team Leader 
Maudslay 312 
College of Art, Design and Built Environment 
Nottingham Trent University 
Burton Street 
Nottingham NG1 4BU 
Tel: 0115 848 2393 
Fax: 0115 848 4298 
Email: sarah.dossor@ntu.ac.uk 
www.ntu.ac.uk 
 
DISCLAIMER: This email is intended solely for the addressee. It may contain private and 
confidential information. If you are not the intended addressee, please take no action based on it 
nor show a copy to anyone. In this case, please reply to this email to highlight the error. 
Opinions and information in this email that do not relate to the official business of Nottingham 
Trent University shall be understood as neither given nor endorsed by the University. 
Nottingham Trent University has taken steps to ensure that this email and any attachments are 
virus-free, but we do advise that the recipient should check that the email and its attachments 
are actually virus free. This is in keeping with good computing practice. 
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Appendix 4: Evaluation/Validation Invitation Sheet and Structured 
(Qualitative) Questionnaire 
                                                                                                     
Institutional Waste within the UK Construction 
Industry: An Exploratory study 
 
Researcher   Saad Sarhan, PhD Candidate, MSc Civil Engineer   
Contact details Email:  sarhan_com@hotmail.com; or 
saad.sarhan2012@my.ntu.ac.uk                                                                          
Programme of study PhD in Construction Management 
Faculty/University Centre for Lean Projects, School of Architecture 
Design and the Built Environment, Nottingham 
Trent University, United Kingdom   
Project supervisors Prof. Christine Pasquire, Director of the LCI-UK 
Dr. Andrew King, Programme Leader for MSc QS 
Dr. Emmanuel Manu, Senior Lecturer at NTU 
Dear Participant, 
You are invited to evaluate and validate a conceptual model that provides a new 
perspective to the generation and persistence of waste in construction. The devised 
model forms part of a PhD dissertation at Nottingham Trent University, which aimed 
to develop a theory of waste that that considers the institutional, commercial and 
procurement environments that surround the design and delivery of construction 
projects. The underlying premise is that if we can understand the detailed causes of 
coherence for the prevailing imperfect construction model and reveal the 
consequential wastes, then the adoption of more efficient and collaborative business 
and project delivery models may become improved and  more widespread. 
Institutions Matter?! 
             
 
 
 
 
               
Behaviour of the 
Actors 
Rules of the 
Game 
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The developed theoretical model is based on the findings of the following completed 
activities: 
 Empirical data obtained from a specific major infrastructure project in the UK 
(10 Interviews + contract and document reviews) 
 14 in-depth Interviews with Senior Directors, Managers and Professionals 
within the UK construction industry  
 Grounded-theory analysis of data (open, axial and selective coding processes) 
 
 
Contact for Further Information 
If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you 
may contact the Director of this study (contact details below). 
Professor Christine Pasquire 
Head of the Centre for Lean projects and Director of the LCI-UK 
Nottingham Trent University 
School of Architecture, Design and the Built Environment 
Burton St, Nottingham, United Kingdom 
NG1 4BU 
Tel: +44 (0) 115 848 2095 
Email: christine.pasquire@ntu.ac.uk 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet 
Date 
March 2017 
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Conceptual Model Evaluation/Validation Questions  
The aim of this validation structured interview is to evaluate and validate the 
developed theoretical model of 'institutional waste in construction', in terms of its 
relevance, representation of reality, and explanatory sufficiency. 
Please refer to Appendix and supplementary Power-Point Presentation. Then, 
kindly provide us with feedback on the developed model by answering the 
following questions:  
1- To what extent do you consider the topic of understanding and exploring the 
institutional wastes within the construction industry to be relevant and useful ? Please 
justify your answer.  
 
2- To what extent do you agree with the main findings and conclusion  of the study 
(please refer to pages 10 to 20 in the power-point presentation and the Appendix 
below) 
 
3- Are the relationships between the four main categories of the developed 
conceptual model (see Fig. 1 in Appendix below) logical, relevant to the construction 
industry, and reflective of the situation in real practice?  
- To what extent do you agree that institutional factors influence construction 
procurement choices and practices? 
- To what extent do you agree that construction procurement and contractual 
arrangements can impact on the performance and behaviour of project team 
parties. 
- To what extent do you agree that client time and cost overruns of construction 
projects reinforce imperfect institutional factors (e.g. clients' flawed assumptions 
and errors during pre-contractual stages)? 
- To what extent do you agree with the negative loop leading to the coherence of 
the prevailing imperfect construction business and project delivery model?  
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- To what extent do the main themes identified within the 'imperfect institutional 
factors' category sufficiently explain why wasteful/inefficient procurement and 
contractual practices persist? 
 
4- The study identified a number of imperfect 'normative and cultural-cognitive 
institutions'. One of these was a theme named as: "clients' flawed assumptions and/or 
errors during pre-contractual stage". Within this theme, a number of imperfect 
fundamental paradigms were identified that influence clients' approaches to 
construction procurement. To what extent do you agree with the examples/instances 
identified within this theme (see Figure 2 in Appendix below)? 
 
5- Can you please provide us with your suggestions for any of the following: 
- Improving the developed conceptual model? 
- Future research directions? 
- Potential implications on practice? 
 
 
Thank you for your invaluable insights and contribution to the study. 
Saad Sarhan.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: An overview of the concept of 'Institutional Waste in construction 
 
 
Lists of Abbreviations 
 
Table 1: Description of themes identified as examples of imperfect institutional factors 
Imperfect Institutional Factors (IF) 
ID Description 
IF1 
Bargaining Power (Imperfect power disparities within the construction market 
place) 
IF2 Bounded rationality or lack of adequate understanding and experience of client 
IF3 Clients flawed assumptions and/or errors during pre-contractual stage 
IF4 Construction Economy 
IF5 Cost-driven environment (sharp focus on reducing costs) 
IF6 Political forces (Government related policy and processes) 
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IF7 Price-based mind set 
IF8 Risk-aversity 
IF9 Self-interest based on commercial incentives 
IF10 Social legitimacy/fitness self-interested drivers 
IF11 Uncertainty 
IF12 Vested interests of professional roles and firms not directly involved in 
production 
IF13 Voluntary diffusion of imperfect norms 
 
 
 
Table 2: Description of themes identified as examples of inefficient procurement 
practices and arrangements  
 
Inefficient Procurement Arrangements and Practices (IP) 
ID Description 
IP1 Complexity of Contractual Procedures and Mechanisms 
IP2 
Exclusion or late involvement of Key actors during pre-contract stages of 
construction  
IP3 Lowest price selection criteria 
IP4 Non-joint specifications of design 
IP5 Non-value adding performance monitoring and reporting arrangements 
IP6 Onerous pre-selection of suppliers 
IP7 Poor payment terms and arrangements 
IP8 Price-based tendering as an expensive non-value adding activity 
IP9 Safeguarding Practices (e.g. disclaimer/exculpatory clauses) 
IP10 Separated procurement methods (Separating design from construction) 
IP11 Sub-optimisation (optimising the parts rather than the whole) 
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Table 3: Description of themes identified as inefficient performance and behavioural 
impacts 
Inefficient performance and behavioural impacts (PB) 
ID Description 
PB1 Adversarial relationship problems 
PB2 Claims (of compensation events) and Disputes 
PB3 Commercial Pressure 
PB4 Communication and Information-flow problems 
PB5 Conflicts 
PB6 Design issues and problems 
PB7 Increased risks or failure to mitigate risks at early stages 
PB8 Making unnecessary imperfect assumptions 
PB9 Opportunistic practices 
PB10 Variations and Change events or orders 
 
 
 
Table 4: Description of themes identified as consequential waste 
Consequential Waste 
ID Description 
W1 Financial Losses and cost overruns 
W2 Quality loss (Value-loss in design) 
W3 Time waste 
W4 Waste of human potential 
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Figure 2: Clients’ flawed assumptions and errors during pre-contractual stages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
